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jj^lpmOlj GMANS, GKEEN, AND 
' '^ ' 1873. 

fights reserved. 





(September 22 to October 16, 1827.) 

The French Admiral having arrived, the two Admirals send joint letter 
to Ibrahim Conference with Ibrahim Armistice De Rigny to 
Hydra ; Sir E. C. to Zante Ibrahim's Fleet come out Sir E. C. 
encounters Fleet off Patras, and turns them back Dispersed by 
Hurricane They return to Navarin Proceedings of Cochrane and 
Church Arrival of Russian Squadron . . . PAGE 1 


(October 16 to 24.) 

The three Admirals' Warning to Ibrahim Protocol Sir E. C.'s Notes 
relating to this period Instruction to Combined Fleet Forces of 
Ottoman Fleet Forces of Combined Fleet They enter the Harbour 
Hostilities commenced by Turkish Fleet Battle of Navarin Sir 
E. C.'s account of it to Admiralty Letter of the three Admirals to 
Turkish Commanders Lady C. hears of the Battle, and goes to 
Malta Letter to Colleagues General Order to Allied Fleet H. J. 
C.'s Account of the Battle . . . . . .55 

(October 25 to December 29.) 

Combined Fleets leave Navarin : French ships to France, English and 
Russian to Malta, for repairs De Rigny remains to watch Morea 
Sir E. C.'s Letter to Duke of Clarence Sir F. Adam's Letters Sir 
E. C.'s Notes of Incidents at Navarin Tahir Pacha Order of the 
Bath Letters from Sir J. Gore, and Duke of Clarence Sir E. C.'s 
Letters to Lord Dudley and Mr. S. Canning Piracy Grabusa 
Arrival of Sir J. Gore ' Queries ' from Ministry Sir E. C.'s 
Answer to ( Queries ' Sir J. Gore's Report to Admiralty Lord 
Ingestrie before the Cabinet Emperor of Russia's Letter with 
Order of St. George ...... 92 



(January 6 to February 28, 1828.) 

W. J. C.'s Memorandum Letter of Sir G. Murray Of Sir J. Gore 
Of Sir F. Adam Of Sir F. Ponsonby Capodistrias at Malta- 
Sir E. C.'s Notes relating to him Affairs of Greece Question of 
Greek Slaves Huskisson and .Duke of Wellington King's Speech, 
1 Untoward event at Navarin ' Debate on King's Speech Affairs of 
Greece Attack on Pirates, and destruction of Grabusa Loss of 
1 Cambrian ' Pacha of Egypt .... PAGE 157 

(March 3 to April 20.) 

W. J. C.'s Letters about Mission to Egypt Affairs of Greece Piracy 
Letter of Duke of Portland Sir T. Staines, Grabusa De Rigny 
in support of Sir E. C. Sir E. C.'s repeated request for Instructions 
Lord Dudley about Turkish Fleet Sir E. C.'s Answer Huskis- 
son, Wellington Papers Russian Manifesto Duke of Wellington's 
Memorandum to his Cabinet as to recalling Sir E. C. Fleet off 
Navarin reported Turkish, proved to be French . . . 201 


(April 20 to June 19.) 

House of Commons, Greek Slaves, Peel's Speech Russia declares War 
Letter of Huskisson on Armistice and Blockade Sir E. C.'s Reply 
Affairs of Morea Difficulties between French and Russian 
Admirals Letter to Huskisson, Blockade Warning letter to 
Ibrahim Letter of Sir J. Gore Reports in London Question of 
burning harvest in Morea About pecuniary aid to Greeks Austrian 
aid to Turks France sends money to aid Greeks . . . 251 


(June 22 to July 25.) 

Note by W. J. C. Lord Aberdeen's Letter recalling Sir E. C. 
Reply of Sir E. C. House of Lords, Greek Slaves To Duke of 
Clarence about recall To Colleagues to announce recall De 
Rigny's Reply Heiden's Reply Sir E. C. to Admiralty on his recall 
Letter from Sir J. Gore Sir E. C. to Duke of Clarence Barker 
on Transmission of Slaves Overtures from Ibrahim Conference 
at Modon Proposed Evacuation of Morea De Rigny on Starvation 
in Morea W. J. C. to General Ponsonby Sir E. C. to Captain 
Spencer about recall, and Instructions .... 309 

(July 25 to August 18.) 

The three Admirals at Zante Protocol Sir E. C. requested to go to 
Alexandria to negotiate Ibrahim's return to Egypt Home Letters 
Negotiations with Mehemet Treaty of Alexandria Sir E. C. 
returns to Navarin to meet Sir P. Malcolm . 381 



(August 21 to September 9.) 

Sir E. C. writes his defence against the charges Finds his successor 
oft' Navarin, and gives up the command to him Has to remove into 
' Wellesley ' Sees the three Allied Fleets in Navarin Friendly 
parting- with his Colleagues Mr. S. Canning on ' Cannon Shot ' 
Sir E. C. goes to Malta in ' Wellesley,' and has again to remove 
to < Warspite ' Sir J. Gore's Letters . . . PAGE 411 


(September 11, 1828, to October 24, 1831.) 

Return to England Letters of Friends Interview with Duke of 
Wellington Offer, and refusal of Pension Claim for Seamen at 
Navarin Visit to St. Petersburg Meeting with Heiden Visit to 
Paris French Politics Command of Channel Fleet Evolutions 
Fleet at Cork Return Home . . . . .433 

(December 1831, to November 1839.) 

Election for Devonport Tour in Wales Anecdotes of Mehemet All 
Visit to Paris French Politics Memorial refused Peel's Expla- 
nation in House of Commons Fees for Order of the Bath Debate 
on Grant for Navarin Grant obtained Plate presented by his 
Navarin Officers Death of Lady Codrington . . . 491 

(November 1839 to April 1851.) 

Speech on behalf of the Navy in House of Commons Plate presented 
by 500 Naval Officers Portsmouth Command Offer of Greenwich 
Hospital' Talbot ' at Siege of Acre The Queen's Visit to Ports- 
mouth Duke of Wellington Sir I. Brunei Return to London 
home Home Details Riding in Windsor Park Receives Good 
Service Pension Second offer of Greenwich Hospital New War 
Medal On the use of Kites Home Details Illness and Death of 
Sir Edward Codrington Extract from his Will Letters from 
Friends Record on Tablet List of Orders and Distinctions . 514 




71 Journal of M. Bompar (Turkish Fleet) . .543 
91 Warning Letter of the Admirals to Greek Government, Octo- 
ber 24, 1827 546 

91 Eeply of Greek Government, November 30 ... 547 

101 Interview with^the ReisEffendi, Constantinople, October 29, 1827 548 

120 Instructions from Lord Dudley, October 15, 1827 . . 552 

271 General Order relating to Blockade, May 21, 1828 . . 555 

381 Protocol of Admirals at Zante, July 25, 1828 . . . 556 

400 Text of Treaty of Alexandria, August 6, 1828 . . . 557 
411 Letter of Sir E. C. to Admiralty. Explanatory reply to Lord 

Aberdeen's Despatch, August 10, 1828 . . . 560 

440 Explanation of Instructions ..... 581 

443 Sir E. C.'s compressed Narrative of his Proceedings in Medi- 
terranean Command ...... 585 

449 Memorial to the King for Grant for Navarin . . . 599 

77 State of Ottoman Fleet after the Battle of Navarin . . 600 
530 Official Keturn of Services called for and sent in to Admiralty, 

May 1846 . . . . . . .604 

119 Chronicle de la bataille de Navarin d'apres Froissart . . 608 


WOODCUT OF BATTLE or NAVARIN .... Frontispiece. 
MAP OF WEST COAST OF MOREA . . . .to face page 19 








BY the arrival of the French Admiral before Kavarin 
on the 21st of September whilst a portion of the Turkish 
ileet was still outside the harbour, not only was the 
force under Sir Edward Codrington increased, but in* 
stead of the isolated and critical responsibility of the 
English squadron, a joint action of the Allies was par- 
tially secured. 

Although the Russian squadron was still absent, yet 
Sir Edward Codrington and Admiral De Rigny at once 
commenced proceedings, and in an interview with 
Ibrahim Pacha, declared the determination of the Allied 
Courts to carry out the Treaty, and the necessity im- 
posed on the Admirals to enforce the armistice referred 
to in their instructions. 

From Admirals Sir E. Codrington and Count de Rigny to his 
Highness Ibrahim Pacha. 

(o) Before Navarin : September 22, 1827. 

As Your Highness appears to have entertained some doubt 
of the perfect harmony which exists among the three Allied 
Powers, I must inform you that, Admiral Codrington having 
communicated to me the letter which he had the honour to 
address to Your Highness, during a calm which detained me 
at some miles from this place, we have thought proper to 
transmit to you a second copy of it in French, and sigiied 
by us both. 

&c., &c.j &c., 
VOL. II. > B DE 


We have the honour to inform Your Highness, that in con- 
sequence of a Treaty signed at London, between England, 
France and Russia, the Allied Powers have agreed to unite 
their forces for the purpose of preventing the transport of 
any troops, arras, or warlike stores to any part of the con- 
tinent of Greece, or of the islands. This measure has been 
adopted, as much for the interest of the Grand Signior himself, 
as for the benefit of all nations trading in the Archipelago ; 
and the Allied Powers have taken the humane precaution of 
sending a very strong force to prevent all possible opposition 
on the part of the Turkish commanders, whose resistance 
would not only bring with it their own destruction, but would 
also be very hurtful to the interests of his Highness. 

It would be as painful to us, as it would also be to our 
respective sovereigns, whose great desire it is to spare the 
effusion of blood, to be compelled to use force on this occa- 
sion. We earnestly beg you not to oppose a resolution, the 
execution of which it is not in your power to resist ; for we 
must not conceal from you that, although it is our desire to 
put an end to this cruel war by conciliatory means, our orders 
are such that we must proceed to the last extremity rather 
than forego the object for the accomplishment of which our 
sovereigns are allied. If then, on this occasion, a single gun 
is fired against our flags it will be fatal to the Ottoman fleet. 

The undersigned have the honour, &c., 

EDWARD CODRINGTON, Vice-Admiral, &c. 
H. DE EIGNY, Eear- Admiral, &c. 

From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C. 

1 Syrene/ Navarin : ce 23 septembre 1827. 

MONSIEUR L'AMIRAL, Je viens d'avoir une conference 
particuliere avec Mehemet * Ali. Je n'ai pas voulu en avoir 
une publique, parce que je crois tres a propos que nous fassions 
ensemble cette demarche en presence d'Ibrahim, du Capitan 
Bey, et de Tahir Pacha. Je ne doute pas que la resolution 
d'Ibrahim Pacha soit de ne pas sortir : il a fait donner cette 
nuit Pordre a sa flotte de rentrer, mais je sais que cet ordre 
avait ete provoque par PAmiral turc, qui est dehors. II 
parait que d'apres quelques paroles du Capitaine Hamilton, 
il craignait qu'on ne mit obstacle a la rentree de cette partie 
de la flotte ; et son inquietude s'accroit par cette circon stance 
que c'est la flotte de Constantinople qui est ainsi exposee, 
et que cela pourrait paraitre une combinaison concertee 
entre nous et lui. II veut expedier une goelette a son pere, 

* [&<?*] An evident mistake for Ibrahim Pacha, 


et un courrier a Constantinople, et tout suspeiidre jusqu'a 
de iiouveaux ordres : c'est done une suspension d'armes de 
fait ; il demande alors, si les Grecs, rencontrant cette 
goelette, nous permettrions qu'ils 1'arretassent puisque vous 
exigez de moi que je n'aille pas a Hydra, ne devez-vous pas 
exiger des Grecs qu'ils s'abstiennent de leur cote de toutes 
hostilites? Dans cette circonstance, Monsieur PAmiral, je 
vous prie d'entrer ; je crois que nous aurons un resultat 
passable ; si non, nous emploierions les grands moyens. Mais 
au moins nous aurons epuise tons ceux de la persuasion. 

Mr. Cradock vous donnera plus de details, auxquels 
j'ajouterai, aussitot que vous paraitrez, ceux que j'aurai pu 
encore recueillir. Je pense que vous approuverez que j'ai 
prie le Capitaine du 'Dartemoute' de vous porter cette lettre. 
Je vous prie d'agreer de nouveau ma haute consideration. 

Le C tre -Amiral 


From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

'Asia/ off Navarin : September 25, 1827. 

SIR, On the 19th of September, still finding myself 
without the aid of Bear-Admiral De Rigny, I sent the 
enclosed documents'* (Nos. 1 and 2) into the port of Nava- 
rin. After receiving the report (No. 3) made by Captain 
Baillie Hamilton, who was employed by Captain Fellowes to 
execute this service, I sent in the note (No. 4) with the 
extracts therein mentioned. On the 22nd, on being joined 
by Eear- Admiral De Bigny, we agreed to take advantage of 
Ibrahim Pacha having expressed doubts of the truth of our 
union, to send in the letter (No. 5) ; and the Rear- Admiral 
acceded to my request, that he would support it by going 
into Navarin himself, accompanied by Lieut. -Colonel Cradock. 
At 6 in the evening Colonel Cradock returned in the ' Dart- 
mouth ' to strengthen the Rear-Admiral's opinion that I 
should have a personal intei'view with the Pacha. Accord- 
ingly the ' A sia ' obtained an anchorage here yesterday 
evening ; and it was agreed that the whole of the Turkish 
ships should also come in to prevent a suspicion of collusion 


No. 1. Letter to the Turkish Admiral. 

2. Note to the Austrian Commander* 

3. Captain Baillie Hamilton's report. 

4. Note to Ibrahim Pacha. 

5. Joint letter from the English and French Admirals. 

6. Letter from Sir E. C. to Ibrahim Pacha, September 24. 

7. Mr. Dyer's memorandum of the Conference with Ibrahim. 

B 2 


arising from the circumstance of the Egyptian division not 
having yet put to sea. Upon the 'Asia' anchoring I sent 
the letter (No. 6), and this morning saluted the Pacha with 
19 guns, which was returned with equal number. At 9 A.M. 
to-day I received an invitation to attend the Pacha, according 
to my letter ; and I have now to inform you, for the informa- 
tion of his Royal Highness, of the result. It is agreed that 
the Turco-Egyptian fleet shall remain in the port of Navarin, 
and there suspend hostilities until the Pacha can receive 
from Constantinople and Alexandria orders consequent on 
his representation of the communications which we have 
made to him first, of our orders and the necessity we are 
under of enforcing them to the utmost necessity ; and secondly, 
of his finding it impossible to resist them without the sacri- 
fice of the whole expedition under his command. It will 
not be deemed necessary that I should attempt to detail a 
discussion of about three hours, in the presence of the whole 
Turco-Egyptian chiefs, by which this arrangement was 
brought about. It will, I trust, suffice that the result should 
have been an armistice in fact, as far as this great expedition 
is concerned, which the Porte itself has peremptorily refused, 
for a period of about a month, whilst the Greeks are still at 
liberty to profit during that interval for improving their 
internal condition. I have communicated this despatch to 
Mr. Stratford Canning. 

I have, &c., 


A letter identical with this in substance was written 
to Mr. Stratford Canning at Constantinople, as well as 
to Lord Dudley in England. 

P.S. As the circumstance of Rear- Admiral De Rigny's 
not having joined me with his squadron until the Turkish 
fleet was actually out of the harbour and waiting only for 
the Egyptian division, may otherwise leave an unfavourable 
impression, I think it incumbent on me to say that I have 
derived the greatest possible benefit from his personal support 
and assistance, arid that he has contributed greatly to the 
establishment of the present favourable state of affairs. 

E. C. 

From Sir E. Codrington to Ibrahim Pacha. 

H.B.M.'s ship Asia/ at Navarin : September 24, 1827. 
SIR, As I am come into this port, to explain the orders 
under which I am acting, and the necessity I am under of 


obeying them to the fullest extent, whatever may be the 
consequences, it is my wish that I may be permitted to do 
so in the presence of all the principal chiefs commanding in 
the Turkish expedition. 

&c., &c., &c., 

To his Highness Ibrahim Pacha, EDWARD CODRINGTON, 
&c., &c., &c, 

Memorandum of the Conference at Navarin, September 25, 
1827, with Ibrahim Pacha. 

Vice- Admiral Sir Edward Codrington having entered the 
port of Navarin on the 24th September, 1827, with the in- 
tention of having a conference with Ibrahim Pacha, the next 
morning was appointed by Ibrahim for receiving* Sir Edward, 
as well as Rear- Admiral De Rigny, who had likewise entered 
Navarin at the same time with the English admiral. 

On the 25th, at 10 A.M., Sir E. Codrington landed, accom- 
panied by Captain Curzon, of the ' Asia,' Lieutenant Dilke, 
his flag-lieutenant ; Mr. Dyer, his secretary ; the Honourable 
Colonel Cradock, and Mr. Codrington, midshipman ; and 
joining the French admiral on the beach, who was accom- 
panied by some of his officers, they proceeded together to 
the tent of Ibrahim Pacha. All the Turkish and Egyptian 
chiefs, with the exception of Tahir Pacha, who was said to 
be unwell, were ranged on one side, and the officers of the 
French and English squadrons took their seats on the other. 

After the introduction and usual Turkish compliments 
had passed, the Admirals began by informing Ibrahim that, 
in consequence of a treaty which had been signed by England, 
France and Russia, it became their imperative duty to inter- 
cept every supply sent by sea of men, arms, &c., destined 
against Greece, and coming from Turkey or Africa in gene- 
ral ; and in order to show the perfect frankness which they 
wished to use in all their relations with him, they read to 
him, in extenso, those parts of their instructions which were 
applicable to the case in point. 

Ibrahim replied that the Admirals must be aware that he 
was a soldier, like themselves, and that to obey orders was 
as imperative a duty to him as to them ; that his orders 
were to attack Hydra, and that he must put them in execu- 
tion ; that it was his part to act and not to negotiate, and 
that he must refer them to the Grand Signior for any diplo- 
matic arrangement. 

The Admirals answered that they were aware what must 
be the feelings of a brave man under such circumstances, 


and that they congratulated him on having a force opposed 
to him which it was impossible to resist. They reminded 
him that if he put to sea in defiance of their amicable warn- 
ing, they must carry their instructions into execution, and 
that if he resisted by force, the total destruction of his fleet 
must follow ; and that it would be an act of madness which 
the Sultan could not applaud. The Admirals said that per- 
haps if they regarded their feelings as mere military men, 
his obstinacy would only afford them a means of distinction 
which they might wish; but in the present friendly relations 
between the Allies and the Turks, they would deeply deplore 
any circumstance which could tend to compromise the good 
terms which subsisted. It was the sincere wish of the three 
Governments, and their positive instruction, to avoid what- 
ever might tend to a rupture ; and that it was with this view 
at heart that they had come thither to open his eyes to the 
situation in which he stood ; that they wished to make this 
declaration before an assembly of his chiefs, in order that 
no doubt might be entertained as to the real intentions of 
the Admirals ; that no distrust might be generated amongst 
his officers with regard to the communications of the Admi- 
rals with himself. 

Ibrahim then replied that he acknowledged the weight of 
what he had heard it was true that when his orders had 
been sent to him from Constantinople, the actual state of 
affairs, and the risk of a collision with the combined fleet, 
had not been foreseen. He would therefore take upon himself 
to suspend all operations of the land and sea forces forming 
the expedition from Alexandria till he received answers 
from Constantinople and Alexandria by couriers, which he 
would immediately despatch ; until that period the expedi- 
tion should remain stationary at Nararin. He, at the same 
time, asked permission to send two despatch vessels, one to 
Alexandria and the other to Previsa, which was immediately 
granted. The Admirals offered even to send a vessel with 
them to ensure their safety; but this, he said, would com- 
promise the dignity of the Turkish flag. 

The Admirals then said that his promise satisfied them, 
and that they would trust to his word of honour as they ex- 
pected that he would trust to theirs. Ibrahim put his hand 
upon his heart and said that it was sacred ; but added, ' when 
I have promised this, I must say that I cannot think it just 
you should impose this obligation on me, and allow the 
Greeks to prosecute hostilities.' The Admirals answered that 
it was not a parallel case, for that the Greeks had accepted 
the mediation of the Allies, and that the Turks had not. Sir 


E. Codrington then said that, to prove to Ibrahim the fair- 
ness with which he wished to act, in consequence of in- 
formation he had received of Lord Cochrane's intention to 
excite an insurrection beyond the actual theatre of war, he 
would himself put a stop to his proceedings. 

The conference here ended, and the Admirals re-embarked. 
Next morning (the 26th) Mr. Abro, the Pacha's interpreter, 
came on board the 'Asia,' and told Sir Edward Codrington 
that Ibrahim had received intelligence in the interval, of Lord 
Cochrane having made a descent upon Patras; that his 
first impulse had been to cut his cables, break the armistice, 
and sail in the night, but that fortunately he had thought 
better of it ; and that he came on board from the Pacha to 
request permission to send a part of his fleet to Patras. This 
was peremptorily refused, and it was agreed that, if the 
Pacha still showed a disposition to assert a right to rein- 
force Patras, that Mr. Abro should return on board ; but if, 
on the contrary, the Pacha acquiesced in the prohibition of 
the Admiral according to the arrangement of the day before, 
that no further communication was necessary. Mr. Abro 
did not return, and on the same night the ' Asia ' and ' Sy- 
rene' put to sea. 

Ibrahim wished, after the conference, and more particu- 
larly when he had pledged his word of honour to observe the 
armistice, to talk on other subjects not connected with the 
treaty, &c. ; but Sir Edward Codrington said to the drago- 
man (Abro) : ' I wish to understand before the conversation 
ends, whether his Highness fully comprehends all that has 
been communicated from me and Admiral De Rigny to you ; ? 
to which he replied ' Yes, fully.' 

HENRY S. DYER, Secretary to Vice- Admiral 
Sir Edward Codrington, K.C.B. 

HOBART CRADOCK, Lieut.-Colonel. 

EDWD. CURZON, Captain of H.M.S. 'Asia.' 

From Admiral De Rigny to the Comte de Guilleminot. 

1 Syrene/ Navarin : September 26, 1827. 

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, I have the honour to inform your 
Excellency that I arrived before Modon and Navarin 
September 21. Thirty-two ships of the Turkish fleet, of 
which three were ships of the line, seven frigates, the rest 
brigs and corvettes, were cruising off the entrance to the 
harbour. These ships were evidently filled with troops ; 
eighty other vessels of all kinds were within the harbour. 


One English corvette and two brigs, in search of their Ad- 
miral, were with us at the time; one had on board Mr. 
Cradock. The same day at noon we saw the English ships 
which had been becalmed to the westward. The following 
day we joined them in the presence of the same Turkish 
ships. I went on board the ' Asia ' to confer with Admiral 
Codrington. He told me that while cruising near Hydra, 
he learnt, on meeting with a Greek vessel, that the Turkish 
fleet had arrived on September 7 at Navarin, and that they 
were hastening the embarkation of troops for the expedition 
to Hydra ; that this meeting had made him decide to re- 
pair to Modon ; and that he had sent forward his cutter to 
give notice of his intention, but that, a strong north wind 
coming on unexpectedly, this information had not been able 
to reach its destination. On seeing the Turkish fleet make 
such hasty preparations, he had thought proper to address, 
in his own name, to the Turkish Admiral commanding the 
ships outside the harbour, a letter, which had been carried 
by an English officer to the Capitan Bey; but he having 
refused to open it, saying that he was under the orders of 
Ibrahim, and that to him the letter must be addressed, the 
same letter was then taken to Navarin, and given to 
Ibrahim. It appears that, on reading this letter, written in 
English, which the dragoman of the Pacha does not under- 
stand very well, Ibrahim expressed some doubt on its being 
the unanimous opinion of the three chiefs of the Allied 
Squadron the more so, that at the date of its being written 
the French ships were not within sight of Navarin. Ad- 
miral Codrington having communicated to me the report of 
the British ofticer whom he had sent to Ibrahim, and having 
informed me that he had despatched the ' Dartmouth ' frigate 
to Navarin, I proposed to Sir Edward Codrington, in order 
to give to the step which he had taken that character of 
concert which might appear to be wanting to it in the eyes 
of the Turkish chieftains, that the same letter which he had 
written should be translated into French and sent again to 
Ibrahim Pacha, signed by us both, under the form hereunto 
annexed. In order to act in this matter with greater effect, 
it was agreed between Sir Edward Codrington and me, that 
I should go myself to Navarin, and, after an interview with 
Ibrahim, at which I should point out to him that the 
menaces mentioned in that letter would certainly and speedily 
be carried into execution, I should let the English Admiral 
know if I saw any necessity for his coming to join me in a 
final appeal. I anchored at Navarin on the 22nd, and im- 
mediately forwarded to Ibrahim the letter agreed upon, re- 
questing him to appoint a place of meeting, which was fixed 


for the following morning at whatever hour I should choose. 
At 8 o'clock I was in his tent : he was there alone with 
Tahir Pacha, who commanded one of the two divisions of 
the fleet at Constantinople. When Ibrahim, who was de- 
sirous of a private interview, made a sign to Tahir Pacha to 
withdraw, the latter made him repeat it, and testified some 
displeasure ; his distrust was evident. At this interview 
with Ibrahim Pacha, he did not attempt to conceal his em- 
barrassment. H6 found himself in the same position at 
Navarin as his father was at Alexandria. The eves of the 
Turks were upon him ; and these conferences, rather of a 
confidential nature, excite in them feelings of jealousy 
towards the Egyptians. I forcibly depicted to him the 
results of the obstinacy of the Sultan : I told him the total 
destruction of the Ottoman fleets would be the consequence 
of it. I then learnt, that although he had not had, either 
from the Porte or from his father, any order relative to the 
circumstances which had lately taken place, he knew 011 
August 13, by a messenger from England and Trieste, that the 
Treaty was signed ; that he had for a long time expected his 
fleet, always hoping that he should have time to settle mat- 
ters at Hydra before we could throw any obstacles in his 
way ; that this fleet being now arrived, he had hurried on 
his preparations, and that on the 21st the two divisions 
of his fleet were ready, the troops embarked when, at the 
moment he thought of attaining his object, and of giving a 
mortal blow to the Greeks, he found himself arrested in his 
progress by an obstacle which he knew to be insurmountable. 
That he was about to send couriers to his father and to Con- 
stantinople with the summons which had been addressed to 
him ; that he would order those divisions to return which 
were outside the port ; and on this subject he expressed some 
astonishment at what the British officer who had been sent 
to him had said of opposition which might even be made to 
their return to port. He was most anxious to be informed 
on this point. This matter not having been discussed by Ad- 
miral Codrington and myself, I replied that it was not pro- 
bable that, while I was talking to him, there should exist an 
idea of preventing the return of his division ; but that I 
could assure him, in my own name as well as in that of Sir 
Edward Codrington, that his fleet would not be permitted by 
us to take any outward direction excepting only that of Alex- 
andria. With regard to sending these couriers, I told him 
that he would do well to await the arrival of the British 
Admiral, whom a contrary wind at this moment prevented 
from approaching the port ; that the courier's vessel might 
be taken by the Greeks. c So then,' cried he with some 


warmth, c whilst you require of me to suspend all operations, 
you allow the Greeks to do as they wish ; that is not just.' 
I answered him, that the obstinacy of the Grand -Signior, in 
not accepting a mediation which it was his interest to have 
done, might, although there was no change in our desire 
for peace, effect a change nevertheless in the nature of the 
means to be employed, &c. His situation, he said, was too 
embarrassing ; he could not escape from it until he received 
fresh orders. ' It is a most unfortunate thing for me that 
you did not make this demand at Alexandria when the fleet 
was there ; all would now have been settled.' He then 
turned to the subject of the fortified places, under the sup- 
position of the evacuation by him of the Morea. ' Never,' 
said he, i will the Grand Signior consent to give back the 
fortified places to the Greeks ; he would rather die under the 
ruins of Constantinople.' ' There is no question of the for- 
tified places,' said I ; < that will be decided at a future time. 
What is required at present is to obtain an armistice, either 
with the consent of the Porte or by force, which will compel 
the Porte to treat. In establishing it de facto, you may per- 
haps save the Ottoman empire ; you will at least save your 
father and your inheritance. Your father is old, and much 
burdened with cares. Reflect. Egypt with its riches is of much 
more value than the Morea, of which you are making a desert.' 
Doubtless Ibrahim would wish to withdraw himself 
from the difficult position in which he finds himself one 
word from his father would decide him ; but in the pre- 
sence of the Turkish fleet and its chieftains, he is exposed to 
their distrust, which has been roused ever since the interview 
with the officer sent to him by the British Admiral ; that 
officer, pursuing his written instructions, which he held in 
his hand, turned the conversation on Egypt, on the desire which 
was felt to respect his father's interests, &c. &c., expressions 
which, although suppressed or modified by his Dragoman, 
had nevertheless been understood by one of the persons pre- 
sent (Tahir Pacha), and interpreted and spread about as the 
result of an understanding between him and us. One cir- 
cumstance has given to this jealousy a more serious charac- 
ter. Tahir Pacha, incensed at what passed yesterday, retired 
on board his ship, and refuses to leave it. Ibrahim has sent 
me his confidential dragoman to acquaint me with this 
occurrence, which appears to occupy his attention much. 
Thus, at the point where matters are now arrived, the object 
would appear for the moment gained, as far as regards the 
terms of the second instructions, which require, 'that the 
measures to be adopted against the Ottoman marine should not 


degenerate into hostilities, and that the armistice at sea, which 
the Porte might not concede de jure, should be established de 
facto ;' for I repeat, there is no doubt that Ibrahim does not 
wish to commit himself without receiving further orders from 
the Porte, which I am inclined to believe he would not obey 
if his father advised him otherwise. His hundred and odd 
vessels which have re-entered Navarin can never sail out 
again in a body ; the expedition against Hydra has failed 
and become impossible, as much from the nature of the 
obstacles thrown in its way, as from the jealousies which 
have arisen between the Turks and the Egyptians. We may 
be quite sure that Ibrahim will wait until the return of the 
couriers. If, on the contrary, in spite of the repeated sum- 
mons, or even after the return of the couriers, he resolves to 
pursue the orders he has received to destroy Hydra, we can- 
not fail to meet with him in the Archipelago ; we recover the 
advantage which we should have enjoyed if we had possessed 
the power of acting before his fleet had entered Navarin, 
and by compelling him to return to Egypt with his fleet 
entire, or dispersed, great progress would be made in the 
business. In order to effect this, it is only necessary to watch 
his fleet by two or three brigs, of which one would always 
remain off the islands of "Sapienza, and to have the ships 
always ready to unite at the first intelligence, and to close 
every other passage except that of Alexandria for the Egyp- 
tians, and that of the Dardanelles for the fleet of Constanti- 
nople. At that point we shall have exhausted all indirect 
means, we shall have pursued the spirit and letber of the 
instructions ; in any case I do not now think that, should 
we meet this large squadron at sea, it would oppose any re- 
sistance to the notification which w r ould be made to it, the 
more so that we shall then be joined by the Russian squad- 
ron. On the 24th I sailed out of Navarin to meet Admiral 
Codrington ; and the same evening, and at the same time 
with the Turkish division, which was re-entering, we cast 
anchor at Navarin with the intention of making on the follow- 
ing day, personally to Ibrahim, when surrounded by the chiefs 
of his fleet, a public notification, reserving at the same time 
for himself alone, and in consideration of the personal situa- 
tion of his father, communications of a confidential character. 
On the 25th, at 10 o'clock in the morning, Sir Edward 
Codrington and myself, accompanied by Moiis. Achille Rouen, 
first Secretary of Embassy, by Mr. Cradock, attached to the 
British Mission, and by some French and English officers, 
repaired to the tent of Ibrahim Pacha, where we found him 
surrounded by his principal officers. After the usual com- 


plinients, we stated to him, each in turn, in English and in 
French (the replies being all made in French), the orders 
with which we were charged, in consequence of the refusal 
of the Porte to accept the mediation. Some paragraphs of 
the second instruction to the Admirals were then read to 
him, terminating with a formal declaration to establish de 
facto an armistice, and to destroy any Ottoman vessels which 
should break it. After having listened with tlie utmost at- 
tention a/nd coolness to our declarations, the Pacha replied, 
( that as a servant of the Sublime Porte he had received 
orders to press the war in the Morea, and to terminate it by 
a decisive attack upon Hydra ; that he had no authority to 
listen to communications such as we had made to him, nor 
to act upon his own responsibility. That, however, the 
orders of the Porte not having foreseen the extraordinary 
case which presented itself, he should forthwith send couriers 
to Constantinople and into Egypt, and that till their return 
he gave his word that his fleet should not quit Navarin, 
however hard it was upon him to be thus arrested just at 
the moment when all was settled, because the force of his 
expedition, as we ourselves saw, was too strong for the 
Greeks to resist. That ' if his Sovereign, who was the best 
judge of his real interests, still maintained in force his first 
orders, he should obey them whatever might be the result of 
the unequal struggle in which he should be engaged.' As 
his couriers were to go by sea and in his vessels, he asked if, 
while we required a suspension of hostilities on his part, we 
would leave it in the power of the Greeks to attack his 
vessels ? Upon this we proposed to him to allow his vessels 
to be accompanied by one of ours ; but he did not appear to 
be pleased with this proposal, which might be considered as 
derogatory to him ; and he preferred to risk meeting with 
the enemy, from which, on the other hand, we could not 
secure him, since the Greek pirates, acting on all sides with- 
out order and without license, always dispersed at our 
approach, and by that means escaped us. One may see, in 
this complicated situation, the confusion which results from 
that article of the instructions which treats of an under- 
standing to be concerted with the Greeks, when we find 
there neither government nor individuals with whom to act 
in the present state of disorganisation of this country. It is 
very desirable that the respective ministers and ambassadors 
should also consider attentively this side of the question, on 
which we find great difficulties. To reply as well as possible 
to some observations, which were not wanting in justice, and 
speaking in the sense of a communication from the ambas- 


sadors, dated September 4, wliicli I received yesterday, re- 
lative to the ix "its within which the Greek navy must con- 
fine its operations, we said to Ibrahim, that' 'having been 
informed that Loxd Cochrane purposed proceeding towards 
the coasts of Albania, with the view of exciting a revolt 
there, it was the intention of Admiral Codrington to oppose 
at once any attempt of this kind (such attempt being made 
in the Ionian Sea) as tending to enlarge the theatre of war, 
as long as there existed any armistice either temporary or 
definitive.' I will not enter into a detail of the objections 
and arguments which he put forward in addition, when, after 
his promise had been given, the conference ceased to be 
official ; but I cannot refrain from remarking that all that 
Ibrahim said shows an understanding and good sense very 
superior to what is generally seen, and to the education 
which he must have received. He was especially anxious to 
refute all that had been published in the papers respecting 
his pretended cruelties, and we, who have been on the spot, 
must confess that exaggeration has been as busy there as 
elsewhere. Such is then at present, as I observed above, the 
situation of affairs. The Turkish fleet, consisting of near 
126 vessels, of which there are 4 ships of the line, 4 frigates 
of 60 guns, 14 frigates of 40, 29 corvettes, 37 brigs, &c., re- 
mains inactive in Navarin. If it attempts to quit the port 
in consequence of any fresh orders from Constantinople, 
which Ibrahim cannot receive for twenty-one days at least, 
we shall meet with them in the Archipelago, and all return 
to the Morea will be cut off. Some very confidential com- 
munications on the part of Ibrahim Pacha give me reason to 
believe that he will secretly give us notice when he is about 
to come out ; and I think I can affirm beforehand that a de- 
monstration will suffice to send back this formidable expe- 
dition to Egypt and the Dardanelles. I must not omit to 
mention here that, with the consent of Mr. Cradock, I have 
informed Ibrahim of what had been concerted at Cairo with 
his father, and also that the letter of Mehemet Ali addressed 
to his son (of which I was the bearer on my return from 
Egypt, where 1 discussed with the Pacha all the supposed 
cases which have since been realised), has determined the 
latter to follow that course which I have stated it to be my 
opinion that he will pursue. Such has been, and such with- 
out doubt will be, the result of measures concerted between 
Sir Edward Codrington and myself. 

One work remains even more difficult than that which we 
have already accomplished, even supposing it to be necessary 
to follow up that work in a short time by the employment of 


force it is to annihilate, if possible, that piracy which has 
become so inveterate among the Greeks. It will not be 
heard perhaps without a feeling of surprise, that at the very 
moment when the squadrons of the Allied Powers are on the 
point of engaging in a contest with the Turks in favour of 
the Greeks, merchant vessels, English and French, are car- 
ried off from the coasts of Syria to Egina, seized upon and 
pillaged, because, under the pretext of a right of search so 
unfortunately conceded, the Greek pirates, caring little for 
the fate of their country, have no other object in view 
than to make a livelihood by piracy, and to bear away to 
Hydra their plunder, converted, by the greatest abuse, into 
lawful prize. It would be shameful, it would even be ridicu- 
lous, to suffer any longer the existence of such abuses ; but 
it is necessary to act with vigour and adopt decisive mea- 
sures. I know of none others than those I have so often 
proposed to employ. 

I beg your Excellency, &c., 


From H. J. Codrington to his sister Jane. 

H.M.S. ' Asia,' Navarin Harbour : September 25, 1827. 
DEAE, JANE, Yesterday the c Asia ' and ' Philomel ' with 
the ' Sirerie,' French admiral, anchored in here to communi- 
cate with Ibrahim Pacha. The entrance at the south end is 
narrow enough to render working in inconvenient for a large 
ship ; but the water there is deep and the bottom clear. The 
harbour is formed by a long, rocky island (Sphacteria) 
running along the coast in a bight just to the north of 
Modon. The island itself seems quite unproductive, and, 
except a Turkish guard, there is nobody on it. The entrance 
to the southward is very fine, though not so striking as many 
others. The northern entrance I hear is too narrow and 
shallow for anything larger than brigs or boats. The harbour 
is large and, I think, very commodious, but I'll tell you 
more about it by-and-bye. At present it is full of Turks, 
large and small. Well, this morning we went on shore to 
visit Ibrahim ; the party were as follows : English Admiral, 
Captain Curzon, Lieutenant Dilke, Colonel Cradock, Mr. 
Dyer, and myself. French Admiral De Eigny, his captain, 
a secretary of legation, and a captain of a schooner. Lord 
Ingestrie went with us also. We pulled on shore and landed 
just underneath his tent ; which, with several others belong- 
ing to people of consequence, was pitched on the top of a 
little bank rising from the beach to the northward of the 


town. His tent or tents, for it was a continuation of them, 
was green. Though the place was pretty level, they had 
collected a great number of large stones which they stowed 
as close to each other as possible on the ground through 
these two tents, which opened into one. Over these stones, 
in the inner tent, a sort of rough platform was made by 
laying boards on them, and on these boards was the Pacha's 
sofa, with its embroidered velvet cushions and a mattress 
with gold fringes. Under the inner tent, and just over this 
sofa, was a sort of small pavilion or tent, the strings of 
which interfered very much with my cocked hat. Around 
the sofa and on the platform were ranged arm-chairs. As 
we came into the tent, he bowed, but did not rise off the sofa. 
Father came to on the said sofa, close alongside him ; and 
the French Admiral brought up also, on the sofa, under 
father's lee. We were ranged round in their front rather on 
the right ; and on the left, and behind him, were ranged his 
officers, pachas, beys, &c., and attendants. They first began 
with the ceremony of introduction ; which, as there were a 
good number of us on each side, was proportionably long. . . . 
At length, however, I got settled, and began to look round 
me again; this tent also was open, and from his sofa he 
looked down over the whole harbour, and really the sight 
was beautiful, covered as it was by the ships, and boats of 
all sorts continually passing to and fro. His tent was out- 
side the walls of Navarin ; and indeed what force he had 
with him appeared to be outside of the town. Altogether I 
thought he had chosen the coolest and most convenient place 
to pitch his tent on that could be found. But, to return 
thither. He is a man of about 40 years old, not at all good- 
looking, but with heavy features, very much marked with 
the small-pox, and as fat as a porpoise. Though I had 110 
opportunity of seeing his height (as he was on his sofa, lying 
down or sitting the whole time), I should not think him 
more than five feet seven inches. He was for a Pacha, 
plainly dressed I think, particularly as his followers and 
officers were covered with gold and embroidery ; and for a 
Turk, I think his manners were very good indeed. The con- 
versation first began about the weather and such common- 
place things, for I learnt (from the interpreter) he does not 
talk of business till after coffee. A short time after we were 
seated, the Pacha took his ' gem- adorned chibouque,' and 
father and De E-igny also had each one, and I never saw 
such beautiful ones before. The mouth-pieces were, of course, 
of the purest and largest amber, and the upper and lower 
parts of the stem were studded with diamonds and other 


precious stones. The stem itself was at least ten feet long. 
Then they brought in a small cup of coffee for each of us, 
and, what I believe is a great favour, it was sweetened. The 
cups were of china, and about the size of three thimbles. 
They had no handles, but as the Turks take their coffee very 
hot, they place these said cups in a sort of filagree stand of 
silver or gold ; which is very necessary, as from the heat 
of the coffee it would otherwise be impossible to handle 
them. These being removed with great caution by the 
attendants, business was entered upon before everybody, so 
that his officers might also understand the whole. It was 
carried on through an interpreter, who continued standing 
the whole time. Father spoke most, I should say nearly all ; 
and it was by the interpreter translated from his French or 
English into Turkish. I cannot tell you all they talked 
about, for I can't remember it ; but I was very much inte- 
rested in it the whole time. At length, they settled that he 
should not proceed in the war any further till he had re- 
ceived fresh instructions from Constantinople, in answer to 
the representations which he was going to send thither of 
the state of affairs and of the impossibility of his moving 
any way without being sunk by our fleet. This will take 
about twenty days, which time, I believe, we are to take ad- 
vantage of by sending the 6 Genoa ' and ' Albion ' to refit at 
Malta. I must say I was very much surprised by the clear- 
ness and ability with which father's arguments were carried 
on, and the good sense which Ibrahim showed. On his 
being told that in the event of his attempting to come out 
we must drive him into the harbour again, and if he resisted, 
sink him ; he said that, like us, he was under positive orders, 
which as a subject of the Porte he must execute, though in 
the attempt he were certain of destruction ; and that a few 
years would not make much difference in his life now. Father 
answered that, as the two parties had such positive orders 
(which evidently could not both be complied with) the execu- 
tion of them would depend on the relative force of the two 
parties, for whichever would prove strongest must necessarily, 
in honour, enforce their orders ; and, he added, that without 
doubt we were at present the strongest, and would, by the 
arrival of the Russians (who were hourly expected) be much 
stronger. In fact, after some more such palaver, the business 
was arranged. Ibrahim gave in to reason, as slmuly as a Turk 
among Twrks could ; he rallied several times, and once said, as 
a demibr effort, 'Nous n'avons d'autre marchandise abord de 
nos vaisseaux que les balles et la poudre a canon ;' which little 
M. de Eigny quickly answered by 6 Et nous les avons aussi ; 


and we can exchange some with you and give you good 
weight too ! ' This, with a little humbug about their regret 
at having to destroy, without reason, so many brave men 
(pointing to the Turkish officers), backed by a little quiet 
flattery to soften their Wounded pride, opened their eyes to 
conviction. Ibrahim found that however decided he might 
show himself, the admirals could not, and would not, swerve 
from their orders and instructions, extracts from which were, 
before everybody, read to him and translated. When they 
had finished business, he with a smile said that though they 
had transacted all the matters of service, &c., yet he re- 
quested them to stay and ' talk jokingly over things in gene- 
ral;' and so, on they did talk; with some occasional fishing on 
his part, and questions about us, and the Greeks, and Lord 
Cochrane, &c. However, father quite brought him up with a 
round turn once; for on his depreciating very much the 
Greeks in every way, and affecting to despise them, saying 
that there never was a Greek worth anything ; he answered, 
that his Highness ought to abstain from undervaluing those 
men whom he had been such a time attempting to conquer ; 
for that by so doing he must lower in our estimation the 
talents and abilities of himself and those brave men (pointing 
to the Turkish officers) who had made several campaigns 
with him without effecting their object. This was a regular 
pall-er, and he made no answer ; but as soon as he recovered, 
changed the subject. In spite of the regular custom of Turks 
(trying to keep the muscles of the face immovable so as not 
to let observers see what is passing within), I could clearly 
nmke out that he was quite taken aback, and that he found 
he had unadvisedly got himself into a scrape. Indeed, the 
pride of his heart had led him too far ; for, were the Greeks 
what he represents them, the Sultan would never have sent 
an armament of three 74 's, 18 frigates and small ves- 
sels, in all 120 sail or more, against them now, and this not 
for the first time. Has he not been beaten several times by 
them? Have not the forts of Napoli, Athens, Tripolitza, 
Navarin, Corinth, and many others, successively fallen by the 
arms of the Greeks? Has not the whole force of the Turkish Em- 
pire been continually employed against them since the break- 
ing out of the rebellion in 1821 ? and, as yet, very little is done 
by such an" overwhelming force to warrant Ibrahim's boast ? 
Throughout the whole conference I could see that there were 
many things that would never have been said on either side, 
had it not been for the sake of the Turkish pachas being 
present. As for instance, though Ibrahim said, ' I am the 
Forte's soldier ; whatever they order I must execute, and if 


they order me out of the harbour I must go, though it be to 
certain death ; ' yet I am sure he never would have gone out. 
As it was, he only sent the Turkish division out the other 
day. I am certain that if the Porte should even now order 
him to proceed, he would send the Turks out but not budge 
with his Egyptians. What would be the use of the Pacha 
of Egypt having all his fleet sunk or destroyed on account of 
the obstinacy of the Sultan ! 

T must add that the humbug of palaver was not confined 
to the Turkish side only. Ibrahim made the following 
remark at the end of the joking conversation, viz., that he 
took in most English and French papers, and yet never did 
he see one in favour of the Turks; he saw by them that the 
Greeks were always successful everywhere, and the Turks 
always massacring, but the Greeks never! Now he said he 
could disprove them all, for he had several hundred Greek 
villages under his Government, now very quiet, and those 
Greeks near him fed and provided by him. In short, his 
account of affairs is very different from the general one. The 
right line I suspect is between both. He also remarked 
that, if Greece was to pay the Porte any sum of money, 
England or the allies must be guarantees for it ; or perhaps 
(laughing) the English would give them another loan. 

Altogether I liked him pretty well, and was very much 
pleased with my forenoon, for we were upwards of three 
hours there. It has given me a much better opinion of him 
than I had before, though, of course, we only saw the fair 
side of the picture. 

When I first began this letter I did not intend to talk 
about politics ; but as there was nothing but said politics at 
the interview, and I was so led on from one thing to another, 
I could not help it. Indeed, I am glad I have done so, for I 
find father has said nothing about it, trusting to me ; so 
that you must take this disjointed epistle for an account of 
the whole ; and you must excuse me if it is neither legible 
nor intelligible, as I am now in the greatest hurry. 
Your affectionate brother, 

H. J. C. 

From Sir Frederick Adam to Sir E. C. 

Corfu: September 21, 1827.* 

Our Government are by this time informed by Mr. S. Can- 
ning, from Constantinople, of the determination of the Sultan 

* Received September 25. 

Gulf of Patras /Patr 


London, lonomaris & Co 


to use every effort to carry on the war vigorously by land, 
and in a very few days they must know of the arrival of the 
Egyptian fleet and reinforcements at Navarin, for I commu- 
nicated the information given me by Lord Ingestrie ; and 
they, with their allies, will have taken their determination, 
and will give their orders. I hope these orders may be in 
time. It is quite true, or at least highly probable, that the 
war by land on the part of the Turks will die of exhaustion 
in the course of a twelvemonth, if their operations by sea are 
interrupted, and if Austria be prevented from carrying sup- 
plies: but in the mean time this land war, while it can 
remain in a state of vigour, will go nigh to having extermi- 
nated the Greeks, to have deprived them of all possession of 
the country, and then where is the object of the Treaty? 

Sir E. C. to Mr. Stratford Canning. 

1 Asia,' in the port of Navarin : September 25, 1827. 

DEAR SIR, On the 23rd I received your letter of the llth, 
with your official letter of the 8th September, enclosing the 
inem. of the 10th, the Protocol, &c. I need not say how 
much I am gratified by finding I had anticipated your 
private wishes, as well as the decision of yourself respecting 
neutrals carrying Turkish property contraband of war. 
Admiral De Rigny tells me the Austrian schooner of war 
which was in the port when we first reached it, did not ac- 
company the expedition, but was the bearer of despatches for 
Ibrahim ; that he fell in with her on her way from hence, 
when watching his movements ; and that, when questioned 
if I was off this port, and if the Turkish ships were within it, 
he said ( no ' to the latter question, and replied to the former 
that he saw some large ships which he supposed to be Turks. As 
he had sailed from this port after our having shown ourselves 
close to it with our colours flying, and several days after the 
whole expedition was anchored, this is somewhat barefaced ; 
and shows how little officers of that nation, in these seas, can 
be trusted ; whilst their whole conduct belies the statement 
of the Court of Vienna being equally anxious with the Allies 
for the fulfilment of the Treaty. 

That the absence of my colleague at such an important 
moment is hardly to be accounted for, and was very near 
producing a collision between myself and the Turkish Com- 
mander is not to be denied. But it is incumbent on me to 
say that, since his arrival at so fortunate a juncture, he has 
done everything I could possibly wish, arid has greatly pro- 

c 2 


moted the object of our Governments. He has approved of 
all my proceedings previous to his arrival, although certainly 
very different from his own at that period ; and whenever 
he has suggested an opinion as to what we should do, to 
which I showed a dissent, he has readily yielded the point 
at once. In fact the sea is not his element. 

Although the result of our joint interview with Ibrahim 
and his chiefs to-day will be all that you may absolutely 
require, I could wish that Colonel Cradock, or one of the 
b} r -standers, would give you the detail of what passed ; for 
it is a task which, as being a principal actor, and having 
to study my words and those of my colleague, as well as 
the interpretation of them, and the effect they produced, 
it is quite out of my power to perform. And yet if fully 
described, it might enable you to form an early judgment 
of the course which things are likely to take eventually. 
I can only say that I am more than satisfied with the 
progress which we have thus far made. And I do sin- 
cerely believe that we have disposed all the chiefs of the 
expedition to feel sincerely desirous of receiving orders 
to accede to our proposals. My letters to Lord Dudley 
and the Lord High Admiral will go to Corfu at the same 
time that this starts for Smyrna. Admiral De Rigny will 
also write to Mr. Bogos, as will Colonel Cradock to Mr. 
Salt, by a French vessel which the Admiral proposes to send 
there, at the same time that the Turkish vessel goes on the 
same errand to Mehemet AH. I intend sending such an 
order by the ' Philomel ' to the neighbourhood of Cape Papa, 
as will stop Lord Cochrane's meditated embarkation of 
General Church's troops until I can proceed there myself to 
put an end to his ill-timed expedition altogether. I begged 
Colonel Cradock, whom I requested to accompany Admiral 
De Rigny into Navarin, would endeavour to see the letter 
from Mehemet Ali to Ibrahim. The Admiral first showed 
the letter to Colonel C. and then delivered it himself to 
Ibrahim, who was much affected by it. You will be glad, as 
I am, to find that there was no insincerity in this ; and at 
the same time lament, with me, that my colleague should 
lay himself open to such general suspicion. 

I remain, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Mr. S. Canning. 
1 Asia/ in the port of Navarin : September 25, 1827. 
DEAR SIR, Although my public letter will tell you all 
that is essential^ I cannot help offering you my congratula- 


tions on the issue thus far of our intercourse with the Turco- 
Egyptian commanders. The arrival of M. De Kigny and 
his squadron was certainly very opportune ; and the assist- 
ance which I derived from his opinions and his knowledge 
of the parties, of material use in producing, what I am 
sanguine enough to consider, the present prosperous state 
of affairs here. It will probably be a month before Ibrahim 
can receive his answers ; and during that time he is bound 
to remain inactive. Even if he should then have an order 
to make the meditated attack, the season will have become 
more likely to defeat his purpose, and even to destroy some 
of the ships of which his fleet is composed ; whilst we, as I 
trust, by the arrival of the Russian squadron, and by having 
our own ships replenished and re-supplied with stores of 
which they are deficient, shall become more fit to profit by 
their increased difficulties. I am glad you have taken into 
consideration the conduct of the Austrian vessels. The letter 
which I had prepared for the commander of the schooner 
which was in this port when we arrived, M. De Kigny will 
take with him to Milo where he proposes placing his ships 
of the line for the interval, that he may deliver it to some 
other Austrian captain, or to Count Dandolo himself. Since 
we have been in the harbour that flag has not been exhibited, 
although the transports must be somewhere in the fleet. I 
intend to profit by the opportunity, and to send the ' Genoa ' 
and the * Albion ' to Malta for such supplies as they may 
require. But I shall find too much to do with Lord 
Cochrane and the Greeks to admit of the ' Asia ' going into 
port, until the fate of the Turkish fleet is decided on one way 
or the other. 

Believe me, my dear Sir, very truly and sincerely yours, 


Sir E. C. to Mr. S. Canning. 

September 26, 1827. 

What with the despatches, the piracies, and the claim for 
regular convoys and extra convoys, I assure you the ships 
under my orders are more harassed than they used to be in 
the height of war. Most of the captains are obliged to have 
their linen washed on board like the ships' companies, and 
they are often upon the ship's provisions also. I have now 
sent Spencer to hunt in the Gulf of Coron for poultry, &c., 
for the fleet as well as himself. Adam has always his fears 
of the effect of Capo d'Istria's arrival. I confess, I have on 


the contrary an opinion that it is the only thing we can look 
forward to, as a means of settling the country. If he obtain 
a Swiss army of some 4,000 or 5,000 men to support his 
government, he will be able to put down the Capitani, the 
curse of the country. And as to fears of Kussian influence, 
surely free Greece will neither require her support nor sub- 
mit to her despotism. Time will be gained at all events, 
and the ' march of intellect ' will have had its effect. Besides, 
as I enforced in the private ear of Ibrahim's interpreter 
yesterday, the having so dexterously got Russia into the 
treaty, must prevent her assumption of more than an equal 
influence with the Allied Powers. 

I remain, &c., 


I must still add to this, that it is evident by what passed 
yesterday in reference to the private communications which 
Mehemet Ali held with Colonel Cradock, that Ibrahim had 
had instruction from his father : for he has done precisely 
all that the father said he would do upon our making to him 
the representations which we did according to the father's 

From Sir E. C. to H. Salt, Esq., H.M. Consul-General 
at Alexandria. 
1 Asia,' at Navarin : September 26, 1827. 

SIR, As Colonel Cradock is giving you a substantial 
account of the state of affairs, I have only to catch a hurried 
moment and acknowledge your letters of August 21 and 22. 
I trust Mehemet Ali will be convinced that we have done 
our utmost to save his fleet from that inevitable destruction 
-which would attend the Sultan's persevering in his proposed 
attack on Hydra, or any other part of Greece. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Lady G. 

In the port of Navarin : September 26. 

Harry will tell you all our interesting story, and will do it 
better than I could do : because I was employed in produc- 
ing and watching final effects of paramount importance. 
The position in which I have been, and still am, is singular, 
and I may say unparalleled. Here we are, now, De Eigny 
and myself, surrounded by above 120 vessels in their own 


port, whom we are forcing into obedience to the allies, in 
direct contradiction of the orders of a Sovereign whose 
slightest disapprobation deprives his subjects of their heads. 
To a by-stander the scene must have been highly interesting, 
and I trust Harry will so paint it to you. I cannot read his 
letter, if I wished it, I am so harassed with business : for 
what time I can spare I would rather devote to you this 
way. I should tell you that Ibrahim has agreed 
to send to the Porte and to his father for orders, after 
they know of our decision, to prevent by force his proceed- 
ing to execute the orders he is at present under, and of his 
inability to resist without sacrificing his fleet, &c. And he 
is in the meantime to remain here in suspension of all 
hostility. De Rigny has done everything I wished or could 
wish since his arrival ; and has certainly been of great use 
in bringing about the present favourable appearances. He 
does not, however, like the sea, and cannot imagine blockad- 
ing ; and he will, I am sure, proceed again to Smyrna, after 
seeing his big ships into Milo, where they are to stay during 
the interval of suspension. 

From Sir E. C. to Lord Dudley. 

< Asia/ off Navarin : September 27, 1827. 

MY LORD, The accompanying letters from Mr. Salt 
reached me this morning by the ' Pelorus.' Added to what 
I sent off last night for Corfu, they will give your Lordship 
such an insight into the state of affairs in Egypt, as may 
enable you to give me decisive instructions as to the line of 
conduct I am to pursue under the circumstances therein 
anticipated. The dragoman of Ibrahim Bey came to me 
again yesterday evening, when I was about to quit the port 
of Navarin, to say that his Highness had received informa- 
tion of Lord Cochrane, with several Greek vessels of war, lying 
off Patras'with the intention of operating against that and 
the other fortresses thereabout : and that his Highness ex- 
pected that I would either obstruct him myself or allow him 
to send a Turkish force competent to do so. Admiral De 
Eigny had received the visit of the dragoman previously, and 
consequently followed him to the ' Asia.' Much art was em- 
ployed by the dragoman, by making some part of what he 
had to say private information, and the other part official 
communication from his master, to induce us to relax from 
our decision of the preceding day. Advantage was taken of 
my voluntary intention of not suffering Lord Cochrane to 
excite a rising at a distance, to show that it was equally j ust 
that I should do so in the Gulf of Lepanto. We met this 


by a reference to our Instruction, and the refusal of the 
Porte whilst the Greeks accepted our mediation : which 
naturally led to a partiality to which the Porte could not 
with reason object, and to which she must now succumb, 
whether she liked it or not. At length, after an hour's dis- 
cussion, and the dragoman finding that nothing could shake 
our resolution, he took his leave, letting us understand that 
if he did not shortly return or send, the Pacha did not pro- 
pose making any further communication. Accordingly, 
having waited until there was merely sufficient daylight to 
effect it, we weighed our anchor and joined the ships off the 
harbour's mouth, where I had collected them by signal, ready 
to proceed to that extremity which, judging by the descrip- 
tion which the dragoman gave at one time of the irritation 
of the Pacha, 1 thought would probably become necessary. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Admiral De Riyny. 

1 Asia' : September 27 5 P.M. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, I fear it is quite impossible for us to 
stop the impertinent and ill-tinied observations of which we 
have all to complain in turn. Upon hearing that the Greeks 
accused each of our Courts individually of intending to deceive 
them, and to subject them to the Turks, and shortly after- 
wards that the Treaty itself was not intended to be carried 
into effect, I wrote a letter and addressed it to Mavrocordato, 
Zarini, or Tricoupi, whom I knew to be then at Poros, to say 
that I should myself be soon there with my squadron in proof 
of English sincerity ; that French sincerity was most strongly 
exemplified by the reduction by the French of the time limited 
for the Porte's answer, from thirty to fifteen days ; and that 
Russian sincerity was still more clearly exemplified than either, 
by Mr. Tinioni being sent to authorise us to act for Russia, in 
the absence of Count Heiden and his squadron. I put the 
stronger term to this latter because of there being then no 
news of the Russian squadron having even arrived in Eng- 
land. I shall always be ready to declare by word, as I have 
done in my letters, that in all our conferences I have found 
in you the greatest cordiality ; that we have never been at 
issue upon any one point of public service, and that I have 
derived from your counsel and assistance all the support I 
could desire.* I think you may rely upon what we have done 

* Sir E. C., after personal communication with Admiral De Rigny, and 
after the joint action towards Ibrahim in the Conference for the Armistice 
of September 25. had full confidence in the support of his colleague. 


here within these few days in unison for removing all such 
reports as you mention from the minds of either of our min- 
isters at Constantinople, or those of any other on whom they 
have made any impression. I have courts-martial to form, 
which must keep my ships here together to-morrow and 
perhaps the next day ; and in the meantime the ' Albion,' 
' Genoa,' and ' Cambrian ' will provision the small vessels, in 
readiness to go themselves to Malta. They will return from 
Malta, show themselves ' en passant,' and catch me at Zante 
or near it, where I propose watching Lord Cochrane's move- 
ments, and seeing at the same time that the Turks do not 
slip out to attack him. I think it might lull the fleet in 
Navarin into quiet if your ships were to show themselves 
here a few days longer, taking the first strong northerly wind 
for going to Milo as you propose, at dark, when their move- 
ments are not seen from Navariii. I shall keep one, and 
probably two vessels hereabout, to see that all goes on well. 
I will return the Protocol when I have had time to look it 
over, which I have not had yet. 

Believe me, my dear Admiral, 

Yery sincerely yours, 


Sir E. C. to Mr. S. Canning. 

1 Asia,' off Navarin : September 29, 1827. 

DEAR SIR, I have nothing material to add to my 
last letter, because things remain in Navarin just as they 
were when I wrote them. On the next day I received letters 
from Mr. Salt for Lord Dudley, of which I conclude you have 
either copies or the substance ; and I sent them off to Corfu 
at once, in hopes of being in time to accompany those of the 
preceding day, with one from myself of which I will enclose 
an extract. Although the discussion referred to produced 
no result, it will show you that Ibrahim was ready with this 
4 ruse de guerre ' to improve on the agreement he had entered 
into ; and that he had only so bound himself because he 
could do no better. The other enclosures will explain them- 
selves. The Rear- Admiral was so uncomfortable that I was 
glad to be able to soothe him.* I am not surprised at your 
being anxious upon the subject of his joining me. The 
chance of wind admitting of my closing with the Turkish 
fleet, as I was under all sail endeavouring to do after making 
the signal to prepare for battle, might have brought me to 

* See letter of September 27 to Admiral De Rigny. 


the extremity I was obliged to contemplate, an hour before 
his arrival. As it turned out, the wind which advanced him 
retarded me at the same time. I trust we shall henceforth 
manage our rendezvous better. In the meantime, I have the 
pleasure of assuring you that nothing can have been more 
cordial than all our personal communications, and that I 
have found in him everything I could wish on this most 
trying and important occasion. The ' Genoa ' and ' Albion ' 
are just gone to Malta, to be ready to return here in a fort- 
night ; and the French ships will go to Milo for the same 
purpose, where they have a store-ship. 

I shall keep the sea between this and Corfu, where if 
opportunity oifer I may have an interview with Sir F. Adam ; 
and I shall thus watch the movements of Lord Cochrane and 
of the Navarin fleet at the same time. 

I remain, &c., 


It will be seen that this watchfulness on the part of 
Sir E. C. saved Greece from calamity, and the alliance 
of the three Powers from ridicule or worse. 

Sir E. C. to Lady G. 

Navarin: September 30, 1827. 

The more I look into what I have done, the more I 
am satisfied with my conduct. It may be vanity, it may be 
blindness ; but it is at all events a very agreeable contempla- 
tion, and thus I impart it to you. It is said, ' II n'y a point 
de heros pour son valet de chambre.' You, in my case, repre- 
sent my valet de chambre ; for you are behind my scenes, 
and know all the contrivances by which I get through my 
part of the great drama we are now performing ; nor am I 
afraid of letting your scrutinizing eye peer into the inner- 
most recesses of the very complicated machinery upon which 
our success depends. My colleague is, or rather was in a 
quandary, for I have helped him out of it. He himself must 
account in the best way he can for not coining to sea sooner ; 
viz., by his not receiving my letters and so forth ; without 
telling the world that neither I nor the commodore of his 
own ships of the line knew where to send to him if they had 
had the means. It seems that the news of the Alexandria 
fleet sailing, and my leaving Vourla for the Greek coast in 
preparation for preventing its acting, reached Constantinople 
at the same time : that the tone of the Eeis Effendi was 
therefore more mild, and the anxiety of Mr. S. Canning 
more strong ; the one fearing the loss of his fleet, the other 


that a war might be brought on by me for want of the sup- 
port of the French ships. Mr. S. Canning, under these circum- 
stances, and hearing from me that I knew not De Kigny's 
plans or movements, mentioned his anxiety to Count Guil- 
leminot ; and referred, I fancy, at the same time, to reports 
prevailing at Smyrna, 'that my said colleague and myself 
were upon bad terms.' A letter from the Count reached De 
R. three days ago upon this subject after I had experienced 
in him perfect concord and cordiality, which he communi- 
cated to me. I therefore wrote him a letter, to say that I 
had found this in all our conferences, and that I derived 
great benefit from his counsel and assistance ; and that I 
should be always ready to repeat this, as I had already 
written it in my public letters lately. I further sanctioned 
his showing my letter or making any use of it he pleased, 
and he is more than contented. The report will, however, 
do him good. He has now so arranged, that if himself 
absent, his ships will obey my wishes at any time ; and I 
have no doubt of all going on well, even if we should not 
have the aid of the Russians. In preparation for this latter 
event, and for the termination of the armistice, I have 
written to Count Heiden at Malta ; and have sent * Genoa,' 
' Albion,' and ' Cambrian ' there, to get such provisions and 
other supplies as will prepare them for keeping the sea until 
the fleet is disposed of. I shall continue at sea, or in one of 
the Ionian Islands, where I can best watch Cochrane, and 
keep up a communication with Adam, and shall return 
here on or about October 14. If, as I expect, we should 
have merely to convoy the ships of this fleet to Alex- 
andria and the Dardanelles, I shall wish very much that you 
were with me. Harry and I have done so before during 
this cruise, when with our large fleet! of three sail of the 
line and a frigate, we were performing evolutions as a 
practice, and I could have wished for you on more than one 
occasion since ; for example, when sailing in the midst of the 
Turkish fleet, when standing into the port of Navarin, tacking 
round their ships, and coming to an anchor as if the ( Asia ' 
were a small frigate, in the centre of their whole force and 
in front of Ibrahim's tent ; and when coming out just before 
dark under every stitch of lofty sail, with the band serenad- 
ing a beautiful young moon, in one of the loveliest evenings 
I ever enjoyed ! It was a scene altogether of peculiar in- 
terest, from the variety of extraordinary and important 
circumstances which so closely preceded our coming out of 
that magnificent harbour. The whole affair is almost too 
much mixed up with self for me to detail it, even if I were 


competent to do so. But to those who, not being principals, 
could attend to the working of the minor wheels, the story 
of what passed in the three or four days to which I refer, 
including the interview with the Pacha, would be well worth 
the relation. 

From Sir E. C. to H.E.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

OffNavarin: September 30, 1827. 

SIR, I find it difficult to give Your E. H. all the informa- 
tion upon the subject of discipline to which a sense of duty 
prompts me, without appearing to throw reflections which 
might be deemed invidious. But it is due to myself to say, 
that I have found a falling off in this respect since I was last 
employed, which has quite astounded me. I am at a loss to 
comprehend how the service was carried on at all, under such 
circumstances as have been represented to me : and I am 
quite sure, that if I had not succeeded in producing a better 
system we could not have executed the duties which we have 
now to perform. I would rather refer Your E. H. for par- 
ticulars to such captains as have served on this station, and 
who are equally aware of the causes and their effects, than 
enter further myself on details with which I am not personally 
acquainted. My remarks on the severity of some of the 
punishments in the quarterly returns, were met by the abso- 
lute necessity of it for restoring that discipline which I 
insisted upon having established. The frequency of petty 
officers being struck by private men, seems to have originated 
in an idea of a positive right to do so if the former lifted 
their hands first ; whilst the want of proper support left no 
other alternative for getting the common routine of duty 
performed. This naturally led to inferior men becoming 
petty officers ; and this is the only way in which I can 
account for so many of that class having been subject to 
corporal punishment. In mustering the ships I felt it requi- 
site to comment upon this practice, and to desire that no 
man, subject by his conduct to such treatment, should con- 
tinue to be so rated. This produced the question of what 
was to be done, when there were no others equal to the duty ? 
And this, Sir, brings me to the system of manning ships 
referred to in my letter of the 17th inst., which prevailed 
before Your E. H. entered on your high office ; of which the 
' Asia ' has been the victim ; which Your E. H. has had 
the wisdom to change ; and which I trust will never again 
be permitted to drive from the Navy the flower of English 

Had Your E. H.'s circular of the 19th June 1827 been 



in force when the ( Asia ' was fitting out, she would have 
been one of the best manned ships that ever went to sea ; 
whereas she is now as inferior in the quality of her men as 
she is deficient in number for the guns she has to fight. Not 
having met with any satisfactory consideration to the obser- 
vations I offered during our outfit, I did not wish to say all I 
might in my late public letter ; but the enclosed explanation 
of our provision for battle, will put Your E. H. at once into 
possession of my present feelings, as to what may be ex- 
pected of the ' Asia ' if she should be called upon to force 
the Turkish fleet to the point required by the Treaty. 

October 3. 

I have now had a still stronger practical proof of the error 
in sending the 'Asia ' out with a crew so little proportioned 
to her armament. A great disparity in numerical force 
between mine and that to which I expected to find myself 
actively opposed, as shown by my official letter, with the 
common chances even of random shot taken into considera- 
tion, might have produced consequences extremely fatal on 
this very critical occasion. 

Fortunatety, the Asia's appearance in battle array, with 
the danger of passing such a broadside, and the bold and 
determined countenance of her supporters, the * Dartmouth,' 
' Talbot,' and ' Zebra,' awed our opponents into a submission 
which was entirely beyond my most sanguine expectations, 
but which I hope I may now consider as a presage of our 
future success. To what further trials, however, we may yet 
be exposed in this novel and arduous business, I am not 
bold enough to attempt to calculate. Thus far I may con- 
sider myself as favoured to the utmost by fortune ; and 
before the opposite side of the wheel turn uppermost, I trust 
I shall be joined again by the 'Genoa' and 'Albion,' so 
replenished and refitted as to make me more independent of 
her favour. Your E. H. will observe in the punishment 
reports of this ship, and I believe in that of most others, 
that the great majority of culprits are marines. This 
betokens some error in the management of that corps gene- 
rally ; and what has just been discovered in this ship may 
lead to a general improvement. We find that the sergeant- 
major has been selling liquor to the marines, and that he has 
apparently had the purser's steward's mate, if not another, 
in partnership with him. As he frequently brought marines 
to the quarter-deck for drunkenness, he was not suspected, 
and even fifty lashes would not bring those who it turns out 
had bought of him, to confess the source of their supply. I 


shall order this man before a court-martial, on which occasion 
the whole scene will be perhaps more fully developed. But I 
beg leave to suggest to Your E. H., that instead of appointing 
sergeants and corporals, according to the roster, or rota, 
suitable selections should be made for all ships going abroad, 
and more particularly for the flag-ships, from which promo- 
tions are to be made into the smaller ones. 

I have, &c., 


From H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence to Sir E. C. 

Bushey House: November 4, 1827. 

DEAR SIR, Your confidential of 30th September is what 
it ought to be from a Commander-in-Chief to a person in 
my situation. You and I ought to know when and where to 
be prudent, and to write and talk with confidence. I served 
a whole peace, and therefore by experience am aware, unless 
the officer in command, and particularly abroad, is exceed- 
ingly attentive, the discipline is very improperly relaxed. 
The respect due from the fore-mast men to the petty officers 
has never been properly defined ; and I now trust the order 
so properly issued respecting the non-punishment of petty 
officers and the badges worn, will make that class of useful, 
and I hope in future respectable, men be considered and 
looked up to. 

You know I never approved of our ships in peace having 
a different complement from war ; and as fast as I have the 
power so will I send you men to complete the whole squad- 
ron. The ' Warspite ' will have joined you. 

I admire your public despatches and approve altogether of 
your conduct. I trust all the captains and commanders will 
follow your excellent example in zeal and ability. 

The following letters relate to the attempt of Ibrahim 
to relieve Patras during the absence of the allied squad- 
rons from Navarin. 

From Sir E. C. to the Secretary of Admiralty. 

1 Asia/ in the Gulf of Lepanto : October 2, 1827.* 
SIR, Yesterday, while at anchor at Zante Eoads, in com- 
pany with the ' Talbot ' and ' Zebra,' at about 4 P.M., the 
'Dartmouth' hove in sight and made the signal that the 
Turkish fleet was putting to sea from Navarin. The weather 

* Received at Admiralty, October 27, 1827. 



was so bad, with thunderstorms, heavy rains, light and vari- 
able winds, that it was with difficulty this ship was got under 
way. About 8 P.M. Captain Fellows came on board and 
reported that it was a division of the fleet only,* consisting of 
one double-banked frigate, six other frigates, nine corvettes, 
nineteen brigs, and four Austrian vessels under convoy, and 
that they were steering N.W. The 'Asia,' with the before- 
named ships in company, f being placed for the purpose, the 
Turkish fleet was discovered coming down at midnight ; and 
she was between them and the entrance of the Gulf of Le- 
panto in. the morning art daylight. I directed the Honourable 
Captain Spencer, of the 'Talbot' to inform the Turkish 
Admiral that their coming out of Navarin was a breach of 
parole ; that I should not allow him to proceed ; and that if 
he permitted a single gun to be fired at the English flag, I 
would destroy his whole fleet, if I could. Upon this he 
brought to ; and whilst the two frigates and brig were turn- 
ing back the advanced ships, the second in command, HalJil 
Bey (the Eeala Bey) a Rear- Admiral, came on board. Al- 
though he admitted that he was present with the other 
chiefs in Ibrahim's tent when he bound himself in honour 
not to send any of his ships out of port without the joint 
permission of Rear- Admiral De Rigny and myself, he pre- 
tended to believe I had given my consent to a division of 
them going to Patras.J I told him that having broken their 
words of honour, I would put no faith in either Ibrahim or 
any one of them hereafter ; and if they did not turn about 
willingly I would make them. As the interpreter seemed to 
shuffle, and be afraid to explain in its full force what I had 
said, I wrote a letter, of which I enclose a copy, and sent it 
by one of the lieutenants of the 'Asia' to Mustapha, the 
Petrona Bey, and a Vice- Admiral commanding the division. 



j- ju'ii^aut; {iin 

1 Frigate (fla 
1 Frigate 
1 Frigate 
1 Frigate 
1 Frigate 
1 Frigate 
9 Corvettes 
19 Brigs 

B < 



to 28 
to 22 



Dartmouth . 
Talbot . 
Zebra . 




J The Dragoman came on purpose to ask this on September 26, and was 
positively refused by Admiral De Rigny and myself. 

The third in command is called ' the Petrona/ and his ship so named 
after his office. 


In about an hour and a half I received an answer, of which 
I enclose a translation. Upon the receipt of this answer, the 
' Asia ' filled her main topsail and fired a gun ; when the Turk- 
ish fleet, by a signal from their Admiral, filled and made sail 
also towards Navarin. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Mustapha Bey. 

His Britannic Majesty's Ship * Asia,' 
off the mouth of the Gulf of Lepanto : October 2, 1827. 

SIR, His Highness Ibrahim Pacha gave his word of 
honour to the French Admiral and myself, in the presence 
of his chiefs and by their consent, that none of the ships of 
the Turkish fleet should leave the port of Navarin without 
our permission. He has forfeited that word of honour, and 
I will not again trust the word of honour of him or any chief 
under his command. The ships now here under the com- 
mand of Mustapha Bey shall not re-enter the port of Navarin, 
or any port in Europe on this side of the Dardanelles. 

To His Excellency Mustapha Bey, &c. 

From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

' Asia/ at Zante : October 4, 1827.* 

SIB, When proceeding as mentioned in my letter of the 
2nd instant, a division of Turkish ships (as per margin), f two 
bearing flags at the main, the rest carrying pendants, came 
round the north end of Zante, and joined the rest of the 
fleet. The 'Asia' was at this time considerably advanced in 
the S.E., looking out for any support that might be coming, 
and preparing to take a position in the mouth of Navarin 
for obstructing the entrance of the fleet. Upon observing 
the Petrona Bey to bear up with his division, and seeing 
symptoms in the other division, evidently commanded by 
Ibrahim Pacha in person, of making sail towards Patras, I 

* Received at Admiralty. October 27. 


Double-banked Frigate 60 guns . Ibrahim Pacha. 
Double-banked Frigate 60 guns . Moharem Bey. 
Frigate of 50 guns .... Tahir Pacha. 
4 corvettes 22 and 28 guns. 
7 brigs 14 to 22 guns. 


directed Captain Curzon to bear up also, and beat to quar- 
ters, with the intention of doing the best I could with such 
a disparity of force, in fulfilment of the orders and instruc- 
tions under which I am acting. On approaching the body 
of the fleet I observed a communication taking place between 
the Admirals, and therefore hove to to see what effect might 
be produced by the letter I had written to Petrona Bey. About 
6 P.M. the whole fleet made sail towards Navarin, although 
the wind was then fair for Patras.* 

The night afterwards became very threatening, the wind 
light and variable, and a swell rising, &c. I therefore an- 
chored at the mouth of this bay, in company with the ' Tal- 
bot/ having detached the 6 Zebra ' towards Navarin for any 
ships which might be there to come to our assistance, leav- 
ing the 'Dartmouth' outside to watch the motions of the 
fleet. The c Talbot' was short of water, and eni.irely destitute 
of fuel, and the officers generally of the detachment in want of 
stock and refreshments. Of these we have received a par- 
tial supply ; and as soon as there shall be a sufficient breeze 
to command the ship against the swell which still prevails, I 
shall again proceed in execution of my instructions. 

I wish it to be made known to his Eoyal Highness the 
Lord High Admiral, that there are seven Austrian merchant 
vessels in this fleet laden with supplies; and that an Aus- 
trian corvette called the ' Caroline, 5 and one, if not two, 
different men-of-war schooners have been frequently at Nava- 
rin, and, according to the private information of Admiral 
De Eigny, have been the constant carriers of the Turkish 
despatches. Two of these transport vessels having chosen 
not to hoist their colours when the Turkish ships did, until 
guns were fired at them from the *Asia,' I have taken away 
their papers to show proof of the Austrian proceedings. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

October 2 4 P.M. 

These Turks won't fight with us, whatever they may do 
with others. Yesterday evening, when lying in Zante, the 

3 Double-banked frigates . . .172 

7 Frigates 370 

13 Corvettes 312 

26Brig3 416 

49 1270 guns. 



' Dartmouth ' came from her station off Navarin, with the 
signal that the Turkish fleet had put to sea ; and by the 
time variable light winds, heavy rain, and thunder storms 
would let us get fairly under way, Captain Fellowes was on 
board to tell me it was a division of forty-seven sail coming 
to Patras. We got sight of them at midnight ; and at 
daybreak in the morning they saw us just betwixt them and 
their entrance into the Gulf. Boats passed between the two 
Bey Admirals ; and I sent Spencer in the ' Talbot ' to say 
that I would not suffer them to pass, and that if they fired a 
shot at the British flag I would destroy the whole fleet, if I 
could. The Rear- Admiral then came to me to explain, when 
I told him that before they broke their word I esteemed the 
Turks, and wished to save them as much as possible, but now 
that I looked for an opportunity of punishing them, and that 
whenever I found one I would do it severely. As the inter- 
preter he brought was afraid to give what I said its full 
strength, I acted the brag so as to impress the Bey, in their 
way, with my determination; and he was right glad to get 
out of the ship again to communicate with his superior. He 
pressed hard to go to Patras, and lied terribly as to what had 
passed at Navarin upon that subject. I therefore wrote to 
his chief ' that I would not consent to his re-entering Nava- 
rin or any port in Europe on this side of the Dardanelles.' 
To this he has sent an answer, f that he will not oppose me, 
and that he will go to Navarin for orders ; ' with a shuffle 
about my having given permission. I then filled the 'Asia's ' 
main topsail and fired a gun, and he made his fleet fill also, 
by signal; and thus we are now jogging on towards the 
place we came from. As the French look-out frigate, the 
' Arnride,' went for De Rigny at the same time that the 
' Dartmouth ' came to me, I hope we shall find him off Nava- 
rin. My friends the 'Genoa' and 'Albion' will not stay at 
Malta longer than they can help ; but I can hardly afford to 
send anything for them. Colonel Cradock, attached to the 
Paris Embassy, has been my messmate for about a week, and 
is likely so to continue. I find him sensible, well-informed, 
and agreeable. 

Off Zante : 9 P.M. October 3. 

This is very curious work. We saw thirteen additional 
ships yesterday evening at a distance, which prove to be 
Ibrahim and two other full Admirals, one of which I take to 
be Tahir Bey. Upon their joining the others this afternoon 
the latter bore up, and I thought the whole were pushing 
for Patras. I therefore bore up also to see what could be 


done ; and I must say our fellows again received the beat to 
quarters with great cheerfulness. However, after a con- 
sultation, in which my letter was no doubt made known to 
Ibrahim, the whole hauled to the wind, as if decided on pur- 
suing their way towards Navarin. This being the case, I 
felt myself too happy to let them alone ; and as it suited my 
purpose to come here and get something to eat for us all, I 
made it a matter of delicacy that they should go on without 
any further threat on my part, and I can easily join them in 
the" morning. The ' Dartmouth ' is watching them, and will 
call me out if they bear up for Patras. It is impossible for 
me to judge of their final intentions ; and with such a dis- 
parity of force it is best for me to say no more of mine, until 
De Rigny or my own ships come to my support. We 'Asias' 
shall all have a good and quiet night's sleep at all events, 
whilst the Turks are assailed by thunder storms and very ugly 
weather. And so I must finish, with my ' God bless you 
and yours ! ' 

Zante : October 4. 

We have had a very quiet night in spite of thunder, rain, 
&c. When we anchored the sky seemed to be charged with 
Pandora's box, and I think my friend Ibrahim must have 
been a little troubled by its contents although in all this 
sort of weather we have lately had, there have been r*f* 
strong squalls of wind. And now I must wind up by telling 
you, there is no reason to think we shall have any fighting. 
There certainly was a probability of something two days ago, 
but the young ones have now given up all hopes, and you 
may as well, therefore, give up any fears that may have tor- 
mented you. And so once more, at ease or in difficulty, 
believe me your affectionately devoted, 

E. 0. 

From H. J. Codrington (Midshipman) to his Moih&r. 

1 Asia,' Zante : October 4, 1827. 
We arrived here from Navarin on the 1st, the Turks 

having promised not to do anything for twenty days 

Both squadrons had dispersed, leaving the c Dartmouth' and 
a French frigate off Navarin. The French Admiral went to 
Cervi, near Cerigo, and we came to this place with the 
' Talbot ' and ' Zebra.' But as it turned out, the Turks see- 
ing us, go away, thought the coast clear, and came out. On 
the evening of the 2nd we were lying here, the rain pouring 
in bucket! uls, when the ' Dartmouth ' hove in sight with the 
signal up that they were ' out of port.' When we had got 

D 2 


our boats in, and given the people their supper, it was dark, 
and we had to beat out of Zante Bay with light and very 
variable winds, closer to several merchantmen than they 
liked, with the rain pouring incessantly in a way that defied 
everything to keep it out. 

When we got out we stood off and on Zante, or between 
Zante and the mainland, till 12, when the Turks hove in 
sight, coming down before the wind (which was to the south- 
ward) for the Gulf of Patras. Having stuck to them all 
night, we found ourselves (' Asia,' ' Dartmouth, 5 ' Talbot,' 
and 'Zebra') in the presence of half or two-thirds of the 
Turkish fleet ! At 6 o'clock we beat to quarters and got all 
clear for action. Father then sent a message to the Admiral 
of the Turkish squadron to say, that if the ships tried to 
enter the Gulf they would be fired into, and if they fired a 
shot at the British flag, he would immediately sink the ships 
so offending. And seeing that several of the Turks were 
slow in heaving to, he accelerated their motions by despatch- 
ing several very efficient messengers to them in the shape of 
32-pound shot across their bows. It is astonishing how plain 
all guns, from the musket to the 68-pounder, can talk, par- 
ticularly a long 32-pounder, one may well say that it speaks 
volumes! In this case the summons was very well under- 
s^tood and instantly obeyed ; and afterwards the Turkish 
Rear-Admiral, the second in command, came on board, and 
being asked on what pretence they had broken their word by 
coming out of Navarin, he replied that when they were in 
Navarin their intention was to go to Hydra ; and that though 
the} 7 - had given us a promise not to go out of port for that 
purpose, that yet they did not extend it to any other place. 
Now it so happens that though we thought at the time that 
Hydra was their object, yet their promise was not to go out 
of Navarin, in fact to suspend operations for twenty days. 
After a little talk, at the end of which Father gave his ulti- 
matum, that as Ibrahim and his chiefs had broken their word 
of honour with him, he would neither let them go into Nava- 
rin nor any other port this side of the Dardanelles they, in 
number 7 frigates, 9 corvettes, 22 brigs, turned tail and 
there were we, three ships and a brig, driving them back, like 
a huntsman and the whippers in and the hounds. It was a 
very pretty and curious sight. At dusk we popped in here 
with ' Talbot ' to get some provisions, leaving ' Dartmouth ' 
to watch the Turks ; and this morning they are out of sight, 
I suppose gone to the south, as we wished them. The fact 
is they had not the slightest idea of seeing any of us here, 
and thought most likely they would have time to get past 


the Castles in the Gulf of Lepanto (or Corinth) before we 
started from Corfu, where I think they guessed we were. But 
by the French Admiral being at Cervi, he would be enabled 
to stop anything- going to Hydra, and by our being here we 
have stopped this expedition. Fancy ' Asia,' ' Dartmouth,' 
' Talbot,' and ' Zebra ' drawn up in line ahead across the 
entrance of the Gulf of Patras, saying to the Turkish fleet, 
6 Thus far, and no farther! 9 Had it been a finer day the 
sight would have been beautiful. As it is, since we have 
been in sight of Zante it has, with very short interruptions, 
been raining continually. I have never seen any decks so 
magnificent as ours when clear ! Mind there is not in the 
main and lower decks one bulkhead or cabin up, the deck is 
perfectly clear, and standing aft and looking forward they 
appear most formidable batteries ! They are quite magni- 

From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

'Asia/ off Cape Papa: October 6, 1827.* 

SIR, On the morning of the 4th inst., after writing 
my letter to you whilst lying in Zante Bay, I learned by 
communication with the 'Dartmouth,' that a considerable 
part of the Turkish fleet had stood towards Patras. As soon, 
therefore, as there was wind enough to command the ship, 
the 6 Asia ' weighed and made sail in that direction. The 
weather was very variable and squally, and it was not until 
6 P.M. that we had approached Cape Papa, where we saw 
most of the largest Turkish ships at anchor, and the rest 
of the fleet endeavouring to join them. It was evident to 
me, that this was a sly trick on the part of the Turkish 
commander to send supplies into Patras, in defiance of the 
second agreement of the Petrona Bey made with me the 
day preceding. It was observed, that the vessels still 
working up for an anchorage, directly contrary to their usual 
custom would not show their colours to us in passing. Shot 
fired near them not producing the effect of either making 
them hoist their colours, or bring to, several shots were fired 
at them from this ship and from the 6 Dartmouth ; ' and thus 
a large division of the vessels carrying the supplies, was 
prevented joining the admirals and the rest at anchor. 
Shortly after dark the weather became extremely bad ; vio- 
lent squalls from different quarters, with lightning and heavy 
rain confined our attention to the preservation of our own 
ships. At daylight it blew a hurricane, and we put before 
the wind under bare poles, in order to shelter under the lee 
* Received at Admiralty October 27. 


of Zante. At this time from twenty-five to thirty sail were 
seen under the same circumstances far ahead, between 
Zante and Cephalonia, and the rest of the fleet in a state of 
general dispersion. So soon as the gale abated, I endeavoured 
to work back and ascertain if any ships were still left in a 
position to send supplies into the Gulf of Lepanto ; and at 
9 P.M. gained an anchorage under Cape Papa, in company 
with some fifteen sail of Turkish and Austrian vessels in- 
cluding a frigate and corvette and two or three other vessels 
of war, besides the ' Dartmouth,' ' Talbot,' and ' Philomel,' 
which latter sloop hove in sight yesterday morning. This 
morning the captain of the Turkish frigate came on board 
with his Italian pilot, who said that they were returning to 
Navarin on the night of the 3rd inst. until nine o'clock, when 
Ibrahim Pacha, in a thick squall, made the signal to bear up, 
and that they anchored the next morning under Cape Papa 
at four o'clock. They remained there, being prevented going 
higher up by the contrary wind, until five P.M., when hearing 
some guns in the offing (our firing at the vessels which would 
not show their colours), Ibrahim made the signal and they 
got under way, but were dispersed by a gale of wind on the 
night of the 4th ; that Ibrahim was on board a Leghorn- 
built frigate, double -banked, but never hoisted his flag, although 
all the signals were made from his ship. The two admirals, 
with flags at the main, were Tahir Pacha and Moharem Bey. 
I informed the captain of this frigate, who asked me per- 
mission to go to Patras with supplies, which he states to 
have been the known intention of Ibrahim in bearing up in 
the night of the 3rd, that I would not permit him, repeating 
to him what I had said to the Petrona Bey ; and I gave it to 
him in writing as the only means, as he thought, of prevent- 
ing his having his head cut off on his return to Turkey. 
Trusting that the French frigate ' Arriride' will have reached 
Kear- Admiral De Eigny so as to enable him to be by this 
time off Navarin, and perhaps with him some of the ships 
under my immediate orders, I shall probably delay here- 
about so as to baffle any other attempt to send supplies into 
this Gulf. 

I have, &c., 


Zante, October 10, 1827. 

P.S. On Sunday the 7th I proceeded nearer to Patras and 
turned away two Austrian vessels which were pressing towards 
that place, notwithstanding the warning they had ; and wo 


brought away also a Turkish brig, which landed about 
twenty men at Vassaladi, the fort commanding the entrance 
to Missolunghi, in spite of the guns from this ship, the 
' Dartmouth,' and ' Talbot.' These vessels being towed as 
far as Cape Tornese were then directed to follow the Turkish 
fleet ; and on the night of the 8th we anchored in this bay 
where we have since been completing our water. 

5 P.M. The 'Alacrity' has just joined me from Corfu, with 
an account that the landing at Petala was by a party of mere 
pirates : and that she showed her colours this morning to 
seven sail of Russian vessels of war to the westward of this 
island. I have sent the ' Talbot ' with a letter to request 
Count Heiden will have the goodness to meet me off 


Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

October 6, 1827. 

We anchored under Cape Papa where we are now, at 
9 FiM. last night ; in company with ' Dartmouth,' ' Talbot,' 
and ' Philomel,' and a division of Turks of some 15, in- 
cluding a large frigate, a corvette, and 3 or 4 smaller ves- 
sels of war. Cape Papa is at the entrance of the Gulf of 
Patras, which is at the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto. My 
last letter left me on the 3rd at Zante, whilst Ibrahim and 
his fleet we supposed to be obediently working towards 
Navarin. It seems that in the night, inspired by the dirty 
weather, the dirty dog edged away for Patras, and was 
stopped by a violent wind down the Gulf from proceeding 
beyond this Cape, where we saw him and his admirals, &c., 
at anchor, after we had approached in chase to intercept his 
movements. There was evidently trick in this ; for none of 
the vessels we passed would hoist their colours (although as 
their general rule they keep them at all times flying), until 
they had several shot right at them. By thus detaining a 
considerable number of these vessels with the supplies, we 
separated them from the fleet ; and the frequent fire of this 
ship, and the ' Dartmouth,' and the ' Talbot,' was an earnest 
to Ibrahim of the spirit in which we were now acting since 
the failure of his word. 

Whatever may have been the cause, the effect was his 
weighing at and after dark, with all those around him ; 
being exposed, like ourselves, during the night to weather 
which made it enough for each to look out for ourselves ; 
and being at length obliged, like us, to put before a hurricane 


for shelter. By 8 A.M. yesterday (the 5th) the wind abated. 
We then saw some 25 sail down to leeward betwixt Zante 
and Cephalonia, at too great distance to know what they 
were ; and nearly as many more scattered about in all direc- 
tions. These, like me, imagined that the chief himself 
might still be within the gulf; and we therefore all made to 
the same point, for the same purpose. Accordingly, I found 
the 6 Asia' surrounded by them this morning; and they are 
now all under way, obeying my directions to proceed towards 
Alexandria. The captain of the frigate, who came on board 
this morning to ask my leave to go to Patras, told me that 
Ibrahim made a signal in the night to bear up for that place, 
and was stopped by the wind, as above, &c. That the two 
flags at the main were those of Moharem Bey and Tahir 
Pacha; that Ibrahim hoisted no flag, but yet made all the 
signals. Thus we have again by activity and spirit, defeated 
the object of the Turks, and fulfilled the instructions ema- 
nating from the Treaty : and we have shown that there is 
no solid foundation for the prevalent belief in either Turkish 
honour or Turkish bravery. 

Spencer is gone to bed until my dinner-hour of 3 P.M., 
having been up the last two nights ; the 'Asia,' ' Dartmouth,' 
and ' Philomel' having gained their anchorage we have all had 
a real good snooze. I cannot describe the luxury of hearing 
the rain last night pour down over my head after the 
lightning, without a breath of wind to call up the people, 
the preceding night having called every one of us on deck. 
Late last night the 6 Hinde,' cutter, brought me your letters 
to 25th September. In proportion as I myself am made 
happy by good accounts of you to so late a date, I am 
annoyed at your being so long in getting similar accounts 
of me. You will find it is neither my fault nor Hal's, for 
we have never missed an opportunity. Nor has there been 
any need of pumping ; for we have had plenty to write 
about, as my official letters alone would show you. I have 
no doubt that those alone will be found very interesting, from 
the variety of events which have occurred, and are still oc- 
curring every day suddenly and unexpectedly. 

Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

October 7. 

I told you in my last I had been so far very fortunate : I 
may again say the same ; for the many difficulties to which 
I have been exposed have turned to my personal credit. We 
6 Asia,' < Dartmouth,' ' Talbot,' and latterly the ' Philomel, 


have driven off Ibrahim and his four admirals, &c., &c., &c., 
amounting to fifty-seven sail (but excluding his three ships 
of the line, which, I conclude, were left at Navarin as not 
sea- worthy), and have prevented his succeeding in the object 
for which he broke his word, not certainly without firing 
guns, but without producing hostilities ; an effect for which 
the Allied Governments had prepared twelve ships of the 
line, besides frigates, &c. I staid behind in this Gulf of 
Patras, to prevent supplies being landed slyly in small quan- 
tities. Accordingly, seeing a brig anchor of Missolunghi 
and send off a boat full of men, we have just cut her cable, 
and are taking her out to sea, short of her boat and the 
crew in her, with her cargo of flour. From one or the other 
of us she has received several shot through her sails and hull, 
but none have been killed. The captain asked if his head 
was to be cut off, and seemed well pleased with the negative, 
which he immediately communicated to the others. * 

We have all in turn (except Dilke) been watching a corps 
of Albanians marching along in regular order. Smith was 
the longest of all, helped on by Harry, who was himself half 
an hour in finding out they were pelicans ; all books of tra- 
vels relate this sort of thing, but nobody believes it until 
they are convinced by their own experience of the similarity 
in appearance. I must also record another curiosity which 
I never saw before, that is a lunar rainbow on the night of 
the 5th, extremely perfect. The red and orange rays were 
very discernible. 

From H. J. Codrington to his Mother. 

' Asia/ off Navarin : October 18. 

At dusk on the 4th it came on to blow very fresh out of the 
Gulf, and, after having furled all the sails, we were obliged 
to bear up again for the mouth of the gulf till it moderated. 
At daylight we were at the entrance of the gulf, ' Dartmouth,' 
6 Talbot,' and ' Philomel ' in company, but only one or two 
stray Turks to be seen. ' Philomel ' told us Lord Cochrane 
and the steamer with several Greek brigs had been in the 
Gulf of Lepanto, and that Lord Cochrane had left it, but the 
steamer, &c., had burnt nine vessels, either belonging to or 
in pay of the Turks, amongst them some Austrian merchant- 
men, who had just landed some corn for the Turks, and 
whose masters were at the Turkish camp getting their money. 
She also told us that when she was running down during 
the night, the Turkish fleet had come down before the wind 


under a very heavy press of sail, and passed her in great 
confusion, running right out of the gulf at a devil of a rate ; 
and, on taking a careful look from our mast-head, we did see 
half of them to leeward very much dispersed. That evening 
(October 5) we anchored near Cape Papa among a few 
Turks, whom we sent off next morning (6th). The captain 
of one said that most likely if we did not let him go to Patras 
Ibrahim would cut his head off for not getting there, and the 
poor man was very disconsolate for some time. So that there 
was very good reason for those fellows so obstinately per- 
sisting the day before. On the 7th we weighed and ran up 
the gulf a little higher past Cape Papa, turned a few more 
Turkish and Austrian brigs, &c., out, had a good look at 
Missolunghi, &c., and a glimpse at Patras. Missolunghi is 
built on a perfect flat at the foot of some very high hills 
running N. W. and S.E. about ; on the shore of the gulf it is 
surrounded on the land side by low and impassable marshes, 
except on one front, which is fortified, if I may so call it, by 
a ditch and wall, neither in good repair. Eeport says there 
were sixty pieces of cannon mounted in the town. Towards 
the sea no vessel bigger than a small boat could come within 
several miles of it, on account of the shoals and sand banks 
which form the lagoons, or lakes, between it and the sea. 
From the entrance of the banks to the town there are only 
one or two canals, or passages, for even boats, which pas- 
sages are serpentine and very difficult to find ; as to the 
lagoons themselves, the} 7 are of too soft a bottom to be ford- 
able, but too sticky a one to be navigable for anything but 
flat-bottomed boats. There are also several tiers of banks 
above water between the outer one or entrance, and the town, 
with only a few passages, and those difficult to find. One of 
the outer entrances (the chief one) is guarded by a small fort 
called Yassiladi, which has only two narrow passages to it, 
although the great passage into the gates is close under its 
guns. We saw it (in 1825 or 1826, when in the Naiad) 
taken from the Greeks by the Turks, by means of their flat- 
bottomed gunboats which they built at Patras, towed over 
to the lakes, and got in at a smaller entrance out of shot. 
At one time there were upwards of twenty of these, some 
with two and some with three guns, firing at this fort. It 
was taken in consequence of the magazine being blown up by 
a shell, In consequence of its loss the Greeks could no longer 
victual Missolunghi from the sea, as that passage by the fort 
was the only one that could admit loaded boats. As to the 
town, while we were at anchor off it in ' the Naiad ' we regu- 
larly saw them begin every evening at nine o'clock, firing 
into and bombarding it, and once or twice saw a general 


assault, always at night, and invariably repulsed. It was 
certainly very beautiful, and amused the first watch very 
much. During the day they were generally very inactive, 
except when either party fired a chance gun ; then it was 
immediately answered and re-answered for five minutes, when 
they left off. This happened five or six times a day. Latterly, 
I believe, the Turks had nearly fifty large flat-bottomed gun- 
boats on the lakes against the town. Before its fall the garri- 
son had eaten nothing but sea-weed for four days. Then they 
made their last desperate sally ; part escaped, part were re- 
pulse'd, and the Turks immediately storming the town, the 
garrison being so much weakened, were driven from the 
batteries to the armed houses, where, finding there was no 
chance of escape, they ultimately blew up themselves and chil- 
dren. But, to return to present time, the red flag was waving 
on the little fort, and, having taken out a brig which was 
at anchor near the fort, and which had a boat with her 
officers on shore, we commenced beating out, taking in 
tow several Austrian brigs, &c., which still hovered round. 
. . . On the 13th, in the morning, we fell in with the 
Eussian squadron (4 sail of the line, 2 frigates, and 1 
corvette) ; and subsequently with the French squadron. 
In the evening the French squadron (two sail of the 
line, two frigates, &c.), went to Zante, and we, Russians in 
company, continued our route to Navarin. The same day 
two Turkish corvettes came from Ibrahim, who was at Na- 
varin, to enquire after part of his fleet, and to ask leave to 
go to Patras, which was refused. It was curious to observe 
how the Turks kept clear of the Russian ships and got under 
our lee. When the Russians came near them they bore up 
and ran to the side of us, for they did not like their looks. 
The Russian ships are very clean, and, I think, in very good 
order. Many of their officers speak good English, and several 
of them served as volunteers in the English navy during the 
war. Count Heiden is the Russian Rear-Admiral, his flag- 
ship is ' the Azoff.' They all have their names on their sterns, 
appear quite new, and, their copper being new, is of a beau- 
tiful dark rose colour, which very much improves the appear- 
ance of the ships. Since our arrival we have been cruising 
about as usual, waiting for the French, who arrived here 

From Sir Frederick Adam to Sir E. C. 

Corfu: October^ 1827. 

I am very anxious to hear what has been the result of your 
bold, decided measures, and that the return to Navarin has 


been prevented. If you meet the French squadron in time 
I am confident you will prevent their returning to that port ; 
I even anticipate this result if you don't fall in with aid. It 
has given me great pleasure and a sensible gratification to 
hear of your little force commanding and directing one so 
superior ; and I admire the decision which produced this 
result. I hope, however, very soon to learn how this has 

From Sir E. C. to Sir Frederick Adam. 

Zante : October 10, 1827. 

Knowing that I have had this work to perform with such 
a small force, the good folks at home will be anxious for 
further news ; and will partake of my satisfaction in having 
defeated Ibrahim's object without actual hostilities, and in 
this arrival of the Russian ships preventing my being again 
placed in a similar extremity. The 14th was the day fixed 
for De Rigny and myself re-joining off Navarin when we 
still relied on Ibrahim's promise ; therefore we are sure to 
assemble there all together in readiness to act decisively. 

I am glad Lord C. has given up his projects in Albania. 
He might have had pretty pickings out of this fleet after the 
late gale, if he had had anything hanging about for such a 
purpose. I dare say that he is gone back to Poros ; as the 
time for which his men were entered is nearly out, and they 
won't serve without being regularly paid up. 

As to my having steamers, you may judge of the en- 
couragement I have to ask for such aid, when I tell you" I 
am allowed 20 men for manning the tenders which take 65 ; 
that we are so over-armed in proportion to our men, that 
being now several short, we could only put 9 men to a 32- 
pounder if we were to fight the whole ; and that having 
about 2,000 fathoms of one-sized rope in wear as lifts and 
braces, always liable to go from being always relied upon for 
supporting the yards, we have some 85 fathoms to replace 
them as our full allowance. This is economy with a 
vengeance, but I trust our new master will order it in a more 
un-Secretarial manner. 

10 P.M. 

I have just got your note of the 8th by the steamer. I 
assure you my good friend I know the value of your good 
opinion of my conduct and prize your expression of it accord- 
ingly. We certainly put a good face on it, and I suspect 
Ibrahim thought we had been joined by some of our friends, 
by his bolting away as he did, after having sacrificed his 


honour in order to effect his purpose. If De E. got to 
Navarin in time, lie will have shut the door on Ibrahim of 
course : but if not, we can now force him into our measures 
without difficulty. 

P.S. Stovin tells me the Turkish fleet have got into 
Navarin. I fear De Rigny again changed his mind, and did 
not go to Cervi to water, as he settled to do, but went away 
to Milo or Poros ; or else he must have got back in time to 
stop them. 

Yours, with great regard, 


Sir E. G. to Lady G. 

Zante : October 9, 9 P.M. 

The ' Alacrity ' came here this evening from Corfu having 
shown her colours to seven sail of Russian ships-of-wa,r on 
the other side of this island. This is a good bit of news for 
you as well as me, for it will show you that I shall now have 
ample means of doing what is required, and that my anxiety 
will be greatly diminished : as you know what sort of man 
Adam is and that his good opinion is well worth having, I will 
enclose a note I received from him last night. It was im- 
possible for me to prevent the fleet getting back to Navarin 
as there were always some devils hanging back for Patras, 
and at the last we were obliged to use both shot and the 
tow-rope to effect our purpose. It is of no consequence, 
except that the job would certainly have been more complete. 
However, I may fairly say to you that if my masters are not 
contented with me they are vepy unreasonable. 

October 9 (after hearing the news of Mr. Canning's death). 

I admired him as much as most people out of his personal 
circle, but I cannot forget the blots in his political conduct, 
blots which the good arising from the change of system he 
was about establishing would certainly have wiped off, but 
which at this early period it is quite impossible to forget. 

However, he is a very severe loss to us just 

now, and it is lamentable that he should not have lived to 
see the benefits of his late measures. 

From Sir Frederick Adam to Lady G. 

Corfu : October 14, 1827. 

Although I send the latest accounts of the Admiral from 
himself, you must, my dear Madam, submit to receiving 
this also, that I may congratulate you, as I do most sincerely, 
on Codrinsrton's brilliant achievement, for such I must con- 


sider his late encounters with the promise-breaking Turkish 
fleet. The Admiral's whole conduct has been a fine specimen 
of prompt, bold, and manly decision, has done him great 
honour, and added to the character of the noble service to 
which he belongs. Fifty three against four, and the four 
obliging their opponents to comply with their demand ! it 
has really done me good. I am national enough to be pleased 
too, that this important service has been accomplished by 
the English squadron alone : this may be called narrow- 
minded, but I am Englishman enough to have such narrow- 
minded feelings. 

With great truth, your very sincere, &c., 


From General Ponsonby to Sir E. G. 

Malta: October 21, 1827. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, Again let me congratulate you on 
the success of your late operations (at Patras) which could 
not have succeeded except by the greatest decision in most 
critical circumstances, and by this decision the peace of 
the world is still maintained. 

From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty.* 

1 Asia/ at Zante : October 10, 1827. 

SIR, I have more than once had to complain of the 
irregular conduct of Lord Cochrane. You will now inform 
his Eoyal Highness the Lord High Admiral that I received 
a letter from his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick 
Adam on the 23rd of last month, stating that information 
had reached him of a Greek squadron under his Lordship 
having on board a considerable body of troops said to be 
under the command of General Church, being about to make 
an attack on some parts of the Albanian provinces to the 
north of the Gulf of Prevesa. Agreeing with Sir F. Adam, 
and my opinion being sanctioned by that of Rear- Admiral 
De Rigny, that it was requisite to restrain the Greek forces 
from exciting revolt in parts not hitherto the theatre of war, 
I immediately sent the 'Philomel' to wherever Lord 
Cochrane might be, with directions to Commander, Lord 
Viscount Ingestrie, to make known to the commanders of the 
expedition that I considered it my duty in the present state 
of affairs to prevent such a measure being carried into exe- 
cution; and that I should shortly present myself in that 
neighbourhood. The ' Philomel ' joined me off Cape Papa 

* Received October 27. 


on the 5th inst. ; and Lord Ingestrie reported that upon his 
showing the order to Lord Cochrane his Lordship promised 
to guide himself by the spirit of it. Lord Ingestrie then 
passed into the Gulf of Lepanto where he made a similar 
communication to General Church, who equally expressed 
his decision to attend to it. That general was at Vostitza 
on the 4th inst., meditating the blockade of Patras by land. 
Yesterday, I received another despatch from Sir Frederick 
Adam, reporting to me the occupation of the Island of Petala 
by a part of Lord Cochrane's force, and requiring the assist- 
ance of a frigate. As the ( Ariadne ' must have reached Corfu 
very soon after the date of this last letter, and as I hear the 
' Hellas,' with a steamer in tow, was seen on September 28, 
off ' Cephalonia,' steering to the southward, I trust the 
Lord High Commissioner will have had sufficient means of 
restoring that island to its former state of neutrality. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. G. to Sir Henry Wellesley. 

< Asia,' Zante : October 11, 1827. 

MY DEAR SIR HENRY, As your son will have told you of 
our proceedings and of his being a party to them in this 
ship, I need only say that we have brought Turkish honour 
and Turkish valour to a discount : there have been two 
occasions in which I thought it impossible they could yield 
without fighting for it ; but they nevertheless, after forfeiting 
their word of honour to effect their purpose of giving sup- 
plies to Patras, &c., gave up that purpose rather than 
encounter the broadside of this ship, supported by the little 
( Dartmouth ' frigate, the lesser f Talbot ' with her carronades, 
and the ' Zebra ' brig. As we were to avoid hostilities, it is 
a satisfaction to me to have effected the object with such a 
modicum of the force prepared for that service by the Allied 
Governments, without going to such an extremity. I fear 
Admiral De Rigny did not get back to Navarin in time to 
prevent Ibrahim and his fleet re-entering that port. How- 
ever, there his Highness's expedition will terminate its 
hostile career, I think, since the Russian squadron is an- 
nounced to me as being now off this island. 1 hear a report 
of the ' Sultan ' having been at direct variance with his 
divan, and having quitted them and joined his army at 
Scutari, where he is building another seraglio. The Greeks, 
instead of aiding their own cause, are mostly employed in 
piracies at sea and on shore : and whenever the affair is 


settled with the Turks, we shall have an endless work to 
perform in bringing the Greeks to anything like regularity. 
If Capo d'Istria come with some 3,000 or 4,000 Swiss to 
support his government, things may do well, but so long 
as the Capitani are to continue their sway, so long will vice 
prevail over patriotism and even common honesty. 
Very sincerely yours, 


From Sir E. G. to Mr. S. Canning, Constantinople. 

1 Asia,' off Navarin : October 14, 1827. 

SIR, I had the honour of addressing Your Excellency on 
the 29th of last month by the ( Dryad,' which ship proceeded 
to Smyrna. The enclosed copies of letters to the Admiralty,* 
and of one to his Excellency Sir Henry Wellesley,f will 
afford you all the information of our proceedings since that 
date. The Russian squadron, consisting of four sail of the 
line, three frigates, and a corvette, joined company yesterday 
morning off Zante, and are now proceeding with me towards 
Navarin. Bear- Admiral De Rigny also joined company 
yesterday with part of his squadron, but went into Zante 
with them for the purpose of getting refreshments. It 
appears that when off Cerigo proceeding to Cervi, La 
Provence ' ran aboard * le Scipion ' in the night, by which 
accident both ships were disabled, the one losing her main- 
mast and the other her bowsprit. Whilst remaining at 
Cervi the mainmast was taken out of f la Provence ' and 
put into 'le Scipion,' which will make the latter ship 
effective. * la Provence ' is ordered to Toulon. It is very 
creditable to Admiral De Eigny's squadron to have effected 
this very difficult operation. It is, however, much to be 
lamented that such an accident should have prevented the 
French squadron coming off Navarin during the time that 
Ibrahim's fleet was at sea, as we could then have given it 
what direction we pleased. Upon Admiral De Rigny's re- 
turn I shall consult with him and Count Heiden as to the 
propriety of forcing Ibrahim to come out and proceed to 

I have, &c., 


* Relative to the affair at Patras. 
t Relative to Austrian vessels. 


From Sir E. C. to Mr. 8. Canning. 

'Asia,' off Navarin: October 14, 1827. 

DEAR SIR, Yesterday, at the moment of being joined by 
the Russian squadron, I received by the ' Brisk ' your letters 
of the 28th and 29th September, with their enclosures. 
Although, from the want of a correct understanding of Ad- 
miral De Eigny's plans and rendezvous, and from my being 
unable to detach a vessel to make known my sudden move- 
ments after the Turkish fleet, I was put into a very critical 
situation, and felt myself called upon to state the difficulties 
I had to contend with, it becomes me to assure you that 
my colleague would have gladly co-operated with me from 
the first, with the same zeal and cordiality which I have 
found in him since our meeting. The only vessels which knew 
of my comimg this way were driven by a gale of wind be- 
yond Candia ; and when the ' Cambrian ' came as far as 
Sapienza in search of me, I was carried by a current as far 
as the Strophades. For all the extraordinary events which 
have attended Ibrahim's breach of faith I refer you to my 
letters to his Eoyal Highness the Lord High Admiral, of 
which I sent you copies with my official letter. I was 
always of opinion that something was meditated in the 
neighbourhood of Patras, before the avowed attack on Hy- 
dra; I therefore placed myself at Zante, where I could be 
ready for any small detachments from this port, as well as to 
watch the motions of Lord Cochrane. I did not, however, 
feel any doubt of Ibrahim's ostensibly fulfilling his engage- 
ment, any more than did Admiral De Eigny ; or I should 
not have sent my squadron into Malta to refit. That the 
service which was thrown upon me by this violation of good 
faith was arduous and critical, will be evident to you on the 
perusal of my narrative ; and that by the gallant and able 
support of the little band which I had with me, I was enabled 
to defeat the purpose for which Ibrahim sacrificed his honour, 
I shall consider as one of the most fortunate circumstances 
of my professional life. I reckoned on being back here in 
time to prevent the re-entry of the fleet ; but that very wind 
which favoured my first object, by dividing and dispersing 
them, detained me off Missolunghi so long that I could only 
hope for that measure being effected by the arrival of the 
French or Eussian squadron. When Admiral De Eigny 
returns from Zante, I shall confer with him and Count Hei- 
den as to taking measures for forcing Ibrahim's return to 



Egypt. He is now less entitled to delicacy on our part ; 
and if he before stood in awe of the 'Asia' singly, he may be 
very ready to yield obedience to the ten sail of the line 

From Sir E. C. to Mr. S. Canning 

'Asia,' off Navarin : October 14, 1827. 

DEAR SIR, I have written you such a private letter as I 
think you will find no difficulty in showing to your colleagues. 
In thatl have touched upon Admiral DeRigny's not joining me, 
in such a way as I hope will make all smooth as far as concerns 
his sincerity. He does not, however, understand service in 
our way of performing it, and seems to incline much more to 
the diplomatic. After asking about his ships going away 
from hence when ours did, and being advised by me to let 
them remain here three or four days, and then profit by a 
strong northerly wind to let them get away in the night 
when they would not be seen, he took them off the next day 
in sight of the Turks, and of an Austrian vessel of war, which 
of course gave notice of his movements. When off Cerigo, 
two of his ships ran foul of each other, by which both were 
disabled, until (much to their credit) they transferred the 
mainmast of the one to the other in Cervi Bay. The 'Armide' 
carried him the news of Ibrahim's breach of faith at the 
same time that the 'Dartmouth' came to me; but there he 
remained, and only joined me yesterday ; whereby, besides 
leaving me unsupported to prevent the success of Ibrahim's 
treachery, he lost the opportunity which his coming directly 
here with his other two ships of the line, his own large 
frigate, and the 'Armide,' &c., would have given him, of pre- 
venting the return of the Turkish expedition into Navarin ; 
and conducting them, as in that case we should be now 
doing, back to their own ports. He joined me yesterday at 
the same time as Count Heiden ; and though I proposed we 
should have a conference as soon as the wind should mode- 
rate, he proposed going to Zante, if I had no objection, for 
stock for his officers. I offered to share mine with him, but 
he said all his officers were in the same destitution ; and, as 
he still clung to it, and said he would not be a whole day 
absenb, I could not but consent. Such is the man, and I 
therefore mention it to you. But at the same time he is 
quite ready to act as I wish when present with me ; and, 
though delays and difficulties will arise, I doubt not but we 
shall come out pretty well in the end. Count Heiden was on 
board the 'Asia' to-day, and is to dine with me to-niorrow. 
He appears to be all I could wish ; like one of our service, 


eager to act under my orders as he is directed by his instruc- 
tions to do, whether the French commander do the same or 
not; and his ships are apparently in good service -like order. 
He says, but for being ordered to rendezvous at Messina 
(and then Zante) he should have been here a fortnight sooner. 
He will write to propose Malta hereafter, instead of Mes- 
sina. At the moment of his joining there were two Turkish 
corvettes coming to ask me after seven missing vessels, three 
of which they openly said were Austrians. I told them I knew 
nothing of their vessels, and upon their asking to go to the 
Gulf of Patras, and getting from me a flat refusal, they went 
away from Navarin, and of course made known the arrival of 
the Eussian squadron. To-day we have shown ourselves close 
enough for Ibrahim to see their colours, and I imagine it 
was a sight to him not of the most agreeable description. 
Captain Hamilton has got your letters to him, and is gone 
to make a visit to Pedro Bay at Maina. Admiral De Eigny 
talked to me about his letter on piracy and gave me a copy 
of it, some time after he had received your answer to Count 
Guilleminot upon its contents. Thinking we had then quite 
enough upon our hands here, I did not enter much into 
the subject. I may say at once to you that I by no means 
agree to his plan of having a tribunal at Syra, a plan origi- 
nating in his wish to favour the Catholics there, whom he 
considered under his immediate protection. So soon as the 
actual warfare ceases, I apprehend some regular consular 
agents will be appointed ; and their signatures at the seat of 
Government may perhaps be a good countersign to the docu- 
ments furnished by the executives. I am told that the 
eagerness on the part of the said executives for these con- 
demnations arises from their receiving a twentieth part 
themselves, which they account for as they please. I have 
used, and must use, strong language to these people, and 
must take strong measures also : or the delay in completing 
the object of the Treaty may almost annihilate our commerce 
in these seas. 

Tuesday, 16th, 10 A.M. 

As Eear- Admiral De Eigny is not yet returned from Zante, 
and as it is important that the arrival of the Eussian squadron 
should be known by you and your colleagues, I will send my 
letters, and those of Count Heiden off at once. Whenever 
you suspect a reason for having another vessel at Tenedos, 
after you may have despatched the ' Eifleman,' you will of 
course let me hear of it. 

Believe me, &c., 


E 2 


P.S. Sir F. Stovin believes that the line of limitation being 
extended to Arta might interfere with the supply of cattle 
to the Ionian Islands ; but I shall shortly have Sir F. Adam's 
official answer to this question. 

October 16, 3 P.M. 

Since I enclosed my letter this morning, an Austrian cor- 
vette, which I have no doubt is the ( Carolina,' made such a 
push for Modon that I directed the 'Dartmouth' and 'Tal- 
bot ' to endeavour to stop her, and bring her to me. I think 
they will be too late. The ' Cambrian ' is now under signal 
to stop two Austrian schooners doing the same thing ; but 
to say that if charged with despatches for Ibrahim or the 
Turks, they may go. I wish to commit them to the fact, 
but not to prevent a communication which possibly may 
occasion the retirement of the expedition to Turkey. Count 
Heiden and I have agreed upon a note to Ibrahim, which we 
proposed having signed by Commodore Milius, if Mons. De 
Rigny should not return in time, and then sending it in with 
the hope of stopping him in laying waste the country as he 
is now doing. 

Your very obedient servant, 


From Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

Off Navarin : October 15, 1827. 

On the 13th, when close to the southward of Zante, we 
were joined by both the French and Russian squadrons. It 
seems that two of the former, the ' Provence ' and ' Scipion,' 
ran foul of each other off Cerigo, that the mainmast of the 
former was transferred to the latter in Cervi Bay,* a job 
which does them great credit, and that the i Provence ' is 
gone to Toulon. The Russians seem to be in good service- 
like condition, well managed, and very desirous of going 
hand in hand with us in everything. Count Heiden is quite 
like one of us, candid, hearty, and eager to act under my 
orders. Our visit yesterday made us well-acquainted, and as 
he dines with me to-day, we shall henceforth fully understand 
one another. I think to-morrow will bring my own two 
friends* from Malta (' Genoa' and 'Albion') and De Rigny 
back from Zante, where he went on the 13th with his squadron, 
to get some grub. I offered to share mine with him, having 
already sent him two sheep and twelve fowls ; but as he 
pressed the point, I did not like to offer any objection to his 

* NOTE BY SIK E. C. ' De Rigny remained there after "1'Armide" had 
joined him, in order to see this operation.' 


going, ill-timed as it was. I must say that now, after having 
done what excites the approbation of all hands, I feel some- 
what proud of my mixed and most extraordinary command. 
The whole history will be better detailed by others than 
by myself; for I have not time for more than my actual 
duty claims, except this little relaxation with you. It is 
altogether so curious : we have at this minute a Greek 
brig-of-war in company which brought me letters, and a 
Turk watching our movements, in addition to our own three 
flags. Sir G. Don calls the Treaty the tricolour treaty, which 
I think not inappropriate. 

From Lord Dudley to Sir E. C* 

F. 0. : November 5, 1827. 

MY DEAE SIR EDWARD, An Ionian messenger goes to-day, 
and though it is not my business to communicate with you 
officially, yet I may be allowed to tell you as a friend how 
much I am gratified by the spirit and ability you have shown 
in the late transactions with the Turks. 

If this affair is speedily and satisfactorily terminated, you 
will have contributed your full share to that result. 

We are on the tiptoe of expectation for accounts of the 
effect produced at Constantinople by the communication from 
Ibrahim Pacha. Upon that depends the turn subsequent 
events are to take. 

Believe me, ever most truly yours, 


Lord Dudley was Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs : there was no hesitation in expressing approval 
of the execution by force of a portion of the Treaty, 
when it had been successful, without a battle. But the 
account of this bold act of personal and naval respon- 
sibility, maintained by cannon shot against so superior a 
force this first instalment of active hostility was 
never published, either from ministerial fear, or from 
some anti- professional influence at the Admiralty. And 
so, the gallantry called forth by this almost unique 
episode, and the success resulting from the moral effect 
of that gallant bearing, have remained even to this time 
almost unknown to the English public. It is, however, 

* After receiving the account of the encounter with the Turkish fleet off 
Patras on October 4. 


such acts as these that awaken the warm sympathy of 
Englishmen, and the public acknowledgment of which 
forms the best incitement to their imitation. 

It seemed as if those in England responsible for the 
Treaty, did not dare to show to the world that its 
execution against the will of Turkey involved actual 
hostility. This affair of Patras was a warning a prac- 
tical measure of war, sure to culminate in something 
more serious when the time, might come for enforcing 
upon the Turkish and Egyptian forces a full compliance 
with the Treaty. Meanwhile, the warm cordiality of 
Lord Dudley became checked, and this was the last ex- 
pression of it. No more private letters were received 
from him, and the next communication from his Lord- 
ship was the official -despatch containing the 'Queries.' 



THE following warning from Admiral De Rigny to 
the French officers in the Turkish fleet was supposed to 
have been given some time before, when if done it might 
have had a very advantageous effect. 

From Admiral De Rigny to 'Messrs. Letellier, Bompard, et autres 
Officiers fran$ais a bord de la Flotte turque.' 

Syrene : le 15 octobre 1827. 

MESSIEURS, La situation dans laquelle vous voyez les 
flottes ottomanes blocquees dans le port de Navarin, la 
circonstance du manque de parole de S.A. Ibrahim Pacha, 
qui s'etait engage a une suspension d'armes provisoire, doit 
vous indiquer que desormais vous pouvez vous trouver en 
face de votre pavilion. Vous savez les chances que vous 
courez, et en vous sommant de quitter le service turc au 
moment ou la flotte ottomane s'est placee dans une situation 
agressive dont elle doit courir les chances, je vous donne un 
avis que vous ne devez pas negliger si vous etes restes 

J'ai Phonneur, etc., 


Order by Sir E. C. 

Given on board the < Asia,' off Navarin : October 16, 1827. 
WHEREAS, I have received information that a part of the 
army of Ibrahim Pacha, in direct breach of the agreement 
which he made with Bear- Admiral De Rigny and myself on 
September 25 last, has advanced into the plain of Kalamata, 
where it is ravaging the country, destroying the habitations, 
and burning the olive and other fruit trees ; and that it is 
likely to force the pass of Varga for the purpose of going to 
Maina you are hereby directed to proceed in the ship you 
command towards Varga, put yourself in communication 


with the Greeks, and use your utmost endeavours not only 
to defend them against these barbarities, but to drive back 
the army of the Pacha within the lines of Navarin. 

To G. W. Hamilton, C.B., 

Captain of H. M. Ship ' Cambrian.' 

From the English, French, and Russian Admirals to His 
Highness Ibrahim Pacha. 

A bord du vaisseau de S.M.B. 'Asia/ le 17 octobre 1827. 

ALTESSE, Des informations tres-positives, qui nous ar- 
rivent de toutes parts, nous annoncent que de nombreux de- 
tachemens de votre armee parcourent dans differens sens la 
partie occidentale de la Moree ; qu'ils devastent, detruisent, 
brulent, arrachent les arbres, les vignes, toutes les produc- 
tions vegetales ; qu'ils se hatent enfin de faire de cette con- 
tree un veritable desert. 

Nous apprenons de plus, qu'une expedition est preparee 
contre les districts de Maina, et que deja des forces avancent 
dans cette direction. 

Tous ces actes de violence extreme se passent sous les yeux 
pour ainsi dire, et au mepris de I'armistice que Votre Altesse 
s'est engagee sous sa parole d'honneur d'observer fideleuient 
jusqu'au retour de ses courriers armistice en faveur duquel 
la rentree de sa uotte a Navarin lui fat accordee le 26 septem- 
bre dernier. 

Les soussignes se voient dans la penible obligation de 
vous declarer aujourd'hui qu'une pareille conduite de votre 
part, une violation aussi etrange de vos engagemens, vous 
placent, Monsieur, hors la loi des nations, et au dehors des 
Traites exista'ns entre leurs Cours et la Porte ottomane. 

II y a plus ; les soussignes considerent les devastations qui 
se commettent dans ce moment meme par vos ordres, comme 
directement contraires aux interets de votre souverain, qui 
pourroit perdre, en raison de ces devastations, les avaiitages 
rels que le Traite de Londres lui assure sur la Grece. 

Les soussignes demandent a Votre Altesse une reponse 
categorique et prompte a la presente notification, et ils lui 
laissent a prevoir les consequences immediates d'un refus ou 
d'une tergiversation. 

EDWD. CODRINGTON, Vice-Admiral. 
H. DE RIGNY, Contre-Amiral. 


From Colonel Cradock to Sir E. 0. 

H.M.S. < Dartmouth/ off Navarin: October 18, 1827. 
SIR, In compliance with your desire I proceeded to Navarin 
with the letter for Ibrahim Pacha from the three Admirals. 
On entering the Port, Captain Fellowes sent an officer on 
board the ship bearing the flag of Mucharem Bey, with a 
request that Mr. Abro, Ibrahim Pacha's interpreter, might 
be informed of my wish to see him. The officer brought 
back word that Ibrahim was absent they knew not where, 
and that Mr. Abro was at Modon, at two hours' distance, 
but that a messenger should be sent to him, and that he 
would probably come to Navarin that evening or early the 
next day. At 10 o'clock this morning Mr. Abro came on 
board the ( Dartmouth.' I told him that I had a letter 
signed by the three Admirals which I was directed to deliver 
to the Pacha. Mr. Abro replied that Ibrahim was not at 
Navarin. I asked him whether it was not probable that the 
Pacha might return were he informed that a person had 
arrived with a letter of great importance from the Admirals, 
and who wished to present it personally ; or, that if he would 
find me a horse and accompany me, that I would proceed to 
wherever the Pacha might be, provided it was within a day's 
distance. Mr. Abro replied that unfortunately there was no 
means whatever of forwarding the letter to His Highness, as 
his movements had been kept a profound secret, and that 
nobody knew where he was. On Mr. Abro giving me his 
honour of this, I proposed to Captain Fellowes to return to 
the squadron, and I enclose herewith to Your Excellency the 
letter with which you entrusted me. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

October 17, 

We have sent in a paper to Ibrahim by which we hope to 
stop his ravaging the country, as he is now doing in mere 
spite ; and at the same time giving him an opening for any 
fresh proposal which he may have to make, now that he has 
probably had an answer from his father. We are now as- 
sembled in full force It is said Ibrahim is very sulky 

in consequence of being foiled so unexpectedly in the object 
for which he sacrificed his word of honour ; and well he may, 


for lie lias heretofore prided himself in his character for both 
courage and honour, as the Turks understand the latter at 
least ; and I have certainly exposed his want of both, with 
an inferiority of force which removes all excuse. He was 
probably instructed to avoid war as strongly as J was, but I 
presume he had orders which he was bound to execute at all 
risks, or else he would not have broken faith ; and in this 
we were equally under the responsibility of originating a 
war, when peace was the object in view. It is my good 
fortune to have escaped that extremity; and yet to have 
effected that with one ship of the line, which was destined 
to have been performed by twelve. 

Now, is not this enough of myself? I think it may do for 
the present at all events, if I add, that both Harry and my- 
self are quite well. However, you will have more of me from 
others, for I shall send you the nattering expressions of Sir 
Frederick Adam, who did not then know the worst which befell 
me ; and of Sir Frederick Ponsonby, another soldier of the 
same right sort, who knew only the first act of the drama. 

I like my new colleague (Admiral Heiden) much ; he is 
a straightforward sort of fellow, and ready, perhaps too 
ready, to go all lengths. He says if he had not had such 
positive orders to go to Messina, and had gone to Malta in- 
stead, he would have been here a fortnight sooner. He was 
only three days at Portsmouth ; went there unprepared and 
unknowing his destination, and had to get provisions, &c., 
for the voyage. Messina ! of all places, the last for the pur- 
pose. He has now written to propose Malta. 

P.S. Our letter to Ibrahim is brought back unopened, his 
lying dragoman saying nobody knows where he is gone. I 
dare say he will be found to-morrow, if the wind favour our 
running into an anchorage alongside his ships. 

Sir E. C. to Lady Emily Ponsonby at Malta. 

Off Navarin : October 18, 1827. 

Many thanks, my dear Lady Emily, for your kind chatty 
note, which accompanied that of the 8th from Ponsonby. 
The expressions of approbation which I have received from 
him and from Adam, as coming from men who have none of 
that which is so well understood by the vulgar word humbug 
about them, are very agreeable to me, and I trust they will 
have no reason to think otherwise of my subsequent pro- 
ceedings. My Russian colleague is more of my sort than the 
other, and is desirous of being always with me and going 


hand in hand with me on all occasions. De Rigny is quite 
as much so when we are together, but he has none of that 
endurance which became the character of our profession in 
the late war, and which is wanted for the present service. 
This it is which leads to his being out of the way at parti- 
cular times when his presence is much wanted, and which 
brings on him the character of insincerity. However, I 
might easily have had a worse colleague, and I doubt not, 
since we now understand each other, we shall get through 
the business very well. 

From Sir E. 0. to G. Glaraki, Secretary to Provisional Govern- 
ment of Greece. 

< Asia/ off Navarin : October 18, 1827. 

SIR, In answer to your three letters of September 24, 
last, I shall begin by saying that, as I believe the owners of 
the ' Achilles ' to be much more in fault than the people 
whom they send to sea for the purpose of committing piracies, 
instead of doing what they wish I will do my utmost to 
have the ship destroyed, and to make them responsible for 
all the damage she has done. 

Next, as to the conduct of Captain Lambessi. As his con- 
duct in plundering the ( Kitty ' English brig of her cargo, is 
much more blameable than the conduct of the master of the 
' Kitty,' instead of suffering that vessel to be carried before 
your tribunal, she is already set at liberty : and if the Greek 
Government and the Greek tribunal had an honest and up- 
right sense of justice, they would punish the Greek captains 
for such infamous conduct. 

You claim from me this vessel as the right of your nation, 
and you call upon me for justice and humanity in favour of 
public robbers, against my own countrymen who have not 
been proved to have committed any offence, and whose com- 
merce it is my duty to protect. And you then talk to me 
about the rights of a nation whose subjects, under the pro- 
tection of their government, are committing piracies upon 
the commerce of the three Allied Powers which are making 
enormous sacrifices for them. I deny all claim on the part 
of such a Government, and on the part of a nation that sub- 
mits to be so governed. I now hear of an Ionian vessel, 
part of whose cargo was condemned by your tribunal, being 
plundered at Egina of the remainder by express orders from 
you, in the name of the Greek Government. When other 
important matters admit of it, I will give my attention more 
particularly to these abuses. In the meantime I must inform 


you that I shall consider you and the individual members 
composing the present Provisional Government of Greece, as 
personally responsible for this outrage ; and my future appli- 
cations will be made to the legislative body. With respect 
to the news contained in the postscript of your letter, I can 
inform you that if I had not, with only the ' Asia,' ' Dart- 
mouth,' ' Talbot,' and ' Zebra,' placed myself between the 
whole Turkish fleet and the entrance to the Gulf of Patras, 
both Captain Hastings and Captain Thomas, the only people 
whom I hear of opposing their enemy, would have been en- 
tirely destroyed ; and had those Greek cruisers which have 
been seizing English vessels even as far as the Island of 
Maritimo, been as much disposed to make war against the 
Turks, they might have made prizes from the scattered 
Turco-Egyptian fleet, which would have been a source of 
both profit and honour. 

From Captain Hamilton to Sir E. Codrington. 

H.M.S. < Cambrian/ Kitries : October 18, 1827. 

I have the honour of informing you that I arrived here 
yesterday morning in company with the Eussian frigate 
4 Constantine,' the captain of which ship had placed himself 
under my orders. On entering the gulf, we observed by 
clouds of fire and smoke, that the work of devastation was 
still going on. The ships were anchored off the pass of 
Ancyro, and a joint letter from myself and the Eussian cap- 
tain was despatched to the Turkish commander, a copy of 
which I enclose ; the Eussian and English officers, the bearers 
of it, were not allowed to proceed to head-quarters, nor have 
we yet received any answer. In the afternoon we, the two 
captains, went on shore to the Greek quarters, and were re- 
ceived with the greatest enthusiasm. The distress of the 
inhabitants driven from the plain is shocking ! women and 
children dying every moment of absolute starvation, and 
hardly any having better food than boiled grass ! I have 
promised to send a small quantity of bread to the caves in 
the mountains, where these unfortunate wretches have taken 
refuge. It is supposed that if Ibrahim remained in Greece, 
more than a third of its inhabitants will die of absolute 


Protocol of the three Admirals. 

Off Navarin : October 18, 1827. 

The Admirals commanding the squadrons of the three 
Powers which signed the Treaty of London, having met 
before Navarin for the purpose of concerting the means of 
effecting the object specified in the said Treaty, viz., an 
armistice de facto between the Turks and the Greeks, have 
set forth in the present protocol the result of their con- 

Considering that after the provisional suspension of hos- 
tilities to which Ibrahim Pacha consented, in his conference 
of the 25th of September last with the English and French 
Admirals, acting likewise in the name of the Russian Ad- 
miral, the said Pacha did the very next day violate the 
engagement, by causing his fleet to come out with a view to 
its proceeding to another point in the Morea : 

Considering that, since the return of that fleet to Navarin 
in consequence of a second .requisition addressed to Ibrahim 
by Admiral Codrington who had met him near Patras, the 
troops of this Pacha have not ceased carrying on a species 
of warfare more destructive and exterminating than before, 
putting women and children to the sword, burning habita- 
tions, and tearing up trees by the roots, in order to complete 
the devastation of the country : 

Considering that, with a view of putting a stop to atroci- 
ties which exceed all that has hitherto taken place, the 
means of persuasion and conciliation, the representations 
made to the Turkish Chiefs, and the advice given to Mehemet 
Ali and his son have been treated as mockeries, whilst they 
might, with one word, have suspended the course of so many 
barbarities : 

Considering that there only remains to the commanders 
of the allied squadrons the choice between three modes of 
fulfilling the intentions of their respective Courts, namely.: 

1st. The continuing throughout the whole of the winter 
a blockade, difficult, expensive, and perhaps useless, since a 
storm may disperse the squadrons and afford to Ibrahim the 
facility of conveying his destroying army to different points 
of the Morea and the islands ; 

2ndly. The uniting the allied squadrons in Navarin itself, 
and securing by this permanent presence the inaction of the 
Ottoman fleets ; but which mode alone leads to no termina- 
tion, since the Porte persists in not changing its system ; 


3rdly. The proceeding to take a position with the squad- 
rons in Navarin, in order to renew to Ibrahim propositions 
which, entering into the spirit of the Treaty, were evidently 
to the advantage of the Porte itself: 

After having taken these three modes into consideration, 
we have unanimously agreed that this third mode may, 
without effusion of blood and without hostilities, but simply 
by the imposing presence of the squadrons, produce a deter- 
mination leading to the desired object : 

We have in consequence adopted it, and set it forth in the 
present protocol. 

Signed by the English, French, and Russian Admirals. 
October 18, 1827. 

The following notes relating to circumstances imme- 
diately preceding the Battle of Navarin, were written 
down by me some years later from my father's dictation. 
They were all read over by him, and authenticated by 
his own corrections.* JANE B. 

Upon leaving Zante after the affair off Patras, I was joined 
by the Eussian squadron. Count Heiden took the earliest 
moment to visit me on board the f Asia,' bringing with him 
Mons. Katakasi, a diplomatist. I saw at once that the 
Count was a plain-sailing, open-hearted man ; which inspired 
me with a desire to communicate openly and frankly with 
him upon the duties we had to perform. He spoke very good 
English, though mixed up with French whenever he found 
a word in that language more expressive of his meaning. 
But, before proceeding further, I asked him whether I was 
to treat his companion with the some confidence with which 
1 proposed to treat himself : to this he replied in the affirma- 
tive, and our discussion was pursued on that understanding. 
I note this now, because on a subsequent occasion, when 
more intimate with the Count, I expressed my surprise that 
he, as a sailor, should bring a diplomatist with him to talk 
over such matters with a brother sailor. He told me that 
this man, being sent officially with him to make his report 
to the Emperor, felt himself quite out of his element in 
having to deal only with sailors. His observation was, ( Que 
peut-on faire avec ces marins anglais ? ' and that he 
(Heiden) had told him that he was quite sure he would find 

* Note by Sir E. C., on the manuscript. ' Written down from Sir E. C.'s 
dictation in October 1838, by J. B. 0.' 


me candid and open in communication, without interposing 
any difficulties ; that he brought him on board on the first 
occasion to give him an early proof of it, and that on their 
return to ' Azoff,' he (Katakasi) repeatedly expressed his asto- 
nishment at my free communication on all the subjects of 
our discussion, and at my seeming to have no concealment, 
no arriere-pensee, whatever. It was, I think, the following 
day that we were joined by Admiral de Rigny. He was 
considerably junior to Count Heiden, although bearing the 
same rank as Rear- Admiral ; and wishing to get them upon 
good terms with each other, I so expressed myself as to hint 
the propriety of his calling upon Count Heiden. I think I 
proposed that we should go together : he evaded this at 
once by expressing a wish to go to Zante for stock, if I had 
no objection to it, as he was very much in want of provisions 
for his table : I told him that I believed we had got every- 
thing that was to be had there ; and that I was very willing 
to share it with him, which I could the more readily do, as 
our own ships coming from Malta would certainly bring me 
a sufficiency of everything. But he still pressed his object 
so pertinaciously that, in spite of my strong objections to it, 
at a moment when it was material that the three squadrons 
should be united and prepared to act in concert, I could no 
longer resist it without exciting an unpleasant feeling. This 
was an augury of the difficulty I contemplated in uniting 
the three divisions as one squadron. Upon the return of 
Count De Rigny and the junction of the French and Eng- 
lish ships of the line (the former reduced to three by an 
accident which happened near CerviBay),* it became requisite 
to form an order of sailing in two lines. My object was to 
keep the French and Russians, who evidently bore no good 
will to each other, as much separated as possible. In this 
wish each of my colleagues seemed to share, De Rigny 
being well pleased with my proposal, that the French ships 
should take station astern of the English in the weather line, 
while Count Heiden seemed equally gratified with my plan 
that his four line-of-battle ships and his large frigates should 
continue in one complete division by themselves, forming the 
lee line. I found myself hampered by this jealousy in all 
my communications, lest I should seem to give a preference 
to one over the other. The two chiefs readily met at dinner, 
or otherwise, on board the 'Asia,' but neither of them 
seemed disposed to make a visit to the other on board his 
own ship. In occasionally drawing up records of our pro- 

* It was repaired in Cervi 


ceedings to be signed by each, the paper being in the first 
instance placed before me for my signature, was put down on 
the table by me without presenting it preferably to either, 
and I observed that whichever first took hold of it put his 
signature next, without acknowledging in the other any 
superiority ; De Rigny thus putting himself upon an equality 
with Heiden, although the other was much the oldest rear- 
admiral of the two. 

The object of the Allied Powers was to prevent Ibrahim 
pursuing his barbarities in Greece. On the union of the 
three squadrons off Navarin, I found that he was then 
ravaging the Morea by means of that army which he was 
bound by the Convention not to employ. This was made 
known to me by deputations from the Morea, and verified by 
Captain Hamilton, whom I sent there on purpose to ascertain 
the fact. A letter upon this was addressed to Ibrahim, 
signed by myself and colleagues, warning him of the conse- 
quences of such breach of honour. This letter was entrusted 
to Colonel Cradock, and sent in in the c Dartmouth ' frigate. 
Colonel Cradock was told upon landing, by Ibrahim's own 
dragoman, that nobody knew where Ibrahim was to be 
found, not even he himself being aware of it, and that no 
other person could open the letter or act upon it, even if they 
were apprised of its contents. Colonel C. told the dragoman 
that such was my anxiety that Ibrahim should have this 
letter, that if he was within a ride of 48 hours and they 
would give him a horse, he would gladly undertake the 
journey. But the dragoman persisted that no one knew 
where he was, and Colonel Cradock had no alternative but 
to return on board with the letter. What was to be done ? 
some decisive step became necessary. We had been carried 
away by currents in a calm, and on other occasions had been 
driven out of sight of Navarin by gales of wind, so as to 
make effectual blockade impracticable; and if, whilst so 
driven off, the Ottoman fleet had put to sea in order to pur- 
sue their great object of destroying Hydra or any other 
place, and we had fallen in with them at sea, a battle must 
have ensued, even according to the very wording of our 
instructions. Under these circumstances, and considering 
that Ibrahim had submitted to be driven back from off Patras 
by a small portion of the force which I then had at my dis- 
posal, I felt myself justified in concluding that the imposing 
spectacle of the whole Allied Squadrons (that force which 
the Government had deemed ample for the purpose) anchored 
in the Bay of Navarin, where we could be eye-witnesses of 


liis proceedings, and ready to punish any infraction of his 
agreement, would awe Ibrahim at once into submission, and 
thus obtain without bloodshed the objects of the Treaty. In 
the Egyptian squadron Mons r Letellier and several French 
officers were embarked as naval instructors for their manage- 
ment. Admiral de Eigny, at my request, had written to the 
principal, warning him that a battle might possibly arise, 
and that if they were found opposed to their own flag the 
consequences to them might be very serious, and he there- 
fore advised them to retire from their situations ; and 
although he received in answer a promise that they would 
do so, he did not feel confident of that result. According to 
the plan brought out by the ' Dartmouth,' the whole Ottoman 
forces were anchored in the form of a compact horse-shoe in 
the entrance portion of the harbour, so as to have the 
assistance of the batteries ; the principal limb being that 
on the right hand going in, which was occupied by the largest 
ships. Those ships were anchored as near to each other as 
they could be in safety ; the next in size filling up the inter- 
vals, the corvettes and smaller vessels forming a sort of 
third line, in readiness to direct their fire through any 
openings that might be left. Three fire-vessels on one 
side and two on the other occupied the entrance part of 
this horse-shoe, leaving no space for the Allied Squadrons 
but the passage between them leading directly into the 
middle of the horse-shoe, where it was contemplated we must 
necessarily anchor. Admiral de Rigny had received infor- 
mation that this well-concerted position had been preparing, 
under the direction of Letellier, for four or five days, every 
one of the Turkish ships having springs on her cables for 
giving their broadsides the most advantageous direction. The 
whole scheme was evident to me on the first inspection of it ; 
but being precluded from showing any evidence of hostility, 
I could not defeat their object by breaking a way between 
the upper end of their line and the shore, and thus taking 
them in reverse, as I otherwise should have done : feeling 
obliged to avoid all appearance of suspicion, and to proceed 
to the inner part of the horse-shoe which they had prepared 
for us. The head of the principal line was formed by four 
double Egyptian frigates, the fourth bearing the flag of 
Moharem Bey. The next in succession was the principal 
Turkish division under the Capitan Bey, whose flag was in 
an 84-gun ship, next to Moharem Bey, forming the fifth 
ship in that line ; next to her was another Turkish ship of 
the line, and, with two or three frigates intervening, there 


was a third Turkish ship of the line in the bight of the 

Having therefore made up my own mind that there was 
no other means but this of effecting the object of the Treaty, 
my next business was to bring my colleagues to the same 
conclusion ; and the question for my consideration was how 
to bring this matter about. I had found Count Heiden as 
ready in every instance to meet my wishes as if he had been 
an officer of our own navy. With my other colleague the 
case was very different. In our intercourse at Nauplia, he 
had shown a rooted dislike to the Greeks and a leaning 
towards the Egyptians, with whom he had long been in 
friendly intercourse. I had also found in him so pertinacious 
an adherence to such details as were suggested by himself, that 
in order to ensure his yielding to me whatever I considered 
essential, I embraced every opportunity of giving way to 
him in matters of minor importance. The situation in which 
I now found myself respecting him was one of great difficulty. 
Any hesitation or backwardness on the part of either of my 
colleagues in following me into the Port, would have been 
our destruction. In order, therefore, to ensure and rely upon 
the cordial support of Count De Rigny, my object was to 
lead him, as if of himself, to the same conclusion which the 
above circumstances had produced in me. I relied upon the 
wearisome nature of the blockade service for giving me this 
opportunity, and my hopes were realised shortly afterwards. 
Upon Admiral De Rigny coming on board one morning to 
make me a friendly visit, I adverted to the difficult and 
harassing prospect before us of a winter blockade ; and this 
brought us to the point at once. He treated the blockade as 
a thing impossible to be continued, and considered the at- 
tempt to execute it as tantamount to giving up the object of 
the Treaty ; since Ibrahim could move his army in any direc- 
tion he pleased, even if he did not take advantage of our 
occasional absence to put to sea with his fleet. I expressed 
my accordance in this, suggesting at the same time the 
strong censure which would be thrown upon us for the 
failure, however unjust it might be ; and then put the direct 
question of c Does any remedy occur to you ? ' After a 
little consideration he said, { None except going into the 
port and anchoring in company with the Ottoman Fleet.' 
I then asked him if he had thought of this before, and had 
weighed all the consequences ; candidly telling him that I had 
been for some time persuaded that it was our only means of 
preventing the barbarities of Ibrahim and effecting the 
objects of the Treaty. He said, No ; that the suggestion 


arose out of our present conversation, and that if I approved 
of it, he was ready to join me in carrying it into execution 
at once. I pointed out to him the possible consequences if 
the measure should be disapproved of by our Govern- 
ments ; warning him that though the principal portion of 
censure would fall upon me, he was sure to obtain his share 
from his own Government ; adding, that I thought he had 
better go on board and sleep upon it before he entirely made 
up his mind. He said, No ; it was not requisite ; that he saw 
all the consequences, and was perfectly ready. He staid with 
me about an hour ; when, finding him apparently quite steady 
to his purpose, I said : ' If your mind is as much made up as 
it appears to be, I will at once make the signal for Count 
Heiden and hear what he has to say about it.' To this he 
acceded ; and upon the plan being communicated to the 
Count, he frankly signified his full approval, and his readi- 
ness to take whatever part I might point out. This determi- 
nation being settled, I became strongly impressed with the 
great difficulty in preparing for the contingency of a battle 
in preventing the possible ill-effects of the jealousy evinced 
by my Allies towards each other, and the consequent liability 
to failure from want of union. I therefore resisted their 
desire that I should at once indicate to them the positions I 
intended them to take, begging them to return to their ships 
and to leave me to consider that matter undisturbed. My 
plan had been made at the time of the measure having first 
occurred to me, from a consideration of the position of the 
Ottoman fleet as pointed out in a sketch taken on board the 
6 Dartmouth' when I sent her in with Colonel Cradock. 
This plan I now determined to pursue; but I had some 
doubts how to make it palatable to my colleagues. As soon 
as they were gone being left alone in my cabin with Colonel 
Cradock I ejaculated : ' Now comes my difficulty ! how am 
I to ensure the cordial co-operation of these two people ; 
seeing that there is such a rooted jealousy between them that 
they would as lief be engaged with each other as with the 
Ottoman Forces?' Colonel Cradock then said to me: 'I 
think, sir, you said when you were looking over the plan 
made in the ' Dartmouth,' that you had made up your mind 
how the Allied fleets should be placed in the bay if such a 
measure should become necessary ? ' I said : ' Yes ; and I 
see no reason for altering the opinion I then formed, now 
that the determination is made. I should go in in the order 
of sailing, for two reasons first, because we can be equally 
prepared for defence if attacked ; and secondly, because it 
will remove all objection to my leading in in the ' Asia,' as I 



certainly shall do. My plan is, that De Eigny in his double 
frigate, followed by his three ships of the line, shall anchor 
abreast of the four Egyptian double frigates, which form the 
head of the principal Ottoman line on the right hand of the 
Bay ; that the English squadron shall take station next to 
them, each of us having our own frigates abreast of us on 
the opposite line of the Ottoman fleet ; and that the Russian 
squadron shall have the bight of the Bay to themselves ; 
thus placing the English division in both lines between the 
French and Eussian ships, so as to prevent any unpleasant 
occurrence taking place between them. ; but this gives two 
of the Ottoman ships of the line to the English division, 
and the remaining one to Count Heiden, whilst it gives 
the French division only the four double frigates-; and this, 
I suspect, will excite jealousy on the part of De Eigny.' 
* Sir,' said Cradock, ' as Admiral De Eigny by your desire 
has had a correspondence with the French officers employed 
in the Egyptian squadron, warning them of the contingency 
of their being opposed in battle to the French flag, and 
advising them to retire immediately cannot you satisfy 
Admiral De Eigny by pointing out to him the probability of 
his ensuring their retirement by anchoring as you propose ? 
whereas, on the contrary, if any part of the Eussian squadron 
were so placed, it would produce a contrary effect and secure 
to the Ottoman division the benefit of their assistance ? ' 
c Thank ye,' said I, ' you have relieved me at once from my 
difficulty ' and I then drew out the order to my two col- 
leagues, which was subsequently carried into execution. 

Instructions as to the Manner of Placing the Combined Fleet in 
the Port of Navarin. 

'Asia/ off Navarin : October 19, 1827. 

It appears that the Egyptian ships in which the French 
officers are embarked, are those most to the south-east ; it is, 
therefore, my wish that his Excellency Eear- Admiral Chevalier 
de Eigny should place his squadron abreast of them. As the 
next in succession appears to be a ship of the line with a 
flag at the main, I propose placing the 'Asia' abreast of her, 
with the ' Genoa ' and ' Albion ' next to the 'Asia ; ' and I 
wish that his Excellency Eear- Admiral Count Heiden will 
have the goodness to place his squadron next in succession 
to the British ships of the line. The Eussian frigates in this 
case can occupy the Turkish ships next in succession to the 
Russian ships of the line ; the English frigates forming 


alongside such. Turkish vessels as may be on the western 
side of the harbour abreast of the British ships of the line ; 
and the French frigates forming in the same manner, so as 
to occupy the Turkish frigates, &c. abreast of the French 
ships of the line. If time permits, before any hostility is 
committed by the Turkish fleet, the ships are to moor with 
springs on the ring of each anchor. No gun is to be fired 
from the combined fleet without a signal being made for 
that purpose, unless shot be fired from any of the Turkish 
ships ; in which case the ships so firing are to be destroyed 
immediately. The corvettes and the brigs, are under the 
direction of Captain Fellowes of the ' Dartmouth,' to remove 
the fire-vessels into such a position as will prevent their 
being able to injure any of the combined fleet. In case of a 
regular battle ensuing and creating any of that confusion 
which must naturally arise from it, it is to be observed, thatj 
in the words of Lord Nelson, ' No captain can do very wrong 
who places his ship alongside that of an enemy.' 

EDWD. CODRINGTON, Yice- Admiral. 

From Sir E. 0. to the President and Members of the Legislative 
Body of the Greek Nation. 

1 Asia/ off Navarin : October 19, 1827. 

GENTLEMEN, The conduct of the Provisional Government 
of Greece, and of the Marine Tribunal, has been so unjust 
and so injurious to the commerce of the Allied Powers, and 
they have so entirely falsified the promises they made to me, 
that I shall decline writing to them henceforth, and must 
beg to communicate with you instead. In. consequence of a 
direct breach of the word of honour given me by Ibrahim 
Pacha, I found myself with only two small frigates and a 
brig opposed to the whole of the Turco- Egyptian force at 
the entrance of the Gulf of Patras. I well knew the Pacha's 
object was to destroy the vessels commanded by Captains 
Hastings and Thomas, and the others with them in the Gulf 
of Lepanto ; and as that was the only Greek force which I 
knew of being employed against their enemy, I determined 
to run all risks with the very inferior force I had with me to 
secure their protection. I had the good fortune of being 
successful in saving those brave men from destruction. Judge, 
Gentlemen, under these circumstances, what are my feelings 
that in the meantime the boasting Hydriotes, Spezziots, 
Ipsariotes, &c., have been plundering the ships of all nations, 
even at the distance of Malta and Maritimo : and that ar- 


rangements have been forming for distant and useless enter- 
prises : and judge of my indignation at finding that their so 
cruising has been under the sanction of your Provisional 
Government. If the sums which have been expended in 
fitting out these corsairs had been laid out for the purpose 
of attacking the Turks, honour and profit would have attended 
it, for the Turkish fleet has been dispersed over these seas ; 
and the wretched people of Kalamata and that neighbourhood 
would not be living upon boiled grass, as Captain Hamilton, 
whom I sent to prevent the advance of the Turkish army, 
informs me they are now doing. I have only time to add at 
present, that the united fleet of the Allied Powers is about 
to enter the port of Navarin, for the purpose of preventing any 
further operations on the part of the Egyptian expedition. 

I am, &c., 


Sir E. C, to Lady C. 

October 19, 7 P.M. 

Well, this day has gone by with all preparation and no 
fight. The wind was not strong enough to carry us in, and 
we must now take the chance of what to-morrow produces. 
I have given out my Instructions, which seem to please my 
two colleagues, each being content with the part allotted to 
him, and my own squadron appear to be so perfectly up to 
the mark, that they will think it a pity if it all end in smoke. 
Such is, however, my own expectation, although the Turks 
have apparently made every preparation to receive us. Ihe 
French officers who were in the Egyptian ships have retired, 
according to De Rigny's advice, except Letellier the chief, 
and are now embarked in an Austrian merchant brig. This 
Ibrahim, who boasted to us his humanity and complained 
of being called in the newspapers the e Sanguinary Ibrahim,' 
is ravaging the whole country ; and Hamilton, whom I sent 
to drive back his army near Kalamata, tells me that some of 
the poor houseless wretches in the country which he has 
desolated, are living upon boiled grass ! God bless you and 
yours, say I ; a sentiment I may I hope repeat and repeat 
again. Yours, E. C. 

The following day, however, did not go by with ' no 
fight * the crisis had come, and the 20th of October 
was a day of fate to many : a full and complete detail of 
its circumstances and results is furnished by the fol- 
lowing collection of official and private letters. 


The OTTOMAN FORCE consisted of:- 

3 line-of-battle ships. 

4 double-banked frigates. 
13 frigates. 

30 corvettes. 
28 brigs. 
6 fire brigs. 

5 schooners. 

(exclusive of 41 transports.) 


35,000 Egyptian troops in the Morea, 4,000 of whom came with the above 
ships, as stated by the Secretary to the Capitana Bey. 

The ALLIED FORCE consisted of: 

3 line-of-battle ships. 

4 frigates. 
4 brigs. 

1 cutter. 


3 line-of-battle ships. 

1 double-banked frigate. 

1 frigate. 

2 cutters. . 


4 line-of-battle ships. 
4 frigates. 

24 ships of war. 

From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty, 

H.M.S < Asia,' in the port of Navarin : October 21, 1827. 

SIR, I have the honour of informing his Royal Highness 
the Lord High Admiral that my colleagues, Count Heiden 
and the Chevalier De Rigny, having agreed with me that we 
should come into this port, in order to induce Ibrahim Pacha 
to discontinue the brutal war of extermination which he has 
been carrying on since his return here from his failure in the 
Gulf of Patras, the combined squadrons passed the batteries, 
in order to take up their anchorage, at about 2 o'clock yes- 
terday afternoon. 

The Turkish ships were moored in the form of a crescent, 
with springs on their cables, the larger ones presenting their 
broadsides towards the centre, the smaller ones, in succession, 
within them, filling up the intervals. 

The combined fleet was formed in the order of sailing in 


two columns ; the British and French forming the weather 
or starboard line, and the Russian the lee line. 

The 'Asia' led in, followed by the 'Genoa' and 'Albion,' 
and anchored close alongside a ship of the line bearing the 
flag of the Capitana Bey, another ship of the line, and a 
large double-banked frigate ; each thus having their proper 
opponent in the front line of the Turkish fleet. The four 
ships to windward, part of the Egyptian squadron, were 
allotted to the squadron of Rear- Admiral Be Rigny ; and 
those to leeward, in the bight of the crescent, were to mark 
the stations of the whole Russian squadron, the ships of their 
line closing those of the English line, and being followed up 
by their own frigates. 

The French frigate 'Armide' was directed to place herself 
alongside the outermost frigate on the left-hand enter- 
ing the harbour; and the 'Cambrian,' 'Glasgow,' and 
'Talbot' next to her, and abreast of the 'Asia,' 'Genoa,' and 
'Albion.' The 'Dartmouth' and the 'Musquito,' the 
'Rose,' the 'Brisk,' and the 'Philomel' were to look 
after six fire-vessels at the entrance of the harbour. I gave 
orders that no gun should be fired unless guns were first 
fired by the Turks ; and those orders were strictly observed. 
The three English ships were accordingly permitted to pass 
the batteries and to moor, as they did with great rapidity, 
without any act of open hostility, although there was evident 
preparation for it in all the Turkish ships ; but upon the 
'Dartmouth' sending a boat to one of the fire- vessels, Lieu- 
tenant G. W. H. Fitz Roy and several of her crew were shot 
with musketry. This produced a defensive fire of musketry 
from the 'Dartmouth' and 'la Syrene,' bearing the flag of 
Rear- Admiral De Rigny ; that was succeeded by a cannon- 
shot at the Rear-Admiral from one of the Egyptian ships, 
which of course brought on a return ; and thus very shortly 
afterwards the battle became general. The 'Asia,' although 
placed alongside the ship of the Capitana Bey, was even 
nearer to that of Moharem Bey, the commander of the 
Egyptian ships ; and since his ships did not fire at the 'Asia,' 
although the action was begun to windward, neither did the 
'Asia' fire at her. The latter, indeed, sent a message 'that 
he would not fire at all,' and therefore no hostility took 
place betwixt our two ships for some time after the 'Asia' 
had returned the fire of the Capitana Bey. In the mean- 
time, however, our excellent pilot, Mr. Peter Mitchell, who 
went to interpret to Moharem my desire to avoid bloodshed, 
was killed by his people in our boat alongside. Whether with 
or witliout his orders I know not, but his ship soon after- 


wards fired into the 'Asia/ and was consequently effectually 
destroyed by the 'Asia's' fire, sharing the same fate as his 
brother-admiral on the starboard side, and falling to leeward 
a mere wreck. These ships being out of the way, the f Asia ' 
became exposed to a raking fire from vessels in the second 
and third line, which carried away her mizenmast by the 
board, disabled some of her guns, and killed and wounded 
some of her crew. This narration of the proceedings of the 
'Asia' would probably be equally applicable to most of the 
other ships of the fleet. The manner in which the ' Genoa ' 
and 'Albion' took their stations was beautiful; and the con- 
duct of rny brother- admirals, Count Heiden and the Chevalier 
De Rigny, throughout, was admirable and highly exemplary. 

Captain Fellowes executed the part allotted to him per- 
fectly ; and with the able assistance of his little but brave 
detachment, saved the ' Syrene ' from being burnt by the fire- 
vessels. And the 'Cambrian,' 'Glasgow,' and 'Talbot,' fol- 
lowing the fine example of Capitaine Hugon, of the 'Armide,' 
who was opposed to the leading frigate of that line, effec- 
tually destroyed their opponents, and also silenced the bat- 
teries. This bloody and destructive battle was continued 
with unabated fury for four hours, and the scene of wreck 
and devastation which presented itself at its termination was 
such as has been seldom before witnessed. As each ship of 
our opponents became effectually disabled, such of her crew 
as could escape from her endeavoured to set her on fire ; and 
it is wonderful how we avoided the effects of their successive 
and awful explosions. 

It is impossible for me to say too much for the able and 
zealous assistance which I derived from Captain Curzoii 
thoughout this long and arduous contest ; nor can I say 
more than it deserves for the conduct of Commander Baynes 
and the officers and crew of the ' Asia ' for the perfection 
with which the fire of their guns was directed ; each vessel 
in turn to which her broadside was directed, became a com- 
plete wreck. 

His Royal Highness will be aware that so complete a 
victory by a few, however perfect, against an excessive 
number, however individually inferior, cannot be acquired 
but at a considerable sacrifice of life ; accordingly I have to 
lament the loss of Captain Bathurst of the ' Genoa,' whose 
example on this occasion is well worthy the imitation of his 

Captain Bell commanding the Eoyal Marine* qf r the 
' Asia,' an excellent omcer, was killed early in the |actjoii 
in the steady performance of his duty; and I have^to ft&iiriS 


the death of Mr. William Smith the master, admired for the 
zeal and ability with which he executed his duty, and beloved 
by all for his private qualities as a man. Mr. Henry S. 
Dyer, my secretary, having received a severe contusion from 
a splinter, I am deprived temporarily of his valuable assist- 
ance in collecting and keeping up the general returns and 
communications of the squadrons ; I shall therefore retain 
in my office Mr. E. I. T. White, his first clerk, whom I have 
nominated to succeed the Purser of the ' Brisk.' I feel much 
personal obligation to the Hon. Lieut.-Col. Cradock for his 
readiness during the heat of the battle in carrying my orders 
and messages to the different quarters after my aides-de- 
camp were disabled ; but I will beg permission to refer his 
Royal Highness for further particulars of this sort to the 
details of the killed and wounded; a subject which it is 
painful for me to dwell upon when I contemplate, as I do 
with extreme sorrow, the extent of our loss. I console my- 
self with the reflection that the measure which produced the 
battle was absolutely necessary for obtaining the results 
contemplated by the Treaty, and that it was brought on 
entirely by our opponents. 

When I found that the boasted Ottoman's word of honour 
was made a sacrifice to wanton, savage devastation ; and 
that a base advantage was taken of our reliance upon Ibrahim's 
good faith, I own I felt a desire to punish the offenders. But 
it was my duty to refrain, and refrain I did ; and I can 
a.ssure his Royal Highness that I would still have avoided 
this disastrous extremity if other means had been open to me. 
The ' Asia,' ' Genoa,' and ' Albion ' have each suffered so 
much, that it is my intention to send them to England as 
soon as they shall have received at Malta the necessary re- 
pairs for their voyage. The ' Talbot ' being closely engaged 
with a double-banked frigate, has also suffered considerably, 
as well as others of the smaller vessels ; but I hope their 
defects are not more than can be made good at Malta. The 
loss of men in the Turco-Egyptian ships must have been 
immense, as his Royal Highness will see by the accompany- 
ing list obtained from the secretary of the Capitana Bey, 
which includes that of two out of the three ships to which 
the English division was opposed. Captain Curzon having 
preferred continuing to assist me in the ' Asia,' I have given 
the charge of my despatches to Commander Lord Viscount 
Ingestrie, who, besides having a brilliant share in the action, 
is well competent to give his Royal Highness the Lord High 
Admiral any further particulars he may require. 

I enclose for his Royal Highness's further information a 


letter from Captain Hamilton* descriptive of the proceed- 
ings of Ibrahim Pacha, and the misery of the country which 
he has devastated ; a protocol of a conference which I had 
with my colleagues ;f and the plan and order for entering 
the port, which I gave out in consequence. J 
I have, &c., 

EDWD. CODRINGTON, Vice- Admiral. 

Memorandum written by Sir E. C. 

By Admiral Codrington sending in the ' Dartmouth * 
frigate with a letter from the three Admirals to warn Ibra- 
him Pacha of the consequences to himself of his continuing 
to devastate the country contrary to his agreement, he ob- 
tained a correct knowledge of the position of the Ottoman 
ships and of their preparation for battle. But as he wished 
to effect the object of the Treaty without bloodshed, if pos- 
sible, he avoided every appearance of hostility, and anchored 
his ships within the crescent formed by the Ottoman ships 
instead of forcing an opening through the fire-vessels which 
closed the horns of the crescent with the shore as he could 
easily have done, and then taking them in reverse where 
they were unprepared. With the view also of not showing 
any suspicion that the Turks would fire on his squadron, he 
did not form the line of battle, but preserved the usual order 
of sailing in two lines. He allotted to the French division 
the four Egyptian double frigates which were the four first 
ships on the right hand. But the only one which reached 
the position indicated by him was the ' Syrene ' double frigate, 
bearing Count De Rigny's flag, and she became placed be- 
tween the first and second instead of engaging the first only, 
in consequence of the first cannon-shot fired by the Turks 
cutting her cable in two the moment she was about to let go 
her anchor. The two French ships of the line, ' le Scipion ' 
and ' le Trident,' anchored nearer the entrance of the har- 
bour, and eventually engaged the batteries. But the ' Sci- 
pion ' being set on fire by one of the fire-vessels, was saved 
from being burnt by the English boats commanded in per- 
son by Captain Davies of the ' Rose,' under the orders of 
Captain Fellowes of the e Dartmouth,' and the boats after- 
wards saved the f Syrene ' in the same manner. The third of 
the Egyptian ships not being occupied as intended by one of 
the French ships, continued to fire into the ' Asia's ' lar- 
board side all the time she was engaged on the starboard 
side with a Turkish 84 and a double frigate, having a. cor- 

* See page 60. t Page 61. J Page 68. 


vette and a brig keeping up a raking fire into her stern. 
The sternmost ship of the French, the ' Breslau,' 74, kept 
her course into the bay, and eventually anchored close to 
and greatly assisted the ' AzofF,' bearing the flag of Count 
Heiden. The fourth Egyptian ship, bearing the flag of 
Moharem Bey, the brother-in-law of Ibrahim Pacha, did not 
open her fire for about three-quarters of an hour, by which 
time the ' Asia ' had destroyed her starboard side opponents, 
and had sprung or turned her larboard broadside towards 
the third Egyptian ship, which was still firing at her. At 
this moment the ship of Moharem began to fire also ; and in 
about ten minutes the 'Asia's' fire destroyed them both; 
the one was driven ashore dismasted, and the other was 
blown up. The ' Asia ' then had to spring her broadside 
round again to destroy the corvettes and brigs which had 
been raking her during the whole time of the battle un- 
opposed by anything except the little ( Hind ' cutter, and by 
which vessels she had lost her mizenmast and been much cut 
up about the stern. During this period the third Egyptian 
ship continued burning ; and the wind then being in a direct 
line from her, and the smoke greatly increasing, it appeared to 
the fleet as if she had fallen on board and set fire to the 'Asia.' 
This produced a temporary cessation in that part of the 
battle, in order if possible to send boats to her assistance, 
when the Egyptian ship suddenly blew up, and the 'Asia ' was 
seen uninjured by the explosion ; the Admiral was observed 
still on the poop, where he had taken his station during the 
battle. The feelings of the crews contiguous were then ex- 
pressed by three hearty cheers, and the battle recommenced. 
Of the ships engaged by Admiral De Eigny, one was sunk 
and the other blew up ; and of those around Count Heiden 
there was a similar destruction. 

Letter sent by the three Admirals to the Turkish Commanders 
at Navarin. 


Navarin : October 21, 1827. 

As the squadrons of the Allied Powers did not enter Nava- 
rin with an hostile intention, but only to renew to the Com- 
manders of the Turkish fleet propositions which were to the 
advantage of the Grand Signior himself, it is not our in- 
tention to destroy what ships of the Ottoman navy may yet 
remain, now that so signal a vengeance has been taken for 
the first cannon-shot which has been ventured to be fired on 
the Allied flags. 


No. 1. 

No. 2. 

VOL. II. To face p. 75. 



No. 3. 

No. 4. 


We send, therefore, one of the Turkish captains, fallen 
into our hands as a prisoner, to make known to Ibrahim 
Pacha, Moharem Bey, Tahir Pacha, and Capitana Bey, as 
well as to all the other Turkish chiefs, that if one single 
musket or cannon-shot be again fired on a ship or boat of the 
Allied Powers, we shall immediately destroy all the remain- 
ing vessels, as well as the forts of Navarin ; and that we 
shall consider such new act of hostility as a formal decla- 
ration of the Porte against the three Allied Powers, of which 
the Grand Signior and his Pachas must suffer the terrible 

But if the Turkish chiefs, acknowledging the aggression 
they have committed by commencing the firing, abstain from 
any act of hostility, we shall resume those terms of good 
understanding which they have themselves interrupted. In 
this case, they will have the white flag hoisted on all the 
forts before the end of this day. 

We demand a categorical answer, without evasions, before 

Signed by the English, French, and Eussian Admirals. 

From Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

October 20, 10 P.M. 

Well, my dear, the Turks have fought, and fought well 
too ; and we have annihilated their fleet. But it has cost us 
dear. We have lost poor Smith, Captain Bell (R.M.), and 
many good men. I was slued round more than once, and 
Harry has a slight wound which will ensure him his pro- 
motion directly he has served his time. He wants to write 
to you himself, but I wish to keep him quiet that he may not 
get the least fever, and I do not think I shall let him. He 
was sound asleep when I went down to see him, in one of 
the cockpit cabins, where he is better off until I can get 
something like a cabin. Little Hanmer Bunbury has lost an 
arm, but will do well. Harry told me a delightful anecdote 
of him : he had some water given him, and hearing a 
poor sufferer call anxiously for water, he gave it to him 
directly. Now, my dear, don't fancy anything more than I 
tell you. I am entirely unhurt ; but the ' Asia ' is quite a 
wreck, having had her full allowance of the work. Our men 
fired beautifully ; my two colleagues and the brave men they 
commanded behaved admirably; and nothing could exceed 
the style in which my own ships went into action. I went 
to see poor Bathurst just now, and take leave of him, for he 


cannot live ! The delight of the poor fellow upon my telling 
him that his ship took up her station as well as a ship could 
do, was gratifying to me. I have yet no list of the killed 
and wounded, but I fear it is considerable, and that there 
will be some difficulty in obtaining it, without delaying the 
despatch for England. 

October 21, 1827. 

I will not pass this anniversary, my dear Jane, without 
assuring you that your dear Harry is as well as it is possible 
to be. He is such a favourite that he never wants a friend 
to talk with him ; and he seems to have spun a very long 
yarn for you into the bargain. He laments being kept down 
below and losing the magnificent explosions to which these 
Turks are constantly treating us, by blowing up all their 
crippled ships in succession : but he is so well as he is, that I 
will not let him be moved until I can have a berth in my 
cabin for him. If I can, I will get you copies of the public 
documents relative to this (as I trust I may follow the ex- 
ample of others in calling it) very splendid victory. But 
as I was in too excited a state to profit by lying down last 
night, I must quit my pen for my pillow ; where my heart 
will equally say, as my pen does, may God bless you and 
yours ! E. C. 

October 23, 1 P.M. 

Our dear boy is doing quite well. His good temper would 
assuage a fever if he had one but he has not the least : he 
reads whenever he is not, Pacha-like, giving audience. It 
is worth such a wound to have been in such a glorious battle. 
Write a line to Will, by Ingestrie, if he is able to see you on 
his way. The ' Dartmouth,' which takes him to Ancona, 
will wait and bring you back from thence. 

God bless you, again ! 


From Lady G. to Sir E. C. 

Florence : November 6. 

God bless you ! and God bless our dear boy ! I will write 
to-morrow ; at present I only add this line to Jane's letter 
to let you see I have survived the joy and pride your noble 
and gallant conduct and, above all, your safety, has given. I 
hope and believe from all you say that our dear Hal. is going 
on well. Once more, God bless you both ! 


From Lady G. to Sir E. 0. 

Florence : November 12. 

Now that the first and indescribable sensations on reading 
your account of the battle you have passed through have a 
little subsided, I must try to write to you in a little more 
collected manner than I could have done before. That we 
are all full of joy and pride and thankfulness you may well 
suppose ; but I believe the latter predominates in me, who 
am more given to fear than to hope for those dear to me, 
under such appalling circumstances ! How is it possible that 
for four hours you should have been exposed to so tremendous 
a fire (as Lord Ingestrie writes to me) on the poop and yet be 
untouched. And shall I not be grateful to that Power who has 
protected you through such imminent danger ? I am indeed, 
both for that and the narrower escape of our dear Harry. 
Alas, I grieve that he has been wounded at all ; but when I 
think how very near he was to destruction, how many there 
are who, although spared the extremest evil, are yet much 
more severe suiferers than he is, I am full of thankfulness for 
that blessing too. All other joys appear to me dull and 
insipid compared to the grateful happiness arising from the 
safety of two such valued beings after such terrific scenes 
of destruction as you were surrounded by. Once more let 
me relieve my still overflowing heart by devoutly thanking 
God for your preservation. 

It was, I think, on the 5th November that the news 
of the Battle of Navarin reached Florence ; and it was 
towards evening that we saw the Ambassador's carriage 
drive quickly across the large open space of Santa Maria 
and stop at our door. Having lately had the news of 
the encounter at Patras, we were strung up to anxious 
expectation as to what might come next. But when we 
found he had, on getting out, sent his carriage -away, 
fear took the upper hand, and with it the foreboding 
that he was come to comfort us under evil tidings. My 
mother and I stood transfixed with suspense till Lord 
Burghersh entered with his beaming, kindly face, ex- 
claiming, ' I have the best possible news for you ! ' 
He spent two hours with us, eagerly conning over all 
the details in the letters ; and it was not till he left 
us that my mother found relief in tears, and in the 


burst of gratitude that sent her on her knees to pour 
out her fervent thanksgiving. J. B. 

From Lord Burghersh, Ambassador at Florence, to Sir E. 

November 6, 1827. 

MY DEAR SIR EDWARD, I give you my most hearty con- 
gratulations on your triumphant exploits. I admire you 
beyond measure ; you have achieved one of the great things 
in the annals of our country. Immediately upon the receipt 
of your letter I went to Lady Codrington, and I did my best 
to break the news of your son's wound, and to diminish the 
alarms she would feel at the first mention of such an event. 
I hope I in some measure succeeded ; but it is impossible to 
describe the scene, between the joy at your triumphs and 
your escape, and yet the feel of the danger both yourself 
and the darling boy had been exposed to. I wish you had 
Force sufficient to appear immediately off the Dardanelles, if 
it were only to send a friendly message. When I was with 
Duckworth, if instead of going to the Islands of Prota we 
had gone to within gun-shot of the seraglio, we should have 
made peace by the alarm created, without further expen- 
diture of powder. 

Yours most sincerely, 


No more private letters passed at this time. The 
4 Dartmouth' took the despatches announcing the battle 
to Ancona, from whence Lord Ingestrie carried them 
overland to England. Lady Codrington and her three 
daughters left Florence ; and after a severe journey, 
crossing the snow-covered Apennines, they sailed in the 
4 Dartmouth' from Ancona on the 19th; a very trying 
passage of nine days, with every variety of foul wind, 
head sea, and dead calm, to aggravate and prolong their 
anxiety, brought them to Malta at last on the 28th No- 
vember. On entering the harbour Lady C. saw there 
the Navarin ships, and among them the 'Asia,' with 
nothing above her deck, the wounded masts having been 
removed, and the Admiral's blue flag flying on a boat's 


In the Admiral's house she found her son going 
about on crutches, and her husband just recovered from 
a sharp attack of illness that had followed upon the 
anxious days spent on the coast and inside the Bay of 

On the 20th October Sir Edward Codrington had taken 
up his station on the poop, which afforded him a command- 
ing position for watching all the parts of the battle ; he 
only left it once, and it was to go forward and endeavour 
to get a view, round the smoke, of some portion of 
Capitan Bey's ship, so as to see whether she was still 
in the same position, and the 'Asia's 1 fire rightly directed 

1 O J 

to her. It was while standing at the knight-head that 
Mr. Lewis, the boatswain, to whom he was speaking, 
was killed close beside him. Indeed, as he afterwards 
said, it seemed as if every man he spoke to was to be 
killed before him. On the poop, Mr. Smith, the master, 
was in conversation with him when struck down and 
killed by a shot ; and a shot shattered the head of Capt. 
Bell, of the marines, while standing very near him on 
the quarter-deck. Towards the close of the battle he 
went below for a few minutes to see his wounded boy. 
He had not seen him disabled, and when he first missed 
him from his station, he was afraid to ask what had 
become of him whether he was alive, or not ? He 
himself, though a tall man standing in that exposed 
position, and remaining at one time the only individual 
on deck, all others having been either disabled or sent 
below by him with orders, was never wounded; but 
he had several wonderfully narrow escapes. He was of 
course in uniform, but wearing instead of his cocked hat 
a round hat which afforded better shade to his eyes; this 
hat was pierced right through the upper part of both 
sides, by a bullet which left two distinct holes, but did 
not actually touch his head. The same thing happened 
to his coat sleeve, which he habitually wore rather loose, 
and which, just above the wrist, had two holes from a 
bullet which pierced it without wounding his arm. On 
one occasion his watch was the means of saving his life : 
he wore it, not in the waistcoat pocket as at the present 
day, but according to the custom of his own day, in a 



fob, with a broad ribbon and one seal depending from 
it. A ball struck the watch in his fob, indented its 
gold sides and broke its works, and left him uninjured! 
Indeed, he seemed to bear a charmed life, for Tahir 
Pacha afterwards told Mr. Kerigan and others on board 
His Majesty's ship 'Blonde,' that he had himself during 
the battle directed a company of riflemen to take aim at 
the English Admiral and shoot him if they could. 
During the latter part of the battle, after the 'Asia' 
had conquered her chief opponent, and suffered much 
herself from others while doing so, he continued walking 
up and down on the poop from side to side of the ship.* 
The Asia's mizen-mast, which had been badly wounded, 
fell with all the wreck of sails and rigging hanging about 
it, right aft over the poop ; and the Admiral in his short 
turns up and down had only just passed from the spot 
where it fell, in time to save him from being crushed 
under it in its fall. 

From Sir E. C. to Admiral De Rigny. 

Navarin : October 23, 1827. 

SIR, When Your Excellency did me the honour of volun- 
tarily placing yourself and the French squadron under my 
command, you gave me a right to judge, in that situation, 
by making me, in a great degree, responsible for it. I take 
advantage, then, of that right to say that I contemplated your 
way of leading your squadron into battle, on the 20th, with 
the greatest pleasure ; that nothing can exceed the good 
management of the ships under your especial direction ; and 
that my having had you under my orders in that bloody and 
destructive engagement will be one of the proudest events 
of my whole professional life. Although it was my wish to 
avoid entering into any particular detail, the general expres- 
sions of the captains of the British ships who were near the 
' Armide ' call upon me to say that the conduct of Captain 
Hugon entitles him to the marked consideration of Your 

A letter was addressed by Sir Edward to the Russian 
Admiral in nearly similar terms. 

* On stooping his head under the awning rolled up, a shot passed through 
its folds. 


Count Heiden. having read the letter which Captain 
Maude gave him from the Admiral, expressed his 
highest satisfaction, and said that it was in itself a 
reward as great as any he could receive from his own 

From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. G. 

1 Azoff,' dans la baie de Valette, le 8 novembre 1827. 

MONSIEUR L'AMIRAL, La lettre obligeante et trop flat- 
teuse qu'elle a bien voulu m'adresser apres le combat du 
-J-Q octobre, est un document qui restera a jamais grave dans 
mon coeur, et sera 1'heritage de mes fils. Qui n'aurait pas 
fait son devoir, Monsieur 1'Amiral, dans cette memorable 
journee, ayant sous les yeux 1'exemple de sang-froid et de 
bravoure determinee offert par 1" Asie,' ou flottait votre noble 
pavilion ? 

La journee la plus heureuse de ma vie a ete celle ou j'ai 
pu me montrer comme marin, scrute par un amiral anglais, 
les heros de la mer, et les plus genereux des allies comme 
des ennemis. 

From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. Duke of Clarence. 

' Asia/ in Navarin : October 21, 1827. 

SIR, Since we were unavoidably forced into collision with 
the Turkish fleet, Your Royal Highness may not object to 
receive my congratulations on the ships under my orders 
having done their duty admirably on the occasion. It would 
have done Your Royal Highness's heart good to have seen 
the tremendous effect of the 'Asia's' guns. They were 
worked with a precision which looked like mere exercise ; 
and yet, as the state of the ship and the casualties evince, 
there were causes to disturb men less trained than they are. 
The Capitana Bey's ship, according to his secretary's ac- 
count, lost (550 men killed out of 850.f Her hull had the 
appearance of being tasted by the adze preparatory to being 
docked. I really believe all the ships did their duty equally 
well. The lamented death of Captain Bathurst has enabled 
me to promote Captain Davies, of the ' Rose,' a man whose 
merits, since I have had this command, have entitled him to 
the best rewards of the service. If Lord Ingestrie had also 

* In the port of Navarin after the battle : written down by Captain 

f The badly wounded were left to die. 



been without other protection, I should have promoted him, 
in payment of a debt I owe him for having sunk a fire- vessel 
which he was charged to dispose of, by so well directed a 
fire that she could hardly make any opposition. But Cap- 
tain Anson, whom I have so often employed on important 
services, and who never makes a difficulty, has equally served 
his commander's time, and has equal claims that I should 
recommend him to the consideration of Your Eoyal High- 

My friend Spencer, in the little f Talbot,' silenced the guns 
of a large frigate, single-handed ; and it was not in default 
of opposition on the part of the Turks, for they fought with 
their characteristic obstinacy, and were prepared with more 
ability than they have in general credit for. It seems that 
our decision to remove the fire-ships defeated their plans, 
and precipitated the battle, which was intended to have been 
commenced at midnight, by an attempt to destroy our ships 
by means of these very fire-vessels. In consequence of the 
desire expressed by Your .Royal Highness, in your late letter 
of September 2nd, I have decided on putting Lieutenant 
Edwardes to act in the e Garmet,' and I have given the com- 
mander's commission, consequent on the death of Captain 
Bathurst, to my Flag-lieutenant Thomas DiJke, an officer for 
whose zeal and attention to his duty I will refer Your Eoyal 
Highness to Captain Eobert Spencer. The two lieutenant 
vacancies which I am entitled to fill up, I shall give to the 
two mates of the 'Asia,' whom Captain Curzon recommends 
as having the strongest claims. This has been my guide in 
all the appointments I have hitherto made ; and Your Eoyal 
Highness may rely upon my continuing to reward merit, as 
far as in me lies, so long as I hold a command. The defects 
of the 'Asia' are very considerable certainly; but as they 
are principally above water, I trust it will not be necessary 
to prevent her return to me. She was the great lion of the 
Mediterranean before this action, and her appearance hence- 
forth will have a good effect upon whatever service she may 
be destined to perform. If manned up to her full power, 
certainly her long 32-pounders on the main-deck would tell 
in action. But the ship would be better at sea for having 
them changed to the medium 32-pounders ; and she might 
then have similar guns on the quarter-deck and forecastle, 
instead of 42-pounder carronades, which, besides being of 
different calibre, are so likely to be upset in quick firing, as 
ours were on the 20th. I cannot conclude this letter better 
than by assuring Your Eoyal Highness that I have not exag- 
gerated in the smallest degree the able and gallant support 


which I have mentioned in my public letter my having re- 
ceived from my colleagues. The casualties of each of their 
flag-ships show how large a share they had in the action. 
Their followers were enveloped in smoke; and the light 
breeze which brought us in, was diminished almost to a calm 
by the general cannonade which ensued. They were, how- 
ever, extremely useful in relieving us eventually from the 
more distant but galling fire in the rear, as well as occupying 
the batteries. The conduct of Captain Hugon, of the ' Ar- 
mide,' has gained him the admiration of all who witnessed it. 
The wounds, in general, are of a very serious nature ; but 
whatever can be done by ability and by kindness of attention, 
the poor sufferers will find in Doctor Liddell, whose superior 
I have never met with in the service. Sir Henry Bunbury's 
son has lost an arm, and my son has a shot now in his thigh, 
and another passed through the calf of his leg, and his col- 
lar-bone was dislocated ; but I am happy to say both are doing 
as well as possible. The different ships are adjusting them- 
selves as well as their means admit of, and as soon as the 
wind favours us, we shall proceed to Malta. Ever since the 
battle, in day and night, the Turks have continued to set 
fire to their disabled ships; and at the moment my de- 
spatches close, which will be whenever Count Heiden sends 
me his, I will give Your Royal Highness a comparative list 
of what they were, and what has been their fate. 

I have, &c., 


The ' Hind' cutter was tender to the 'Asia'; she was 
about 150 tons, and had a crew of about 30 men, and 
was commanded by Lieut. John Robb, detached from 
the 'Asia' for that purpose. Having been absent on a 
mission, she came in sight of the squadron just as they 
were running into the bay; and observing the firing 
begin, and being without any orders as to any particular 
position, her gallant commander placed her as near as 
he could on the inshore side of the flag-ship. In this 
central position, the cutter was exposed not only to 
the shot especially directed to her, but also to those 
which were fired at the 'Asia ' herself with which she 
was in a line, from the inner and as yet unengaged lines 
of the double horseshoe. In the course of the battle the 
little vessel was hit by twenty three round shot, no 
wonder she got the name in the fleet of* His majesty's 


line-of-battle cutter ! ' Mr. Dumaresque and Mr. Lee, 
midshipmen, each lost a leg, and others were severely 
wounded. At one time, while the surgeon was below, 
about to perform an amputation, there was a call C A11 
hands to repel boarders' and the surgeon had to leave 
his patients, and join the rest in ' repelling boarders.' 

From Henry Codrington, Midshipman, to his brother, Captain 
William Codrington. 

Malta: November. 

. . . Next day (19th) the e Dartmouth ' came out, having 
made a sketch of the position of the Turks. It was certainly 
a very strong one indeed. It was executed by a renegade 
Frenchman by name Letellier, who had been in the French 
service. There had been, indeed, many French officers in the 
Turco-Egyptian fleet, but the whole had retired to some 
neutral in the harbour, sending a note to De Rigny signed 
with their names as a witness. Letellier, after having signed 
his, returned on board Ibrahim's ship, and was in her when 
it commenced. What became of him is not known. He had 
persuaded Ibrahim that the French ships, knowing the French 
officers were in the fleet, would not fight against their country- 
men, and that there would only be ourselves and the Russians 
to look after, and that he, Letellier, would place the Turkish 
fleet in a situation where they might easily destroy us. So 
he placed them in a long semicircle round the south end 
of the harbour in three lines ; the outer line composed of three 
line-of-battle ships, five double-banked Egyptian frigates 64 
guns each, and 15 Turkish frigates about 50 guns. The next 
line consisted of 26 .heavy corvettes, about 24 guns each, so 
placed that abreast of every opening in the first line there 
should be a corvette. Behind them were the brigs about 20 
guns each : there were also four or five schooners and about 
40 transports and merchantmen behind the lines. Now the 
way he wanted us to go in was evidently to place ourselves 
in the centre of this sort of semicircle or circle I may say, 
for some brigs which were anchored in the entrance to wind- 
ward of the fleet, and of which about three were fire-brigs, 
nearly completed the round. He had judged, and correctly 
too, that the allied fleet would come in with a wind which, 
would place them when anchored to leeward of the fire-brigs; 
and though he expected and wished us to anchor within his 
circle, yet he did not think we would have anchored so close 
to his own line as to render its position less formidable. T 


have no doubt that he intended us to collect in the focus of 
his circle and so be an easy prey to him. During the action 
a man (Arab) swam on board of the ' Philomel ' from a fire- 
brig which she sank in two broadsides, and among other 
things said that it was quite a mistake the action beginning 
then, for that it was to be put off to 12 at night, when the 
fire-brigs were to cut their cables and run down on fire 
among us (supposed in the focus) whilst the double line was 
peppering us. The truth of this I cannot swear to, but it 
looked very like it, for they were prepared for action, springs 
ready, tompkins out, &c., yet let several ships anchor, when 
this mistake, as it is called, took place. Had we gone in as 
enemies, the best way would have been for us to anchor in 
line inside and along his line of corvettes or brigs on the 
east side, turning adrift or running down the transports and 
other small fry ; then we should have had one side of the 
circle only to engage and our shot have reached the other. 
But in this meditating, peacemaking, diplomatique style we 
were obliged to go in as friends, and therefore the position to 
be taken up was this. The line-of-battle ships, counting the 
' Syrene ' 60, French Admiral, as one, were to anchor along- 
side of the line on the east side, while the frigates were to 
take the other side as per plan. By this means each ship of 
the circle being closely employed, the plan was rendered in a 
measure abortive. 

The ' Asia ' had 8 round shot in her bowsprit, 18 in fore- 
mast, 25 mainmast, mizen-mast dowsed, standing and run- 
ning rigging cut to pieces, lower yards useless, &c., and 125 
round shot in the hull, besides quantities of grape, canister, 
and musket shot, &c. I believe no round shot penetrated 
her side in the lower deck, and none through the main deck ; 
there are several shot which have nearly penetrated and even 
pushed in the inner plank, but I think none got regularly 
through, except on the upper deck and through ports, &c. 
She is a regular fine ironsider, and really I am excessively 
pleased with her in every way. 

I had nearly forgotten to tell you how astonished I was 
at the coolness and intrepidity shown by all the men during 
the action ; for my part, I was hopping about here and there 
and everywhere, hurrying them on, for I had not that cool 
way at all ; but devil a bit* would they hurry, and they went 
on in a way that actually made me stare. My father says 
that he never saw any ship's fire equal to ours from our main 
and lower decks in precision and steadiness. As to the 
upper deck, the breachings of the carronades (42) stretched 
and the guns capsized, and the men, as I said above, were sent 


down to work the main deck ones. Having never seen any- 
thing of the sort before,* I can make no comparisons ; but I 
must say that the splinters, &c., in the cabin were quite 
wonderful : some of the bulkheads had been left up and the 
stern railing also, pieces of which the shot sent in in quanti- 
ties, killing and wounding many men. Had all the cabin 
guns been mounted and manned, the slaughter would have 
been great ; but four were not, as we had not men enough 
for them. Three of father's double-barrelled guns and my 
little single one, were lying lashed together under the sofa, 
and a shot came in and literally dashed them to pieces tear- 
ing even the double barrels into two : I mean dividing the 
barrels from each other, and, excepting one, breaking them 
to pieces. Some of the pieces went on to the poop how, God 
knows. Altogether the crash was quite terrible in the 

A piece of the small upright bars of the iron stern railing 
of the Admiral's cabin (which had by mistake been left up) 
was struck by a shot and sent edgeways quite through the 
calf of my right leg, as I was looking aft ; it grazed the shin 
bone on the inside, and, turning clear of it, passed through, 
tearing a little of the muscle out ; the iron must have been 
about an inch square. In the thigh of the same leg, a little 
above the knee, a musket ball, or small canister of that size, 
went in and took a bend clear of the bone, and the deuce 
knows where it is gone. It must be in, but as it has given 
me no annoyance and has all but healed up, I am quite con- 
tent. Then I had a splinter which struck my left collar- 
bone, and luckily, instead of breaking it, only dislocated it, 
making a yellow place as big as my two hands put together, 
but except the bruise, that gave me no pain, and is now all 
right. I was struck in several other places by splinters, but 
they were too small to hurt. I went down to the cockpit 
about the middle of the action. On going down the ladder 
(tarpaulin and grating being lifted) I found myself almost in 
the dark and in an atmosphere which was as hot, though not 
so pure, as many an oven. On the chests, &c., the men's 
mess tables had been laid, and over them beds ; on these lay 
the wounded, some too bad to speak, others groaning and 
crying out with the agony they were in. Some (generally 
the least hurt) calling out lustily for the doctor. ' Oh ! 
doctor, my dear doctor, do come here, I'm bleeding to death,' 
&c., and some saying it was their turn, &c. I managed to 
feel my way to an unoccupied berth amidships, alongside a 

* He was just nineteen. 


poor fellow who had been severely wounded, and I think we 
made a pretty quiet pair, except occasional, nay frequent, 
calls for water, of which, owing to my excessive thirst, I 
must have drunk a great deal, besides what I poured on the 
bandage which had just been put on my wound, which felt 
as if it was on fire and devilish uncomfortable : the water 
felt like ice to it, and relieved it a great deal.* When the 
doctor came to overhaul me he found the upper wound in 
my thigh, which I had not complained of before, thinking it 
only a scratch (not having cut off my trousers) , for I found 
that the pain of the one diminished or concealed the pain of 
the other. The probing of the upper one was not painful, but 
the ball had so buried itself with a turn that it could not be 
found. The lower one was very painful, for the finger being 
much more satisfactory than the probe, the doctor had made 
his meet, thus satisfying himself that nothing was in. This 
did bring me to the ' vocative case.' I was then removed 
into a cockpit cabin, and remained there two or three days, 
during which time the inflammation was completely subdued 
by poultices, and I was comparatively easy. After I had 
found my berth and got my eyes accustomed to the light, or 
what little of it there was, I began to look around me, 
and a disagreeable sight it was. Had not I known that 
father was on deck and in such immediate danger, I might 
have given you some very fine reflections upon honour and 
glory, &c., well suited to time and place ; but my thoughts 
were more on deck than below, and the only thought I had 
of that nature was that I had had quite enough of honour 
and glory for the occasion, and would be an interesting 
object to boot ! However, when all was over, I thought, and 
think now, that I was a very lucky fellow to get off as I did, 
taking everything into consideration. 

Sir E. C. to Mr. Bethell. 

In the port of Navarin : October 23, 1827. 

You will soon know more particulars, my dear Bethell, by 
the newspapers ; I can only say now that we have had a 
desperate battle and have annihilated the Turco-Egyptiaii 
fleet. It has cost us dear, very dear : but the moral effect 
will have much marked influence. My dear Harry is wounded, 

* Doctor Liddell, who \vas very fond of him (they had been together for 
three years in the ' Naiad '), seeing him there, asked what was the matter, 
and wanted to attend to him : he answered that it was not much, and he 
would rather wait and take his turn with the others. 


and severely wounded too, but is doing quite well, and will, I 
am sure, go on so, owing to absence of all fever, and a pla- 
cidity of temper which is quite lovely. The balls out of a 
canister shot disabled several of them at once. He has one 
now in his thigh, and had another through the calf of his 
leg on the same side, and his collar-bone was dislocated. 
But his wounds are flesh wounds, and his flesh is wholesome, 
and the air is delightfully temperate. Bunbury's little boy 
has lost his arm short of the elbow, but is also doing well. 
But I cannot bear to dwell on this part of the business. It 
requires me to look round and see the devastation of our 
treacherous opponents to rouse back my feelings to the glory 
of the victory we have gained, and the fine example we have 
given them of the effects of their baseness. I was twisted 
round two or three times, and find several splinter scratches 
and bruises on different parts of my body. I am worn 
down, but upon the whole may say I am well. The load of 
responsibility which I have had has been lightened by 
the good conduct of my colleagues, and in battle they 
acted admirably. W. Fitzroy has lost a son. We have 
seventy-five killed and wounded in the 'Asia,' lost our 
mizen mast by the board, and though we have saved our 
mainmast, the ship is a mere wreck. You should go and see 
her as soon as she arrives at Portsmouth. The fire of this 
ship was quite beautiful, and does high honour to Curzon 
and the officers. Tell Fane Blair is quite well, and, like the 
rest of us, did his duty admirably. Of about sixty vessels of 
war and others amounting to about 120, not less than fifty- 
three of the former are destroyed. The Turks themselves 
have burned all they could since the action, God knows why, 
as we were content with having made them mere wrecks. 
We have had some thirty-seven beautiful explosions. The 
scene has been the same night and day since the battle on 
the 20th. It would not have been so well on the 21st, as the 
French were now with us. E. C. 

General Order. 
1 Asia,' in the port of. Navarin : October 24, 1827. 

Before the united squadrons remove from the theatre in 
which they have gained so complete a victory, the Vice- 
Admiral Commander-in-Chief is desirous of making known 
to the whole of the officers, seamen, and marines employed 
in them, the high sense which he has of their gallant and 
steady conduct on the 20th inst. He is persuaded that there 
is no instance of the fleet of any one country showing more 


complete union of spirit and of action than was exhibited by 
the squadrons of the three Allied Powers together in this 
bloody and destructive battle. He attributes to the bright 
example set by his gallant colleagues the Kear-Admirals, 
the able and cordial support which the ships of the several 
squadrons gave to each other during the heat and confusion 
of the battle. Such union of spirit and of purpose, such 
coolness and bravery under fire, and such consequent pre- 
cision in the use of their guns, ensured a victory over the 
well-prepared arrangements of greatly superior numbers; 
and the whole Turkish and Egyptian fleets have paid the 
penalty of their treacherous breach of faith. The boasted 
Ibrahim Pacha promised not to quit Navarin or oppose the 
Allied Fleet, and basely broke his word. The Allied Com- 
manders promised to destroy the Turkish and Egyptian fleets if 
a single gun was fired at either of their flags, and with the 
assistance ~of the brave men whom they had the satisfaction 
of commanding, they have performed their promise to the 
very letter. Out of a fleet composed of sixty men-of-war, 
there remain only one frigate, and fifteen smaller vessels 
in a state ever to be again put to sea. 

Such a victory cannot be gained without a great sacrifice 
of life ; and the Commander-in-Chief has to deplore the 
loss of many of the best and bravest men which the fleet 
contained. The consolation is, that they died in the service 
of their country, and in the cause of suffering humanity. 

The Commander-in-Chief returns his most cordial thanks 
to his noble colleagues, the two Rear- Admirals, for the able 
manner in which they directed the movements of their 
squadrons; and to the captains, commanders, officers, sea- 
men, and royal marines, who so faithfully obeyed their 
orders, and so bravely completed the destruction of their 




THE combined fleets left Navarin on the 25th October, 
and reached Malta on the 3rd November. It was a great 
relief to the Admiral when his disabled ships got safe 
past the forts at the mouth of the harbour; and the 
comparative rest of those few days' sail came to him as 
a needful benefit. The excitement, anxiety, and res- 
ponsibility of the previous period had told upon him, 
and caused an attack of illness which lasted some dnys 
after his arrival at Malta. He did not, however, desist 
from work, even on the passage there, as the following 
letters will show. 

From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

' Asia,' on her way from Navarin to Malta : October 26, 18:>7. 
g IRj I had the satisfaction of getting the whole fleet out 
of Navarin yesterday. The light air with which we started, 
and the uncertainty whether the batteries would attempt to 
impede us, upon being becalmed as we were between them, 
made it an anxious moment. The Turks saw that we were 
prepared for the worst, and did not attempt to interrupt the 
crippled ships or exchange a single shot with those which 
were directed to cover us by bringing up the rear ; and by 
the assistance of such boats as could be collected by the fleet, 
we cleared the harbour and gained an offing before dark. 
With night came on lightning, and heavy squalls from all 
points of the compass, torrents of rain, &c., with a directly 
contrary wind. I was very apprehensive of the consequences 
to masts fished and rigged in such a scramble, but I do not 
observe a difference in any of the ships of either squadron 
this morning. Thus, Sir, Your Royal Highness has a detail 
up to the time I am now writing, according to the principle 
which has and will continue to guide me to tell * the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 5 And now that 
the excitement arising from the ' rage of battle ' has some- 


what subsided ; now that the ambition which covets dis- 
tinction is lulled into quiescence, and now that those feelings 
of poignant regret for the brave companions who have suf- 
fered or are still suffering, are assuaged by the calm reflection 
that they are a sacrifice to the good of their country, we may 
reasonably hope that our judgment will not be warped in 
reviewing the battle of the 20th and contemplating its con- 
sequences. Having proved this base and boasting Ibrahim 
to be wanting in courage as well as in honour, I was cer- 
tainly disposed to doubt a resistance by the fleet at Navarin. 
It seems, however, that the renegade Letellier, who but a 
few days before signed and sent to Admiral De Rigny a joint 
submission to his directions, induced Ibrahim as well as 
some of his own countrymen, to believe that the French 
squadron would not join us in the attack ; and that by his 
proposed plan we should be effectually destroyed. Accord- 
ingly, his plan was carried into execution on the 8th and 
9th, as I have endeavoured to describe it in my public letter, 
by the help of the documents which accompany it. If we 
could have gone in openly as enemies, we might have easily 
crossed the head of their line, anchored amongst the small 
vessels, and taken their principal line in reverse ; but being 
avowedly and actually desirous of avoiding collision, and 
being obliged to attribute the same feeling to them, we could 
only anchor in that part of the harbour which their well- 
concerted plan left vacant for us. Letellier, however, had 
underestimated our power. For, from the time the 'Asia's ' 
broadside returned the fire of the Capitan Bey's ship an 84 
she received little injury from her, though galled all the 
while by the ships within her. All these were as speedily 
silenced in turn as the ' Asia's ' guns could be brought to 
bear on them. 

I should observe, Sir, that we did not begin with any one 
of them. I had told Moharem Bey that I would not fire 
unless he did, in reply to his message that he would not ; 
but that if any one gun were fired from any of the Turkish 
ships at either of the Allied flags, I would destroy the whole 
Turkish fleet. His ship did not keep his promise, for which 
she received condign punishment. The 'Asia ''and the other 
ships which I have the honour to command effectually kept 
mine ; and my purpose of preventing the transmission of 
supplies by sea has been thereby fully answered. As I wish 
' nothing to extenuate or set down aught in malice,' I will 
do Moharem the justice to say that I believe his crew fired 
without his orders ; for they killed our pilot in our boat 
whilst his captain was speaking to my flag-lieutenant on 


the gangway. However, the period during which his neu- 
trality was preserved, was sufficient for the ' Asia ' to get rid 
of her two starboard opponents ; and as his fire opened upon 
us just as we had sprung the f Asia ' to return the fire of the 
double tier frigate next beyond him, we were enabled to pay 
them both off at the same time. 

Till now, neither Captain Curzon nor I could tell where 
the shot which most injured us came from. But as these two 
front line ships were cleared away, we found that some cor- 
vettes and brigs had been all the while raking us through 
the intervals ; and I verily believe they did us more mischief 
than any of our more regular opponents. All these, how- 
ever, like their predecessors, quitted their positions either by 
design or by their cables being shot through, and added to 
the mass that ran aground abreast of us. Although the 
firing had now nearly ceased in our neighbourhood nearly 
six o'clock we found a new and an awful danger in the sur- 
rounding vessels on fire. The burning fragments of the 
double frigate on the other side of Moharem Bey's ship, still 
at her anchorage about a cable's length from us when she 
exploded, fell all about us ; but we had already wetted the 
decks and booms, and we escaped without taking fire. If 
Moharem had begun to fire earlier, we should have been put 
to great difficulty, for we had quite as much to do as could 
be performed by our numbers in keeping the guns on one 
side constantly at work, firing occasionally some of the 
opposite ones, and veering either cable, and hauling in either 
spring as most wanted to defend us against other ships. For 
this purpose I was obliged to send marines and everybody 
else, even from the carronades in the cabin, to assist on the 
main and lower deck ; and I can assure Your Boy al Highness 
I had a strong practical example of that deficiency of num- 
bers for such an occasion which I mentioned in a former 
letter. It is quite impossible for me to say too much in 
favour of the conduct of both officers and men under such 
circumstances. I do not, however, doubt that all the other 
ships which had the opportunity of taking up the stations 
allotted to them, had quite as much to do and did it quite as 
well. And if all, not only of the English but of the Allied 
ships also, had been able to place themselves as we did, there 
would still have been a full allowance of opponent guns for 
each since, according to Mons. Bompard, one of the French 
officers who had retired at Admiral De Eigny's summons, 
there were in all 81 vessels in the Turkish fleet carrying 
guns and pendants or flags, whereas our number was only 
23, besides the ' Hind ' tender and two similar-sized French 


tenders, which would have been more useful if they had re- 
mained outside. The fact is, Sir, that after the battle was 
fairly begun, the wind fell so light and the smoke became so 
dense, that neither of the French ships of the line could close 
with the ships between the ' Syrene ' and the ' Asia,' the 
' Scipion ' having been set on fire by one of the Turkish fire- 
vessels in the attempt ; and that all the Russian ships, except 
the 4 Azoff,' carrying Count Heiden's flag, were thrown into 
the same difficulty. 

' L'Armide,' French frigate, and our little Talbot,' corning 
in early, were enabled to choose, as they did highly to their 
honour. The 'Cambrian' and the c Glasgow ' were delayed 
by the latter being sent to meet Captain Hamilton with the 
orders, on his way from the pass of Amyro, near Kalamata, 
where I had sent him to check the brutalities of Ibrahim's 
army ; and it is much to their credit that they could get in in 
time to silence the batteries and relieve their friends already 
requiring their assistance. I may mention to Your RoyalHigh- 
ness that Captain Hamilton's appearance at Amyro checked 
the advance of the 5,000 of Ibrahim's army destined to ravage 
Maina, thus breaking in a second instance his agreement 
with us ; and that upon hearing the cannonade the whole 
returned towards Navarin. If I did not know the interest 
which Your Royal Highness takes in all naval operations, I 
should fear tiring you with this detail. However, I will now 
proceed to submit my opinion on the consequences of this 
late battle. Sir, I think the first great effect will be, that the 
Sultan, finding that by the loss of his fleet he has no longer 
the means of continuing the war, will now accede to the 
proposed armistice ; and that the second will be the Russians 
relinquishing an intention, which I dare say is now in the 
progress of execution, of marching their army towards Con- 
stantinople. For the only grounds on which Russia could 
take such a step (inconsistent with the Treaty, which appears 
to me to have very ably put a curb on this disposition) must 
be the persevering resistance of the Porte. Another effect 
will be Ibrahim's army being put to great difficulty in trans- 
porting supplies, and 1 trust consequently ceasing that cruel 
system which may lead to their own destruction ; and an- 
other of no small importance strongly aided by the joint 
measures of my colleagues and myself, the Greek resources 
being turned from the general plunder of commerce, against 
their own enemy. As to Mehemet or Mohammed Ali, who 
has been trying to commit England to support him against 
the Porte, as I fully believe only with the view of inducing 
the Sultan to reward his sham fidelity by giving him Da- 


mascus and Syria, I shall not be surprised if he lose his 
head as a just reward for his base hypocrisy. I hope, at all 
events, that the conduct of Ibrahim at sea and on shore will 
not be forgotten whenever the question of tribute and com- 
pensation for Turkish property within the limits of regene- 
rated Greece be taken into consideration. The Turks 
having not only refused the mediation, but having set at 
defiance the power of the Allies to enforce it, may well be 
made to pay the penalty of their resistance a resistance, 
moreover, solely prolonged for the purpose of vengeful 
brutality. Two Greeks swam on board the i Asia ' with 
manacles on their legs ; others have been found chained to 
floating pieces of wreck ; and we hear of numbers being pur- 
posely left with the dead and the dying, previous to the 
whole being blown up together. I should observe, Sir, that 
these poor wretches were kept as galley slaves, and not as 
prisoners of war. We have also received some Englishmen 
and some Americans, who say that they were seduced to go 
on board the Turkish ships to work in fitting them, and at 
last were put in irons and forced to come to sea in them. 
They say they were put in the tops during the action ; that 
there are no surgeons in the Turkish ships, and that if a 
man be wounded they let him alone to bleed to death. 

Before I close this letter I wish to explain to Your Royal 
Highness one part of the manoeuvre on bearing up for our 
stations, which may seem to require elucidation. The Egyp- 
tian ships, which formed the head of the principal line, had 
had French officers in them, who, it was presumed, would 
not act in opposition to Admiral De Rigny ; and I therefore 
placed the French squadron as their opponents in the line, 
whilst by this means I gained the superior flag and the 
largest ships for the English squadron. The Eear- Admiral 
observed and joked me upon this, but I claimed it as my 
right. It would have been more regular under these circum- 
stances to have allowed him to lead in ; but I am sure Your 
Royal Highness will not disapprove of my having sacrificed 
a little simplicity in the evolution for the sake of giving to 
myself, to Captains Bathurst and Ommanney, the opportu- 
nity of showing conspicuously how the ships should take 
their stations, an opportunity which was admirably embraced 
by both those gallant officers. 

By giving the above reason for this arrangement, I escaped 
the appearance of giving either of my colleagues that supe- 
riority over the other, which, with all my attention to it, I 
could never catch a symptom of either of them seeming to 
feel or to acknowledge, ready as they both showed themselves 


to put themselves and their squadrons under my command. 
I take the liberty of enclosing a plan, giving more correctly 
the form of the Harbour of Navarin, done by my son whilst 
sitting up in his cot, for his amusement. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

' Asia/ at Malta : November 6, 1827. 

SIR, I have the honour to inform his Royal Highness the 
Lord High Admiral that, although no direct answer was 
received to the joint letter from myself and the Eussian and 
French Admirals, dated the 21st of October last, to Ibrahim 
Pacha and the other chiefs at Navarin, Tahir Pacha, who 
came on board the 'Asia' (and who was the only one of 
them who would not attend the conference at Navarin when 
Ibrahim Pacha pledged himself to an armistice which he 
evidently intended to break), assured me that, as far as the 
remaining ships were concerned, no further hostilities should 
be committed, but that he had no control over the forts and 
land forces. The allied squadrons, however, left Navarin on 
the 25th, without a gun being fired at them. 

8ir E. G. to Doctor Wollaston. 

1 Asia/ on her way to Malta, from Navarin : October 29, 1827. 
That I frequently have wished you here with me, my dear 
Wollaston, is true, because you would have seen extraordi- 
nary sights. I cannot say I wished for you in the late 
destructive battle, however, because I neither expected to 
escape its effects myself, nor that anyone about me would 
be so fortunate. And although many who read of it may 
wish they had seen it, their taste differs much from mine if 
they wish actually to be in anything of the sort. To this 
ship individually it was an astounding encounter. I adopted 
the largest ship in the Turkish fleet for her particular oppo- 
nent, directing the 'Genoa' and 'Albion' to support her to 
the northward, and the four French ships (three of the line 
and De Rigny himself in a large double-tier frigate) to 
occupy the four Egyptian (three being double- tier) frigates 
to the southward, forming the head of the Turkish line. 
Although not intending to oppose the English squadron to 
the headmost ships, I did not like the French to lead ; and 
therefore so arranged the manoeuvre that we should not only 
lead in, but be opposed to the strongest ships. However, the 
evolution was still very plain and simple, and if we had had 



a little more wind would have been executed precisely. We 
were under the further disadvantage of being obliged to sup- 
pose that none of the Turkish vessels would fire upon us, and 
consequently to anchor in the position they had left open to 
us, as it now turns out, under the plan of the French rene- 
gade Letellier, who made the Turks, or rather Ibrahim, 
believe that the French would not act with us, and that we 
should therefore be effectually destroyed by the concentrated 
fire which would thus be brought upon us. We succeeded 
in getting the 'Asia' moored with great rapidity in her 
proper station, as did the 'Genoa' and 'Albion' after her 
in succession. De Bigny, in the ' Syrene,' attained his place 
also betwixt number 1 and number 2 ; but the wind 
dying away, the battle raging, and the smoke enveloping 
the whole space, the three French ships of the line could not 
reach their stations, and were bothered in the middle of the 
crescent, where, at first, their attention was devoted to the 
batteries, and, at last, to vessels in the inner lines, which 
had been galling the 'Syrene' and the 'Asia' all the time of 
the action. This gave the 'Asia' two front-line opponents 
(double-tier frigates) on the larboard side, whilst on the star- 
board side she had her proper antagonist, an 84, carrying 
the Capitana Bey's flag at the main, and a (not sure if 
double) frigate in the second line, astern of her. If these 
had all begun at the same time, we should have been much 
more cut up than we are ; but, luckily, we had time to silence 
those on the starboard side, by a fire which would not have 
disgraced Woolwich practice, before Moharem Bey, scarcely 
our length from us, (or rather his crew) opened their fire ; 
and we were at that moment springing the ship round to 
bring the larboard guns to bear on the ship next beyond 
him, about a cable's length from us, so that we could finish 
both at the same time. Moharem's ship went off in a shat- 
tered state, and ran aground, where she subsequently lost 
her masts by the board ; the other appeared at one time 
about to sink ; but she eventually blew up, and so covered 
the 'Asia' with the burning embers that our friends believed 
that she too was on fire. It was hard to find ourselves still 
galled by the corvettes and small fry, raking us as they had 
done during the whole battle, without our knowing where 
the shot came from. However, the moment these rascals 
felt the effect of our getting our broadside sprung round to 
them, away they went and joined a mass about the ship of 
Moharem Bey, aground. The 'Albion' was still firing when 
dark came on ; and thenceforward, during the whole night, 
we were entertained with most beautiful though awful explo- 


sions. The morning presented us with a scene of horror and 
disaster which it is impossible to describe. Besides the- 
wrecks lining the beach all round the harbour, the water was 
covered with floating spars, upon which were multitudes of 
poor wretches, calling for help in various languages, amidst 
their dead and dying fellow-sufferers. Some that could swim 
to us did so, and amongst them were Greeks with manacles 
on their legs. But boat we could produce none to assist 
them. It is shocking to reflect upon the number of Greeks, 
as well as wounded Turks, which must have been wantonly 
destroyed by their burning their vessels as they did, to the 
number of about 30 (37), including those which took fire 
during the battle. I could not learn their motive for this ; 
and fearing that many Greeks in chains were thus barba- 
rously destroyed with them, they were informed that, having 
sufficiently punished them for firing upon us, I had no wish 
to do them further injury. Still, however, the burning went 
on, and havoc seemed to be the order of the day. At length 
Tahir Bey, who was the only one not present when Ibrahim 
pledged his word of honour to us not to move by land or sea 
until he had fresh orders from the Sultan, came on board the 
'Asia.' I explained to him all that had passed from the 
beginning, and he admitted that they had only themselves to 
blame. It was evident to me that the Egyptians and Turks 
were not upon terms, and that something had taken place 
betwixt him and Ibrahim, although he would not betray it. 
I felt for him very much, because he seemed to me to feel 
for his country, and to be in danger of losing his head, owing 
to Ibrahim's base misrepresentations ; and at the end of a 
second visit he claimed my future friendship, if ever we 
should meet again. I sent home a rough plan of the port 
and the position of the ships, which Spencer can show you, 
with other documents that perhaps will not be made public. 
I fear I cannot get you one done to accompany this, 
although Harry is sitting up in his cot now at work on this 
subject. This said dear fellow is doing as well as possible, 
although his wounds are very severe. The thing which 
passed through the calf of his right leg was about a large inch 
in diameter, and square, as if it had been cut off an iron 
rail ; a similar one is now in the right thigh, and I cannot 
guess what it was which struck him so as to knock his collar- 
bone out of joint. The latter is in its place, and the other 
wounds are going on very favourably. He has no fever, and 
between times he sings and whistles as usual. Little Han- 
mer Bunbury has lost his right arm up to the elbow ; but has 
just eaten a very good dinner in an arm-chair beside me, and 

H 2 


moves into the stern-walk to look at anything passing. I 
have written to Genoa, but fear the father and mother will 
hear the news before they get my letter. Pray remember 
me kindly to our friends in Walbrook Buildings. . . . T have 
had my worries, and anxieties, and disappointments,^ as well 
as our friend Brunei ; and have felt short, very short, of 
means to perform my undertaking. But I have brought it, 
as I trust, to a good result at last, as you may tell him I 
trust he will his. And I hope he and I may both live to 
see as many tunnels in different parts of England as the 
Turks have unceremoniously made through H.M.S. 'Asia.' 
The frigate ' Dartmouth,' which is gone to Ancona with my 
despatches, will, I expect, bring the poor, anxious mother 
and daughters to join us at Malta, where, as I shall be with- 
out a flag-ship, I must remain until the 'Asia' returns from 

Yours with great and sincere regard, 


From Sir Frederick Adam. 

Corfu : October 30, 1827. 

MY DEAR CODRINGTON, I congratulate you with all my heart 
on your glorious achievement, which has indeed finished your 
operations in a way not to 'disparage their commencement.' 
That you should have been forced to come to this extremity 
is to be regretted, but the way in which you have conducted it 
fully comes up to my anticipations of what you would do if 
obliged to act. Your official letter is admirable in its way, 
as your conduct has been as a naval commander ; and you 
may rely on my sincerity and truth when I tell you that I 
look upon your whole arrangements and conduct with the 
sincerest admiration. 

Poor Lady Codrington will suffer the misery of suspense 
where those so dear to her were involved in so much peril. 
I envy her, however, all her brighter feelings, when she 
knows the truth. Well may she be proud of you, my good 
and gallant and able friend. 

I am delighted to find that both your colleagues have 
behaved so admirably. De Rigny seems to have been most 
brilliant, as well as the 'Armide.' Lord Ingestrie gave me a 
sketch of the action. The stubborn fellows (the Turks) seem 
to have shown great courage. 

Mehemet Ali, on the 1st of November, said to Captain 
Peter Kichards, of H.M.S. 'Pelorus/ at Alexandria, 

' The Sultan has ordered Ibrahim to put out and attack 


Hydra in spite of your admiral. He will not move however 
till I write to him, which will be in a few days;' and added, 
with a laugh, 'there must be an engagement at sea, but 
it will be nothing ; a few of the first will be destroyed, and 
the others will turn back : this is necessary to convince every 
one you are in earnest.' * 

From Sir Frederick Adam to Sir E. C. 

Corfu : November 28, 1827. 

Your account of the battle is very interesting and very 
excellently told too ; the praises you meet with are really no 
more than you deserve, and J feel that you deserve them so 
much the more because there is so rare an absence of egotism 
in the way in which you relate your operations, and in the 
manly and handsome way in which you give credit to others. 
Your description in your private letter to me is quite graphic. 
Count Heiden's letter is a true (as it is a most eloquent) 
exposition of his real feelings, and I have not a doubt that 
he is as straightforward and as fine a fellow as you represent 
him to be. Lord Dudley's note (of September) is very satis- 
factory indeed, and the principle of lightening responsibility 
is a wholesome one, as it is also a new one amongst Ministers. 
I have no doubt you will be approved ; for besides that they 
must have been prepared for ' hostile collision ' from what 
occurred near Patras, the hostility was not of your bringing 
on. There is another view : they, the Allies, are quite serious 
in their intentions; they must feel that nothing short of some 
such lesson as you have given, would work on the Sultan ; 
nothing else would convince him that there is unity and 
union between the contracting parties to the Treaty : and 
possibly this event (your victory) may prevent what of all 
things is to be deprecated, the Russians attacking the Turks. 

Lord Granville, in his last letter to me, says, in answer to 
one of mine of 14th October : 

' Sir E. Codrington has acted f with a decision and firmness 
most creditable to him, and well calculated to impress not only 
on those who were the immediate objects of coercion, but 
upon the Divan also and upon the Pacha of Egypt, that we 
are in earnest in the prosecution of our object. The French 
Ministers are highly satisfied with our Admiral's energetic 
conduct, and only regret that Admiral De Eigny had not the 
opportunity of co-operating in the vigorous measures of Sir 
E. Codrington.' Now your measures on the 4th October 

* This must have been before the Pacha knew of the event of October 20 
NOTE by Sir E. C., on Capt. Richards' memorandum. 
f At Patras. 


might have brought on an action they are approved of; and 
it was no more your conduct on the 20th that did bring on an 
action than the same conduct might have done so earlier. 

The following anecdotes relating to the Battle of 
Navarin were written down by me at a later period, 
from my Father's dictation. J. B. 

At the time that the 'Asia's' mizen-mast was shot away 
which I think was entirely done by the corvettes and brigs, 
which formed a sort of third line or division, I happened 
fortunately to be walking forward, by which means I escaped 
being touched by either the ropes or spars. Of the two men 
then in the top one was considerably hurt, and they both fell 
overboard, but both scrambled in again by means of the 
rigging. The vessels of this third line did us considerable 
mischief whilst we were occupied by the other two sets of 
larger vessels to which we were exposed. It was just about 
the time when we were employed springing the ship's 
broadside towards them; for which purpose, and to avoid 
their being unnecessarily exposed, I had sent down both 
Captain Curzon and Commander Baynes to direct the use of 
the springs upon the lower deck, being then myself the only 
person remaining upon either the poop or quarter-deck. 
Seeing that the object of getting the starboard broadside 
to bear was not likely to be successful, and wanting some 
person to carry a message down to Captain Curzon on the 
subject, I was calling out in great anxiety, ' Is there no one 
within hearing of me that can carry a message ? ' when a 
person, with whose figure I was not acquainted and whose 
face was all over blood, came limping towards me, saying, 
* He could.' I explained to him what I wanted done with the 
springs, asking him if he fully understood and could carry 
that message to Captain Curzon ; he answered quickly in the 
affirmative, and away he went with great alacrity. He re- 
turned speedily, and asked me if I had any further commands ; 
upon which I again sent him with a similar message respect- 
ing veering the cable, which he delivered with the same 
intelligence and alacrity. Upon observing to Captain Curzon, 
the following morning, that I had fallen in with important 
assistance at a time of great need from a person with whom 
I was perfectly unacquainted, he explained to me that the 
man was his new clerk, Cyrus Wakeham, whom he had lately 
received from the ' Seringapatam ; ' upon which I begged he 
might be sent to me that I might thank him for his conduct. 
He came into the cabin, limping with so much difficulty that 
I was induced to ask him if he was not wounded, to which 


lie answered, ' Slightly.' I then enquired what the surgeon 
said about it, when he told me he had been several times to 
the sick bay, but always found him occupied with others 
worse wounded than himself, and who seemed to have supe- 
rior claims on his assistance. Upon this I desired Captain 
C. to go forward to the sick bay with him, himself, and 
let me know what the surgeon said about it. It turned out 
that he had several severe wounds, that from that moment 
he was obliged to take to his cot, where he remained until 
he was sent with others of the ship to Haslar Hospital, from 
whence he was only discharged in the following autumn. It 
is worth notice, that when put into his cot, he occupied him- 
self in writing a descriptive poem on the Battle, and also a 
song for the amusement of the ship's company ; and I subse- 
quently learned that he was the principal writer of those 
effusions in prose and verse in the c North Georgia Gazette,' 
to which Captain Parry attributes so much of the cheerful 
endurance of the ' Hecla's' ship's company when fixed in the 
ice. Notwithstanding all his claims, as here specified, and 
his having been two voyages to the North Pole, my utmost 
exertions could not procure him promotion to a purser's 
warrant until the 9th of January, 1835 ! ! 

Returning from that episode to the period when we had 
just succeeded in destroying the corvettes and brigs which 
formed our third batch of opponents, an alarm was given that 
one of the Egyptian frigates right ahead, and then on fire, 
was coming right down upon us. It was a question whether 
it was most safe to slip from our anchors and expose our- 
selves to a similar danger elsewhere, or to remain where 
we were. We were so completely enveloped, in smoke from 
this frigate, that to De Rigny, who was to windward of us, 
and to Heiden, who was down to leeward, and indeed to 
the whole of the ships of our line, the 'Asia' appeared to have 
taken fire. This caused a cessation of firing in those parts 
where the battle still raged, and an endeavour to get boats 
to send to our assistance ; when by the sudden explosion of 
the frigate, which proved to have still remained at her 
anchors, and by the blaze by which it was accompanied, the 
'Asia' was discovered to be clear of that immediate danger. 
Upon this a cheering along the line took place, followed by 
a renewal of the action by those ships whose firing had only 
for the moment been checked by a contemplation of the 
'Asia's' imminent peril. 

At the time when the Egyptian frigate above mentioned 
as being on fire appeared to be fast approaching us an 
appearance created by the rapidly increasing smoke I 


had placed myself at the fore part of the poop, anxiously 
watching the space of water between us, and steadily resisting 
Captain Curzon's urgent desire to slip the cables, until the 
diminution of that space should make the danger of collision 
too imminent for longer delaying that measure, for which 
immediate preparation had been arranged. I myself, in 
common with Captain Curzon and others, believed the frigate 
on fire to be adrift from her anchors ; but I relied upon the 
'Asia,' having still the foremast, mainmast, and all the gear 
standing, driving out of her way whenever the diminution of 
that space should in my judgment render the slipping the 
cables a preferable expedient. Captain Curzon had also 
urged my quitting the position I had taken, that I might not 
be exposed to the pieces of falling timber the explosion would 
occasion, which I had resisted on account of not losing my 
watchfulness of the space of water by which the two vessels 
were separated, which was to be the guide for my decision. 
At this moment, the explosion taking place, showed the expe- 
diency of his precautionary advice, from the firebrands and 
other pieces of wood, and even of men, which fell on different 
parts of the deck. It was for the double purpose of seeing 
the situation of the conflicting squadrons, and showing that 
T myself remained in a condition to continue the duties of 
my office, that I then placed myself conspicuously on a cuddy 
which had been erected on the after part of the poop, when 
the cheering before mentioned immediately took place. 

The fire was so thick upon the ' Asia ' in the early part of the 
action, that Captain Curzon was under the impression that we 
were fired upon by friends as well as foes. Our position cer- 
tainly exposed us to this, by the contiguity of the two parts of 
the horseshoe form in which the two squadrons were anchored, 
and the different positions in which the broadsides of the dif- 
ferent ships in those lines were directed. The smoke at this 
time being so thick that the people at the guns could no 
longer see our immediate opponents, their fire being rightly 
directed to the position of our opponents was only known by 
my seeing their mastheads, and confidence was placed in this 
proper direction of our fire, from the guns being run out in 
the same position in which they had been placed in the 
beginning of the battle. At length, upon the masts of the 
Turkish Admiral's ship falling, and his fire ceasing, in my 
anxiety to ascertain that we were not firing into each other, % 
I tried to make the general signal to cease firing ; but as fast* 
as the flags could be attempted to be shown, either the men 
hoisting them were killed, or the means by which the signals 


were to be displayed were shot away. I then tried to despatch 
a boat with this object, when it was found that we had no 
boat that would swim ; an attempt by hailing to get one from 
the ' Genoa' was equally unsuccessful, and I was obliged to 
give up the attempt and leave things to take their course. 

My first visitor at the close of the action was Count 
Heiden. After our mutual congratulations, he expressed 
the great desire he had felt to lose no time in making known 
to me the gallant conduct of Captain La Bretonniere, in 
placing the ' Breslau ' so as to relieve the 'Azoff ' from a con- 
siderable portion of the enemy's fire, by which she was 
entirely surrounded. This was highly creditable to the 
feelings of the Count, considering the jealousy between the 
men of those two nations. When I expressed a wish to see 
Captain La Bretonniere to thank him, I was told that he 
was too severely wounded to be able to come. 

The next person that came on board was Count De Rigny, 
who said he had hurried on board under great anxiety to 
express the satisfaction he felt in reporting to me that not 
only his own ship, but also the c Scipion,' had been saved 
from being burnt by the able and gallant conduct of Captain 
Davies of the ' Rose,' and the boats of the English squadron. 
The next was Captain Spencer, who had come on board to 
describe to me how much he owed to Le Capitaine Hugon of 
' 1'Armide,' for having placed his ship between the 'Talbot' 
and an Ottoman frigate that was raking her (the 'Talbot' 
being engaged at the time with a double frigate on her 
broadside) ; adding, that upon the before-mentioned frigate 
striking her colours to 1'Armide,' Capitaine Hugon hoisted 
the French and English colours jointly over the Turkish, 
showing the English the higher of the two. I begged 
Captain Spencer would immediately bring Capitaine Hugon 
to me, that I might thank him for his conduct. He had 
hardly, however, got into his boat before Hugon himself 
appeared. He expressed himself highly gratified by the 
terms in which I had spoken of the conduct of TArmide;' 
and said that without reference to his own proceedings, he 
was coming on board to describe to me the admirable con- 
duct of Captain Davies, who, after saving the other ships by 
towing off the fire-vessels, had moved the c Rose ' from the 
position in which she had first anchored, and placed her 
between ' 1'Armide ' and another Ottoman frigate, by 
which she had been exposed to a raking fire similar to that 
from which ' 1'Armide ' had relieved the < Talbot.' These 
circumstances induced ine to prefer Captain Davies to the 


rank of Post-Captain in the vacancy made by Commodore 
Bathurst> who died about 3 A.M. the following morning.* 

On the evening of the battle I had a visit from Tahir 
Pacha, f the Commander of the Turkish division, the im- 
mediate object of which I have never clearly understood ; it 
probably was to lead me to apprehend that being under 
Ibrahim's orders he had no choice but to act as he did, and 
to make the best excuse for his having done so, in order to 
prevent further ill-consequences. Our interpreter being a 
very inferior one, made the difficulty of explanation so much 
the greater. I told him that I had taken sufficient satis- 
faction for the insult offered to the Allied flags, and that if 
they were contented with the result, I was. I observed 
strongly on the breach of word and honour shown by Ibrahim 
and his chiefs, in attempting to enter the Gulf of Lepanto 
after the agreement he had made with me in their presence 
to make no movement with either the troops or ships for at 
least twenty days ; that, as he himself (Tahir Pacha) did not 
attend that meeting as all the other chiefs did, I acquitted 
him of being a party to it, and should therefore place re- 
liance upon whatever he might have to say to me. I said 
that I understood his reason was disapproval of the conduct 
of Ibrahim ; to which he seemed to assent, by saying he was 
not upon terms of open communication with him. I told 
him that the letter I was then writing was intended to warn 
Ibrahim that if he attempted anything further against the 
shipping, I should consider it as a declaration of war on his 
part ; that I should open a tire upon his camp immediately, 
and destroy as many of the Ottoman people and the Ottoman 
vessels as I possibly could. I also explained to him, that 
previous to coming into the harbour I had written a letter to 
Ibrahim warning him of his having already broken his pro- 
mise by his expedition to the Gulf of Lepanto, and again by 
the conduct he was then pursuing by the exterminating 
system of his army in the Morea ; that if he did not desist, 
I should feel myself called upon to enforce a strict obedience 
to the convention agreed upon. I expressed a wish that he 
himself would take this letter in, that I might be sure of its 
being delivered, by which means all further bloodshed might 
be prevented. He repeated that he was not upon terms to 

* Le Baron Milius, captain of ( le Scipion/ also came on board the l Asia ' 
after the battle of Navarin, and said to Sir E. C., ' Je viens faire mon com- 
pliment au brave des braves. Ah ! que cela a 6t6 beau ! Si jamais je dois 
encore combattre, j'espere que ce sera sous vos ordres pour bien apprendre 
a faire mon devoir.' 

t See in Appendix, a curious account by Tahir Pacha himself. Also 
H. J. C.'s account of Tahir Pacha, 


have any personal communication with Ibrahim, but that 
he should certainly hold him?elf bound to deliver the letter 
if T desired him to do so ; and he took charge of it accord- 
ingly.* During the time of his short visit, I remarked three 
explosions of the Ottoman vessels, and I asked him what it 
meant repeating that having sufficiently avenged the insult 
offered, it was not our doing, and that it must be the act of 
some of the Ottoman people, and that I wished he would 
take measures to prevent it. Upon this point he did not 
seem willing to give a candid explanation, and I was there- 
fore led to believe that it was an act done by his order, or at 
all events with his sanction. 

On the second visit of Tahir, which I think was on the 
following morning, he told me that he had taken means to 
have the letter safely delivered to Ibrahim. Upon some 
further conversation respecting the explosions of the Otto- 
man vessels still continuing, and the cruelty probably in- 
flicted on the wounded, who were still on board of them ; and 
my professing a desire to do anything he could point out 
to prevent any further continuance of them, and calling his 
attention to the ' Cambrian ' frigate under sail near the vessels 
aground with a flag of truce at her mast head, sent there by 
me for that express purpose, he signified to me that if I 
would recall the frigate and send a boat it would be more 
likely to have the effect desired ; with which I immediately 
complied. He then left the ship, apparently much satisfied 
with our interviews. We supposed him not to understand 
any language but his own, and spoke of him and his visit 
openly upon that supposition. But Captain Curzon, who 
attended him out of the ship, having observed aloud ' that 
he appeared to be a very fine fellow, and that he pitied him 
from his heart,' was surprised by his saying in return, ' 1 
thank you.' 

Although I thought that the chastisement that Ibrahim 
had brought upon his fleet, and the warning I had sent him 
through Tahir Pacha, would prevent any further act of hos- 
tility on his part, it was advisable to prepare for the worst. 
I therefore placed the 'Cambrian' and 'Glasgow' frigates with 
the 'Trident' and 'Provence' French ships of the line which 
remained uninjured, opposite Ibrahim's camp, with orders to 
open their fire upon it in case of any gun being fired from 
the forts upon the crippled ships whilst quitting the harbour. 
When we first weighed anchor we had a light favourable 
breeze, which diminished to almost a calm with light flaws 
of wind in a contrary direction at the moment when the 

* See letter, p. 76. 


whole of us were passing the narrows. This occasioned con- 
siderable confusion by obliging the ships to risk their getting 
aground on either side, which probably would have taken 
place but for the assistance of the boats of the squadron to 
those who were most in want of it. The extraordinary ap- 
pearance of the ships under their jury rigging, contrived 
according to their different necessities and the means they 
had of providing for their sea voyage all heaped together 
in the very entrance of the harbour and the anxiety lest 
the forts should open their fire upon them in that condition, 
made it a moment of extreme anxiety which will not easily 
be erased from my memory ; but it would form a beautiful 
subject for such a painter as Vandervelde. 

This chivalrous zeal to afford help to each other 
and chivalrous eagerness in each to give public acknow- 
ledgment of the help received from another was one 
of the most unalloyed pleasures attending this day of 
trial and danger. It showed how fortunate the Com- 
mander-in-chief was in the instruments placed within 
his hands to work with. Even his own captains were 
most of them unknown to him before he came to his 
command ; but he was not unknown to them by 
character, and his frank and loyal bearing had quickly 
won their confidence. 

Whatever might be the reciprocal prejudices of the 
two Rear- Admirals, both the Russians and the French 
had confidence in the English ; and all combined to 
support their leader with heart and hand. English, 
French, and Russian ships came to each other's assist- 
ance as circumstances called for it; and brave men who 
had done their own duty nobly, delighted to proclaim the 
merits of their companions in arms, and the aid they had 
received from them. It was a happy contrast in that 
respect to the difficulties Lord Howe had to contend 
with in his day of glory and of trial; and forcibly 
recalled the words written by Sir E. C. to his wife on 
the 1st June, 1812: 

e Here is the anniversary of the glorious and ever-memor- 
able 1st June. Eighteen years have elapsed since the day 
of that grand battle. And if the captains of that day had 
done their duty as they do now, it would still keep its pre- 
eminence over all the subsequent victories of Nelson himself, 


because there was no Cadiz to take shelter in, and the whole 
might probably have entered Spithead together, captors and 
captured forming one grand spectacle.' 

A letter from Mr. Thomas Kerigan (of H.M.S. 'Blonde') to Sir 
Edward Codrington. 

March 26, 1845. 

DEAR SIR, I feel much pleasure in giving you the sub- 
stance of the conversation which took place at the gun-room 
table of the c Blonde,' shortly after our arrival at Constan- 
tinople in June, 1829. 

Tahir Pacha, the Turkish Yice-Admiral, and the second 
in command, came on board the ( Blonde,' attended by 
several officers, and took a minute survey of the ship. . . . 
After completing the object of his mission he came into the 
gun-room, and took a seat at our table ; he was very com- 
municative, and entered largely into the particulars relating 
to the Battle of Navarin. . . . He then talked of the 
battle, and of the distinguished prowess of the English 
Admiral, who, tall as a mast, was conspicuous in all parts of 
his flag-ship, directing the operations of the most sangui- 
nary and destructive battle that had taken place for many 
ages between two hostile fleets. At one time, as the 
English Admiral stood upon the poop, taller than the 
mizen mast, (I use the very words as reduced to English 
by our interpreter,) I directed a company of riflemen to 
take a deliberate aim at him, and put an end to the 
dreadful conflict by shooting him through the head or 
heart, telling them that it was the only hope of salvation 
which was open to us. c Destroy the English Admiral and 
the day is ours ; for when he falls his ships will surrender 
and not fire another gun.' Well, my riflemen fired at the 
English Admiral ; they took a deliberate aim at him, the 
same as if they were only firing at a target ; but, like a 
target, a pillar, he stood firm and untouched ; and, though 
taller than the mizen-mast, noble, goodly, and erect, a fine 
man (here the Pacha raised his hand high above his head), 
the best marksmen in the fleet were not able to strike him ; 
he was proof against all their shots. But it was the will of 
God that he should be saved from my sharp-shooters ; it 
was God alone that saved him ; and shortly after I was a 
prisoner on board his flag-ship. But he appeared so mild and 
benignant, so calm, cool, and collected, that in his presence 
I forgot the enemy, and looked upon him at once as my con- 
queror and my friend. He is not the enemy of our country, 
though he destroyed twenty-eight of our ships, and sacrificed 


nearly 11,000 of our best seamen. But the English. Admiral 
is not to be blamed for all this destructive waste and 
slaughter ; he is a great and good man ; it was the will of 
God that we should suffer a grievous loss ; he was favoured 
by Heaven, and God armed his hands for battle, and pre- 
pared his heart for a great victory over the fleets of Turkey 
and Egypt. 

The above is a verbatim statement of what Tahir Pacha 
said relative to you and to the ever-memorable Battle of 

The following notes, though twelve years out of date, 
will not, I think, be considered out of place, from the 
interesting account they give of one of the prominent 
actors in the Battle of Navarin. 

Notes written by Captain Henry Codrington of his meeting 
with Tahir Pacha in 1838-9. 

H.M.S. ' Talbot,' at Smyrna. 

I was present at an entertainment given in honour of 
Tahir Pacha, then on his way through Smyrna from Con- 
stantinople to take possession of his Government of the 
Pachalic of Aidin to which he had just been appointed. 
(Smyrna is in the Pachalic of Aidin.) One of the bystanders 
informed him of my name, upon which he desired me to be 
sent for from the other side of the room and presented to 
him. He received me with great kindness and cordiality of 
manner, asked me if I was the son of Sir Edward Codrington, 
and on my saying that I was, he replied that he always 
considered him as one of his greatest friends to whom he 
was under great obligation. He then took me by the hand, 
saying, 6 Come and sit down with me, we must have some 
conversation together :' he then led me out of that crowded 
room into the next, which happening to be equally full, he 
led me on to a third room which was more quiet and with 
several vacant sofas. Taking possession of one, he made me 
sit down alongside him, his friend and man of business (Mr. 
Kune I think is his name) being also close to us, and 
occasionally joining in conversation, and explaining when 
our deficient Italian put us at fault. He understood Italian 
very well, and spoke it passably himself. 

English and French he did not speak, and professed not to 
understand. He enquired much after my father, asked how 
and where he was, and what he was doing now, &c., &c. ; he 
spoke of his kindness to him on board the c Asia ' after the 
battle of Navarin, and said how greatly he considered him- 


self indebted to him, and how much he admired his cha- 
racter. He asked if I was going to Constantinople. I said 
I was not going immediately, though probably a short time 
hence the ship I commanded might be sent to be stationed 
there. ' Well,' said he, ' my house is at Balta Liman (on the 
Bosphorus close above Constantinople), and I hope to see you 
there : and/ added he, ' if I knew when you would be at Con- 
stantinople I would go there to receive you. 3 This certainly 
sounded rather Eastern and allegorical, for the Pacha of the 
Province Aidin to go all the way to Constantinople to re- 
ceive the captain of a foreign ' donkey ' frigate, as I well 
knew the difference of value in Turkey and Turkish estima- 
tion of Pachas and captains of donkey frigates : but the 
future showed that whatever verbiage there was in this, his 
kindness was real, and shown at Constantinople as well as 
at Smyrna. The conversation continued for some time on 
various topics, old Tahir expressing himself (for a Turk) 
rather freely, as if conscious of being individually in a posi- 
tion sufficiently secure, and in times improved enough, 
to allow of his doing so. Besides natural shrewdness 
and habit of observation, his remarks showed consider- 
able acquaintance with the men and names of the day, and 
the changes consequent on the modification of the old 
regime that was going on. He evidently had a good head, 
and, for a Turk, was a man of business ; but there was a 
coldness in his grey eye, and an expression of decision and 
hardness of character in his countenance, which, in spite of 
all his kindness to me personally, gave me the idea that 
there might be some foundation for the prevailing reports 
of his sternness and occasional violence and cruelty. On 
my rising to take leave of him, I said something civil about 
not wishing to obtrude longer upon him, or take up more of 
his time from others whom he might wish to see ; and I 
thanked him for the kindness with which he had received 
me. Before I had quite finished, he interrupted me, and 
taking my hand in one of his, he patted me on the shoulder 
with the other, saying, c Figlio di Codrington figlio mio.' One 
or two days afterwards he went on to Aidin. I was much 
pleased with his manner and kindness to me as my father's 
son ; and having, luckily, a print of my father, I sent it to 
Tahir as a souvenir of one who had always had a very 
high esteem for him, Tahir. In the meantime, for I don't 
exactly know which was done first, he had ordered his man 
of business to present me a horse, a very nice little 
Turkish horse that had belonged to himself, as a mark of 
his friendship for me. He also, after receiving the print, 
wrote a kind letter of thanks to me. 


In the winter of 1840, when the ' Talbot ' was at Constan- 
tinople, I again met old Tahir, and several times called on 
him in his own house at Balta Liman. He was now out of 
office, but as stately in person and as vigorous in mind as 
ever. He subsequently visited me on board the 'Talbot,' 
but declined all salutes or honours. On my first visit to 
his house, while we were sitting with pipes and coffee in 
his morning room, he suddenly rose, and taking me by the 
hand, led me through one or two rooms till he came to one 
which, with other European furniture, had pictures hung 
up round it ; then leading me up to one, he pointed it out 
to my notice. It was a picture in oils of the Battle of 
Navarin ! ! ! I was astonished at this ; for it seemed extra- 
ordinary that he, one of the commanders of a beaten fleet, 
beaten too in the act of their dirty work, should thus seek 
to perpetuate the glory of his opponents, and thus keep 
before his own eyes such a record of the disgrace and hu- 
miliation of his country's arms. The explanation is, perhaps, 
that these people do not feel the bond of nationality as we 
do. The personal character of an individual, with them, as 
with us, is of great consequence to himself, or may be so, as 
it materially affects his prospects in life besides touching his 
personal honour ; but if there is in their imagination such a 
thing as a national character, it has no connection with the 
individual personally. 

Tahir was not implicated in the Turkish breach of faith 
which preceded the battle, nor responsible for the mismanage- 
ment by which they brought it on; but he felt that like a 
brave man he had done his duty, and fought with courage 
and honour in the greatest battle that had occurred for years; 
and that in fact the Battle of Navarin did him, Tahir, per- 
sonally much credit. To a man who, like him, had by turns 
been in the service of most of the Mussulman states a soldier 
of fortune seeking the means of rising in life the nationality 
of the calamity that destroyed his fleet was but a name. 
With us the national character aiid that of the individual 
are so closely interwoven, that anything affecting the credit 
of his country is of the greatest moment to the individual 
citizen. He considers himself in some, degree as one of its 
guardians, and he would resent personally anything to the 
disparagement of his country, nationally. 

Tell an Englishman his sovereign is no better than he or 
she ought to be ; that his countrymen are a set of rogues, 
or his country a faithless one, and he will knock you down. 
Tell a Turk the same, and he will say, Allah ! Kerim ! A 
Turk has no country : an Englishman has, and it is his own. 


I also saw in Tahir's house prints of several other national 
engagements, including the First of June, Lord Howe's 
victory : one of those of the First of June was a rare one 
that I had not seen before. At Smyrna he had his young 
son with him, a nice-looking, modest lad (he was not allowed 
to sit in his father's presence), and he seemed pleased when 
at Constantinople I asked for him again, and I saw him. 
Old Tahir can make a joke now and then. One day, standing 
together by the block of stone placed near the Giant's Land- 
ing-place (or landing-place of the Giant's Mountain) where 
the Russian auxiliary army had been encamped, he pointed 
to it and said, 'You, England and France, placed that moun- 
tain there.' Not imagining a joke in his grave eye and face, 
I replied that I had heard the Russians had placed it 
there. 'Well,' said he, 'was it not the conduct of England 
and France that brought the Russians here ?' I felt that 
I could not say it really was not. He was then, in 1840, 
still an active, energetic man ; and one day in his garden, 
after a cup of coffee, he suddenly called for his horses, and 
starting off at full speed, he led me a very sharp burst as 
hard as we could go, galloping by winding narrow paths up 
the face of the steep hills that overhung his house. I was 
glad, and the horses too, when we reached his farm at the 
top. The character attributed to him at Constantinople is 
that of a good, active officer, but too harsh and severe for the 
present day. 


The letters of hearty congratulation received by Sir 
E. C. on the victory of Navarin are far too numerous 
for insertion; they came from admirals, generals, and 
other friends well capable of forming a judgment on 
the subject, and were much valued by him. I have 
inserted a very few of these cordial and gratifying testi- 
monials ; and have refrained from adding more for fear 
of overburdening the text with them. 

From Admiral Sir John Gore to Sir E. C. 

November 12, 1827. 

MT DEAR CODRINGTON, I must leave you to the dictates 
of your own feelings to render justice to ours towards you and 
yours upon the first intimation of your great and most un- 
paralleled victory over the Turco-Egyptian fleet in Navarin 
harbour. To say that we congratulate you, however sincere, 


sounds cold, and not to convey an iota of our sentiments. We 
are all alive to all that you and dear Lady C. can enjoy on such 
an occasion, and we fully participate in it all. We rejoice with 
you and we unite in the national exultation that the navy have 
clearly manifested being in its full vigour after thirteen years 
of peace. There can be but one sentiment on such an event, and 
we all feel proud that our friend has achieved it. May you live 
long in happiness to enjoy the honours so nobly won ! Your 
official letter is perfectyou have left nothing unsaid nor 
anything to unsay. You came, you saw, you conquered ; 
and you, by yourself, you, set a noble example which all 
will be proud to follow when you and I are returned to our 
native dust. And let the consequences or results of this 
merited chastisement be as it may, you can only feel the 
proud consciousness that you have fulfilled your duty amidst 
dangers and awful scenes never before witnessed ! 

Your loss has been severe in officers, but when the nature 
of the action is considered, the cross-fire you must have been 
exposed to, and the number of deliberately pointed guns 
fired from batteries and vessels unoccupied by your ships, I 
am only surprised that it was not greater, deplorable as it is. 
I can fancy the effect of 'Asia's' broadside in such a situation, 
and you had a fine opportunity of experiencing all the 
advantages of your round stern over ( Genoa's ' old-fashioned 
one. I have no chart to give an idea of Navarin, and thereby 
enable me to judge completely of your own and the adver- 
sary's position. Could you send me a sketch, however rough? 
Sir George Montagu will be pleased to see such ; and note the 
direction of the wind when you entered. * Warspite ' (William 
Parker) is on the way to join you, but I conclude that all 
your ships will be replaced. I propose to go to London to- 
morrow to learn the sentiments of the Admiralty upon the 
rewards for such services. They are cold and close, but I 
will see the Lord High Admiral if I can. He so highly 
applauded all your conduct previous to this brilliant service, 
that he cannot fail to extol it now. Dear Lady C., how 
anxious I am to hear of her after this excitement of her 
noble soul. Her proud feeling that her husband has won 
the day, and under circumstances so peculiarly novel a 
British Admiral leading a confederated fleet of Eussians, 
French, and English against Turks and Egyptians, to vic- 
tory so entirely perfect ! We all unite, my dear friend, in 
shouts of admiration and most sincere good wishes to you on 
this great event ; may it please God to bless you with many 
years of health to enjoy the result. 

Believe me your faithfully-attached friend, 



Whitehall: November 13, 1827. 

The King has been pleased to nominate and appoint 
Vice- Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, Knight Commander 
of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, to be a 
Knight Grand Cross of the said Most Honourable Military 

The King has also been pleased to nominate and appoint 
the undermentioned officers in the Royal Navy to be 
Companions of the said Most Honourable Military Order of 
the Bath, viz., 

Captain John Ackworth Ommanney, 
the Hon. J. A. Maude. 
the Hon. Frederick Spencer. 
Edward Curzon. 
Commander John Norman Campbell. 

Richard Dickinson. 

George Bohuii Martin. 

Lewis Davies. 

the Hon. William Anson. 

the Lord Yiscount Ingestrie. 

Robert Lambert Baynes* 

From H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence to Sir E. 0. 

Admiralty : -November 19, 1827. 

DEAR SIR, In the first place, I am to congratulate you 
on the splendid victory you have obtained, and rejoice you 
are quite well. I admire your perfect conduct on the day 
of battle, and most highly appreciate the exertions of all 
ranks under your orders. 

This will be delivered to you by our common friend, Sir 
John Gore, who proceeds, with the approbation and the 
perfect knowledge of the Cabinet, to obtain a complete 
and satisfactory explanation to certain questions which his 
Majesty's confidential servants have thought it their duty to 
put to you respecting the cause of your going into Navarin 
Bay, and the commencement of the firing. Last night a 
messenger was despatched from the Earl Dudley with the 
very queries which you will, I make no doubt, so satisfactorily 
answer through Sir John Gore. I mention this fact because 
the Cabinet sent him off in such a hurry that there was no 
time to inform me, who was, being Sunday j out of town at 
Bushy, or otherwise I should most certainly have written. 
Ever believe me, dear Sir, 

Yours most sincerely, 



P.S. By the mail coach of this evening I send down to 
Captain Bridgeman, of the 'Rattlesnake/ your Insignia of the 
Bath, and the crosses of the C. B.'s for the various Captains 
and Commanders who had the honour and happiness of 
serving under, and sharing with you the glory of the 20th of 
October last. 

By the same conveyance I venture to send a sword from 
myself, which I trust you will accept as a small token of my 
admiration of your conduct in Navarin Bay. 

From E.R.H. the Duke of Clarence to Sir E. C. 

Bushy House : December 2, 1827. 

DEAE SIR, I am to acknowledge yours of 9th August at 
Vourla, &c You were perfectly right in proceed- 
ing off Navarin with the squadron. I make no doubt you 

will always do your duty Having now answered 

all your letters except that which relates to your Action, I 
now enter on this interesting and glorious event. I could 
have wished, either by the messenger who preceded Sir John 
Gore, or by that Admiral, to have written at once. But I 
really had not time. Not being in the Cabinet, I can only 
look at the business as a sea officer, and I do therefore, from 
the bottom of my heart, congratulate you on the event. The 
' Asia's ' fire speaks for itself the Capitana Bey's ship a 
perfect wreck with 650 killed out of 850 ! I rejoice all did 
their duty. Everybody must lament poor Bathurst. I 
altogether approve of Captain Davies's promotion. I have, of 
course, promoted Lord Ingestrie. Anson is also a Captain, 
* and all the commanders in the ships of the line are, or will 
be, made Captains, as will those in the sloops .... I 
approve entirely of the two mates of the ' Asia ' being made 
Lieutenants. I am confident you will ever reward merit. I 
trust the ' Asia ' will be able to continue your flagship. 

I rejoice your colleagues have so well done their duty. 
Capitaine Hugon in ' L'Armide ' has eminently shone. Your 
gallant son has been most seriously wounded, but I trust in 
God by this time he is quite well again. You must have had 
plenty to do to refit the ships so far as to return to Malta, 
where, thank God, we know they are safe arrived. I under- 
stand from Lord Ingestrie the Turkish, Egyptian, and 
Tunisian squadrons hardly exist. 

I have now answered your letters, and have to add the 
King of France has nominated you a Grand Cross of the 
Order of St. Louis ; Captain Fellowes a Knight Commander 
of the Legion of Honour, and all the captains and com- 


manders who were actually in the command of ships and 
vessels of the British during the action in Navarin to be 
Knights of St. Louis. I suppose we shall hear shortly of 
similar honours to yourself and the gallant fine fellows 
under your command from the Emperor of Eussia. On every 
account I must and shall be anxious to hear from you after 
the arrival at Malta of Sir John Gore. For the present, 
adieu, and ever believe me, 

Dear Sir, yours sincerely, 


From H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence to Sir E. 0. 

Admiralty : December 7, 1827. 

DEAR Sin, This morning brought me yours of October 
26th, between Navarin and Malta, and your letter of 'Novem- 
ber 17th from Malta. 

In answer to your first and most important letter, I shall 
begin by observing how sincerely I do rejoice at the whole 
fleet having got out of ISTavarin without any damage, and 
that equally the ensuing gale did not any damage. Your 
remarks are just, that the passions of men will be up in great 
events, and you write your first letter, then cool. I un- 
derstand your reason for taking up your anchoring ground 
as you did : the pilot may have been killed contrary to 
orders. I can easily conceive the surrounding vessels on 
fire were very dangerous ; the wetting of the decks and 
beams was very judicious ; your contest, from the numbers 
of the enemy, must have been severe. I clearly understand 
you must have felt the shortness of complement on board the 
'Asia' ; the enemy were clearly numerous. The 'Talbot' 
and ' L'Armide ' did indeed their duty ; I make no doubt 
the ' Cambrian ' and ' Glasgow ' did all they could. As for 
the consequences of your victory I will not venture an 
opinion. I hope you are right and J, therefore, wrong; but 
I am more inclined to believe in war than peace. You were 
very wise in placing the French opposite to the Egyptians. 
I trust with all my heart your son is quite recovered, 

God bless you both, and ever believe me, dear Sir, 

Yours truly, 



From Sir John Gore to Sir E. C. 

November 14, 1827. 

MY DEAR CODRINGTON, In my letter of Monday I pur- 
posed to make my bow of congratulation to the Lord High 
Admiral upon your brilliant victory under his Royal High- 
ness's administration. I did so yesterday, and was well re- 
ceived and most truly gratified by the unmeasured terms of 
approbation he (the Duke of Clarence) expressed on the 
whole of your conduct, and the admirable manner you have 
secured yourself from being made a political ( cat's paw,' by 
identifying the French and Kussians so completely in the 

6 As I have nothing to do with political considerations, 
and only look to the conduct of the navy, when I sent Cod- 
rington's despatches to the King I requested that the Grand 
Cross of the Bath should be sent to him at once ; and as the 
case is entirely novel, and sloops of war have fought with 
ships of the line, I have promoted all the commanders, the 
senior officer of each rank in every ship, and, contrary to 
the routine, I have given the vacancies in the Marines to the 
officers on the spot. But, to effect this, I have been obliged 
to fight a battle to overcome the obstinate prejudices which 
exist in that Boardroom of which you can form no idea 
yes, you can, from their treatment of you respecting the 
Signal Committee ; but I conquered, and will again, in 
order to do justice.' 

He then told me that Ministers are thrown on their backs 
by your splendid achievement in chastening the faithless 
Mussulman ; that they could not imagine the probability of 
such results, and that he had a personal altercation almost 
amounting to open quarrel with Mr. Canning for sending 
the ' Genoa * and ( Albion ' to you, and that ' Warspite ' is 
now on her way to you unknown to the Cabinet (ex officio}. 
( I told Mr. C., presiding as I do over the navy, it is my duty 
to preserve its importance, and I will not suffer a risk of its 
disgrace. If your object is peace, send such a force as will 
command it, not one to invite hostilities. It is strange that 
Sir George C. sided with Canning against my opinion, and 
no man was more astonished at the arrival of Codrington's 
despatch than him. But they shall not catch me asleep. 
I have ordered " Revenge," "Ocean," and " Wellesley " to sail 
as soon as possible to replace the ships coming home. The 
consequences of this victory to the navy must be most bene- 


ficial and lasting, and it is my duty to see justice done to all 
who aided in its achievement.' 

'Your Bo} 7 al Highness has enhanced the value of your 
approbation by the promptness" of the rewards.' 

' Yes, in that consists the advantage of my not being a 
Cabinet Minister. I, like the Duke of York, have only to 
look to my own duty, without waiting the cold calculation of 
political considerations. Ministers would gladly shelter them- 
selves from the odium of the nation by throwing the blame 
on Codrington ; but he has done his duty nobly. I will up- 
hold him. And he has placed himself above their disappro- 
bation by linking Count Heiden and Admiral De Kigny to 
his car.' 

This is the substance (if not verbatim) of our conversation 
on the subject. 

I long for a chart of the port and the position of the fleets 
all the ships. Cannot dear Harry send me one? I was 
delighted to hear from the Duke, Spencer, and Will, that 
on the 23rd said Harry was doing quite well, and that you 
were not under any anxiety about him. I read a copy of the 
Duke's letter to Mrs. Bathurst. It is manly, beautiful, and 
most truly benevolent ; so that in all respects he has done, 
and is doing, well on this great and glorious occasion ! And 
now again, my good friend, let me congratulate you on all 
these results, and the honourable commendation I hear from 
all persons of your whole conduct. It was truly gratifying 
to me yesterday in London to hear but one sentiment 
respecting your conduct though the policy which led to it is 
very loudly execrated as likely to produce incalculable results. 
Sir George Montagu is delighted, and commands Geena and 
me to communicate to you his highest sentiments of admira- 
tion and congratulation. The voice of the nation will doubt- 
less be expressed in Parliament, and yourself and subordi- 
nates receive the high meed of your valour. 

From Sir Isambard Brunei to Captain W. Codrington. 

November 17, 1827. 

One of the most extraordinary circumstances of the late 
achievement of your worthy father is that of his being the 
first British commander who has commanded a French fleet, 
and where the French have shown a cordiality and devoted- 
ness which reflects the highest credit on both ; most parti- 
cularly on your father for having directed everything with 
so much regard towards the different parties. 


That he is safe and well after this, is for his friends a most 
delightful reflection, and in this feeling no one is more sin- 
cere than 

Yours truly, 


On the Allied fleets separating for repair and refit 
after the battle of Navarin, it was arranged with 
Admiral de Rigny, who was to remain at Smyrna, 
that he should undertake the duties in the Archipelago, 
and especially the watching the ports of Navarin, 
Modon, &c., in the Morea. 

The refittal of the Russian squadron occupied the 
main attention and resources of Malta Dockyard ; the 
English squadron, which reached that port on the 3rd 
November, was afterwards sent to England, as the 
quickest means of refit and return. 

There remained at Malta no disposable vessel for 
the Admiral's flag, which was temporarily hoisted on 
board a 28-gun frigate then under repair. 

But, although at Malta, this was no idle time for 
Sir E. Codrington. Every available vessel had been 
dispersed for the protection of British subjects in the 
Ottoman ports against possible fanatical outbreaks ; 
Greek piracy required immediate and decided measures 
for its suppression, with or without the consent of 
Count Capo d'Istrias, the President of Greece, who was 
on the point of arrival. 

The slowness and inefficiency of communication at 
that time are shown by the fact that the affair of Patras, 
the Battle of Navarin, and the subsequent arrival of 
the English fleet at Malta on the 3rd November, all 
took place before the receipt from London of the 
Protocol and Instructions of 15th October, by which a 
final answer was obtained to questions of importance 
put by Sir E. C. to Mr. S. Canning in August. 

These Instructions of October 15th are printed in the 
Appendix.* They were in answer to, and confir- 
mation of, the previous views and corresponding acts 
undertaken by Sir E. C. on his own responsibility, as 

* See Appendix. 


to preventing or facilitating particular movements of the 
Ottoman ships between their own ports, whether in 
Greece, Egypt, or Turkey. Yet in a subsequent part 
of this memoir will be seen a declaration of the Govern- 
ment, that he who originated them did not understand 
or obey them. W. J. C. 

From Sir E. G. to Earl Dudley. 

( Asia/ in Malta harbour : November 8, 1827. 

Your private letter of October 16* proved excellent medi- 
cine to me, my good friend, early this morning in my sick 
bed. I knocked up just before our arrival here on the 3rd. 
You will find that we maritime diplomatists are rather rapid 
in our proceedings, and that we have already advanced in 
anticipation of your instructions as well as those which we 
get from Constantinople. Thus it is, you will say, with 
people whose only dragoman are cannon shot ; and I will 
say, this is the way with people who have confidence in the 
due support of their employers, and who see the advantage 
of their boldly undertaking at once that which they feel must 
be done eventually. Had we waited in a blockade for further 
instructions, the base arid brutal Ibrahim would have devas- 
tated the Morea whilst we were looking on. He cannot do 
more ; and if he should, it will be at his own eventual cost. 
But when I can give myself to this part of the subject, I 
propose submitting to Mr. S. Canning my opinion that a 
warning to the Porte and to the Pacha of Egypt of certain 
consequences, will alter his system. We can turn the tables 
on him, I think, and his provisions will not last him long, even 
if the Greeks should not enter upon that harassing warfare 
which I am trying to press upon them. I hope the strong 
measures which the horrid conduct which Greek cruisers 
have lately pursued under the encouragement of the present 
venal Provisional Government obliged myself and my col- 
leagues to have recourse to, will have the effect we expect of 
leading the legislative body to change the individuals com- 
posing it, without even waiting for Capo dTstrias. For with- 
out putting their power aside no good could arise, and Greece 
would be quite ruined before the final arrangements could be 
entered into. I am sanguine enough to think that the 
victory of October 20, instead of creating a war, will prove 
the only means of preserving peace. Here again you will 
smile at my maritime diplomacy. First, the Turk will suc- 
cumb and accede to the Treaty ; secondly, the Eussians will 
* See page 460, Vol. I. 


have no excuse for not stopping their meditated march on 
Constantinople, which I imagine them to be now actually 
beginning, and submitting to the silken bonds by which that 
Treaty has so ably tied them down ; and thirdly, the Greeks 
will, by our present power to watch them, be obliged to act 
on their own coast, and enter into some sort of trade instead 
of living by piracy ; and during this process a better class of 
men will probably come forward. I will not enter into the 
story of the battle, since I have detailed all that concerns it 
in my official letters so fully. I consider it merely what the 
pugilists would term a ' turn up,' arising from our suddenly 
entering the antagonists' quarters uninvited, and whilst they 
were in the act of training ; but I will say before the best of 
them, that it would not have disparaged the loftiest stage 
and the finest ring which could have been collected in 

From Sir E. C. to Mr. S. Canning. 

1 Asia/ at Malta : November 12, 1827. 

DEAR SIR, From the time of the ' Bifleman ' having 
joined my flag with your despatches, I have been so unwell 
I could do no more than get through the daily demands 
which have been made upon me ; demands, indeed, which to 
a man in health would have been very agreeable, as they 
have arisen out of our late success. ..... 

By these last you will see that I have never lost sight of the 
subject of piracy, although I have not had time to form 
speculative opinions upon it, or have been able to aid you 
with my sentiments as much as I could wish ; I assure you 
it has not been for want of disposition to do so, but merely 
owing to that multiplicity of demands upon me (even when 
I had to manage the treacherous Ibrahim singlehanded), that 
the day was not long enough for me to work through its 
duties. You will see that Mehemet Ali, as well as his worthy 
son, has been playing a game both with the French and our- 
selves. .......... 

It is clear to me that he wished to be able to tell the Porte, 
that he had been assured of English support in case of his 
throwing off his allegiance, in order ther eby to obtain Da- 
mascus and Syria, and to be put, as Mr. Salt termed it, at 
the head of the Mussulman world. Upon the subject of the 
French officers, I cannot do better than refer Your Excel- 
lency to the communications which Admiral de Rigny will 
have made to Count Guillerninot. 

I am convinced that the attack and resistance of the 
Turco-Egyptian fleet was owing to the renegade Letellier 


having persuaded Ibrahim that the French squadron would 
not co-operate with us ; and that by his plan of placing us 
in the centre of their fire, we should be effectually destroyed. 

The venal composition of the present Provisional Govern- 
ment of Greece naturally gave rise to the fresh intrigue of 
Colocotroni and other Capitani. The language openly held 
in all personal communications wherever we went, as to the 
consequences to the parties eventually, had probably pre- 
vented the success of all those attempts ; and the influence 
which the late battle has given us will preponderate still 
more decisively hereafter. You will see by the strong mea- 
sures we have felt ourselves called upon to adopt, that we 
dreaded consequences beyond the contemplation of your 
letters, unless a stop were put at once to the proceedings 
therein practised. 

I am, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Mr. S. Canning. 
(Confidential. ) 

1 Asia,' at Malta : November 12, 1827. 

DEAR SIR, I have been so ill since the receipt of your 
letter by the ' Rifleman,' that I could not till now send her 
back to you as I wished for the chance of her being wanted. 
By this time the conduct of the Sultan must be decided ; but 
I send the ( Rifleman,' nevertheless, for my own satisfaction, 
and for the chance of getting late despatches that way from 
you. If there be no occasion for her stay, you will oblige me 
by not detaining her. 

De Rigny is quite cured of any predilection he may have 
had for the Egyptians ; and well he may, for nothing can be 
more clear than that Mehemet Ali has long been playing him 
off to his private purposes. The opinions contained in his 
letters, of which you have sent me copies, are similar to 
those he has always expressed to me. And that wily chief 
seems to have worked in the same manner upon Mr. Salt, 
and even Colonel Cradock, who could hardly believe in his 
treachery until it became too glaring. Perhaps if I had had 
a personal communication with him, I might have felt the 
same confidence ; but I could never be persuaded that Hydra, 
was the sole object of such preparations ; and even if I had 
not found it requisite to watch Lord Cochrane's movements, 
I should still have kept in the neighbourhood of Zante. 
However, as it was that over-reliance on the good faith of 


Ibrahim which induced De Rigny to let him see the French 
squadron quit Navarin, instead of going away in some dark 
night as I proposed, and which consequently led to the battle 
from which I expect so much eventual good, I have no rea- 
son to complain of it. After he heard of the Turks being 
out, he still remained at Cervi with his two sound ships of 
the line, and his own and another frigate, instead of corning 
away at once as he should have done. And yet, upon learn- 
ing from Bompard the detail of Ibrahim's plans about going 
from Patras to Hydra, he himself observed : ' So that if any 
one ship, even a frigate, had been off Navarin when you 
drove him from Patras, he would not have attempted to re- 
enter that port.' I give you this merely to make you aware 
of everything, but not to lessen De Rigny in your eyes ; for 
his conduct in the battle, and on all occasions when present 
with me, has been as able and as cordial as possible. You 
will see that the urgency of the case obliges us in many in- 
stances to anticipate instructions from you as well as from 
home. Before explanations can be given, the mischief would 
be done. I have now an order, or rather a power, to detain 
Lord Cochrane's schooner, which I shall announce both to 
him and to the Greek legislative body, that we may avoid 
the necessity of it. 

I feel confident that the strong line I have taken respect- 
ing the conduct of the Greeks will make them give their 
exertions a more proper direction at sea, and leave our com- 
merce more unrestrained. Malta has been almost blockaded 
of late by the Greek vessels of war, and the Ionian Islands 
much in the same state. These vessels have been under 
regular license from the Provisional Government, who share 
a twentieth of the condemnations. With respect to Proto- 
cols, you will see that in one important instance my de- 
cision to place the fleet in Navarin with the Turks my 
colleagues supported me by a regular document of that sort. 
But separated as we must necessarily be, it is not possible 
for us in general to adopt that proceeding. We are obliged 
to act on the spur of the moment as the occasion requires ; 
and though we cannot pledge each other to our measures 
thus separately entered upon, they are undertaken upon a 
previous concert as to contingencies. 

Believe me, &c., 



Extract of a letter from Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

< Asia/ at Malta : November 16, 1827. 

The Tunisian Admiral, who was with the fleet at Navarin, 
sent me word that he had had no intention to take part in 
any hostility against us,* and that he hoped I would permit 
him to return to Tunis, in a brig, the only remaining vessel 
of his squadron. I acceded immediately to this, assuring 
him that I had only acted in self-defence ; and that having 
amply punished the perfidy of Ibrahim Pacha, I should con- 
sider the battle as a mere casual event to be attributed to 
the misconduct of that individual, and as not likely to inter- 
rupt the amity which before prevailed betwixt England and 
the several Ottoman Powers. I am in hopes that this cir- 
cumstance being made known by the Tunisian Admiral will 
prevent any brutality on the part of the populace in any 
of the Mussulman States. 

I have, &c., 


At the N.W. corner of the island of Candia there rises from 
the sea a small rocky island named Grabusa or Carabusa, 
200 or 300 feet in height and perhaps half a mile across. 
The greater part has a high perpendicular and impracticable 
cliff for its coast, whilst at another smaller portion of the 
island the ground rises in a steep grassy and stony slope 
from low rocks up to the fort, which crowns the available 
space at the top. The anchorage is bad from its small size 
and rocky bottom : it is formed by the shelter between this 
island and the mainland, and by a da.ngerous reef of rocks 
which bars the effect of sea. But it well answered the pur- 
pose of a refuge for pirates in their small vessels and of 
this class, description, and occupation were at that time 
many of the so-called Greek men-of-war the vessels an- 
chored below, and their plunder was sent up to the castle, 
which nominally was supposed to be in possession of the 
Greek Government, and hoisted its flag. This nest of piracy, 
the head- quarters of villains, who not only plundered vessels 
but committed all sorts of crimes upon the crews, had to be 
destroyed ; and the duty was entrusted to Commodore Sir T. 
Staines, lately arrived from England in H.M.S. 'Isis,' by an 

* On the subsequent taking of Carabusa there were found in a cask letters 
from the Bey of Tunis to his Admiral at Navarin, enjoining him to do his 
utmost to destroy the Allied ships ; and the Bey of Tunis was informed 
pointedly of the discovery of these instructions. 


order to destroy the fortress, with, all vessels and boats of 
whatever description belonging to it, and to carry to Malta 
in irons for trial all persons who might be likely to be iden- 
tified as principals in the piracies committed. W. J. C. 

At this period of difficulty, the English Admiral was 
left by his Government without further information or 
instructions than could be obtained from a despatch 
containing c Queries ' as to the cause of the Battle of 

On the 4th December, 1827, a small merchant brig 
under sail was seen trying to reach the Island of Malta, 
and attempting a well-known signal of 'wishing to 
speak the Admiral ;' and when, after some difficulty, 
she had gained the anchorage, Vice -Admiral Sir John 
Gore, an old and intimate friend of Sir E. Codrington, 
who had been sent by the Government through France, 
and had embarked in this brig at Marseilles, placed the 
following despatch in the hands of Sir E. C. 

From Earl Dudley to His Royal Highness the Lord High 
Admiral, E.G. (sent to Sir E. C.). 

Foreign Office : November 17, 1827.* 

SIR, His Majesty's confidential servants have had under 
mature consideration the despatch from Sir Edward Cod- 
rington of October 21, which, together with its several enclo- 
sures, has been transmitted to me by Your Royal High- 
ness's command. They entirely concur with Your Royal 
Highness in recognising the great skill and distinguished 
bravery displayed by His Majesty's naval forces on October 
20, as well as the ability of Sir Edward Codrington in main- 
taining that perfect harmony and good understanding with 
the admirals commanding the Allied forces, which became 
the guarantee of their cordial and gallant co-operation in 
the hour of trial at Navarin. Whilst, however, His Majesty's 
Government are happy to make this acknowledgment, it is 
impossible not to lament the loss of life with which this 
severe conflict has been attended ; and it is their duty to 
consider the circumstances of this case with reference to the 
instructions under which Sir E. Codrington was acting, 
marked as they were by an anxious desire to avoid, except 

Received December 4. 


in the last extremity, any act of hostility. In this view of 
the question there are some points of great importance, upon 
which the despatches hitherto received from the Admiral do 
not convey that full explanation which His Majesty's Govern- 
ment deem it essential to obtain; the omission of which 
they ascribe solely to the circumstances under which those 
despatches were written, and to the Admiral's anxiety to 
transmit the earliest intelligence of the important event that 
had occurred. 

The points respecting which further explanation is con- 
sidered to be necessary are those adverted to in the following 
Queries : 

1. Is the memorandum transmitted in Sir Edward Cod- 
rington's despatch of September 25 (Enclosure No. 7) the 
only written document in which there is any specification of 
the conditions of the armistice agreed upon with Ibrahim 
Pacha ? 

2. Was that memorandum communicated to Ibrahim 
Pacha, or to any officer of the Turkish forces who had been 
present at the conference at which the armistice was agreed 

3. It being stated in Sir Edward Codrington's memoran- 
dum that the armistice was to take effect by sea and land, 
was there any article or any understanding in respect to the 
forces and districts to be included in it, or as to the period 
and mode of its termination ? 

4. Was there any mode agreed upon for denouncing the 
armistice by either party on receipt of the answer from Con- 
stantinople ? 

5. On October 18, when the protocol was signed, had any 
answer been received from Constantinople ; and, if so, was 
the nature of that answer known to the admirals when they 
agreed to the protocol ? 

6. It having been alleged in the answer of Patrona Bey, 
when he was turned back with the forces under his command 
on his way to Patras, that Ibrahim Pacha did not consider 
the armistice as precluding him from making that move- 
ment, was any explanation entered into between the return 
of Patrona Bey to Navarin and October 20 for clearing up 
that difference of construction of the armistice ? 

7. Was any step taken by Sir Edward Codrington, after 
the conclusion of the armistice, and before the entrance of 
the combined fleets into Navarin, to remonstrate against 
the hostilities carried on by the forces of Ibrahim Pacha by 

8. Was any communication made to the admiral com- 


manding the Ottoman fleet in Navarin, as to the object of 
the movement of October 20, before it was carried into 
effect ? 

9. If the second mode of proceeding mentioned in the 
protocol of October 18 had been adopted, would it not, on 
the one hand, have effectually obviated all the risks pointed 
out as objections to the first mode ; and, on the other hand, 
as effectually secured, so far as the naval forces in Navarin 
were concerned, the main object of the instructions of July 
12, namely, c the interruption of all supplies of arms, ammu- 
nition, &c., to the Turkish forces' in Greece, without in- 
curring the same danger of collision as was apprehended 
from the third ? 

10. With respect to the third mode of proceeding, what 
were the propositions referred to therein, as intended to be 
made to Ibrahim Pacha ? 

His Majesty's Government confidently expect that the ex- 
planations which they thus require, will enable them com- 
pletely to vindicate, whenever they may be called in question, 
the grounds upon which Sir Edward Codrington acted at 
Navarin. I Lave the honour to be, with the highest respect, 

Sir, Your Royal Highness's most obedient humble servant, 


Answers to 'Queries. 9 
From Sir Fl. Codrington to the Admiralty. 

1 Asia/ at Malta : December 9, 1827. 

SIR, On the 4th inst. I received your letter of the 18th 
November with the enclosure of the 17th from the Earl of 
Dudley, which his Royal Highness, the Lord High Admiral, 
was pleased to entrust to the care of Vice-Admiral Sir John 
Gore. By these letters I am commanded c to give such 
further explanations as may occur to me as necessary for 
putting his Royal Highness and his Majesty's Government 
in full possession of all the circumstances and motives on my 
part which led to the battle of Navarin, and with particular 
explanations of points stated in Lord Dudley's letter.' 

I propose, therefore, in the first place taking these latter 
points seriatim : 

First Query. ' Is the memorandum transmiHed in Sir E. 
Codrington's despatch of the 25th September (EnclosureNo.7) 
the only written document in which there is any specification 
of the conditions of the armistice agreed upon with Ibrahim 

Answer. There was no written agreement between 


Ibrahim and the Admirals. I was given to understand that 
it was not customary with this people to put such things 
down in writing ; but also because their word given in the 
presence of witnesses is supposed to be sacred. On this ac- 
count I demanded that the interview which Ibrahim required 
with me might take place in the presence of all his chiefs ; 
and I for the same reason took with me several of my officers, 
as did also Rear- A dmiral de Rigny. I likewise took on shore 
with me as interpreter, a gentleman of Malta, but did not 
insist on his admission when told it would offend. 

I spoke in English, which the Pacha's dragoman showed he 
well understood by repeating the sense of what I said in 
French to the full satisfaction of Admiral de Eigny, and 
which he then transferred to the Pacha and his chiefs in the 
Turkish language, without the least hesitation. And it 
was the conviction of the bystanders, who watched his 
manner and the effect my observations thus translated had 
upon the auditors, that they were given faithfully. 

Second Query. 'Was that memorandum communicated to 
Ibrahim Pacha, or any officer of the Turkish forces who had 
been present at the conference a,t which the armistice was 
agreed to ? ' 

Answer. The dragoman was always asked if he clearly 
understood what we said, to which he replied in the affirma- 
tive ; and we were all convinced, by watching him and his 
auditors, that he did so. When off Patras, I asked the Reala 
Bey, who came on board the * Asia/ if he was not present at 
the interview, and he answered that he was ; and when I 
then told him he was therefore as bad as Ibrahim himself 
in breaking his word of honour, he excused himself by saying 
that he understood I had given leave on the 26th. And 
further, upon the dragoman being asked if what passed at this 
conference was as binding as if committed to paper, he re- 
plied that his Highness Ibrahim's word was considered as 
his bond, and therefore it might be as much relied upon as a 
written treaty. And, upon nay desiring at the close of our 
conference that this question might be put to the Pacha, the 
dragoman objected that it would be an affront to doubt it. I 
nevertheless made a point of it, and it was therefore put, and 
replied to by Ibrahim in the affirmative. 

Third Query. ' It being stated in Sir E. Codrington's 
memorandum that the armistice was to take effect by sea 
and land, was there any article or any understanding in 
respect to the forces and districts to be included in it, or as 
to the period and mode of its termination ? ' 

Answer. The armistice by sea and land thus agreed upon 



referred only to the ships and troops forming the expedition 
then at Navarin. It was to remain inactive at Navarin until 
Ibrahim should receive answers from Constantinople and 
Alexandria to the communications he was to make of what 
had passed at our conference. Upon my asking how ]ong 
the answers might be coming, it was stated that twenty days 
was the shortest period; and it was agreed that Ibrahim 
should make known to us, through our ships off the port, his 
receiving those answers. At this time the Turkish part of 
the fleet was outside the harbour, and I acceded to Ibrahim's 
request that I would allow them to come in (lest, as he said, 
suspicion of his inclination to follow our wishes should arise 
from the Egyptian ships alone being in the port) on account 
of his disposition to bind himself by the armistice. 

Fourth Query. ( Was there any mode agreed upon for de- 
nouncing the armistice by either party on receipt of the 
answers from Constantinople ? ' 

Answer. Ibrahim was to make known his receipt of 
answers to his communications, and whether, by those answers, 
our proposals were or were not acceded to. 

Fifth Query. ' On the 18th October, when the Protocol 
was signed, had any answer been received from Constanti- 
nople ; and, if so, was the nature of that answer known to 
the Admirals when they agreed to the Protocol ? J 

Answer. I have no means of knowing whether any answers 
were received or not. No notification as agreed upon, of any 
such answers being received, was made to us. 

Sixth Query. c It having been alleged in the answer of 
Patrona Bey, when he was turned back with the forces under 
his command on his way to Patras, that Ibrahim Pacha did 
not consider the armistice as precluding him from making 
that movement, was any explanation entered into between the 
return of Patrona Bey to Navarin and the 20th October, for 
clearing up that difference of construction of the armistice ? ' 
Answer. No explanation was entered into, because I felt 
sure that Ibrahim had misstated the fact designedly. On 
the 26th September, when the ' Asia ' and ' Sirene ' were 
about to quit Navarin, betwixt two and three o'clock 
Ibrahim's dragoman came to me from the Pacha to say that 
he had received information of Lord Cochrane having made 
a descent upon Patras, and to ask if I would give him leave 
to send a force competent to beat him off.* Admiral de 
Eigny was present at this interview on board the 'Asia,' 
and we both replied that on no account whatever could we 
permit such a thing, as being directly contrary to that part 

* There was no truth in this. 


of our orders which we had read at the preceding day's con- 
ference. The dragoman argued that I had myself promised 
to prevent Lord Cochrane's proceedings. I said that this 
intention referred to a meditated expedition to a part beyond 
the present theatre of war ; and that, the Greeks having 
accepted our mediation, I had no authority for interfering 
with their operations in any part within the present theatre 
of war. I then enquired if I was to consider the armistice 
still as binding ; to which the dragoman, in conclusion, said 
that if the Pacha had any further objection to urge he would 
return to announce it ; and that if he did not return in about 
an hour, we were to conclude that the agreement remained 
as settled the preceding day. We waited until almost dark, 
and, the dragoman not having returned, the * Asia ' and 
c Sirene ' went out of the harbour. 

Seventh Query. 'Was any step taken by Sir Edward 
Co.drington after the conclusion of the armistice, and before 
the entrance of the combined fleet into Navarin, to remon- 
strate against the hostilities carried on by the forces of 
Ibrahim Pacha by land ? ' 

Answer. Yes; as the accompanying document clearly 
shows. But Ibrahim, consistently with his other conduct, 
made his dragoman swear that he did not know where to 
find him, and that there were no means whatever of sending- 
him the letter. (See Lieutenant-Colonel Cradock's report.)* 

Eighth Query. 'Was any communication made to the 
Admiral commanding the Ottoman fleet in Navarin, as to 
the object of the movement of the 20th October, before it 
was carried into effect ? ' 

Answer. None. Because the commander of the Ottoman 
fleet had refused to receive my letter of the 19th September, 
alleging that he had no authority to receive any such com- 
munications, and that they must pass through Ibrahim him- 
self. Accordingly, Ibrahim, who was then passing in his boat, 
received the letter himself from Captain Baillie Hamilton, 
although not addressed to him. 

Ninth Query. c If the second mode of proceeding men- 
tioned in the Protocol of 18th October had been adopted, 
would it not, on the one hand, have effectually obviated all 
the risks pointed out as objections to the first mode ; and, on 
the other hand, as effectually secured, so far as the naval 
forces in Navarin were concerned, the main object of the 
Instructions of the 12th July; namely, "The interruption 
of all supplies of arms, ammunition, &c., to the Turkish 

* Page 57. 
K 2 


forces in Greece," without incurring the same danger of 
collision as was apprehended from the third ? ' 

Answer. The third mode of proceeding having in con- 
templation the renewing the propositions, was less likely to 
' degenerate into hostilities ' than the second ; but as Ibra- 
him had determined to receive no communications from us 
while without the port, and as we considered an effectual 
blockade of Navarin during the winter as physically impos- 
sible, we adopted the plan of entering the port as the only 
means of fulfilling the object of the Treaty. I may here 
state that when before Navarin in the middle of September, 
we were at one time carried as far to the northward as the 
Strophadia Islands ; and at another time, in a strong wind, 
aided by a southerly current, below the Gulf of Coron ; and 
there is no anchorage whatever upon any part of the neigh- 
bouring coast. There is no safety for any larger vessel than 
a sloop of war in Modon or under Sapienza, where the 
( Columbine ' was lost. 

Tenth Query. ' With respect to the third mode of pro- 
ceeding, what were the propositions referred to therein as 
intended to be made to Ibrahim Pacha ? ' 

Answer. The propositions referred to were, that the ex- 
pedition should return to Alexandria or the Dardanelles, 
and not operate further in Greece or the islands; and we 
were prepared to guarantee the safe return of any or all the 
forces at Ibrahim's disposal, if he consented to abandon the 

I am induced to think the answers which I have thus 
given to the queries put by Lord Dudley, will be satisfactory 
to the Government, as showing that I had no other means 
of effecting the purpose of the Treaty than by anchoring in 
the port of Navarin. 

But I will beg leave to trespass further upon the time of 
His Eoyal .Highness the Lord High Admiral, by adverting 
in the first place to that part of the second instruction 
emanating from the Treaty, which says : ' Should this hy- 
pothesis be realised you will be informed thereof directly 
by the King's ambassador at Constantinople, who is in- 
structed to correspond with you, &c. The informations 
which you may receive and the directions which may accom- 
pany them, to which you will be pleased to conform, will be 
concerted between the three ambassadors ; and the proceed- 
ings and arrangements which these ambassadors shall have 
pointed out, as well as those which circumstances may have 
rendered necessary, must be arranged between you and the 
French and Russian commanders.' 


Now, upon weighing the possible, if not probable, effect of 
carrying this Instruction into execution, I wrote on the llth 
August to Mr. Stratford Canning : ' Neither of us* can make 
out how we are by force to prevent the Turks, if obstinate, 
from pursuing any line of conduct which we are instructed 
to oppose, without committing hostility. Surely it must be 
like a blockade if an attempt be made to force it, by force 
only can that attempt be resisted.' 

To this he replied in a confidential letter dated 19th 
August, 1827 : ' I agree with you in thinking that any loss 
or imminent danger occurring to His Highness's fleet is 
more likely to soften than to rivet his determination. In 
speaking of " collision " in a former letter, I only meant that 
the decisive moment as to war will be that in which he first 
learns by experience that we mean to enforce, if necessary 
by cannon shot, the armistice which it is the object of the 
Treaty to establish, with or without him, as the case may be. 
This I imagine to be the true meaning of the second In- 
struction addressed to you and your colleagues. You are 
not to take part with either of the belligerents, but you are 
to interpose your forces between them, and to keep the peace 
with your speaking-trumpet, if possible, but, in case of 
necessity, with that which is used for the maintenance of a 
blockade against friends as well as foes I mean force.' 

And in another confidential letter dated 1st September, 
1827, he further replied: 'On the subject of collision, for 
instance, we agree that, although the measures to be exe- 
cuted by you are not to be adopted in a hostile spirit, and 
although it is clearly the intention of the Allied Govern- 
ments to avoid, if possible, anything that may bring on 
war, yet the prevention of supplies, as stated in your 
Instructions, is ultimately to be enforced, if necessary, and 
when all other means are exhausted, by cannon shot. 5 

These documents will show that it was my duty to execute 
the Treaty, by persuasion if I could, but if not, by the em- 
ployment of actual force, and that force is defined by Mr. 
S. Canning to be cannon shot. 

In all my subsequent proceedings, detailed with a scrupu- 
lous minuteness, His Eoyal Highness will observe that I used 
my utmost endeavours to avoid the collision contemplated 
in the Treaty. My first letter received by Ibrahim in Na- 
varin, urging consent to the mediation, goes to establish this 
point; for, if the expedition had put to sea, and he had 
refused to return with it to Africa upon my representation, 

* Meaning Admiral de Rigny and myself. 


it is evident I mast, according to my instructions, have 
employed the force under my command to effect it, without 
waiting for his first making an attack upon any of the 
Allied ships. Even if a blockade could have been made 
effectual, we must have come to this extremity whenever a 
want of provisions might oblige the Ottoman fleet to put to 
sea. But in the meantime the whole Peloponnesus would 
have been ravaged by the vengeful Ibrahim and his army ; 
and its unopposing and unoffending inhabitants reduced to 
that misery, to prevent which was the prominent object of 
this important Treaty. This conduct of Ibrahim was first 
made known to me by deputies bringing letters from Armyro, 
translations of which, with other papers, accompany this. 

In order further to show that I have made it my object 
throughout to avoid collision with the Ottoman fleet, and not 
to let my interruption of the supplies of men, arms, vessels, 
and warlike stores, degenerate into hostilities, I have en- 
closed copies of papers referring to this particular head ; in 
all of which His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, and 
his Majesty's Government, will observe that caution on this 
point has been my prominent principle. 

Even when a division of the Navarin fleet was met with 
going to Patras in breach of the armistice, and when so 
favourable an opportunity was afforded for professional dis- 
tinction, I refrained as much as possible from coming into 
actual collision. The same evidence of determination to 
execute the object of the Treaty which prevented collision 
on the above occasion, enabled me to deter Ibrahim himself, 
with almost his whole fleet, from forcing the passage which 
it was my duty to intercept. 

I may now be permitted, in closing this letter, to repeat 
that, according to the concurrent testimony of all the pilots 
and all the officers whose local experience established the 
soundness of their opinions, a blockade of the port of 
Navarin was physically impracticable. 

That so long as the Allied Fleet remained without the 
port, Ibrahim continued to practise uninterrupted that bar- 
barous and exterminating warfare which the Treaty was 
formed to prevent. 

That, therefore, the object of the Allied Powers could only 
be accomplished by our actually entering the port of Navarin, 
and, by means of the imposing presence of the squadrons, in- 
ducing Ibrahim to send back the expeditionary force to 
Alexandria or the Dardanelles. 

I have, &c., &c., 



From Captain Fellowes to Sir E. C. 

Malta : December 11, 1827. 

So, Having been called upon by you to furnish a state- 
ment of the immediate causes which led to the commencement 
of the action of Navarin, on the 20th October, 1827, I have 
the honour to state for your information, that, in pursuance 
of your instructions of the 19th October, I anchored 
H. M.'s ship under my command betwixt the brulot and the 
first ship (double-banked) on the eastern side of the harbour. 
While in the act of furling sails, a Turkish boat pulled past 
the ' Dartmouth,' in the greatest hurry, and went on board 
the brulot. On perceiving them occupied in preparing their 
train, and from our being so very near, I felt it absolutely 
necessary that immediate steps should be taken to prevent 
the destruction of the fleet, which, from their manner of pro- 
ceeding, seemed inevitable. I accordingly sent the pinnace 
with the first lieutenant, directing him to explain to them 
that if they remained quiet no harm was intended ; but, as 
their position was one of great danger to us, I wished them 
to quit the vessel in their boats, or to remove her further 
in shore out of our way. As our boat left the ship, perceiving 
one of our midshipmen with his sword drawn, I desired him 
to sheath it; and that the men in the boat might perfectly 
understand, I called out from the gangway, in the hearing of 
the ship's company, ' Eecollect, Sir, that no act of hostility 
is to be attempted by us on any account.' When the boat 
reached the quarter of the vessel, and was in the act of laying 
in the oars, the coxswain was shot dead, although the first 
lieutenant had made signs to the Turkish commander that 
no violence was intended, which he even repeated after the 
man had been shot close by him. This shot was followed up 
by several others, fired through the after ports, killing and 
wounding others of the boat's crew. At the same moment 
we observed part of the Turkish crew ignite the train for- 
ward ; upon which I despatched Lieutenant Fitzroy in the 
cutter for the purpose of towing her clear of this ship ; in 
executing of which he met a boat conveying the crew of 
the burning fire-vessel towards the shore, who immediately 
opened a fire of musketry upon him by which he was killed. 
On observing this, I ordered the marines to cover the retreat 
of the boats, which were again sent to tow the vessel, then 
in flames, clear of us. Almost at the same instant, two shots 
were fired from an Egyptian corvette in shore, one of which 
passed close over the gangway, and the other we observed 


strike the ' Sirene,' bearing the flag of Rear- Admiral de 
Rigny, then in the act of anchoring. Thus, from the aggres- 
sion on the part of the Turks, commenced the action ; nor 
could forbearance on ours have been exceeded, or your par- 
ticular instruction to avoid hostility more fully complied 

I have the honour to be, Sir, 

Your most obedient humble Servant, 


Sir John Gore's Report to the Lord High Admiral. 

After carefully perusing all the documents, and attending 
to all the parole circumstances relating to the entrance of 
the allied fleet into the harbour on October 20, 1827, it 
appears to me that the measure was indispensable for the 
fulfilment of the Treaty and the obedience to Sir E. Codring- 
ton's instructions founded thereon. 

On September 25 Ibrahim Pacha, surrounded by all his 
chiefs, received Vice- Admiral Sir E. Codrington and R. A. 
de Rigny, with their respective suites, and, in a solemn 
divan, agreed to a suspension of hostilities by sea and land 
until he should receive instructions from Constantinople and 
Alexandria, of which he pledged himself to inform Sir E. C. 

On the 26th Ibrahim sent his dragoman (Arbro) to the 
Allied admirals, and obtained a further declaration respect- 
ing the intent and object of the treaty of the previous day's 
conference. Notwithstanding which, a few days after, he 
put to sea with part of his fleet, and attempted to get to 
Patras, but was foiled by the firmness and address of Sir 
E. C. (who, trusting to the protestation of honour of Ibrahim 
Pacha, was left with the 'Asia' 84, 'Dartmouth' 42, ' Tal- 
bot' 28, and 'Zebra' 18 only) ; and was obliged to return to 
Navarin. On this occasion, a further explanation of the 
treaty and extent of the armistice was given to the Capitana 
Bey who commanded the Turkish fleet, and who was second 
in command under Ibrahim Pacha. 

The Allied squadrons reassembled before Navarin about 
the time Sir E. C. was led to expect that answers would be 
received from Constantinople and Alexandria, and of which 
Ibrahim Pacha had promised to inform him ; but no intima- 
tion was conveyed to him that such answers had been received, 
though the brig which went to Alexandria on September 27 
returned to Navarin on October 16. On the contrary, he 
was informed from various authorities that Ibrahim Pacha 
was at the head of part of his army devastating the Morea 
and committing all those cruelties and atrocities which it 


was the object of the Treaty of London and the instructions 
of Sir E. C. to prevent. Consequently, on October 17, the 
Allied admirals wrote a letter to Ibrahim Pacha calling on 
him to desist, and sent it into Navarin by the Hon. Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Cradock in H.M.S. ( Dartmouth.' This letter 
was returned unopened, the Turkish admiral and Arbro the 
dragoman declaring repeatedly upon their honour that they 
did not know where Ibrahim was, and that no person had 
authority to open any letter, or to give any reply ! The 
Allied admirals were thus cut off from all means of commu- 
nication so as to suppress such acts of barbarity on the part 
of the Turco-Egyptian forces ; and as the season was too far 
advanced to admit of blockading Navarin which is entirely 
impracticable during the winter, and as in, personal con- 
ference with Ibrahim it was found they could amicably 
arrange the most essential objects of the Treaty of London, 
it was determined to take the Allied fleets into Navarin, and 
there demand an interview with the Pacha and by con- 
ference prevail on him to retire to the Dardanelles and 
Alexandria with his forces. It was ascertained that the 
Turco-Egyptian fleet was moored in a very strong position 
with fire-vessels at each extremity, and in every way pre- 
pared for offence and defence, even to having springs on 
their cables. A corresponding caution was required on the 
part of the Allies ; and under the entire breach of confidence 
in Ibrahim Pacha, it would have been an act of indiscretion 
almost amounting to insanity for the Allied admirals to have 
come into Navarin to hold such conference with less than 
their entire force prepared for battle. In doing so, to evince 
that the intentions of Sir E. C. were not hostile, see his 
letters to Mr. S. Canning of August 1 1* and 24, his general 
orders to his captains of September 8,f his letter to Rear- 
Admiral Count Heiden of September 30, and his letter to 
Ibrahim Pacha of October 17,1 which was returned to him 
unopened, whereon the Allied admirals decided to proceed 
into Navarin and obtain a conference, and propose an ami- 
cable return of the Turco-Egyptian forces to the Dardanelles 
and Alexandria. 

As the known want of discipline and extreme carelessness 
of the Turks on board their ships rendered the situation of 
the fire-vessels dangerous to the Allied fleet in the position 
it was intended to take up, Captain Fellowes, of the ' Dart- 
mouth,' was directed to move them to leeward, and within 
their own fleet, and in a manner as little offensive as the 
circumstances would admit of. In going in, Count Heiden 

* Pages 415 and 432. f Page 4ol in Vol. I. J Page 56 in Vol. II. 


requested permission to prepare to anchor his squadron by 
the stern. Sir E. C. replied, ' No, for it will bear the ap- 
pearance of premeditated hostility ;' and on Captain Curzon 
wishing to haul the ' Asia's' ports flat against the side, as 
for battle, Sir E. C. forbid it, saying at the same time, ' We 
must not put on a hostile appearance, but be in all respects 
prepared to act if required.' So soon as the ' Asia' was 
moored and the sails furled, the watch was called to square 
the yards, and the band was mustered on the poop to play. 
The furniture was not moved out of the admiral's cabin (in 
consequence most of it was destroyed by shot), nor was the 
drum beat to quarters until the firing was commenced by 
the Egyptian corvette. A fire of musketry from an Egyp- 
tian fire-vessel on the ' Dartmouth's' boat first called atten- 
tion ; it was followed by three shots from an Egyptian cor- 
vette one passed over the ( Dartmouth's ' gangway, another 
struck the French admiral's ship amidships and killed two 
men, a third cut her cable the moment she had anchored 
and obliged them to let go a second anchor ! It had been 
repeatedly urged to Ibrahim Pacha and his chiefs that the 
first shot fired at either of the Allied flags would be considered a 
declaration of hostilities ; consequently, upon this outrage, a 
general battle ensued. 

The Turkish officer who went on board the ' Asia' as she 
entered the harbour, sent by the Capitana Bey to ' request 
Sir E. C. would not come in with such a force as Ibrahim 
Pacha was not there to receive him,' went direct from the 
'Asia' to the shore; he was met on landing by numerous 
chiefs, and was seen to run swiftly up the hill, followed by 
them all, to a tent ; soon after which a red flag was hoisted at 
the tent and a gun fired unshotted. On this signal, a boat 
was sent from the Capitana Bey to the Egyptian admiral's 
ship, and to the fire-vessel close to the 'Dartmouth;' and 
on Captain Fellowes seeing them preparing the train, he 
sent his first lieutenant in the pinnace to request they 
would desist ; and, observing the midshipman in the boat 
draw his sword, he called out, ' Put up your sword, sir, and 
make no hostile demonstration whatever,' and the lieutenant 
in the boat made every sign he could imagine of pacific in- 
tentions. Nevertheless, as the boat approached, the coxswain 
and one of the crew were shot dead from the quarter ports, 
and the midshipman was killed going up the side, and fell 
across the gunwale. Seeing this, and that the vessel was 
in flames, Captain Fellowes sent Lieutenant ITitzroy in a 
cutter (not armed) to tow the fire-vessel clear of the Allied 
fleet. On crossing her bow, the cutter met the boat full of 


the retiring crew, who opened a fire of pistols, whereby 
Lieutenant Fitzroy and several of the cutter's crew were 
killed and wounded. At this moment, ' la Sirene,' Mons. 
de Rigny's flagship, passed close and fired some muskets, 
as did the ' Dartmouth,' to cover the boats, and at the same 
time the corvette as before mentioned laying close to the 
place where the Turkish officers had landed, commenced the 
fire. At this period, only the ' Asia,' ' Genoa,' and ' Dart- 
mouth ' had anchored ; the ' Albion' received two broadsides 
before she anchored, and every Turkish ship and Egyptian 
ship and vessel had opened their fire before either of the 
French ships of the line had anchored, so that the ' Breslaii' 
did not see her proper station. 

From these facts it is manifest that hostilities did not 
commence with the Allies ; and it may reasonably be pre- 
sumed that the battle was premeditated by Ibrahim Pacha, 
under the advice of the French renegado Le Tellier, and that 
hoisting the red flag and firing the gun at Ibrahim's tent was 
the signal to engage, as a similar act occurred previous to the 
battle of Algiers. Having carefully perused all the extensive 
correspondence which Sir E. Codrington has maintained 
with Sir S. Canning, the Earl Dudley, Viscount Granville, 
Mr. Consul Salt, and his colleagues, since the first moment 
he received the Treaty and his instructions for its fulfilment, 
it is impossible for me not to be surprised and to feel ad- 
miration at the dispassionate, enlightened, and extensive 
view he has taken of the whole, and the manner in which he 
has by anticipation adopted the intentions of His Majesty's 
Government in carrying into effect so extraordinary, unpre- 
cedented, and arduous a duty : nor has he evinced less 
ability in the manner in which he has preserved unanimity 
among his associates, who are all in good humour with each 
other, and join in almost enthusiastic admiration of the chief 
who has directed and led them. 


From Lord Ingestrie to Sir E. C. 

71 Lower Grosvenor Street : November 20, 1827. 
MY DEAR SIR, You will see how magnificently the Duke 
has behaved to us all, for it is all his doing and nobody else's. 
Since my arrival I have been catechised pretty copiously in 
all quarters. The whole affair seems to have occasioned the 
greatest degree of surprise, and to none more than to His 
Majesty's Ministers. I am told they do not like it, and 
think that you have been precipitate and so forth ; and, as it 
has always been, when an odious thing was to be accom- 


plished, have wished to throw the whole onus on the 
shoulders of the executive department. I am glad of it, for 
I know you will come triumphant from all their mean in- 
sinuations. I find that the transactions of September 25, 
and the subsequent ones of October 2 and 3, are only known 
to those in office, and consequently to the world it appears 
somewhat strange. People at large exonerate you, but ques- 
tion, as I have always done, the policy of the Treaty ; and I 
hope the Ministers will get a good rattling shake. They 
had me before the Cabinet and asked me a string of ques- 
tions, the whole tendency of which was to make me let 
something inadvertently drop, which would imply that suffi- 
cient provocation had not been given you to act as you did. 
It struck me that they wished to make out that Ibrahim was 
entitled to proceed how he liked by land, and seemed to for- 
get his gross violation of faith by sea, entirely. 

I answered them in a fearless manner, by a simple affirma- 
tive or negative. I am considerably hurt at the unhandsome 
manner I conceive they have used towards you and myself 
I say to you, for I think it most unjust .that a pack of ques- 
tions- should be put without allowing me to refer to the 
transactions relative to Patras at all ; and to me, for it 
makes me, an eye-witness, appear to have been guilty either 
of gross stupidity or want of observation. Of course I could 
only answer such questions as were put to me, and that I 
did in the most straightforward manner I could. You can- 
not conceive the fuss that is made in this town about the 
whole affair. We unresponsible people receive our share of 
the credit that accrues to you ntmine dissentiente as far as 
the action itself goes. 

Who the deuce would ever have thought of my being a 
C.B. ! I have insisted with your soldier son on being al- 
lowed to present you with your G.C.B. insignia, and you will 
confer an additional obligation on me by pocketing the 
affront from a paltry post-captain. With every wish to 
your health, honour, and happiness, 

I am yours gratefully, 


These, with a few questions as to who fired the first gun, 
&c., and concerning the death of Mitchel, the resources of 
Ibrahim, &c., are as near as I can recollect the questions 
and answers. I enclose them, for it will be satisfactory to 
me to know how you approve of my answers. 

1. Did you understand that by the armistice Ibrahim was 
restricted by land as well as by sea? 


Ans. Certainly, in my opinion. Ibrahim's own impression 
was most decidedly that his ships were not to move, from 
the circumstance of his asking leave to send a ship with the 

2. Did any communication take place after the return of 
the Egyptian fleet to Navarin, between Ibrahim and the 
Admirals of the combined fleet, previously to the action ? 

Ans. Being absent on other duties I cannot say, but I be- 
lieve there was some. 

3. Did the 'Dartmouth' carry any letter in, or was she 
there only for the purpose of reconnoitring, and how long 
was she there ? 

Ans. She was there a whole night ; the former part of 
the question I cannot answer. 

4. What was the general impression in the fleet as to' 
whether there would be an action or not ? 

Ans. My own was that there would be none, and I think 
that was the most general opinion. 

5. Had the Admiral any other means of knowing that 
atrocities were committed on the part of Ibrahim except by 
Captain Hamilton? % 

Ans. Yes ; by what means I know not, but it was a current 
fact before Captain H. left the fleet for Kitries, after which 
the letter was written. 

6. Was it the general impression in the fleet that those 
atrocities were committed ? 

Ans. Nobody doubted it. 

7. Did the forts fire at you going in ? 

Ans. No ; they fired a blank gun after a boat had been to 
the Admiral, to tell him he must not come in, who answered 
that he was come to give and not to receive orders. 

8. Had the boat from the ' Dartmouth ' a flag of truce up 
when she was fired into ? * 

Ans. No. 

9. What was she sent for ? 

Ans. She went to desire the brulot to move from a 
position which rendered the situation of the fleet precarious ; 
her orders were to avoid committing any hostility. 

10. Was any signal made from the 'Asia' for commencing 
the engagement ? 

Ans. I saw none ; but after the first gun, the firing became 

* Not customary except between belligerents. 


From Sir E. C. to Admiral Sir George CocJcburn, Admiralty. 

Malta : December 10, 1827. 

MY DEAE COCKBUEN, Many thanks for your congratu- 
lations. It is very flattering to me to have received such 
strong approbation of my conduct from so many of my 
brother officers, as well as from my countrymen in general ; 
and when these are added to the commendation of the Lord 
High Admiral, and the distinction bestowed on me by my 
King, I need not, and shall not, be uneasy as to what may 
be said by politicians. All I will say further on this point 
is, that the more my conduct is scrutinised the more I shall 
be satisfied, provided I am given the opportunity of explain- 
ing myself. My excellent son is nearly well, and as merry 
and as happy, whether on his crutches or steering his wheel- 
chair through the doorways of this large house, as if he had 
escaped unhurt, as I did. By the way, it is not easy to ac- 
count for my escape upon examining my coat. There is a 
hole through the two parts of my sleeve without the bit 
being torn through, which Dr. Liddell thinks must have 
been a musket-ball, or a piece of their extraordinary lang- 
ridge ; and yet it only produced a scratch, of which I was 
not sensible at the time, and which never required even a 
piece of sticking plaister, although the mark is still there. 
The other results were caused by splinters, which merely 
pulled me round rudely. But I have no doubt of my watch 
and seal having saved me from what would, but for their 
nobly sacrificing themselves for their master, have proved 
a severe contusion. On putting my hand up, in consequence 
of the blow, I caught the piece of rail which occasioned it 
and threw it overboard. How one's pen is led on ! I had 
no intention of entering upon this history when I began ; 
and you must attribute it to yourself for mentioning my 
escape in your letter. I think all our friend Gore will 
have to tell the Government, added to the mass of which my 
despatch is composed, will tire them of requiring explanations 
from me. They will show at least that I have no wish to 
conceal anything. And I have sent Eellowes also with this 
view ; as, besides being the immediate cause of precipitating 
the battle, which no doubt was to have been begun by the 
Turks at midnight, he, having been sent twice into Navarin 
with letters, can further explain all the verbal instructions 
which accompanied the order under which we acted. Lady 
Codrington is of too anxious a nature not to fidget about 
the mission of John Gore ; and like him, has hardly yet 


ceased to be surprised at my treating it so lightly. The fact 
is, I have always looked forward to such a contingency, and 
it has taken them unawares. What has been often said of 
success, I say of approbation. I cannot be sure of obtaining 
it ; but, as far as my ability can reach, I will take care to 
deserve it. As I can hardly now except the wounded son, I 
may say Lady C. and her children are all well. She desires 
her kind regards to be joined with those of 

Yours most sincerely, 


From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta: December 10, 1827. 

SIR, I fear Your Eoyal Highness will be tired of the sight 
of letters from me ; but I cannot let my friend Sir J. Gore 
return without adding to the mass of papers which accom- 
pany him the expression of my cordial thanks for the sword 
which Your Royal Highness has sent me by the ' Rattle- 
snake.' I consider that sword as a very valuable addition 
to the other splendid proofs of your approbation of my con- 
duct in and relating to the battle of Navarin ; and I shall 
never put it to my side without inward feelings of pride 
that I should have been deemed worthy of so distinguished 
a mark of Your Royal Highness's kindness. I have further 
to thank Your Royal Highness for having chosen as the 
medium of your late communications a brother officer of high 
rank and distinction ; whose mind is sure to be directed to 
the attainment of a just and upright view of the business 
in which he is engaged, and whose warm and honest heart 
is guided by the sincerest friendship for me personally. 
Events may perhaps by this time have removed from the 
Cabinet those fears for the consequences of the Treaty which 
they do not appear to have contemplated. My conduct as 
an officer is not to be judged by those events, whatever they 
may be ; but I may repeat to Your Royal Highness the 
opinion which I took the liberty of offering shortly after the 
battle, that it is more likely to produce a good than a bad 
effect upon the future proceedings of the Sultan. It appears 
to me by Mr. Croker's letter of the 13th November that 
Your Royal Highness would have readily bestowed some 
additional honour upon those officers named therein who 
were already Companions of the Bath. I am therefore led 
to mention a suggestion of General Ponsonby, that they 
should be made Knights Commanders of St. Michael and St. 
George. He thinks that making this a military order, and 


thus giving it to officers for conduct in battle within these 
seas, will enhance the value of the Order. Honoured as I am 
with the Grand Cross of the Bath, I trust it will not be 
thought that by mentioning this suggestion I am seeking 
only to make my own distinction permanent, although I am 
aware that such an arrangement would naturally follow his 
Majesty's adoption of it. In such case, I feel it incumbent 
on me to request that the name of Captain Curzon may be 
joined with those of Captains Hamilton and Fellowes. 
There is one other point which I am induced to advert to, 
as it may be turned to Parliamentary account in the dis- 
cussion of the battle of ISTavarin with some flippant debater. 
The island of Sphacteria by which the harbour is formed, is 
admitted by Treaty to belong to the Ionian States ; and as 
it has been admitted that the Turks have no right to sail in 
the Ionian waters without first obtaining permission, the 
port of Navarin itself appears to belong more to the Ionian 
States than to the possessors of the adjacent coast. I am 
sure Your Eoyal Highness will now be glad to be released ; 
and I will trouble you no further at present than to receive 
my assurances that I am, with the most unfeigned respect, 
Your Eoyal Highness's very grateful and obedient servant, 


From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : December 18, 1827. 

SIR, Although I think my letter replying to the queries 
contained in the letter of Lord Dudley will be sufficient to 
remove any idea of my not having conducted myself accord- 
ing to my instructions, I take the liberty of addressing to 
Your Eoyal Highness some further observations arising 
from the communications made to me verbally by Sir John 
Gore, and from his notes taken when in conversation with 
Sir George Cockburn just before his departure. The report 
made by Captain Fellowes will remove all doubts as to how 
the battle was brought on. But as I wish that there should 
be no ground for supposing I have a desire to withhold any- 
thing whatever relating to its origin, I have requested Cap- 
tain Fellowes himself will accompany Sir John Gore to 
England. It will be evident to Your Eoyal Highness that 
if I had intended to begin hostilities I should not have done 
so with musketry, but by firing our broadsides into those 
fire-vessels as we proceeded towards our anchorage. It is 
equally evident, that instead of placing the Allied fleets 
where I did, exposed to the fire of both the principal lines 


of the Ottoman fleet, and to the fire- vessels also, I should 
have passed betwixt the Egyptian division and the shore, 
and have attacked them on that side, on which they were 
probably unprepared. But I sacrificed this advantage to 
give proof of my desire to preserve peace at all hazards ; and 
I objected to Count Heiden's wish to have a cable out of the 
' Azoff 's ' stern, as I did to Captain Curzon's wish of hauling 
up the c Asia's ' lower-deck ports beyond their level, as indi- 
cative of hostile intentions. In fact, so little did I expect a 
battle, that after the ' Asia ' was moored and the sails furled, 
the watch had been piped to secure yards, and the band was 
mustering on the poop, when the firing at the ' Dartmouth's' 
boat took place ; and then the drum was again beat to 

Men without professional knowledge may consider our 
going in prepared for battle as evidence of hostile intention. 
I might beg leave respectfully to refer them to your Royal 
Highness as to the duty of captains on such occasions. But 
a very sufficient reply to such a supposition will be found in 
the Instructions to Captains, page 79, article 17; which says: 
' In time of peace he is not to approach a ship of war of any 
foreign power without having the ship so far prepared for 
battle, that in case of aggression he may be immediately 
ready to defend himself,' &c. I am free to say that this 
very preparation, and the answers I gave to the Turkish 
oificer who desired me to wait the pleasure of Ibrahim Pacha 
(he who chose not to be found when required to receive the 
joint letter of my colleagues and myself), were well cal- 
culated to have prevented hostilities, if that wily chief had 
not previously directed an attack to be made on us, accord- 
ing to the plan of the renegade Letellier. With respect to 
my desiring that the fire-vessels should be removed, I con- 
sider that measure as a precaution under any circumstances 
indispensably necessary for the safety of the fleet, and as a 
probable means of preventing the execution of hostility 
previously concerted, had there been sufficient time to effect 
it; for, according to the concurrent testimony of several 
Greeks and English who were forcibly detained in the 
Ottoman fleet, as well as that of a Turk saved from the 
fire-vessel which was sunk by the 'Philomel,' the setting 
fire to those vessels at midnight and dropping them down 
upon the Allied fleet was the meditated signal for a general 

As to my designating the Turks 'enemies,' your Royal 
Highness will excuse my observing on the inconsistency of 
those who object to that single word at the end of a sen- 



tence and quoted from Lord Nelson and who pass over the 
early part of the sentence, which runs ' in case of a regular 
battle ensuing,' &c. I am almost ashamed to have addressed 
answers to such observations as the above to your Eoyal 
Highness personally, who have been pleased to view my 
conduct in the late important battle with so much favor, 
and so much generosity. It has been my pride, my am- 
bition, to deserve that confidence of which your Royal High- 
ness had always given me so many proofs ; and after such 
gratifying marks of the gracious approbation of my Sove- 
reign and of your Royal Highness, whose professional judg- 
ment cannot be questioned, I might well rest contented, 
without combating the unreasonable objections of persons 
entirely uninformed. But my character is no longer merely 
my own. I feel now bound to prove that I am not unworthy 
the spontaneous, the generous patronage which his Majesty 
and your Royal Highness have given me. I hope, therefore, 
I may be excused for having entered more into detail upon 
the subject of my own conduct, than I should otherwise have 
considered necessary, in order to justify such unbounded kind- 
ness on the part of my Sovereign and of your Royal High- 
ness. And I beg to assure your Royal Highness that if I 
had no other motive for the zealous fulfilment of my instruc- 
tions, this very kindness would insure my devotion to the 
important duties with which I have the honor of being 

I cannot sufficiently express how sensible I am of his 
Majesty's most gracious consideration of my services, in 
bestowing upon me the Grand Cross of the Bath; and of the 
gracious recommendation of your Royal Highness that I 
should be honored with this most valuable distinction. Nor 
have I words to convey to your Royal Highness the joyous, 
the grateful feelings of the officers and men under my com- 
mand, for that high approbation, those liberal promotions, 
and those honorable distinctions, with which your Royal 
Highness has been graciously pleased to mark their brave 
and exemplary conduct in the battle of Navarin. 

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, your 
Royal Highness's very grateful and obedient 


It may have been right to ask for full explanation 
from Sir E. Codrington of the cause of the battle, and to 
send for that purpose a distinguished naval officer and 
intimate friend. Yet these official queriesj and the doubts 


thus thrown on the conduct of the English Admiral, left 
the future in uncertainty, both as to the Treaty itself 
and the measures to be taken under it. The English 
Government Lord Goderich being Prime Minister 
surprised by a hostile result for which they ought to 
have prepared themselves by their knowledge of the 
affair of Patras, and the country by the publication of 
it, was weak in nerve, weak in Parliament, and was in 
face of a strong opposition, particularly in regard to the 
foreign policy of their late chief, Mr. Canning. This 
Ministry resigned in December, 1827, before the meeting 
of Parliament, and was succeeded by that of the Duke 
of Wellington. W. J. C. 

Sir E. Codrington had received from his own sovereign 
the Grand Cross of the Bath ; and there was no hesitation 
in France and Russia as to the approval of the sovereigns 
of those countries. The King of France conferred upon 
Sir E. C. the Grand Cross of the Military Order of St. 
Louis; and he had the rare honour of wearing the 
second class of the Military Order of St. George, con- 
ferred upon him by an autograph letter from the 
Emperor Nicolas : Count Heiden was also desired, if 
an English ship were not available, to offer any Russian 
line-of- battle ship for the flag of the English Commander - 
in-Chief. ' Vous mettriez a sa disposition tous ceux de 
votre escadre, et vous Tassureriez que 1'Empereur regar- 
derait sa presence sur un de nos batimens comme un 
veritable honneur pour la marine russe.' 

Sir E. C. said to Count Heiden: 'I can never forget 
the rare compliment of offering me permission to hoist 
my flag in one of the Russian ships.' 

From the Emperor of Russia. 

St. P6tersbourg, le 8 novembre 1827. 

de remporter une victoire dont 1'Europe civilisee doit vous 
etre doublement reconnaissante. La memorable bataille de 
Navarin et les manoeuvres hardies qui 1'ont precedee, ne 
donnent pas seulemeiit an monde la mesure du zele de 
trois grandes Puissances pour une cause dont leur desinte- 
ressement releve encore le noble caractere ; elles prouvent 

L 2 


aussi ce que pent la ferinete centre le nombre, et uno 
valeur habilement dirigee centre un courage aveugle, quelles 
que soient les forces dont il s'appuye. Votre nom appartient 
desormais a la posterite. Je croirais affaiblir par des eloges 
la gloire qui 1'environne, mais j'eprouve le besoiii de vous 
offrir une marque eclatante de la gratitude et de 1'estime 
que vous inspirez a la Eussie. C'est dans cette vue que je 
vous envoy e ci-joint 1'ordre militaire de St.-George. 

La marine russe s'honore d'avoir obtenu votre suffrage 
devant Navarin, et pour moi j'ai le plus vif plaisir a vous 
assurer des sentimens de consideration que je vous porte. 


A M. le Vice-Amiral Codrington.* 

From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : December 15, 1827. 

SIR, Although I conclude the situation of affairs at Con- 
stantinople is known to his Majesty's government, I have 
thought it well worth while to direct that a courier should 
be sent from Genoa to Paris with the information of the 
ambassadors having demanded their passports ; so that Lord 
Granville may forward it by express if no such information 
has passed through the capital. The Porte has refused the 
passports, and the general tranquillity of the people indicates 
peace rather than war ; and notwithstanding any contrary 
appearances, I still retain the opinion I first submitted to 
your Eoyal Highness and have since repeated, that the 
battle of Navarin is more likely to preserve peace than to 
create war. The Reis Effendi received the account with, per- 
fect calmness, as an event which he expected ; observing 
6 This is what you call friendship, occasioning the Sultan the 
loss of a million and a half of pounds sterling, and the lives 
of betwixt eight and nine thousand of his subjects.' I hear 
Tahir, and several other Turks, slipped away in the night 
from Navarin, in the corvette in which he had hoisted his 
flag, and is arrived at Constantinople, and that at the first 
moment of learning of the destruction of his fleet the Sultan 
ordered Pera to be surrounded by his troops and to be given 
up to butchery ; that the Divan under the influence of the 
Capitan Pacha had the heads taken off those who were to 
have carried this measure into execution, and thus stopped 
it, whilst the Internuncio sat up with the Sultan all night, 

* To this gracious kindness Sir E. C. returned a grateful and suitable 


and at length succeeded in dissuading him. from this bru- 
tality. I believe letters are coming in a French vessel to me 
from Mr. S. Canning, but I have not had a line from him 
since he knew of the battle. However, the measure of 
demanding the passports I rather think was previously deter- 
mined on, in case of the Porte continuing obstinate, as the 
only one which could force a decision. 

December 17. 

A gale of wind directly into the harbour has prevented 
any vessel getting out since I began this letter, and I myself 
have been too ill to close my despatches ; but I trust I am 
now sufficiently convalescent to continue my duties. I give 
your Royal Highness the above reports of what is passing, 
without being able to place any reliance upon them. 

The c Asia ' will be ready to sail, jury-rigged, in a few days, 
and I intend that she and the * Albion ' should go together. 
It would take more time, and be, I imagine, more expensive, 
to repair her here, or I should not subject myself to the in- 
convenience occasioned by her absence. The divers report 
a notch in her gripe, I apprehend just where the stem is 
scarfed to the keel, which would endanger a cable being 
caught in it. I have put some of the mates lately promoted, 
to join the 'Asia' upon an understanding that they are not 
to remain in her. There are several lieutenants on the sta- 
tion whom I wish to have in the ' Asia,' on account of their 
good conduct, if your Royal Highness will give me that in- 
dulgence, as an encouragement of that zeal and spirit which 
is conspicuous on this station. 

In a private letter from Captain Richards, of the ' Pelorus,' 
he mentions the Pacha of Egypt having said, on November 
1, before he had heard of the battle : c The Sultan has ordered 
Ibrahim to put out and attack Hydra in spite of your ad- 
miral ; he will not move, however, till I write to him, which 
will be in a few days ;' (and he added with a laugh) : ' There 
must be an engagement at sea, but it will be nothing ; a few 
of the first will be destroyed, and the others will turn back ; 
this is necessary to convince everyone that you are in earnest.' 
All that I have yet heard since the loss of the Ottoman fleet 
became known, convinces me that if we carry the business 
in which we are engaged with a high hand, particularly now 
that the whole race are so humbled, the result of the Treaty 
will be satisfactory. But I trust your Royal Highness will 
excuse my saying that it behoves any government to support 
their own instructions. Had they done so, they would per- 
haps have avoided an attack which a contrary conduct would 
seem to invite. 


From Sir E. C. to Vice-Admiral De Rigny. 

Malta : December 17, 1827. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, I most sincerely congratulate yon 
upon your promotion, as announced to me in your letter of 
the 7th of this month by the ' Jasper/ and it will always be 
a great pleasure to me to reflect that I have been so fortunate 
as to have under my command, an officer who, besides ex- 
hibiting such conspicuous gallantry, has entitled himself in 
so many other ways to my great esteem and regard. If I do not 
immediately answer your official communication of His Most 
Christian Majesty having honored me with the Grand Cross 
of St. Louis, it is because I must undergo the form of asking 
my own Sovereign's permission to wear it. It is best, per- 
haps, to wait until I get an answer to this request, which I 
have immediately made, for myself and my brethren in arms. 
Your news of what is passing at Constantinople, is very in- 
teresting. In spite of warlike appearances, I still retain my 
opinion that the battle of Navarin will have inclined the Sul- 
tan to yield to circumstances. I hear that since the arrival 
of Tahir at the capital, provisions have been sent to Ibrahim. 
This shows that if Lord Cochrane and his fleet had blockaded 
Navarin instead of going to Scio, the army in the Morea 
would have been reduced to great extremity. But it seems 
his Lordship wanted to be Grand Master of the Islands of 
the Archipelago under the banner of Christ ! ! ! De Heiden 
has expressed to Mons. de Bibeaupierre the same opinion you 
have, that the Russians can only act under the Treaty. Sir 
Thomas Staines will have by this time made known to you 
my plan for destroying the principalestablishmentatCarabusa ; 
and he will consult you on the subject. I have not received 
a line from Mr. S. Canning since the news of the battle 
reached him. I quite agree with you, that if we are to pass 
the Dardanelles, we must have the assistance of troops to 
take the castle on one side, if not both. But by the time we 
have done that, this ferocious Sultan will have lost his head. 
For his brutal subjects must revenge themselves on somebody 
for their losses ; and I hope they will not find it quite as easy 
to get at yours or mine, as that of their own most sublime 

I have still got the ' Asia ' and ( Albion ' here, in case of a 
pressing demand for ships, but I shall send them off with the 
next easterly wind. For if such ships are wanted, the news 
from Mr. S. Canning arriving in London, will induce our 
Lord High Admiral to send me others in their places. If the 
Greeks will not blockade Navarin, and endeavour to starve 


Ibrahim's army, we must try what we can do ourselves ; for 
upon that depends the conduct of the Porte. If that army 
is a.ble to continue its ravages, the Sultan will be contented, 
and will remain sulky ; but if he finds it loses ground daily, 
he will perhaps come to his senses. 

Believe me, &c., 


I have received the most unqualified approbation of my 
Sovereign and of his Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral ; 
but our ministers, like yours, not being able to foresee the 
consequences of the battle, are in a fright, and don't know 
how to defend their own Treaty. My last letter will open 
their eyes. 

From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

1 Asia,' at Malta : December 20, 1827. 

SIE, On my first arrival off Navarin on the 12th September 
last, I found the Ottoman army had taken regular possession 
of the Islands of Sphacteria and Sapienza which are com- 
ponent parts of the Ionian States; the first forming the 
harbour of Navarin, the last that of Modon. On Sphacteria, 
Ibrahim Pacha had placed a considerable body of troops, and 
he had erected batteries at the S.E. end, in order to command 
the entrance. In contemplating an effectual blockade of the 
port, the means of so doing by taking possession of this 
island, did not escape me : it was, however, quite evident 
that the attempt would have been resisted, and that it could 
not have been enforced without that open hostility which it 
was my desire to avoid ; whilst I felt justified in expecting 
that no opposition would have been offered to the whole 
Allied squadron combined, by that same force which had 
relinquished the most important object of relieving Patras, 
when the ' Asia ' was supported by only the c Dartmouth,' 
' Talbot,' and ' Zebra.' In order to fulfil the second instruc- 
tion emanating from the Treaty under the circumstances of 
the Sultan still obstinately refusing the mediation, whilst 
Ibrahim Pacha is endeavouring to destroy the whole Pelo- 
ponnesus, I beg to submit to his Royal Highness the Lord 
High Admiral, the propriety of now claiming possession of 
those two islands, and enforcing that claim against any 
resistance that may be offered ; as the most effectual and 
prompt way of paralysing the future movements of the whole 
Ottoman army now ravaging the country. 

I have, &c., 



From Sir E. C. to His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : December 20, 1827. 

SIR, The reports of our Ambassadors having actually 
quitted Constantinople, indicate that continued obstinacy in 
the Sultan which will make it requisite for us to draw more 
strictly the line of opposition to his measures. I have three- 
fore made the proposal contained in my public letter of this 
day's date, a duplicate of which I intend sending open through 
Sir Frederick Adam, that he may, if he think proper, make 
any observations of his own on it to the Colonial Secretary 
of State. The paucity of troops in these parts just now, 
may occasion hesitation. But even if Ibrahim should offer 
resistance, and boldly justify this breach of neutrality in 
taking possession of Ionian territory, I do not think his 
opposition could be effectual ; and the occupation of those 
islands by any troops of ours, could only be temporary, 
since he could not retain either Navarin or Modon under 
such circumstances. 

I take this opportunity of requesting .that your Eoyal 
Highness would be pleased to let my friend Ingestrie suc- 
ceed to the little 'Talbot' upon Captain Spencer's paying 
her off, as he is desirous of doing at the proper period, 
unless some other professional arrangement should have been 
made for him. His heart is at present in the service ; he 
performs his duty zealously and ably in every respect, and he 
will do credit to himself by persevering in it through that 
period which so many who have his prospects waste in the 
idleness and dissipation of our attractive metropolis. I am 
still without a line from Mr. S. Canning since he heard of 
our battle. The island of Corfu will scarcely afford the ac- 
commodation which I understand he and Count Guilleminot 
intend seeking in it. Your Eoyal Highness will see that if 
the Greeks had closely blockaded Navarin and Modon, instead 
of attacking Scio, which they will not be able to obtain pos- 
session of even if they get the fortress, Ibrahim's army would 
have been much straitened for supplies. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. G. to Sir Frederick Adam. 

December 22, 1827. 

I have endeavoured all along, my dear Adam, to keep you 
apprised, not only of my conduct, but of the motives by which 


that conduct was guided ; because I considered you a sound 
judge in your public capacity of what that conduct ought to 
be, and in your private situation as a friend who would give 
me your opinion candidly, whether I performed my task right 
or wrong. Your commendation, my good friend, is almost 
too strong for me to speak of it in such terms as my heart 
inclines ; but I may assure you, at all events, of that heart 
being fully sensible of the value of such commendation 
coming from such a quarter. I imagine I have used a 
stronger expression than outwardly the case justifies, as to 
the feeling of Ministers, or rather, perhaps, some of the 
Ministers : for you quote my words, ' finding fault,' in your 
letter this minute received. I believe 1 should speak more 
correctly if I were to say that from not knowing their own 
case, and being ignorant how to support their own treaty 
from not having contemplated consequences, they ' wish to 
find fault' with me in order to relieve their own shoulders. 
Dudley's last despatch leads me to except him individually ; 
but he is so indolent and indifferent, that he is but a broken 
reed. I fear you will be puzzled to make out the very rough 
sketches which I sent you by 'Warspite;' but I am confi- 
dent that J. Gore presenting himself with the documents he 
has in charge, accompanied by Fellowes to explain how the 
action was brought on, these said Ministers will see that 
attempting to censure me will only the more expose them 
to that turn-out which it seems to be their whole object to 
avoid. . . The fact is, that though outwardly I am required 
to answer the 'Queries' merely to give information, I know, 
confidentially, that the question of recalling me was agitated. 
The confidence I have of my having done right, would have 
made me indifferent to this, as I am to what has passed 
openly. But I never can be indifferent to the manly conduct 
of the Duke of Clarence, in deciding at once as he judged 
right ; nor to the promptness of the King in giving, at his 
brother's request, joint proofs to the country of their un- 
qualified approbation. When I add to these, my dear Adam, 
the encomiums of most of my distinguished brother officers, 
of which some of my family secretaries are now writing for 
you two or three specimens ; and wjien I add to them the 
opinions of yourself, Ponsonby, and Stovin, jointly with those 
of my coadjutors on the 20th October, I feel that I am fully 
rewarded for a whole life of such anxiety as I have been 
undergoing for some few months, 


From Sir E. C. to Mr. 8. Canning. 

Malta : December 28, 1827. 

Vice- Admiral Sir John Gore arrived here on the 4th Dec., 
(being chosen by the Lord High Admiral as being one of 
my intimate friends) with certain queries on the part of the 
Government, and returned by way of Marseilles with my 
replies on the llth. The nature of those queries shows that 
the Ministers, for want of the master-mind which planned the 
Treaty, do not know how to defend it and its consequences ; 
and they have good reason, I believe, for expecting a very 
strong opposition to it in Parliament. I have said I shall 
wait here for the next despatches ; and it is evident that I 
must now have further instructions as to my future pro- 
ceedings. Here also I am in expectation of Count Capo 
d'Istrias, with whom I must concert future operations re- 
specting the Greeks ; and therefore here I must remain, even 
if I had a suitable ship to bear my flag. The 'Asia' and 
'Albion' are now ready to proceed to England under jury- 
masts, whenever the wind may suit ; and the 'Warspite' is in 
the Ionian seas, looking out for the Count, to bring him here. 
Now, under these circumstances, and the preference which 
this place affords in all respects to Corfu, I cannot resist 

pressing your coming to Malta I assure you, after 

having acted with you on so important an occasion, and 
so very confidentially, I should regret extremely the loss 
of any opportunity of repeating personally the satisfaction 
I have derived from your candid manner of conducting our 

But I will not let my letter go without my sincere thanks 
for your kind congratulations. The prompt and liberal proofs 
I have had of the unqualified approbation of the King and 
our illustrious Lord High Admiral, have filled the squadron 
under my command with an enthusiasm which appears to be 
loudly echoed by our brethren at home. In fact I am amply 
rewarded by the commendations which I have received from 
many of the most distinguished officers, not only of my own, 
but of the military service also. 

Believe me, &c., 



From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta: December 29, 1827. 
SlB, ...... 

Captain Cotton of the ' Zebra ' has written to me in strong 
lamentation, that his officers and himself should not share 
in the consideration which your Eoyal Highness has shown 
so bountifully towards the rest of the gallant fellows who 
supported me off Patras, and who had the good fortune to 
be with me at Navarin. However I felt it right to let Mr. 
S. Canning know of the former affair, if I could have anti- 
cipated the subsequent resistance of the same fleet to the 
whole force of the allied squadrons, I certainly should not 
have parted with the ' Zebra.' I cannot recall time and cir- 
cumstances, and put Captain Cotton where I wished to have 
seen him. But I can say with truth, judging from the 
enterprise he has shown against the pirates, his boldly placing 
his little brig abreast of the ' Asia ' to aid in resisting the 
progress of the Turkish forces, and his spirited control of an 
Austrian corvette whose captain wanted to enter Navarin, 
before my return there, are satisfactory proofs that had the 
' Zebra ' been with us in the action he would not have been 
behind his friends in deserving the rewards by which they 
have been distinguished. 

From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. 

Vourla, 21 decembre 1827. 

MY DEAR ADMIEAL, L' ' Isis ' vient d'arriver et m'a remis 
vos lettres du 29 novembre et 3 decembre. Je pense que 
vous avez re9u des nouvelles d'Angleterre qui vous auront 
confirme que notre decision a Navarin a ete tres-approuvee 
par les Gouvernemens : peut-etre pensait-on alors que cela 
ferait ceder la Porte. Mais quand on va savoir que nos 
Ambassadeurs sont partis, il faudra bien qu'on reconnaisse 
que les Turcs n'auraient pas flechi devant les notes diplo- 
matiques, puisqu'ils resistent aux notes des canons. Je 
pense que nous serons peut-etre obliges de passer les Dar- 
danelles, pour nous trouver aussi de notre cote a Constanti- 
nople, si les Busses veuillent y aller du leur. Les Turcs 
preparent un supplement de canons a Tenedos, et aux chateaux 
d'Europe et d'Asie. Un de nos officiers, prize-master d'un 
brick pirate, a ete force par le mauvais terns de relacher a 
Nauplia, et avait dix-neuf matelots avec lui : ils ont ete 

* Received at Malta. 


attaques par quatre barques portant plus de 190 homines. 
ISTeuf Fran9ais ont ete tues en se defendant : Pofficier, quoi- 
que grievement blesse, s'est traine jusqu'a la cabine ou il 
avait prepare les poudres ; il cria alors aux Fra^ais qui 
pouvaient se jeter a la mer, de le faire ; et se fit sauter, lui 
et plus de 80 Grecs qui etaient a bord. Quatre Fra^ais se 
soiit echappes, 1'un avec les deux jambes cassees, les autres 
plus ou moins meurtris. Ce qu'il y a de remarquable, c'est 
que le lieutenant avait concerte ce plan avec son quartier- 
maitre, et que celui-ci avait jure de 1'executer, s'il etait le 
survivant : il ne voulait point se sauver et sauta ; c'est lui 
qui eut les jambes fracassees. II est arrive a terre sans 
savoir comment : les trois autres s'etaient jetes a 1'eauquand 
on le leur avait commande. C'est un trait hautement re- 

On a trouve 71 cadavres grecs le lendemain matin sur le 
rivage. Tous etaient des Candiotes etrangers a 1'ile, dont 
les habitans se sont au contraire bien comportes vers le 

Une canoniere de Cochrane, commandee par un Anglais 
(Derby), a ete les cherchera Stampalie, et les a remis a notre 
Consul a Santorin. 

Je pense que M. Canning part demain pour Corfu ; M. 
Guilleminot apres-demain. 



AMONGST the papers of Sir Edward Codriiigton rela- 
ting to this period, there is a mass of correspondence, 
private and public, with England, with Admiral De 
Rigny, and with naval officers detached to the various 
Mediterranean ports. 

Unfortunately the letters of Sir E. C. to his intimate 
friend Sir John Gore in England, have been destroyed ; 
many letters from Sir John Gore are therefore inserted 
as giving details of interest closely connected with the 
position of Sir E. C. in the Mediterranean. 

These, and the publication of the Duke of Wellington's 
Memoranda and Despatches, vol. iv. 1871, bring into 
distinct light the difficulties under which the duty of 
naval Cornmander-in- Chief was carried on, affected as 
his position was shown to be, by the absence of all pro- 
fessional and personal consideration, and by political 
hostility to the Treaty. 

The absence of Sir E. Codrington from the Levant 
was caused by two circumstances : 

First. His flag- ship, the 'Asia,' had not returned 
from England. It is not simply the hoisting of a flag 
that converts another captain's ship into a flag-ship : 
it may entail the displacement of the captain from his 
own cabins, and the necessary reception of a flag-lieu- 
tenant and secretary, with the staff and space for office 
work, and records ; or, that the admiral invites himself 
to be the private guest of the captain. 

Secondly. Malta was the station for the arrival and 
refittal of the ships of the squadron, and of the direct 
packet communication with England, from whence Sir 
E. C. might well expect those fresh instructions which 


(as now seen by the Wellington Memoranda published 
in 1871) were under preparation and discussion by the 
Government at home. But no communication as to the 
line of policy to be adopted, no assistance, no informa- 
tion was given to Sir E. Codrington consequent upon 
the altered circumstances of the execution of the 
Treaty. W. J. C. 

From Admiral De Rigny.* 

' Trident/ a Vourla : 17 Janvier, 1828. 

DEAR ADMIRAL, Quelqu'inquietude regne a Smirne ; il 
y a quelques jours un Grec a blesse un Turc dans la rue ; le 
Pacha lui a fait couper la tete. 

Nos marchands et les votres se sont constitues en opposi- 
tion avec la mediation : ils sont excites par les feseurs de 

gazette Le Pacha m'a fait prier de venir a 

Smirne les jours qui suivront le depart des Consuls, pour 
aider a calmer les esprits inquiets. J'aurais bien desire que 
les trois Ambassadeurs se fussent reunis a Malte ou a Corfou, 
et je les y aurais immediatement suivis. Mon intention 
dans tous les cas etait d'aller a Malte; mais j'apprends que 
M. S. Canning a dit au capitaine de 1' 'Alacrity ' qu'il vous 
priait de venir a Corfou, de sorte que je ne sais ou vous 
trouver. Je suis bien presse de savoir ce qu'on aura resolu 
dans nos Cours ; mon opinion serait d'attendre ce qui sera 
decide avant de rien faire, et si j'apprends que vous avez 
quitte Malte pour Corfou, je pense d'aller vous y faire une 


Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

Malta : January 6, 1828. 

His Excellency Mr. S. Canning left Vourla in the ' Dryad ' 
on the 23rd of last month for Corfu, and the French Am- 
bassadors sailed on the same day in the c Armide.' By an 
Austrian merchant vessel which arrived this day from Con- 
stantinople, information has been received of the Eussian 
Ambassador having passed the Dardanelles on December 21 
for Vourla. 

* In answer to Sir E. C.'s letters of 17th and 19th December, 1827. 


The ' Galatea ' arrived here yesterday, having visited 
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, at all which Eegencies the most 
perfect tranquillity prevailed. 

I have, &c., 


From General Sir George Murray to Sir E. C.* 

Royal Hospital, Dublin : November 12, 1827. 

MY DEAR SIR EDWARD, I cannot refuse myself the plea- 
sure of offering you my congratulations upon your victory 
at Navarin. It appears to me to have been achieved with 
the characteristic skill and gallantry of the British navy, 
and in a manner that will both uphold their fame and add 
to your own already well-established reputation. And if 
these results are desirable and valuable at any time, they 
are doubly important, in a national point of view, when they 
are connected with an action in which the British Fleet has 
been combined with those of other Powers. The British 
flag, under your guidance, has been placed in its proper 
station opposite the main force of the enemy, and in the point 
which was to determine the issue of the battle. 

I will not take up your time by entering into any political 
speculations connected with this important event : the first 
point of view in which it presents itself to me, is that of a 
triumph honorable to yourself and to the navy, and gained 
in the cause of humanity. I am sorry to observe in the list 
of those severely wounded a young gentleman of your name. 
I should be most sincerely sorry if your victory were to be 
accompanied by any cause of private grief. 

Believe me always, my dear Sir Edward, 

Very sincerely yours, 


Sir E. C. to Lieut. -General Sir George Murray, G.G.B. 

January 6, 1828. 

MY DEAR SIR GEORGE, While certain of the newspapers, 
indirectly under the guidance of a political party struggling 
for favour, are cavilling at my conduct without knowing 
what that conduct has been or the instructions by which it 
was guided, it is very highly gratifying to me to receive the 
approbation of so distinguished an officer as yourself, whose 
opinion outweighs that of all the mere politicians in England. 
Having foreseen the probability of being so assailed by one 

* Received and answered January 6. 


or the other party for whatever might take place in so com- 
plicated a service, I think my assailants, like the Turks 
themselves, will in the end turn out to be my best friends. 
For the more the whole business is investigated, and the 
more I am brought before the public, the more I shall be 
satisfied. As an officer I must bear and forbear ; and, as you 
know, we are never sure that we have done our duty until 
our masters tell us so. But in the full conviction of having 
acted strictly according to the Treaty and the instructions 
emanating from it, I court that publicity which I cannot 
with propriety obtain without being charged with obtrusion. 
The affair off Patras should be published, in justice to the 
gallant few by whom I was supported on that trying oc- 
casion. Situated as I then was, others may well doubt, as I 
did at the time, whether the object of the Treaty should 
supersede the probable destruction of a portion of the naval 
force. Had I been a mere diplomatist, I might have decided 
on a line of conduct which, as a military man, I did not 
think would have become me. Success, it seems, led to my 
justification. But how are those who approve of such a risk 
as that, to disapprove of my approaching the Ottoman fleet 
with the whole of that force which they allotted to me, as 
* by its display to cause their wish to be respected ? ' I have 
entered thus much into this subject, my dear Sir George, 
because I wish to show you that your prompt and valuable 
approbation has not been mistimed or misplaced. I consider 
it due to the good opinion of yourself and many of the most 
distinguished of my brother officers who have favoured me 
with their commendations, to show that they have not mis- 
placed their confidence. The great and so honorably un- 
asked support which I have received from His Majesty and 
our' illustrious Lord High Admiral, would have made me 
quite indifferent as to all that could be said by our mere 
politicians, but for the principle which has such a strong 
hold of me, of justifying to the public the favorable notice 
which they have taken of my proceedings. I will close this 
subject by venturing an opinion which I adopted upon the 
close of the battle of ISTavarin, that the whole object of the 
Treaty is more likely to be gained than to be compromised 
by that event. My son's wounds, severe as they were, are 
all healed, and , he can walk upright without crutches. He 
is specially included in the liberal distinctions which the 
Emperor of Eussia has bestowed upon us. 

Believe me, &c., 



From Sir John Gore to Captain W. C. at Malta. 

January 5, 1828. 

For all news, &c., &c., I refer you to Captain Fellowes who 
has been in London for the last fortnight, and heard the 
opinions of all people, pour et contre, the cause and effect of 
Navarin. I had been interrogated by all the former Minis- 
ters, and had related all that I had heard on the subject, and 
replied to the questions asked me, and one from Lord Dud- 
ley. I enclose an answer I thought it right to write to him, 
and I sent it through Cockburn, who showed it to the Lord 
High Admiral before he sealed it. He told me two days 
after : * 1 sent it because you desired me to do so, but it is of 
no moment in explaining the weak points over which we are 
likely to stumble.' I replied : ' I cannot see any obstacle to 
those who are willing to be convinced' as was the case 
with the Duke of Wellington, with whom I was closeted 
two hours, which concluded with : ' I am very much obliged 
to you for all this information. I shall ask the Duke of 
Clarence for your report which the King has told me of ; 
and unless it appears that Sir E. C. has done something 
outrageous, we will take care of him. I will send for you if 
I require further explanation on any point.' I referred him 
to Fellowes, and desired F. to call on the Duke. He saw 
him, but he could not enter 011 the question. Since then the 
meeting of Parliament has developed the public feeling, and 
the approbation that has been expressed almost by acclama- 
tion, cannot but be highly satisfactory and gratifying to you 
all, as it has been to us. The speech alone staggered us, as 
you will see by the enclosed letter from your uncle it did 
him. What could be meant by it ? On the 14th we shall 
understand it better. Mr. Hobhouse's motion will be carried 
even should Ministers oppose it. If Sir G. C. and J. W. C. 
oppose it, they will offend the King and the Lord High Ad- 
miral ; and then, and what then ? Changes may chance to 
take place. The present Lord Privy Seal had put himself at 
the head of the declaimers against ISTavarin, and had pre- 
pared a morsel of eloquence to last two hours, and a reply of 
one and a half. After he had taken his seat as Lord Keeper, 
a noble Earl, a friend of your father's, met him (and I relate 
ifc from his Lordship's tongue) : ' So, E., you have taken 
office under W., but what is become of your speech and 
reply ? ' ( Oh, I am quite satisfied on that point ; I have read 
all the papers and Sir John Gore's report, and find that I 
was in the dark, as the Ministers were before he returned.' 


So that this arch-opponent is to become the champion ! The 
on dit is that the Turk has demanded the recall of your 
father and Mr. S. C., and the payment of 1,000,000?., which 
it is thought will be a cheap purchase of peace, and that the 
acknowledgment of an error is more honorable than to per- 
sist in it ; but I maintain that the slightest sacrifice of 
honor will be the dearest tribute that we can pay. Lord 
Strangford is certainly to go to Constantinople as our Am- 
bassador Extraordinary to negotiate peace, in order to pre- 
vent the Russian army marching into Turkey, and the 
Austrian and Prussian armies opposing them. If these take 
place, who will predict what the result will be ? If Ministers 
are obliged to yield to political necessity, they will not fail 
to do ample justice to your father. He has no longer a weak, 
timid man to rely on, but a noble-souled, high-minded man, 
who knows and can face all that is due to an officer who has 
ably and amply fulfilled his duty; and in his hands your 
father's honor is safe, while at the same time he is strongly 
upheld by the two highest personages in the realm; and 
under this impression I think your father may feel secure 
and quietly abide the evil, yielding to its pressure as neces- 
sity, should it reach him, of which fact I very strongly doubt. 
Yet in private life, as on the quarter-deck, I like to look out 
for squalls, and be prepared for them in order that I may not 
be crippled or overset when they reach me. I shall rejoice 
through life that I was made an active medium in the business, 
and though desired to ' keep out of the way of being asked 
questions,' I have not chosen to make myself passive. I 
have, therefore, clearly explained all the facts whenever I 
had an opportunity to do so, to those where they would be of 
consequence to your father ; and I have furnished your uncle 
Bethel] with all the papers, in order that he might put them 
into the hands of his own and your father's friends. The 
ships and troops about to proceed to the Mediterranean will 
afford your father a scope for action beyond the powers of 
the little 'Talbot,' and place the distinguished banner of 
Navarin in a more suitable sphere. 

From Sir John Gore to Sir E. C. 

January 6, 1828. 

MY DEAR FRIEND, My letter to Lady C. of the 26th will 
have informed you of my being about to start from Toulon, 
which I did at 11 A.M. on that day, and notwithstanding 
Captain Fellowes knocking up and obliging me to stop a day 
at Troyes, and various littlo aidpnt, to the carriage which 


required repairs, all which detained us at least 24 hours, we 
arrived at Boulogne on the 2nd at 2 P.M. I hired the 'Royal 
George' steamer, and sailed at 9 A.M. ; wind S.S.W., mild 
and gentle. At 10 we were taken aback with a violent gale 
at N.E. ; we struggled all night and were drenched with 
spray. I landed at 4 A.M. with my despatches only, leaving 
Fellowes, Louis, carriage, &c., &c., on board; stept into a 
hack chaise at Dover at a quarter before 6, and got out at 
the Admiralty at 12. Thus you see I lost no time. All 
were as much surprised as pleased to see me, for they had 
counted on the 15 day quarantine (N.B. I overtook Lieut. 
Pardoe at Lyons, and got back my despatches). 

Well, I was handed up to the Sanctum, and your letter 
eagerly opened and read by J. W. C., commenting as he 
went ; but I had previously told G. C. that all was right and 
well. So soon as the Lord High Admiral knew I was there, 
he sent for me and would not let me out of his sight ; even 
took me to luncheon with the Duchess, &c. 

He insisted upon having all the papers and reading them 
himself (aloud to me) before they were copied for the Cabinet 
Ministers; he was much pleased, and when he read your letters 
to himself he was gratified. ' Now let me see what you say/ 
and read my report, a copy of which I sent you, aloud to 
me. When ended he said, ( Thank you for this/ folding it 
up and placing it in the King's box (so marked). 'These 
letters I will read to the King to-morrow morning ; now sit 
down, Gore, and let me hear all you have to say/ which was 
followed by 1 0,000 questions. At two. ' Come, I will not let 
you out of my sight ; come to the Duchess, she has a dejeuner 
to-day, and a ball in the evening, at which you must appear.' 
At 5 o'clock, seeing me dead tired, and learning that I had 
not been in bed for seven nights, he said, 6 Then go home and 
remain quiet to-morrow, for I shall be with the King ; and be 
ready to come if he sends for you; but be here on Friday at 12 
o'clock, when I shall be back from Woolwich.' I am thus 
prolix that you may judge how keenly interested he is on the 
whole subject ; and 1 rejoice to say is perfectly satisfied. On 
my way downstairs I sent for G. C., who was then equally 
well satisfied with all your reply, and my recapitulation of 
my report. Fellowes did not reach London until late at 
night. On Thursday morning he was closely interrogated, 
and on stating that Cradock would not part with your letter 
of 18th October, but took it on board, off they flew ; ' this 
destroys all overthrows the foundation of Gore's report, and 
puts us as much in the wrong as ever ; but for this, all was 
as clear as day/ &c., &c. ! ! Fellowes went to Bath that 


night. When I went to London next day, I found the flame 
in G. C.'s mind raging and increased by J. W. C. discovering 
that you had not replied to the query, Why did you not adopt 
the second article of the Protocol instead of the third ? The 
Duke of C. said, ' Before I say anything more to you, go to 
Lord Dudley and Huskisson, and come to me after.' The two 
Ministers repeated Croker's objection. ' I really think the 
question is fully answered, nor can I imagine how Sir E. C. 
could say more.' I saw them again yesterday ; the same 
objections and queries the same question except that 
Lord D. asked me ' why you did not anchor further off from 
the Turks ? ' ' Because, my lord, the water is too deep, and 
if Sir E. C. had taken a distant position, not only the Turks, 
but the French and Kussiaiis, and many of his own people 
would have thought he was afraid. Rest assured, Lord D., 
that he could do no otherwise than he did, and that the more 
it is investigated, the clearer it will prove. Respecting Col. 
Cradock's not delivering the letter to the dragoman on the 
18th, he and every one else was convinced that Ibrahim was 
on the spot, and that the cause of his absence was subterfuge 
to gain time, he being well aware that at that advanced season 
the fleets were likely to be dispersed and would not rejoin.' 
It is impossible for me to relate all that was said, but such 
is the substance. Fellowes and I are desired to be ready to 
attend the Houses of Parliament ; but there is no question 
that the present Ministers will not be on the Treasury bench : 
who will, is a mystery (and the same sort of change is about 
to take place in France) ; I wish, my dear C., I could fancy 
as much good will to do honour to the gallantry and conduct 
you have displayed, as there is to cavil at the latter. If they 
could they would throw you overboard, and save themselves ; 
but you are above their reach, and you are upheld by the two 
highest powers in the Realm. Therefore, f keep your tem- 
per,' and rest assured that I shall neither slumber nor sleep 
in your cause. I am advised to be silent but I will not 
and your friends shall know how to defend you, and those 
who are not so shall be ignorant for me. 

From Sir Frederick Adam to Sir E. G. 

Corfu : January 8, 1828. 

I return your answers to the queries. They are perfectly 
satisfactory to me, and I have not a doubt the event will 
prove them equally so to the ministers, who had better have 
shown no diffidence, as they must defend you, and their 
sending out Sir John Gore only tends to embarrass their de- 


fence it strengthens yours. The Turk's is a stubborn 
and dogged refusal to hear anything of the Treaty, and we 
must (in my opinion) carry it through. In my next I will 
give you some of my thoughts on this subject, as to the man- 
ner how ; but we must use force without war unless attacked. 
The letters from Sir James Saumarez, Penrose, and Sir W. 
Hotham are admirable, and such opinions, from such men, 
more than repay you for any doubts which politicians may, 
for their own convenience, have entertained. There can be 
nothing more satisfactory, too, than the behaviour of the Duke 
of Clarence and the King, and Spencer's account of the former 
is full proof that His Eoyal Highness's feelings are sincere as 

Your next letters will be most interesting, as they will give 
me an account of the effect of Sir John Gore's return. I am 
delighted at the good accounts of your son. You must all 
come up in a body, that we too may have a share in receiving 
the heroes of Navariii as they deserve. 

Ever, my dear C., yours truly, 


From General Sir Frederick Ponsoriby. 


MY DEAR ADMIRAL, I have had a letter from Lord 
Bathurst, in which are these words : ' I see nothing in what 
Sir E. Codrington has done at Navarin which the July Treaty 
does not warrant. I know not how a hostile Treaty can be 
executed without committing acts of hostility. It is they 
who framed the Treaty, and not they who execute it, are re- 

On January 14, 1828, the strong but necessary 
measure for suppressing piracy was adopted by orders 
from home, of preventing any armed vessel bearing the 
Greek flag from putting to sea, except those belonging 
to the Government of Greece. 

Sir E. C. to Sir Frederick Adam, Corfu. 

Malta : January 15, 1828. 

Whether it be the fascinating power of Capo d'Istrias 
merely, or the more fascinating effect of plain truth, time will 
discover ; but I certainly am induced to give credit to his 
intending to act quite as I would desire in his capacity of 


Head of the Greek Government, if he should accept that 
important office. I do really believe him sincere, my dear 
Adam, mainly because I am persuaded it is his interest, in 
every point of view in which I can contemplate him, to be 
so ; and circumstances which he has detailed to me, and also 
to Count de Heiden, would, I think, dispose you that way 
also. His brother wrote him, amongst other things, that 
Mr. S. Canning mentioned there being reports of his dislike 
to England, and to her having influence in the cause of 
Greek independence. He read me his brother's letter, or at 
least what he stated to be the letter, which he had in his 
hand, and also his answer, which I hope you, jointly with 
Mr. S. Canning, will see. One point, which I think very 
important in disproving this supposition, I must mention, as 
I do not recollect if it was in the letter or not ; and, more- 
over, it is a curious matter of history. First, I should relate 
an anecdote which he gave us the day before he received his 
brother's letter. When Minister in Switzerland he signed a 
Treaty, entered into by Swartzenburg, directly contrary to 
his Emperor's (Alexander) orders ; and that this coup de tete, 
as he termed it, led to his going to Petersburg. Alexander 
was at first angry, but when the effect was explained he said 
with kindness, ' Ce n'est pas en Suisse mais a Petersbourg 
que vous me servirez.' I cannot sufficiently detail the parti- 
culars; but the object was to establish the integrity and in- 
dependence of Switzerland. He has lived in that country on 
account of the freedom of its institutions, &c., and, by the 
way, I may observe that he gave us, in his agreeable manner, 
a short history of that country, which we listened to with 
great delight. However, upon his being closeted with the 
Emperor as a preliminary to his taking office, he begged to 
make one condition. His Imperial Majesty drew up, and the 
other observed that it was merely personal to himself. He then 
said that, as a native of the Ionian Islands, he hoped his Ma- 
jesty would promise never to consent to any other than Great 
Britain having dominion over them. The promise was given, 
and eventually kept in the most honorable manner. In the 
Congress Lord Castlereagh wanted to give Austria those islands. 
Alexander said his consent depended upon Count Capo 
d'Istrias. The rest urged, and the Count continued inflexible ; 
nor would he put his name to any of the other arrangements 
in the name of Eussia, until this matter was conceded to him. 
This must be known to the Duke of Wellington and many 
others now living, as the Count observed : and, if true, surely, 
my good friend, we are justified in believing what I must 
gay has been long evident to me, that the Head of the Greek 


Government, meaning to establish the independence of that 
country, must rely principally upon England. Without 
waiting to sound me, he at once stated that the only guide 
he looked to was the Treaty, which the Allies had agreed to 
execute, and which they had full power to enforce ; that he 
conceived any variation from it on his part would be fatal, 
as would also any difference amongst the Allies ; and that 
he would not take the office proposed to him, but under its 
guarantee: that he would not accept even pecuniary aid, 
upon which success in the first instance depends, from one 
of the three ; and he pressed upon Count de Heiden, as well 
as me, the necessity of his having near him the support of 
one of the vessels of war of each, that all observers might 
thereby see that he was supported in all his proceedings by 
the three Powers. He dwells upon this evidence of union in 
support of the Treaty, as his mainstay : and so, of course, do 
I ; and so must we all. I pointed out the impossibility of 
his accepting the Presidency unless Lord Cochrane and 
General Church were made dependent upon his authority ; 
for he did not appear to me quite as much impressed with 
this evil of independence in them, as I thought necessary ; 
although his decision to exact certain conditions before he 
accept his office, would eventually have led to my proposal, 
that he should call an assembly of the people to diminish 
this power in them to act as they may think proper without 
even making known to the Government what they are going 
to do. His plan will hasten the retreat of Lord C., which 
the Count and I agree in thinking the best thing for Greece 
which can happen. He is strong with me in this point. 

Memorandum by Sir E. C., written at Malta. 

January, 1828. 

I was ordered to send a vessel to bring Count Capo d'Istrias 
from Ancona ; and concluding by this that it was the object 
of the English government to establish an English influence 
over him, I devoted the ' Warspite,' 74, to this service, 
directing Captain Parker to bring him to Malta, at which 
place I considered myself bound to await fresh orders from 
home consequent on the battle of Navarin. Upon the Count's 
arrival, and our meeting at the Admiralty House, I asked 
him as a preliminary to anything further, ' how long he 
proposed to stay at Malta ;' to which he answered with a : 
particular expression, which gave me to understand that he 
came there against his will instead of going direct to 
Greece 'I came here by your Excellency's command, and 


am entirely at your Excellency's mercy.' I said, ' Your 
Excellency is very anxious, no doubt, to get to Greece?' 
He replied, f Most certainly, having come for that sole pur- 
pose.' I then said I was as anxious to get him to Greece as 
he was to find himself there; and in his presence asked 
Captain Parker how soon the ' Warspite ' could be got ready 
to take him ; to which Captain P. answered that he feared 
the ship could not be ready that evening, but she would by 
ten o'clock the next morning. I immediately told Count C. 
that at ten o'clock the following morning the ' Warspite ' 
would be entirely at his disposal ; and ' I now beg leave to 
repeat my question, how long your Excellency proposes 
staying at Malta ?' He seemed very much taken by surprise, 
and said he hoped I should not think two or three days too 
long. Upon this I explained that being myself tied down to 
Malta, and considering it material that we should have a 
personal intercourse in preference to a long epistolary cor^ 
respondence, in order to understand each other, I had thought 
it absolutely necessary to bring him to Malta in the first 
instance, though not with any wish to delay his ultimate 
destination ; that, as he had decided not to go away imme- 
diately, I would request him to dine with me that evening 
and become acquainted with my family, and that I hoped he 
would give me as much of his company as he could during 
his stay ; and we would begin our business to-morrow morn- 
ing. He showed himself full of anecdote and information, 
and made himself extremely agreeable to the whole of the 
party assembled to meet him, with all of whom he left the 
impression of his being a complete man of the world, very 
clever, and very entertaining. On the following morning 
the Count came to the Admiralty House to talk over with 
me the affairs of Greece according to appointment. I said 
I was ready to listen to anything he had to propose; to 
which he replied that as I had brought him there he ex- 
pected to hear what I had to say first. I then said : f 1 will 
be quite plain with you, in order that no misunderstanding 
may arise between us. I am no philanthropist, nor am I the 
least of a Philhellenist ; I set no particular value upon either 
Greeks or Turks, and have no personal feeling towards 
either. I am guided solely by my duty as an English officer ; 
and my duty in this case is pointed out by the Treaty of 
London and my instructions emanating from it, which I am 
determined to fulfil to the utmost : which instructions lead 
me to lean towards the Greeks and from the Turks under 
present circumstances. So long as your Excellency acts 
according to that Treaty T am your warmest and sincerest 


friend ; from the moment that you swerve from it I am your 
bitterest enemy.' 'Well,' said the Count, 'that is quite 
candid, and I will act towards you in the same manner, with 
equal desire to fulfil the object of the Treaty, which, as you 
know, has brought me to this country.' 

From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : January 18, 1828. 

SIE, In addition to your Royal Highness's letter of De- 
cember 2, I have since received your letters of November 4 
and December 7. It is impossible for me to peruse these 
letters without repeating again and again the great satisfac- 
tion which I derive from your Eoyal Highness's approbation 
of my conduct. I may truly say it enables me to do my duty 
not only more cheerfully but more effectually; and I am sure 
that all those who can fully contemplate the important con- 
cerns in which the naval commander-in-chief on this station 
will have to take a part, will see the necessity of lightening 
his load of responsibility as much as possible. The arrival 
of Count Capo d'Istrias, who is gone on in the ' Warspite y 
after four days' stay here, seems to me to open a prospect of 
great eventual benefit. In spite of the prejudice against 
him for having been a Minister in Eussia, and of the caution 
I have had against his fascinating conversation, I feel great 
reliance upon his pursuing that line of conduct which our 
Government would desire. He at once detailed his plans to 
me without reserve, upon finding that instead of delaying 
his arrival in Greece, as he had imagined, I was most anxious 
to expedite it. He has not accepted the post to which he is 
nominated, as yet, because he wishes to exact certain conces- 
sions preparatory, which I agree with him in thinking neces- 
sary. He was nominated by the same meeting which gave 
Lord Cochrane power to act independently of the govern- 
ment at sea, and General Church by land. I have urged his 
calling a meeting of the people to revise this system ; for if 
he and I should agree in any measure, Lord Cochrane may 
act in direct opposition to it, either knowingly or otherwise; 
since he may do what he thinks proper without previous 
communication with the government. Lord C. has at pre- 
sent, moreover, authority from the government to collect 
revenue from the islands for the -use of the navy, which he 
deputes to a Swiss, M. D., and your Eoyal Highness may infer 
from this that such power might, with more benefit to the 
public good, remain in the hands of the president. It is 
said that the Count's arrival will be the signal for his Lord- 


ship's resignation, which, when it is considered that he has 
already cost the Greeks an expenditure of above a million 
sterling, appears to ine a consummation devoutly to be 
wished. The confidence with which your Eoyal Highness 
has been pleased to honor me, leads me to commit opinions 
which otherwise I ought in prudence not to anticipate. I 
venture, therefore, to say at this early period, that I believe 
Count Capo d'Istrias honestly bent upon guiding himself 
strictly according to the object of the Allies, and, like me, 
making the Treaty the law by which he will guide his conduct. 
I say this with the more confidence because he stated it openly 
to me and gave his reasons, before he had heard my senti- 
ments upon any part of those operations in which we may be 
jointly employed. I am much mistaken if the benefit of his 
arrival, as regards piracy, is not made evident in the course 
of the coming summer; for he is not only desirous of facili- 
tating the commerce of other Powers, but extremely anxious 
for re-establishing a turn for trade amongst the Greeks 
themselves, both as a source of revenue and an occupation of 
men who now join in piratical expeditions because no other 
means of support lie open to them. The great difficulty we 
shall have to contend with, is the conduct of the Austrian 
navy under . I fear I shall not be able by this oppor- 
tunity to reply officially to the complaint of Prince Metter- 
nich on this head, because it will require the examination of 
a large mass of papers to expose to your Eoyal Highuess's 
view the whole of the circumstances and the object of the 
parties ; for although I write all my own letters, I want the 
assistance of my secretary to collect facts and extracts with 
which my memory will not furnish me, and he and his first 
clerk are both at present unwell. In the meantime, I beg 
leave to guard your Eoyal Highness against the machinations 
of the Austrian agents ; who besides cloaking their own mis- 
conduct under complaints against me, seem desirous of 
impeding the execution of the Treaty by every little contri- 
vance they can think of for their own exclusive benefit. 

The e Brisk ' has just brought me information from Alex- 
andria of the arrival there on the 27th and 28th of December, 
of the fleet collected at Navarin, including all those which 
have arrived from different places up to the 19th December, 
when they left that port. Captain Keith writes that the 
line-of-battle ship, full of sick and wounded, which left 
Navarin with the others, parted company two days after- 
wards in a gale of wind, and has not been since heard of, 


and it is supposed she foundered, as many of her shot-holes 
were merely covered with canvas. 

I have the honor to be, Sir, with the greatest respect, 
your Royal Highness's very faithful and obedient servant, 


From Sir E. C. to 8ir F. Adam, at Corfu. 

Malta: January 19, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADAM, Your letter of the 14th has just reached 
me by the * Weazle,' in company with the officials about 
Cradock's mission, and the letter of Mr. S. Canning, who 
seems to have been put in a quandary by my mention of the 
expected arrival here of his colleagues. I was so wrong as 
to Count Guilleminot, that when off here in the commence- 
ment of a very violent gale of N.W. wind, when the devil 
himself would have been glad to get into port, the frigate 
would not bear up and come here ; and I think she must 
be gone by the Faro of Messina. Had 1 thought it of im- 
portance, I should not have mentioned the subject, as I 'did 
not mean more than to add some little inducement for him 
to come here. I only knew that the French Consul here 
(M. Miege) felt sure Guilleminot would call here in his way, 
and that Count de Heiden has still the same persuasion as 
to Mons. de Bibeaupierre, as each might naturally call in 
their way to Toulon. De Rigny hints his own coming as a 
possible case, in a letter to me ; and as I was writing to 
Mr. S. C. at the same time, and was thus led to conclude we 
should all meet here, I mentioned it to him. I still think it 
very odd that either of them should pass Malta without 
stopping, unless they would thereby have lost a strong fair 
wind. And indeed I am surprised that the whole of them 
should not have assembled here in the first instance, ready 
to receive further instructions from home, and to instruct us- 
further how to act in consequence. 

It is odd at this moment of increased importance, and 
when I know there is a readiness to find fault with me, that 
1 should be left without any guide for my conduct. Instead 
of any instruction, I get a long diplomatic tirade of a com- 
plaint coming from Prince Metternich about my conduct 
to Austrians, which a letter sent by me to Mr. Croker would 
have in the most part explained, and of which letter he 
had acknowledged the receipt. I have had several more 
letters lately from his illustrious master, all in the same ap- 
proving and encouraging style. Cradock will have the 
4 Galatea ' to take him first to you and then to Alexandria. 


I should have been glad to have seen you, and also Mr. S. 
C., but it is quite impossible for me to leave Malta until I 
have answers to the papers sent home by Gore, and some in- 
structions for my future conduct. I shall still be ready to 
do, at all times, whatever the service clearly requires ; but 
it is as due to the Government as it is to myself personally, 
that I should avoid adopting any decisive proceedings until 
they themselves now signify their sentiments. 

I don't see why this feeling should have prevented Mr. S. 
C. e touching upon any question of politics,' as he says, ' con- 
ceiving, from my last letter, that I do not consider myself 
in a situation to enter thereon with advantage until the receipt 
of further instructions from home.' No one can be surprised 
at my being unwilling to adopt any line purely my own, sub- 
ject to the censure of people ready to supersede me by send- 
ing out - , as the ( John Bull' asserts an assertion which 
accounts to me for his having been closeted with Huskis- 
son upon my subject for five hours, and for his having 
found difficulty in defending the line I had pursued. Our 
latest news from England was in the ' Galignani ' of De- 
cember 19. 

Pray collect all particulars resulting from our late battle ; 
whether Tahir went away by order or without, &c. Your 
mission pleases me much. We had this object, about which 
Ibrahim would not receive communications. After his fleet 
was destroyed, he courted communication with the com- 
mander of a French schooner. If he accede now to your 
proposal, it will be owing to the loss of his fleet ; if he resist, 
the same loss puts him and his army at our mercy. Thus 
good must, in one or the other way, be the consequence of 
the battle of Navarin. 

Yours truly, 


At this time, while recording these matters, I look 
back to those days of early youth with wonder, to think 
how quietly all this labour was got through, and how 
little all these troubles and perturbations were allowed 
to darken our daily life. My father's usual custom was 
to work steadily all the morning in his office room ; and 
when he came among us in the latter hours of the day, 
it was apparently with a mind disengaged from care, and 
ready to enter into the enjoyment of the hour, whatever 
it happened to be. 

His habits of regularity were a great help to him : 


I never in my life remember to have seen him either 
sitting unemployed, or doing anything in a hurry. The 
one was the consequence of the other. 

From Sir E. C. to Mr. 8. Canning. 

Malta : January 20, 1828. 

DEAR SIR, Your letter of the 14th reached me yesterday 
by the 'Weazle.' I lament having mentioned anything of 
your colleagues at all, since it seems to have created uneasi- 
ness on your part. I only gave the convictions of Mons. Miege, 
the Consul here, and of Count de Heiden, upon which my 
own was formed. The latter still thinks Mons. de Bibeau- 
pierre will come here. Count Guilleminot, I suspect, was in 
a French frigate which when off here several days ago, in the 
beginning of a severe gale from the N.W., persevered in keep- 
ing the sea, although she would have saved distance by shel- 
tering here. I therefore return the despatch brought by the 
6 Weazle.' I have directed the ' Galatea,' which was sent 
out only to visit the Regencies and see if all was quiet there, 
to take Colonel Cradock, first to meet Sir Frederick Adam, 
and then to Alexandria. Admiral De Rigny merely men- 
tioned the probability of his coming here, but I think it is 
material that we should meet to combine farther operations, 
and he knows that he would find Count de Heiden and my- 
self both within this port; but of the movements of the 
parties positively, I know nothing more than I have men- 
tioned. By means of the steamboat, no doubt you can ensure 
communication with England by messengers, in the surest 
and best manner ; but I doubt Corfu being the fittest point 
for general rendezvous. I hope you do not mistake any ex- 
pression from me as of unwillingness to act politically in any 
way which you may advise. I certainly am not desirous of 
taking upon myself the responsibility of any new line of 
operation consequent on your leaving Constantinople, when 
the opportunity offers for my being instructed by those who 
seem to have been ready to saddle me with the natural 
results of the Treaty, under what I think still a mistaken 
notion of what these * results will be. I shall not, however, 
hesitate, in the interim, in undertaking anything which 
either you or I myself may deem advantageous to the public 
service. The mission now directed to be adopted shows the 
propriety of my looking for further instructions from. home. 
I was here interrupted by letters from Alexandria in the 
' Brisk.' I enclose an extract from that of Captain Keith, of 
the ' Philomel,' with a list of the ships from Navarin, which 


arrived from Alexandria, under Moharem Bey. I should 
observe that this list includes all that arrived there from the 
time of the battle until the time of their sailing on the 19th 
December, either from the Dardanelles, Prevesa, Patras, 
Modon, or elsewhere. 

Believe me, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

< Talbot/ at Malta: January 21, 1828.* 

SIR, I have this minute received the accompanying letters 
from Captain Richards, of the ' Pelorus,' and Mr. Consul 
Barker, all brought in the ' Pelorus' by Captain Eichards 
himself.* And although some of them are of an old date, and 
I conclude the substance of them has been communicated to 
the Earl Dudley, they contain matters of such interest that 
I think it right to place them before H.E.H. the Lord High 
Admiral. To these I will add a letter which I received 
yesterday from the Honorable Captain Keith, of the ' Phi- 
lomel,' written since the departure of the ' Pelorus ; ' as it 
contains a somewhat more circumstantial account of the 
vessels from Navarin. 

I should observe that the list includes all those vessels 
which were sent there subsequent to the battle, and those 
which could be collected from Modon, Patras, Prevesa, &c. 
On January 15, I received by the packet Mr. Barrow's letter 
of November 27, and on the 1 9th I received, by way of Corfu, 
his secret letter of December 21. In compliance with these 
letters, I have ordered Captain Sir Charles Sullivan to take 
the Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel Cradock upon the mis- 
sion therein mentioned, not having any other suitable ship 
ready for the purpose, and deeming that mission to be of the 
greatest importance at this particular juncture. 

I have, &c., 


* Acknowledged February 18, 1828. 

t List of enclosures in Admiralty letter, January 21, 1828 : 
Two letters from Mr. Consul Barker, dated November 28 and December" 

26, 1827. 
Two letters fro n Commander Richards of the 'Pelorus/ dated November 4, 

1827, and January 21, 1828. 
A letter from Honorable Commander Keith of the ( Philomel,' dated 

January 7, 1828, 

giving accounts of the arrival of the remains of the Egyptian fleet from 
Navarin, having the sick and wounded and many Greek slaves on board, 
the ships in i* wretched state, the line-of-battle ship missing. 


Memorandum W. J. C. 

This question of Greek slaves and their transmission 
with the wounded men and the remains of the Turkish fleet 
from Navarin to Alexandria, is a history worthy of the atten- 
tion of men of all professions. Sir E. Codrington, in this 
letter, reported to his Government the movement imme- 
diately he heard of it for he knew that the departure of these 
ships was an advantage to Greece ; and he was ordered to 
facilitate not to arrest the departure of any Turkish ships, 
serviceable or unserviceable, from the More a. But a ques- 
tion of ' slavery ' and the ' Greek slaves ' was as usual taken 
up in Parliament; and Mr. Huskisson, Secretary for the 
Colonies, being questioned on March 5, in the House of 
Commons, made a Government explanation, stating that 
' renewed instructions,' &c., had been ' sent out to our 

No such instructions, however, were sent. And on April 
3, on another discussion in Parliament, Mr. Peel said that 
' in forty-eight hours after the news arrived communications 
were made to the British Admiral.' 

Now for the facts : this account, dated January 21, and 
sent home by Sir E. C. himself, is acknowledged by Govern- 
ment on February 18. 

No notice is taken of it to Sir E. C. till the despatch from 
Lord Dudley of March 18, one whole month later. 

And there is now seen in ' Despatches and Memoranda of 
the Duke of Wellington,' page 336, a letter from Mr. Hus- 
kisson to the Duke of Wellington, dated April 6, 1828, with 
these words : ' In the draft to Codrington, I have adverted 
to the Greek slaves in a manner which I hope will meet 
your approbation. You will see that I assume that a despatch 
has been already written by Dudley to our Consul at Alex- 
andria to try to get them back by a strong appeal to 
the Pacha of Egypt. Such an appeal should be made to 
him in the most forcible terms, as he values the protection 
and friendship of this country. I think something to this 
effect should be sent off immediately, dated at least a fort- 
night back, when Peel strongly urged it in the Cabinet, and 
I understood it was settled. We shall otherwise not stand 
well in Parliament on this point. 

' Yours very truly, 


4" 'f$- 


From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : January 21, 1828. 

SIR, In my letter of yesterday and the day before, I 
have touched upon the conduct of ships under the flag of 
Austria. This is a subject of so much importance at the 
present moment that I am induced to revert to it, and to 
suggest to your Royal Highness how much it is connected 
with the mission of Colonel Cradock, the good effect of which 
seems to be relied upon by His Majesty's Ministers. It is 
made evident, by the complaint of Prince Metternich, that 
the Austrians will continue to supply the Turkish army with 
the means of prolonging their stay in Greece, under the plea 
of our not having a belligerent right to blockade, and of the 
Greeks neither having the right nor the power to blockade 
effectually. Now, a pretty strong interruption as far as 
locality admits, of that part of the coast in which Ibrahim's 
army is established, would, in my opinion, at once decide 
his wish to retire. This is the first and perhaps the most 
important consideration as to the liberation of Greece. But 
as we may still have great difficulty in bringing the Sultan 
to a decision, and as that decision may depend upon the 
conduct of the Pacha of Egypt, I beg leave to suggest that 
the threat of a blockade of Alexandria would have more 
effect upon him than any negotiation whatever. His coffers 
are now extremely reduced, and his means of replenishing 
them, upon which alone his power depends, are the sale of 
his produce to foreign merchants, and his external trade in 
general. I am persuaded that there is no more truth in 
him than in Ibrahim, and that neither of them will keep any 
agreement longer than it may suit their personal object; and 
I believe they will both be more attracted by the boons 
which they may exact from the Sultan in the present 
state of his affairs, than from any benefits that can be 
offered to them by England. I am thus entering upon 
matters beyond the line of my immediate duty ; but I am 
led by the confidence and the kindness which I receive from 
your Royal Highness, to venture upon speculative opinions 
and anticipations which otherwise I might find it prudent to 
withhold. I had imagined that the Sultan would have ac- 
ceded upon hearing the fate of his fleet, for I did not reckon 
upon his indulging in an obstinacy which can only lead to 
his own injury. Having carried his temper thus far, it is 
difficult to say to what extent it may go. But I cannot help 
thinking that if he should still persevere, and should exclude 


us from that commerce which we have partaken of in com- 
mon with other nations, it will become the Allies to prevent 
Austria from grasping it to herself as a consequence of her 
having supported underhand that resistance to the Treaty 
which the Emperor had avowed a wish to promote. A 
blockade of the Turkish and Egyptian ports, until the Sultan, 
should relax, would soon produce the desired effect, and 
would in the end prove the least detriment to general com- 
merce and the best economy to the Allied Powers. At this 
late period it is not very necessary to add anything to the 
statement which I sent home by Sir John Gore, in justifi- 
cation of my own conduct. But I shall never cease wishing 
to make the ground of that justification as strong as possible, 
in order that Your Royal Highness may be the more strongly 
satisfied with the kindness which you have shown me. I 
enclose a statement of Captain Richards, of Mehemet Ali 
himself having said, that Ibrahim had orders to obey his 
former orders in spite of me ; so that sooner or later a battle 
must have ensued. I feel justified, therefore, in retaining 
my opinion that entering the port of Navarin offered the 
only hope of executing the Treaty without hostility, whilst 
it would at once check that brutal warfare which Ibrahim 
was pursuing uninterruptedly in the Morea. This warfare 
is referred to moreover in the enclosed extract from a letter 
of Mr. Stratford Canning accompanying the Protocol of the 
Ambassadors. And, in reference to the conduct of Austrian 
vessels, I may observe that the fifth Protocol itself points 
out that ' Les commandans des deux escadres ne peuvent 
permettre aux batimens neutres d'introduire dans la Grece 
des secours destines aux Turcs,' &c. This refers to merchant 
vessels particularly ; and transfers my term of vessels of His 
Imperial Majesty, by which I meant those under his flag, 
into ' batimens de guerre,' in the same spirit which pervades 
the two letters he has written me, copies of which I presume 
he has sent to Prince Metternich. 

I have, &c., 


The following extract is inserted as a specimen of the 
kindly consideration for the comfort of officers, which, in 
Admiral Codrington's view of the right mode of carrying 
on the service, had a claim upon the attention of a 
C oinmander-in- Chief : 



Sir E. C. to Sir Thomas Staines. 

Malta: January 15, 1828. 

Bridgeman and all married men should leave the address 
of their wives, that I may write of them when perhaps they 
cannot write themselves ; and with this view I will beg you 
to name them as being well, if so, or otherwise, in your com- 

From H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence to Sir E. C. 

Admiralty: February 5, 1828. 

DEAR SIR, I am to acknowledge yours of 28th No- 
vember; two of 10 th December; of 20th and 26th Decem- 
ber ; and of 6th January, and various enclosures. I conceive 
the King's Speech, which I enclose, the complete and 
manly declaration of the Duke of Wellington, the perfect 
concurrence in your conduct from the Marquis of Lans- 
downe and Viscount Goderich, and the unqualified appro- 
bation in the House of Commons, will entirely satisfy your 
mind. The letter from the Emperor of Kussia, together 
with the honors conferred on you by the King of France 
and his Kussian Imperial Majesty, must convince you of the 
opinion of the Allied Powers. The new Government is hardly 
enough fixed for me to talk on the subject of Orders, but I 
will the moment I can with effect. I am sorry to say there 
seems doubt as to the positive fact of the Island of Sphacteria 
being ours. 

I have now seen the ' Genoa' at Plymouth, the 'Asia,' the 
'Albion,' and the 'Eose' at Portsmouth, and shall pay 
another visit to the ' Asia ' before she returns to the Medi- 
terranean. ....... 

I will not venture an opinion on war or peace. The new 
Ministry must act before an idea can be estimated. After 
the vacations we may see what will be done. More at present 
I cannot say. I hope the Asia ' will not be long before she 
is again ready for sea. 

I remain, dear Sir, yours truly, 


Extract from the King's Speech, January 29, 1828. 

'In the course of the measures adopted with a view to 
carry into effect the object of the Treaty, a collision, wholly 
unexpected by His Majesty, took place in the port of Navarin, 


between the fleets of the Contracting Powers and that of the 
Ottoman Porte. Notwithstanding the valour displayed by 
the combined fleet, His Majesty laments that this conflict 
should have occurred with the naval force of an ancient ally : 
but he still entertains a confident hope, that this untoward 
event will not be followed by further hostilities, and will not 
impede that amicable adjustment of the existing differences 
between the Porte and the Greeks, to which it is so mani- 
festly their common interest to accede.' 

In the debate which ensued Lord Holland said : 

( I cannot but lament the use of the word " untoward," as 
applied to the battle of JSTavarin. If the phrase means to 
say, that the battle of Navarin is an obstacle to their inde- 
pendence,^ I cannot agree to its propriety or justice ; I think 
that even now, it has furthered and promoted the emanci- 
pation of Greece. I look upon it as a step, and a great 
step, to the pacification of Europe.' 

Duke of Wellington : 

6 There is one other subject to which, with your lordships' 
permission, I shall briefly address myself : I mean the sense 
in which the word " untoward " has been used. It was in- 
tended by "imtoward" to convey, that the event referred to 
was unexpected was unfortunate. The sense in which the 
word was used was this : in the treaty, which is not yet before 
the House, and which cannot, therefore, regularly come under 
discussion, though all of us have read it, it is mentioned as 
one stipulation, that the execution of it, if possible, shall 
not lead to hostilities : and, therefore, when the execution 
of it did lead to hostilities, it was a consequence which the 
Government did not anticipate, and which it has, therefore, 
a right to call " untoward." But, in making this statement, 
do I make the slightest charge, do I cast the least imputa- 
tion upon the gallant officer who commanded at Navarin? 
Certainly not. That gallant officer, in doing as he has done, 
discharged what he felt to be his duty to his country. His 
Majesty's Government have taken that gallant officer's con- 
duct into consideration, and have acquitted him of all blame : 
and therefore, it would ill become me to cast the slightest 
imputation on the distinguished action he performed. My 
Lords, it should be recollected, that the gallant Admiral 
was placed in a situation of great delicacy as well as difficulty. 
He was placed in the command of a combined squadron, in 

* Speaking of the Greeks, 
x 2 


conjunction with two foreign Admirals : and his conduct was 
such, that they placed the most implicit confidence in him, 
and allowed him to lead them to victory. My Lords, I 
should feel myself unworthy of the situation which I hold 
in His Majesty's councils, if I thought myself capable of 
uttering a single syllable against that gallant Admiral, 
admiring as I do the intrepid bravery with which he con- 
ducted himself in a moment of much danger and difficulty.' 

Earl Grey : 

'I perfectly agree with the noble Earl (Eldon) who has 
spoken from the cross bench, in looking upon the battle of 
Navarin as a most unfortunate event; but in saying this, 
I mean not to impute the slightest blame to the gallant 
officer who achieved that victory, so much to his own honour 
and the character of his country. I have been long and well 
acquainted with that gallant officer (Sir Edward Codrington), 
and I can venture to assure your Lordships that a better, a 
braver, or a more skilful officer does not exist. I agree per- 
fectly with the noble Duke, in thinking we ought not to look 
with too critical an eye at the conduct of an officer placed in 
a situation of such delicacy and difficulty as Sir Edward 
Codrington was ; and who, in acting as he has done, felt 
that he was doing his best for the honour and interests of his 

Marquis of Lansdowne : 

c All I feel it necessary to declare at the present moment 
is, that if blame attaches anywhere it does not rest with Sir 
Edward Codrington. I concur with the noble Duke, and 
with other noble Lords who have spoken on the subject, that 
the battle of Navarin was an unfortunate circumstance, as 
every circumstance must be considered which is attended by 
great destruction of human life. But, my Lords, I am not 
ashamed to say, it would be quite absurd and childish to 
expect that an armed interference could take place without 
some risk of war without some chance of those hostilities 
which I entirely agree with the noble Duke in thinking it 
would be the wish of every man to avoid if possible. But, 
my Lords, let me repeat, that if blame rests anywhere, it 
will be very easy to satisfy your Lordships and the country, 
that it does not rest with the gallant Admiral whose name 
has been so frequently mentioned this evening but not 
mentioned without deserved praise and honour but with 
those who concluded the treaties which placed him in a 


situation in which, I contend, he exercised a sound discre- 
tion as to what was due to his country, and who risked his 
life in maintaining untarnished the honor of her flag. My 
Lords, I agree with my noble friend in regretting the un- 
lucky selection of the word u untoward ;" and much as I was 
desirous that the Address should pass unanimously, I should 
have felt it my duty to oppose it, if the gallant Duke had 
not declared that, in the sense in which it was used, there 
was not even a remote hint of disapprobation intended 
against the gallant officer. When all the documents on this 
subject shall be laid before your Lordships, it will appear 
that the gallant officer was necessarily entrusted with a 
large discretion, which I contend was well and fairly exer- 
cised ; and in justice to the gallant officer himself, I trust 
that the whole of the documents in the possession of Govern- 
ment on this subject will be laid before your Lordships. 
When the intelligence of the transaction first reached 
Government, it was found that further information respect- 
ing it was wanting. Immediate steps being taken for the 
purpose, that information was supplied ; and being supplied, 
it was seen that the gallant Admiral was entitled to the 
warm approbation of the Government and the country.' 

Viscount Goderich: 

' My Lords, I agree with what has fallen from my noble 
friend, the noble Duke at the head of the Government, as 
well as from the noble Marquis, respecting the conduct of 
the gallant officer, Sir Edward Codrington. He was placed 
in circumstances of no ordinary difficulty, and in my opinion, 
niy Lords, he acted with sound discretion, and discharged 
his duty with consummate skill and courage. Whenever 
that transaction may become the subject of discussion be- 
fore your Lordships, I shall be prepared to support the gal- 
lant Admiral, not merely on the principle that it is the duty 
of a Government to support those whom it employs to execute 
its orders, but from my deep and firm conviction that he was 
justified in the course he took ; and that, in that course, he 
neither tarnished his own fame nor sullied the honor of his 

Earl Dudley: 

c With respect to the affair at Navarin, he entirely con- 
curred with what had fallen from the noble Duke, and with 
every noble Lord who had mentioned the name of Sir 
Edward Codrington upon whom it was not his intention 
to cast the slightest imputation.' 


House of Commons, Jan. 29, 1828. Mr. Brougham : 

' But I do enter my protest and dissent in the strongest 
manner against one clause in the Speech which protest and 
dissent I trust to hear re-echoed and affirmed from one end 
of the kingdom to the other. I allude, Sir, to the manner 
in which the late glorious, brilliant, and immortal achieve- 
ment of the British navy is spoken of as matter of lamen- 
tation only. As matter of lamentation ! This is the first 
time in the course of my experience that I have ever seen 
men anxiously come forward to take an early, an uncalled- 
for, an improper, and I say an unfair opportunity of express- 
ing concern and regret at the victorious achievements of 
the arms of their countrymen. I, however, cannot conceive 
how censure can be cast upon the chief in that engagement, 
after he has been covered with honors, which are only less 
estimable than the fame and glory which he has achieved in 
the service of his country. Wholly concurring in the senti- 
ment, that it would be greatly for the benefit of Greece if 
peace were restored, and believing that this victory will 
mainly contribute to the attainment of that object, I greatly 
rejoice in the event. 5 

Lord Althorp : 

' I agree entirely with my honorable and learned friend 
(Mr. Brougham), so far as we are informed of the circumstances 
that the battle of Navarin was a necessary consequence of 
the Treaty which the Allies had contracted to carry into 
effect. I agree, too, most fully, in the protest of my honor- 
able and learned friend, against those expressions in the 
Speech from the Throne which seem to cast censure upon the 
gallant Admiral who commanded at Navarin. It would, 
indeed, be hard upon naval officers if they were employed in 
highly delicate, as well as important, duties, and afterwards 
had blame insinuated against them, without the clearest 
proof that cause for such blame existed.' 

Lord Palmerston : 

' It was therefore a collision entirely unexpected by this 
Government. The expressions so employed have not been 
meant as any reflection on the conduct of the English Admiral 
who commanded in that engagement.' 

Lord John Russell : 

f With respect to the affairs of Greece and Turkey, I was glad 
to hear the noble Lord opposite make the declaration he did. 


because it relieves me from the apprehension that any blame 
was intended to attach to the excellent Admiral who fought 
the glorious battle of JSTavarin. But I must add that if no 
blame was intended to attach, the words chosen in allusion 
to him are the most unfortunate I ever heard. It is my de- 
cided opinion that that glorious victory was a necessary 
consequence of the Treaty of London ; and it is also my 
opinion that it was as honest a victory as was ever gained 
by the arms of any Power from the beginning of the world.' 

Lord Morpeth : 

6 Ministers might have chosen many other epithets with 
reference to a victory which had filled with joy the heart of 
every lover of freedom. The selection of the word "untoward" 
was injudicious and unjust; it is the most injurious and 
shabby epithet which could have been supplied by the re- 
searches of Ministers into the English language.' 

Lord Palmerston: 

6 It is impossible to deny that in that sense of the word, the 
battle of Navarin was an " untoward event." But as far as 
relates to the character of the country, and to the reputation 
and fame of its arms, no human being can suppose that the 
epithet " untoward " was applied in that sense in his Majesty's 
Speech. In no fair construction of the passage does it imply 
any censure on the gallant Admiral who commanded the 
Allied fleet on that day of arduous but splendid success.' 

Sir F. Burdett: 

' As to the battle of Navarin, so far from thinking it an 
" untoward event," I regard it as one of the most fortunate 
circumstances that could have happened, highly creditable to 
the character of the country, and calculated to raise it in the 
estimation of the civilised world. I cordially approve of the 
Treaty, and cannot help expressing my regret that the 
Ministry which had the vigour to strike this blow of foreign 
policy, had not the vigour afterwards to support itself. The 
Treaty was dictated by sound policy, and carried into effect 
with ability by the gallant Admiral and his fleet in the per- 
formance of their perilous duty. That achievement stands 
far beyond the reach of any vote in this House.' 


From Sir John Gore to Sir E. C. 

February 10, 1828. 

You will hear and read that all question respecting ISTa- 
varin is at an end ; that the highest and most unquestionable 
approbation of your conduct has been expressed ; but that 
Thanks are not, under political considerations, thought advis- 
able. Mr. Hobhouse intends to urge them, and, it is sup- 
posed, will be negatived by the previous question, as peace 
and conciliations of all kinds are universally and most 
anxiously sought for. Therefore, I wish, for your sake, that 
he would not urge his motion ; for, as the approbation is so 
perfect, and as the Duke of Wellington knows and feels all 
that is due to an officer who has so nobly fulfilled his duty 
as you have done, I would rather trust to his honorable 
high-mindedness than to Mr. Hobhouse's zeal, and patiently 
abide the issue of negotiation ; for if peace is perfectly re- 
established while you are in command, I can have no doubt 
that your services will then be amply rewarded ; but not till 
then. I cannot convey to you an adequate idea of the dread 
which still exists of war; and the Duke of Wellington told 
me, c If we can but preserve peace I see nothing to be afraid 
of; but war now will be the destruction of all Europe. 5 
Every breath that indicates hostility is deprecated. 

Sir E. C. to Admiral De Rigny. 

Malta : February 8, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, The enclosed copy of my letter to 
our Lord High Admiral* will tell you my sentiments as 
to what we should now do respecting Turkey. I think if 
Smyrna or Alexandria were not included in a blockade with 
the rest of the Ottoman ports, the Sultan would still continue 
sulky ; and dissatisfaction, by long continuance, would even- 
tually 6 degenerate into hostilities. 3 But if we were at once to 
declare a blockade of all the ports of the Sultan and the de- 
pendencies, he must yield of necessity to any terms we might 
choose to impose on him. Colonel Cradock is again gone to 
the Viceroy of Egypt. I do not approve of asking terms 
which, I think, I have the right and the power to dictate. 
My plan would have been to complain loudly against the 
insult and the aggression offered to us at Navarin ; and to 
demand, by way of satisfaction, the Sultan's acceding to the 

* See Appendix. 


proposed armistice immediately ; and I would blockade all 
the ports until I gained my object. In. this case it would 
become the interest, not only of the French and English 
merchants who now remain under Turkish protection, but 
that of the Austrians also, to assist in bringing- the Porte to 
our terms, and we well know that all these persons take 
interest as their only guide. 

Mr. S. Canning has not informed me of his latest commu- 
nications with the Eeis Effendi, and seems to withhold his 
sentiments on the present state of affairs ; and our Ministers 
do the same. This is very diplomatic, but very unfair, as I 
think. In the meantime that we are thus left without in- 
structions how to act under the new order of our relations 
with the Porte, English vessels at Constantinople have had 
their cargoes of corn taken from them with nothing but a 
mere promise to pay less than it cost the owners, and some 
of the people have been bastinadoed into the bargain. I 
shall shortly have the documents on which to make a repre- 
sentation, which I think must wake our superiors out of their 
present supineness. I should like to have the account given 
by Mons. Bompard, which must be correct. I think you 
must have found his journal a very interesting document.*" 

From Admiral De Rigny. 




Les Turcs se rejouissent fort du changement de ministere 
dans nos pays. Je crois que Sultan Mohammed veut ab- 
solument essayer ses troupes contre la Russie. 

Sir E. C. to the Primates of the Island of Scio. 

H.B.M.S. ' Talbot; at Malta : February 11, 1828. 
GENTLEMEN, In reply to your letter of the 28th of last 
December, requesting the assistance of the Allied fleet in 
defending the Greek forces at Scio against an attack from 
the Turkish ships, I have only to inform you that, as the 
expedition to that island was made against our injunctions, 
and appears to me to have been undertaken much more to 
gratify private interests than to promote the welfare of the 
Greek people in general, I do not consider it as our duty to 
comply with your request. You, Gentlemen, must know as 
well as I do that if the resources wasted on this occasion 

* See Appendix. 


had been employed in favor of the Morea, the army or 
Ibrahim Pacha would have suffered a similar fate to that of 
his fleet, and Greece would not have had the additional re- 
proach which has been brought upon her by the misconduct 
of the Sciotes themselves in this ill-advised expedition. 

I am, &c., 


From H.E.H. the Duke of Clarence to Sir E. C. 

Admiralty : February 17, 1828.* 

DEAR SIR, I am to acknowledge yours of January 18 
and 21, from Malta. Both in my public and private situa- 
tion I consider the matter of Navarin. completely set at rest, 
and for yourself in the most favorable manner possible. I 
do not conceive you will have anything more to do with Lord 
Cochrane, as his lordship is now in London. You were 
right in sending Count Capodistrias to Greece, and I hope 
he may not play false to Great Britain. I therefore cannot 
caution you too much to be constantly on your guard re- 
specting this individual. I wish most heartily piracy may 
be fairly put down by the Greek Government. Count Dan- 
dolo I cannot know. But he is, like yourself, obliged to 
obey the orders he receives. I recommend towards the 
Austrian navy firmness but much coolness on your part. 
Recollect we are in close alliance with Austria, and particu- 
larly on the subject of Portugal. I shall be anxious to see 
events how they arise and the utmost deliberation and 
steady conduct are requisite. I am extremely glad the 
* Galatea ' was not sailed, and has, therefore, been sent to 
carry Lieutenant-Colonel Cradock. I do not think the fleet 
from Navarin will return there again. 

You and I differ widely. I never thought the Sultan would 
act otherwise than he has, because he must be aware it 
is not to the interest of either Great Britain or France to 
permit Russia to be in possession of Constantinople. How- 
ever false the Divan may be, or however treacherous the Pacha 
of Egypt and Ibrahim may be, they do not want for abilities. 
It is for the Cabinet of the Duke of Wellington to determine 
with the Allies what ought to be done, I can only obey the 
instructions I receive. I say nothing more 011 the subject of 
Navarin, because I conceive the public mind here for ever at 
rest. You ought, with your friends, to be most perfectly 
satisfied ; and I once more repeat you were fully authorised 
by your instructions to strike the blow you did in Navarin, 

* Received April 7. 


and the whole of Europe has amply and honorably done you 

God bless you, and ever believe me, dear Sir, 

Yours most truly, 


From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C. 

'Trident,' ce 9 fevrier 1828. 


J'ai envoy e 1' 'Iphigenie' et un brick devant Navarin, pour 
empecher des vivres d'y arriver; mais les petits bateaux 
ioniens font ce trafic plus facilement ; les Presidens pourraient 
peut-etre y mettre obstacle. 

Sir E. C. to the President and the Members of the Legislative 
Body of the Greek Government. 

I1.B.M. ship ' Talbot/ at Malta : February 11, 1828. 
GENTLEMEN, I have had the honour of receiving your 
letter of November 30, 1827, in which you request an exten- 
sion of the limits fixed upon as the range for the Greek 
cruisers, and in which you point out how necessary it is to 
make allowance for the present condition of the Greek people. 
It is well to claim every consideration for errors committed 
by a people so situated ; but the misconduct of the persons 
forming your Provisional Government towards the Powers 
which have allied themselves for the disinterested purpose of 
effecting the welfare of their countrymen, admits of no excuse 
whatever allows not of the least palliation. Greek corsairs 
under the signature of Mr. Glaraki,the secretary to the Pro- 
visional Government, instead of acting against the Ottoman 
forces, have interrupted and plundered our vessels pursuing 
regular and lawful commerce, even on the coast of Malta and 
Sicily. Our vessels so seized and so plundered have been 
declared lawful prizes by a tribunal not guided by law or 
equity and nominated by the same Provisional Government 
whose members share a twentieth part of the booty, whilst 
pirates and the owners of the pirate vessels are suffered to 
continue ther depredations unpunished. Seeing, therefore, 
that little good was to be expected from the Greek armed 
vessels, under such circumstances it became the duty of the 
admirals commanding the Allied squadrons to limit as much 
as possible their power to do mischief. I have thought it 

* NOTE BY SIR E. C. UPON THE LETTER. 'His Royal Highness told Sir 
John Gore he objected strongly to the word " untoward," E. C.' 


right to say this much, Gentlemen, in explanation. With 
regard to the required extension of the limits, I am. sure it 
will give great pleasure to my colleagues and myself to find 
ourselves enabled by the more regular proceedings of the 
Greek vessels of war, to attend to your wishes in that and 
in every other respect. If, therefore, the Count Capodistrias 
should assume the presidency, I shall readily propose to my 
colleagues to take the subject into their consideration ; and 
in the meantime I can venture to assure you that they will 
not deal harshly with any of your vessels which may be 
honestly communicating with Greek troops in the parts you 
mention even beyond the prescribed limitation. 

However, Gentlemen, if Count Capodistrias should unfor- 
tunately despair of bringing the Greek people into those 
habits of regularity and social order which alone can obtain 
their admission into the great compact of civil society, and 
you should continue to the members of your present Provi- 
sional Government the power which they have so disgrace- 
fully abused, I must warn you that I shall not cease to act 
upon the principle that the more their conduct is kept under 
restraint the better for the people over whom they hold au- 
thority. I am, &c., 


Captain Hamilton, in H.M.'s ship 'Cambrian,' was on 
his way to England, after an arduous service of six 
years on the coasts of Greece and in the Levant. He 
had orders to call at Carabusa* for the purpose of as- 
sisting in the attack and destruction of the pirate 
vessels. These vessels at anchor could be reached by 
the fire of ships passing along the outer side of the 
dangerous reef of rocks forming the small harbour. 
The 'Isis' and 'Cambrian' therefore stood in under 
sail, giving their fire as they passed ; but on tacking 
to stand out, the two ships ran foul of each other : 
the ' Cambrian' was thus thrown upon the reef. Every 
effort was made to move her, but without success ; 
she went to pieces on the rocks, and it may well be 
said that the 'Cambrian' died in the service of that 
country which had so long benefited by the humanity, 
the energy, and the discretion of her commander, Capt. 
Gawen Hamilton. W. J. C. 

* Carabusa or Grabusa, 


From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

'Talbot,' at Malta: February 13, 1828.* 

SIR, The accompanying documents, whilst they make 
known to his Eoyal Highness the Lord High Admiral the 
destruction of eleven pirate vessels at Carabusa, will also 
inform him of the unfortunate but accidental wreck of the 
'Cambrian' in the operation. However lamentable the ter- 
mination of the career of a ship remarkable for a long course 
of important duties, I consider it a source of particular gra- 
tulation that our country may still benefit by the future 
services of her distinguished captain, and that of the officers 
and crew who have been trained under his example. 

The whole arrangement, as well as the execution of this 
enterprise, does great credit to Commodore Sir Thomas 
Staines and the officers and men employed in it. 

I trust that its taking place upon the arrival of Count 
Capodistrias will facilitate his turning the Greek armed 
vessels to better account than heretofore, and leading the 
inhabitants of the coast to re-establish commercial inter- 
course with each other. Amongst the vessels employed on 
this occasion, his Eoyal Highness will observe that the 
' Zebra ' was conducted by Commander Cotton with his usual 
devotion to the duties of his station. His assistance of the 
' Cambrian' was the last act of his zealous exertion. He was 
shortly afterwards seized with a brain fever, of which he 
died on the night of the llth inst. 

I have, &c., 


From Captain Gawen Hamilton to Sir E. C. 

Malta : February 12, 1828.t 

DEAR, SIR, I had little idea, when I wrote to you from 
Cerigo, that my next letter was to be from a strange 
ship, with the painful intelligence of the total loss of the 
' Cambrian' off Grabusa. I was to have left the station 
that night, and indeed went on board the Commodore to 
take leave, when he informed me that it was his intention 
to pass along the reef in succession, and fire on the ship- 
ping. I will not at present enter into particulars, indeed, 
could not, except as to what relates to myself. I had longed, 
with presentiment of misfortune, to leave the Archipelago ; 
but the less I agreed with the opinion of my superior, the 

* Received April 1. t Received same day at Malta. 


more I felt it a duty to second by every means whatever lie 
thought proper to do. This feeling I expressed to Captain 
Parker in a private letter, when I begged provisions to be 
sent to enable me to go off Grabusa. 

Nothing could be finer than the conduct of my ship's 
company. They worked as silently, as well, in a ship beating 
heavily on a rock and every instant in expectation of her 
going over, in a dark and tempestuous night, as they ever 
did in presence of an admiral. The squadron did all they 
could for us ; Bridgman ran down on our weather beam, and 
brought up in a dangerous situation with two anchors. He 
then came to me ; nor could I by entreaties or orders engage 
him to leave the ship until my simple duty was performed. 
No lives were lost ; for which I am most thankful to God. 
The masts went in time to prevent the ship from going 
further than her beam. Cotton also remained with me to 
the last. I will hasten to finish these heart-rending details, 
his reason is gone. . . My tears will not allow me to dwell 
on this subject. 

I am, dear Sir, 

Yours faithfully, 


Sir E. C. to Captain Sir Thomas Staines. 

Malta : February 12, 1828. 

The ' Eattlesnake ' gave me your letters about Carabusa 
this morning, and the ' Zebra' has brought in the dead body of 
poor Cotton this afternoon he died last night. This is a 
sad case; and the loss of the ' Cambrian' is certainly a very 
lamentable event. We must, however, look to the other side 
of the picture, and feel rejoiced at the destruction of the nest 
of pirates which have so long outraged humanity. The vessels 
which you have sent with some of the c Cambrian's ' crew, will 
not be released, you may depend upon it. Their coming in 
here does not prevent our destroying them, according to Lord 
Bathurst, and the order of Sir H. Neale grounded on it. 

From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta: February 20, 1828. 

SIR, Although it does not become me to notice the re- 
ports that are generated by the self-interest of people in this 
part of the world, even when they apply to me individually, 
I feel it right to counteract such as may be detrimental to 
the public service on which I am employed. I hear that it 


has been industriously circulated at Smyrna, that Admiral 
De Rigny has disavowed being a willing party to the Allied 
fleet being taken into the harbour of Navarin. I have no 
wish to shrink from, my full share of that measure ; and 
thinking of it as I still do, and as I am persuaded even those 
who cavil at it will do by-and-bye, I would gladly take the 
whole upon myself, as I should necessarily have done if the 
whole fleet had been British. But it is due to my colleague 
to show, that he acted on that occasion with as much can- 
dour and sincerity as he did with judgment and bravery in 
the battle which followed it. I had fully considered the 
subject, and made up my mind on the absolute necessity of 
this measure, when Admiral De Rigny himself upon coining 
into the ( Asia's ' cabin threw out the suggestion ; and after 
discussing it more fully together, I sent for Count De Heiden, 
and the determination was fully made. Thus your Royal 
Highness has the whole account of this affair, and will, I 
trust, feel as much satisfied as I am of Admiral De Rigny 's 
uprightness on the occasion. He is much more likely to 
have taken the credit of originating the measure. But as a 
specimen of the sincerity with which he is guided in his con- 
duct towards me, I enclose an extract from a letter which I 
have lately received from him, which I think it will be agree- 
able to your Royal Highness to read. 

Your very faithful and obedient servant, 


Sir E. C. to Hon. Captain Maude, H.M.8. ' Glasgow. 9 

1 Talbo t,' at Malta : March 2, 1828. 

SIE, I received your letters of February 2 and 8 by the 
' Oxta ' Russian brig of war yesterday. Although the 
Viceroy of Egypt has given you his word that the supplies 
mentioned in your letter are not destined for the Morea, I 
wish you to watch as narrowly as you can the movements of 
the force by which it is accompanied. And as my instruction 
of September 8, 1827, respecting such supplies, was confined 
to .frigates, I now enclose a general order which you will 
give out to any of the sloops with which you may communi- 
cate. In the event of supplies of this sort hereafter leaving 
the Turkish or Egyptian coasts, you will not only yourself 
endeavour to prevent their reaching their destination, but 
you will make the circumstance known to Commander Sir 
Thomas Staines, or the senior officer in the Levant, as 
speedily as possible. 

I am, &c., 



From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty.* 

1 Talbot,' at Malta : February 5, 1828.t 

SIR, I have the honour of placing before H.R.H. the 
Lord High Admiral the copy of a letter from Vice- Admiral 
le Chevalier De Rigny to the French Minister of Marine. J 
I feel strongly the justice of my colleague's observation that 
it would have been better that the Ambassadors should have 
given us the benefit of their advice and opinions, if not their 
instructions, before they determined on separating so entirely 
from each other as well as from the scene of action ; and I 
could also have wished that we should have been informed of 
the tone in which they announced the effect of the battle of 
Navarin to the Porte, as well as the cause to which they 
attributed it. H.R.H. will not fail to observe the difficulty 
in which we are placed by this absence of instructions at a 
moment when such aid appears to be more than ever re- 
quisite. Looking to the doubts which have been evinced by 
the ' Queries ' put to me by Earl Dudley as to the pro- 
priety of my conduct when acting, as I did then, and do still, 
firmly believe, in the full spirit of the Treaty and according 
to my instructions emanating from it, I am. not desirous of 
exceeding the bounds of my prescribed duty. But the gene- 
rous confidence which I have met with from H.R.H. induces 
me nevertheless to submit such opinions for his consideration 
as may appear to me useful to the great object of establish- 
ing peace in the Levant and restoring commerce to its natural 
course. In the absence, then, of the above-mentioned infor- 
mation, I do not hesitate saying, that I think satisfaction 
should have been immediately demanded for the insult offered 
to our flags and the injury done to the fleet on that occasion. 
Under a conviction that such a measure would have induced 
the Sultan to accede to the mediation, I am led to conclude 
by his present resistance that the Ambassadors acted diffe- 
rently. Be that as it may, in order now to bring the Porte 
to assent to the object of the Treaty, and to put an end at 
once to the state of discontent and irritation in which the 
Sultan seems disposed to indulge, I beg leave to submit to 
H.R.H. my opinion, that we should immediately adopt as 
strict a blockade as possible of all the Ottoman ports. I do 

* NOTE BY SIR E. C. ON THE LETTER. ' No answer was ever made either 
by the Foreign Office or the Admiralty to the proposals or the request for 
instructions contained in this letter.' 

j Acknowledged April 3. 

t NOTE BY SIR E. C. ON THE LETTER. ' This letter was sent to the 
Cabinet without loss of time, as mentioned in the Duke of Clarence's letter 
of March 2.' 


not agree with Admiral De Rigny in excluding Smyrna. I 
observed nothing like British feeling in the merchants of 
that place, even before the signature of the Treaty ; and I 
am convinced that those who now remain there, whether 
nominally French or English, will find their interest in be- 
coming decidedly Turkish, thereby obtaining the exclusive 
privileges which will be given to them and others being no 
parties to the object of the Allies and forwarding the views 
of the Porte. Neither would I exclude Alexandria, unless 
the Hon. Colonel Cradock should be more successful in his 
mission than I am prepared to expect. For upon these 
places no doubt the Sultan mainly relies for those resources 
which enable him to persevere in his present resistance, and 
in his probable intention of letting things continue on their 
present discordant footing. Deprived of them he must give 
way at once ; and as his irritation will then not have been of 
long duration, so will it require but a short period to recon- 
cile him to a new arrangement of which he will shortly feel 
the pecuniary and permanent benefit. 

As to the question of piracy, I certainly am not quite as 
much of my colleague's opinion as he seems to imagine owing 
perhaps to not having expressed any dissent when we have 
cursorily touched on the subject. I have found it impor- 
tant on some occasions to lead him from his own to my 
sentiments, when it appeared to me that such change was 
for the good of the service we had jointly to perform ; and I 
have therefore at all times avoided showing a discordance of 
opinion when not absolutely called for. Perhaps his desire 
oi' promoting the interests of Catholic Syra induces him to 
think that place better for general purposes than it appears 
to me to be. The port itself is objectionable for vessels of 
war; and I think that all such tribunals as he refers to 
should be at the seat of government or at the port most 
contiguous to it. But under the present circumstances it 
is right that measures of this sort, and indeed all others 
referring to the conduct of the Greeks, should be concerted 
in the first instance with Count Capodistrias, for I am per- 
suaded he will cordially join us in putting down a system 
which must impede, in every step he may take, his progress 
towards establishing anything like social order in the dis- 
tracted country over which he is invited to preside. 

I have, &c., 

P.S. Vice-Admiral Count de Heiden having favoured me 
with his remarks on the propositions of Vice- Admiral Che- 


valier De Rigny, I have the honour of adding them also for 
the information of H.E.H. the Lord High Admiral. 

It is with much pleasure that I insert this spontaneous 
expression of Admiral De Rigny 's manly determination 
to stand by his leader and colleague. In behalf of his 
friend he certainly shows no hesitation, no vacillation 
of purpose ; and the absence of all parade about it 
enhances the value of the act itself. 

From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C.* 

1 Trident/ ce 9 Janvier 1828. 

La meine gazette dit que vous etes rappele a Londres. 
S'il en etait ainsi, je demanderais mon rappel, et j'irais aussi 
a Londres partager avec vous une responsabilite commune. 
Je prepare, en attendant, quelques pages a ce sujet, et que je 
vous communiquerais d'avance, si 1'occasion venait de les 

Agreez la nouvelle assurance de mes sentimens tres-de- 
voues, et mes VCBUX pour cette nouvelle annee. 


From Sir E. G. to his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence. 


Malta : February 26, 1828. 
SlR, . . . 

I cannot resist the pleasure of adverting to the assur- 
ance which Sir John Gore has given mef of your Royal 
Highness being fully satisfied with my answers to the queries 
with which he was charged. I am, and shall ever continue 
to be, most anxious to secure your Royal Highness's appro- 
bation ; not, as I confidently believe, with reference to any 
worldly advantage to myself, but because I am sure I shall not 
have it without being entitled to it. I well know that, placed 
as I am, I must continue liable to the censure and abuse of 
politicians, as may best suit their party purposes. I will 
not say I am indifferent to such censure ; nor can I deny 
that certain feelings of indignation do occasionally arise in 
my breast, when I read that the flag which I have strenuously 
endeavoured to uphold has been tarnished in my hands. But 
the conviction that truth must in the end prevail over mis- 
representation, and that I serve under the just protection 
of your Royal Highness, restores my submission, and excites 

* Received February 18, sent to Admiralty February 20. 
t Referring to Sir John Gore's letter of January 6, 1828. 


fresh desire in me to pursue with, devotion the arduous 

duties with which I am entrusted. I understand that 

joined with in thinking that Colonel Cradock's bring- 
ing back our letter to Ibrahim 'overthrew all Sir John Gore's 
report, &c.' I lament, on my brother officer's own account, 
that he should not have found this merely political objection 
removed by the explanation of the other chiefs having before 
refused to receive such communications. As to Lord Dudley's 
enquiry * why I anchored the ships so near the Turkish line,' 
I could answer his lordship effectually by telling him it was 
to deter them from meditated hostility on their part, by that 
bold countenance when supported by ten sail of the line 
which the Government deemed ample for the purpose, which 
his lordship -admired so much when I was opposed to nearly 
the same force off Patras with a mere tithe of the number. 
It is difficult, at such a distance, to combat objections such 
as these. I trust I have fully answered all the doubts openly 
expressed ; and I feel myself capable of combating all ob- 
jections to my proceedings from first to last, which are fairly 
put to me, come from whom they may. But I cannot help 
saying to your Royal Highness, that I think it somewhat unfair 
that persons seeming to have authority, should let slip doubts 
and insinuations which give rise to torrents of coarse abuse 
on the part of public writers, hardly admissible in describing 

acknowledged criminality. In Magazine I am depicted 

as a disgrace to his Majesty's service, quoting as a fact a 

statement in the which was fabricated for mere party 

purpose. Amongst the papers which accompany my official 
letters there is one which contains two autograph passages of 
the Sultan : Count Capodistrias and others consider one of 
these as establishing the acknowledgment of the Turks being 
the aggressors on the 20th of October. To me the ' trahison ' 
appears to refer particularly to the fire-vessel not merely 
having begun the action, but having begun it at a wrong 
moment instead of waiting until midnight. But at all events, 
when this is coupled with the admission of the Viceroy of 
Egypt, that the Sultan had ordered Ibrahim to use force in 
resistance of the Allies, I think there remains no doubt of the 
impossibility on my part of avoiding hostilities. I regret 
being thus led on to occupy so much of the valuable time 
of your Royal Highness in nay desire to show that I am 
not unworthy the kindness of which I am most sensible; 
but I rely upon a further extension of that kindness, in 
attributing it to the real motive by which I am actuated. 

I have, &c., 


P 2 


Sir E. C to His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence. 

1 Talbot,' at Malta : February 26, 1828. 

SIR, I received the accompanying documents yesterday 
from Count Capodistrias. I have shown the originals in 
the Turkish language to Monsieur Chabert, late first drago- 
man to the English embassy, and he has verified the hand- 
writing and signature of the letters which accompanied the 
protocol, &c. As this protocol does not appear to have been 
transmitted by any other means, and as it may give a more 
complete insight into the disposition of the Ottoman Porte 
than has yet reached our Government, I propose sending it 
by way of Marseilles immediately ; and as His Majesty's 
Ministers may not wish it to be made public, I have thought 
it best to address it to your Royal Highness personally. I 
beg leave also to draw your Royal Highness's particular 
attention to the state of Greece as depicted by Count Capo- 
distrias. It is evident that the most effectual, as well as, 
eventually, the most economical way of carrying into effect 
that part of the Treaty of 6th July last which relates to 
Greece itself, will be the enabling the President to establish 
a sufficient force by land and sea to maintain his authority 
against the Primate and Capitani, by whom all the resources 
of the country are now grasped for their own corrupt pur- 
poses. If the sum now required by the Count should be 
granted to him, whilst there is an enthusiastic desire to 
support his authority, and whilst we are engaged in a united 
effort to put down piracy and to turn the minds of the people 
towards regular commercial intercourse, he will be enabled, 
in all probability, to collect a revenue more than sufficient to 
cover the requisite expenditure. 

I cannot help observing to your Royal Highness on the 
importance of assisting Count Capodistrias at this moment 
of his first entering upon his arduous office, and when he is 
cordially endeavouring to establish strong measures for the 
security of commerce in the Levant. I have reason to believe 
that piracy is practised to a great extent by renegadoes of 
other nations in the character of Greeks and under the Greek 
flag. If so, we may reasonably infer that as its success with 
those in whom it originated led others to follow their example, 
so the suppression of it among the Greeks will lead to a 
discontinuance of it by the people of other nations. The 
finances of the Sultan do not at present appear to be in a 
very flourishing state ; and so long as he continues to resist 
the Treaty they must continue to deteriorate. But the 


contest of expense now carried on by the Allies may, by a 
well-timed support of the arrangements meditated and pro- 
mulgated by the President, be shortly transferred to the 
Greek Government. For the revenue of Greece, relieved from 
the oppression of the Turks and of their own still more un- 
principled chiefs, may be justly expected to increase in pro- 
portion as that of their opponents is diminished. I am 
therefore induced respectfully to submit my opinion, that 
compliance with the urgent request of Count Capodistrias 
for present pecuniary assistance, would facilitate the object 
of the Allied Powers declared by the Treaty of London. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : February 28, 1828. 

If His Majesty's Government should accede to the request 
made by Capodistrias for pecuniary assistance, I am per- 
suaded they will find it the cheapest mode of executing the 
Treaty, and of suppressing piracy. Without money to 
create an immediate armed support of his authority whilst 
the enthusiasm prevails, the Capitani will again make head, 
by means of that intrigue which has before been successful 
and which the agents of the Porte will assist ; and if we also 
supinely allow the Sultan to carry on his commercial com- 
munications under the deception of the Austrian flag, there 
will be no end to the present disturbed state of affairs. I 
have been wrong in my expectation that the Porte would 
succumb after the battle of Navarin ; but I certainly reckoned 
on some decisive measures being adopted to enforce it. I 
should inform your Royal Highness that Mr. S. Canning 
told Captain Hamilton that the battle made no difference as 
to the Ambassadors leaving Constantinople; on the con- 
trary, that their observations were never so well attended 
to as after that news was received. I was not aware, more- 
over, until lately, of a religious feeling in the Turks against 
surrendering any part of their possessions. Their Koran 
seems only to admit of their having it taken from them by 
force. In fact, I believe that to this day they carry on the 
farce of permitting Christian governments to perform their 
functions, as a mere indulgence of their Sultan. And when 
certain British senators are dwelling upon the destruction 
of human life by the battle of Navarin, and lauding the 
tender government of this said Sultan, they should be re- 


minded of his having ordered the massacre of 150,000 of his 
subjects whom he thought liable to oppose his new system, 
besides the cold-blooded destruction of 30,000 at Scio. I 
enclose an account of the forces under Ibrahim Pacha-, pro- 
cured by Captain Hamilton ; but I cannot rely upon its cor- 
rectness. There cannot be a greater instance of cruelty than 
sending the ship of the line to founder with such a load of 
wounded, &c., on board. 

I have, &c., 


From H.R.B. the Duke of Clarence to Sir E. C. 

Admiralty : April 1, 1828. 

DEAR SIR, I am to acknowledge your two letters of 26th 
and one of February 28, and various enclosures, most of 
which I have forwarded to Lord Dudley. The letters I of 
course keep to myself. 

Not being in the Cabinet, I must leave the policy of assist- 
ing Greece with money to the King's Ministers. 

I never expected the immediate or quiet submission of the 
Sultan, and, therefore, after the signature of the Treaty of 
London, I recommended to you to be fully prepared for the 

I can only repeat, your conduct before and in the action 
of Navarin appears to me correct and perfect. I consider 
this transaction as entirely over, and you ought to banish it 
from your mind, except the pleasant recollection of having 
done your duty ably. I cannot look into futurity, and must 
wait events. Negotiations must of necessity be going on, 
and I am confident you will obey the instructions you will 
receive from the King's confidential servants. 

I remain, dear Sir, 

Yours most truly, 


From Admiral t)e Rigny to Sir E. C. 

A Milo, 6 avril 1828. 

J'ai lu avec bien du plaisir ce qu'a dit au Parlement le 
Marquis de Lansdowne : toutes ces intrigues ministerielles 
ont du vous donner beaucoup d'ennuis ; mais je pense qu'elles 
sont jugees a leur valeur, et qu'il vous est facile, avec 1'appui 
du Due de Clarence et de vos amis au Parlement, de ne plus 
vous en inquieter. 


Je regrette quelquefois qu'on ne m'ait pas attaque dans 
nos chambres, pour que nous puissions combattre encore 

Attendons, puisqu'il le faut, ce qui sera decide; mais 
donnez-moi toujours votre opinion, pour le but commun, et 
dans les choses sur lesquelles je puis etre plus a 1'aise que 
vous pour agir. 

Votre tres-devoue 


From Captain Maude to Sir E. C. 

H.M.S. ' Glasgow,' Alexandria: February 6, 1828. 

MY DEAR SIR, I shall not apologise for troubling you 
with a few lines, because I know it will be satisfactory to you 
to hear that the Pacha has received me most graciously, and, 
as you had anticipated, with greater marks of respect than 
ever. He condescended to invite me to dine with him the 
day on which I paid my first visit. On the 4th inst. I had 
a long interesting conversation with His Highness. The 
Navarin business he calls an unfortunate affair, the result of 
which he had anticipated fifteen days before the news of the 
battle reached him. He has heard that Colonel Cradock is 
on his way to this place, and concludes he is charged with a 
mission. He said, if he comes with another proposal to 
withdraw the Egyptian troops from the Morea, that it will 
not be in his power to comply with such a request. He does 
not quite assent to the Forte's political measures, but as a 
Turk he must unavoidably act in concert with the wishes of 
the Grand Seignior ; were he to do otherwise he would lose 
the reputation he has gained since he has been Viceroy of 
Egypt. I have, however, been told that, were he protected 
by the Allied Powers, something might be done to induce 
him to relinquish his command in the Morea. He is in great 
poverty, and seems quite sensible of his own weakness unless 
time be given him to re-establish his commerce, without 
which he is fully aware he cannot possibly exist. He says 
that the Porte will never agree to the terms of the Treaty 
without being compelled to it by force of arms, as it is con- 
trary to the Mahometan religion for the Government to give 
up their control over a subject or yield one inch of territory 
unless driven to do so by superior force. He made allusions 
to the total impossibility of the Greeks governing themselves, 
and said as much, that, could the Porte be assured the Allies 
would make themselves responsible for the good conduct of 
the Government, less objection would be raised against the 


Treaty of London. He is manifestly doing all in his power, 
by erecting batteries and bringing troops from Cairo, to pro- 
tect himself against any sudden invasion. On hearing that 
Colonel Cradock had actually embarked for Alexandria, I was 
induced to request His Highness to postpone his journey to 
Cairo ; he has consented to remain on the spot until the 
* Galatea's' arrival. 

I have the honour, &c., 




THE following letters give information as to Ibrahim 
Pacha in the Morea, and Mehemet Ali at Alexandria; 
and the attempt made to persuade them to a compliance 
with the Treaty* 

From Captain W. J. (7* to Mr. Betliell* in England. 

H.M.S. ' Galatea,' Zante : January 28, 1828. 

DEAE UNCLE, Orders came out from England to send 
Cradock to Alexandria, to see what effect peaceable conversa- 
tion would have with Mehemet Ali, in inducing him to remain 
neutral in regard to the Greek war ; at the same time Sir 
Frederick Adam is hourly expected here, in order to go to 
Ibrahim Pacha, to see what his sentiments are on this head. 
On the 25th we were off Navarin to me, and many others, of 
course, a most interesting place. A boat Was sent in, in 
which I was a passenger. We passed the forts, which we 
found all ready with their ramrods and spunges out, &c. 
We went into a kind of landing-place, where soon were col- 
lected groups of Turks and others, and finding Sir F. Adam 
was not there, we had little more to say. Ibrahim was at 
Modon with the troops, which seem all to have left Navarin. 
There is an old line-of-battle ship, the ' Asia's J opponent, 
brought up near the town, and forming a kind of floating 
battery close to the others. She is tremendously knocked 
about, with a large hole amidships, and her bows riddled, with 
no masts standing. An Austrian merchant schooner, a cor- 
vette, ashore, wreck from the action, and a Turkish brig at 
the entrance of the harbour, with several Ionian vessels, 
small craft, was all that was to be seen, except now and then 
a mast sticking up out of the water. The said Navarin is, 
however, a most magnificent harbour and bay, with room 
enough for any number of fleets, and capable of being made 
very strong. From Navarin we worked up against the N. W. 
wind to Zante, where we anchored yesterday. Sir Frederick 
Adam is expected in ' Wolf ' every hour ; and I hope we all go 

* Sir E. C.'s brother. 


together to Ibrahim at Modon. I then go on with Cradock in 
* Galatea ' to Alexandria. Ibrahim seems to have turned civil 
to us. The packet boat to Cerigo was taken by a vessel from 
Modon, and plundered. Ibrahim, on hearing of its being our 
boat, sent for the plunderer, caused him to give up everything, 
and then had the fellow's head cut off. The army of the Turks 
is certainly supplied with provisions by the Ionian boats from 
Zante, Cefalonia, Corfu, &c. A great profit to the islands, 
and consequently winked at by their Governments. I do not 
believe there is much hope of the success of this mission to 
Alexandria ; it is probable they will both say that they are 
not free agents. Then, I suppose, at last must come the only 
effective means of bringing the Pacha of Egypt to reason 
a blockade of Alexandria. Four frigates, about 8 corvettes, 
and 9 or 10 brigs-of-war, arrived at Alexandria from Navarin 
about three weeks ago. Several brigs and corvettes have 
been collected since the action, from different parts, Turkish 
possessions in the Morea. The frigates all much damaged ; 
a line-of-battle ship that was in the action, having some of 
her shot-holes only stopped with canvas, sailed in company, 
but was lost sight of in a gale of wind, and supposed to be 
gone down as she had not arrived at Alexandria some time 
afterwards. In case of war with the Porte, the Pacha of 
Egypt is to have (great object of his ambition) the two 
additional Pachalicks of Syria and Damascus. 

Your affectionate 

W. J. C. 

From Captain W. J. C. to Mr. Bethell 

Modon: February 2, 1828. 

DEAE UNCLE, On the 30th we sailed for Navarin, which 
we looked into, having in company the ' Wolf sloop, ' Weazle' 
brig, and a Eussian brig ; there was nothing there but an 
Austrian merchant vessel, and a Turkish merchant brig. 
The ' Asia's ' opponent was brought up from the other end 
of the bay, and anchored close to the town as an additional 
means of defence. She was terribly cut up in her hull, and 
all her masts gone. We got to this place the day before 
yesterday, sent a message requesting an interview with 
Ibrahim, which was appointed for ten o'clock yesterday. 
Accordingly, the Lord High Commissioner and his two 
aides-de-camp (one being myself, pro tern.), with a variety of 
captains and others, walked up from the shore, escorted by 


a guard of honour of Egyptians with black faces and all 
brickdust- coloured clothes, looking just like reddish monkeys. 
They had all arms, however, and a drum and a fife besides ; 
this was our attendant music up to the small house in which 
Ibrahim resides. The town of Modon is small, but has a 
port and a small mole ; the fort runs towards the sea, and 
forms a small anchorage for boats; behind the town rises 
an ascent, on the top of which is a small wooden-built octagon 
dignified by the name of the Kiosk, where the said chief 
resides, from whence he overlooks his camp on the declivity 
of the hill on each side of him to the north and south. We 
had two guardians to prevent anyone touching us and our 
touching anyone, in order to be kept out of quarantine. We 
were all introduced to Ibrahim ; I was not by name, but as 
aide-de-camp to Sir F. A. There was nothing in the room but 
a sofa on which he sat on his velvet carpet, apparently with 
no legs ; a butcher-like fellow with a red cap on, very much 
marked with the small-pox, with a cunning look about his 
eye, but of the most ordinary appearance altogether. He 
was, as he always is, very plainly dressed. When they 
wished to proceed to business, I was sorry to find we were all 
turned out but Sir Frederick Adam, his private secretary, 
and Sir C. Sullivan. Sir Frederick's object was to persuade 
him to evacuate the Morea, or at all events to be willing to 
do so. Ibrahim at first said that he was merely, as his father, a 
general in the service of the Porte ; but after a long conver- 
sation of two hours, the result was that he would obey any 
order that he might receive from his father Mehemet Ali at 
Alexandria. This is something, though I am afraid not 
much, gained. He sends a letter to his father by us to-day, 
which most probably contains the contrary of what he has 
said to Sir F. There is no actual want in the camp here ; 
we saw geese and turkeys going about ; these might be 
Ibrahim's, but there were also plenty of dogs and some horses, 
which shows they are not actually starving. In the morning 
there was a grand review (Friday being their Sunday) on the 
beach ; we could see it pretty well, though some way off, 
from the ships. Having found out when on shore that all 
the troops he had in his camp at Modon were out, we made 
their numbers amount to between 5,000 and 7,000 men. They 
have all musquets, and are drilled in the European way. 
They formed columns and lines; and if things are to be 
taken by comparison, they are beavitiful compared to any 
regular force that the Greeks have ; but if compared to any 
European nation, very lamentable by way of troops. The 
cavalry was at Calamata ; I do not suppose above 1,000 or 


1,500 ; as they told us, 10,000; but having asserted that their 
infantry present here was 30,000, and it is only 6,000, we 
may well deduct from their other account. Arbro, the inter- 
preter, began the subject of Patras with Sir F. Adam again, 
saying that it was not right in the English Admiral calling 
his Highness a man who had broken his word of honour, &c., 
&c., but was stopped by Sir F. Adam saying, that whatever 
his personal respect and friendship might be towards his 
Highness, he could allow no one, ' qui que ce soit,' to cast 
imputations against the perfect good faith and honour which 
governed the conduct of a British Admiral and Commander- 
in-chief, and moreover a particular private friend of his ; 
that the subject was now past, and one for history ; that 
Colonel Cradock, who was present on board the ' Asia ' 
' quand vous, Mr. Arbro, avez eu la conversation a ce sujet 
avec PAmiral Codrington,' was then on board H.M.S. 
* Galatea,' and Mr. Arbro must know as well as he (Sir F. 
Adam) the result of that conversation. This was what is 
called clapping a stopper on his mouth. A grand salute was 
fired for Sir F. Adam by all the ships when he landed. The 
Turkish fort also saluted with the same number of guns, 19, 
two of which (to seaward, luckily) were shotted. 

While the conference was going on we wandered about, 
accompanied by one or two Corsicans who had come to teach 
the troops French drilling ; they would not let us go into the 
fort without permission, which we did not ask, and they 
were also rather jealous of our getting near their camp. I 
went into one or two of the officers' houses, who were very 
civil, giving us coffee, &c The Pacha of Modon is a good- 
looking man, who was also very civil to us. His was much 
the most pleasing expression of any we saw there. The 
colonels of regiments, supposed to be 4,000 each, were pre- 
sented to Sir Frederick, very handsomely dressed and in 
uniform. Sir Frederick Adam had some private information 
ot Ibrahim wishing to leave the Morea, which was the cause 
of orders from home to have the interview. I believe the 
best foundation for this idea is that he has sent his harem to 
Egypt. Ibrahim's letter is now on board, and with a fair wind 
we shall be off to-day for Carabusa, and then Alexandria. 
From thence, after Cradock has done his business, in about 
a week come back to Corfu, and thence to Malta. 




From Captain W. J. G. to Mr. Bethell. 

Alexandria : February 12, 1828. 

DEAR UNCLE, Cradock had his conference yesterday 
morning with the Pacha of Egypt. The result is he must 
wait until he hears from Constantinople the determination 
of the Porte with regard to the proposed neutrality on his 
part. He said that he could not possibly take such a step 
without the permission of the Porte : it would be an actual 
declaration of independence. The Tartar, with his despatch, 
goes to-morrow ; he has pressed on the Porte the necessity 
of not exposing his resources and army to destruction. 
Cradock is to be here, or wait here, for the answer to arrive 
in thirty days. I was introduced to Mehemet Ali as the son of 
the Admiral ; he had known of our coming and was not at 
all surprised, and perfectly gentleman-like. He is fifty-seven 
years old, with rather an agreeable countenance, and a quick 
intelligent eye. There are four frigates, seven corvettes, and 
twenty-four brigs of war here, the greatest part of which are 
ready for use ; and this morning sailed part of a convoy 
with corn for Candia,* but which will find its way to the 

From Captain W. /. G. to Mr. Bethell. 

Malta (in quarantine) : April 8, 1828. 

MY DEAR UNCLE, You will have received some account 
from Alexandria. The answer of the Pacha to Cradock's 
mission is nothing decided, as indeed might be easily fore- 
seen. A kind of temptation to independence is offered to a 
governor by wishing him to do an act of disobedience to his 
Government ; no guarantee is held out in case he draws 
upon himself the anger of the Porte, but plenty of threats, 
unsupported by any appearance of force, are loaded upon 
him to oblige him to commit the said act of rebellion ; how 
could anyone think the Pacha fool enough to do what was 
desired of him now, when he knows that it would always be 
time enough when those threats of blockade. &c., were being 
put into execution? Why commit himself with the Porte 
(who, in case of his willing withdrawal of his troops from the 
Morea, would declare him a rebel) when he has no offer of 
support or mediation, against a war which would be carried 
on against him P The Pacha is no fool ; he has also the fate 
of Ali Pacha before him. The Sultan's declaration of a man 

* Can dia was a Turkish island, and excluded from the operations of the 


being a traitor, has the Pope's power of excommunication of 
olden time against a Catholic ; it then becomes a duty in any 

food Mussulman to do all he can to destroy him, and in 
gypt such people would not be found wanting, nor others 
who would be glad of it to try for his place. The Pacha 
knows well enough that, were an army to be sent from 
Turkey to Egypt to punish him for an act of independence, 
England would not send an army to stop it. There is no 
doubt that Ibrahim would be very glad to quit the Morea, 
either to return to Alexandria or to march into Roumelia to 
join the army under the Seraschier Pacha. Various inter- 
ceptions of despatches from Constantinople to Ibrahim show 
this ; Mehemet Ali, however, ordered him to remain where 
he was, and thus obtained very great credit for zeal with the 
Porte. The Porte stipulated to send him provisions of which 
he was in much want, from Albania, and Patras, and then 
by sea. Mehemet Ali, no doubt, must see that by Ibra- 
him's leaving the Morea he would do much towards strength- 
ening the independence of Greece; but I should think 
another reason might have its effect on him that of seeing 
his troops, and indeed his best troops, removed to a greater 
distance from him, and more under the eye of the Porte. 
This feeling must also have had its weight in producing so 
disinterested an order as that conveyed to Ibrahim. If 
Government would but give decided instructions as to a 
blockade of the Morea, his army could not then remain at 
Modon ; and, if he goes to Bourne! ia, it seems to me an 
immense point gained, if the Treaty of July 6 is really to be 
carried into effect in spirit as well as wording. The result 
of Cradock's mission is a verbal answer from the Pacha's 
confidential interpreter at Alexandria to this effect : 'That 
if the Morea is blockaded, a line of communication for the 
forwarding convoys of provisions will be established from 
Albania and Patras down to Athens ; that Ibrahim's army 
will thus be well supplied with all necessaries; that, this 
being the case, it would be much to the advantage of the 
Allies that he should be permitted to receive provisions by 
sea at Navarin or Modon.' In short, this seems something 
like laughing at us ; and indeed it is not without reason 
that he might do so, if our actions were judged by this last 
mission. I do not think the Pacha will ever declare himself 
independent of the Porte, even if obliged by circumstances 
to do anything contrary to the wishes of his Government. 
I think he would take any opportunity of making the amende 
rather than be declared a rebel. Besides, he has actually all 
the independence he can wish, everything except the name, 


and latterly the necessity of the expense of the Greek war. 
When anything disagreeable comes to him he refers to his 
being dependent on the Porte, &c., &c.; but when he chooses 
does what he likes. In commercial treaties the same ; the 
Porte is the scapegoat for disagreeable arrangements, and he 
either grants them or refuses them at his own convenience 
in this manner. He is certainly a very clever man; has 
overcome all the prejudices which a Turk imbibes from his 
childhood ; has established schools for other branches of 
knowledge than the Koran, manufactures of cotton and silk, 
foundry of cannon, and manufacture of small arms : these 
are all at Cairo, the superintendents are generally French, 
the workmen all are Arabs. The said manufactures are, 
however, a great expense to him, and do not return him any- 
thing ; but, in case of a war, he might perhaps derive advan- 
tage enough from them to compensate for their present 
expense. Yours, W. J. CODRTNGTON. 

From Sir E. C. to Count Capodistrias. 


Malta : March 3, 1828. 

MY DEAK COUNT, I am very much obliged to you for the 
intercepted correspondence to Ibrahim, copies of which I 
have sent to England with other documents mentioned in 
my public letter to you; they are very interesting to me, 
and I think will be so to our Lord High Admiral. I 
assure you I have strengthened your claim for some pe- 
cuniary assistance as much as I could ; feeling as I do its 
absolute necessity at the moment, and the great advantage 
which would be eventually, and indeed I may say speedily, 
derived from it. 1 am more than ever impressed with the 
ill effect of wasting the resources of Greece upon such expe- 
ditions as those of Scio and Candia. Had the expense of 
those measures been devoted to gaining ground in the Morea, 
you would soon have derived the revenue which that country 
is capable of producing. The mission of Colonel Cradock 
will not produce any result, as it appears to me. Neither the 
Viceroy nor his son Ibrahim will openly defy the Sultan's 
power ; and they will only hold out appearances of doing so 
to gain time. The Treaty has been laid before our Parliament, 
and by this time I dare say there has been a full discussion 
of its merits. The word untoward, which admits of more 
than one meaning, was introduced into the King's Speech 
as applied to the battle of Navarin ; and it brought out a 
discussion on my conduct, in which I had the praise of all 


sides, including the Ministers who used it. The French boast, 
with reason, of their king having avoided throwing any doubts 
on his approbation. I have given copies of the Turkish pro- 
tocol both to Count de Heiden and the Chevalier de Bigny. 
I regret that the affair of Carabusa was not executed according 
to your wishes. If you could assure us of the four vessels 
which came from thence with the crew of the ' Cambrian' being 
used for the Government, and that they could in no case return 
into the possession of those owners who, though concerned in 
the piracies, might claim them, I think we might find reason 
for placing them at your disposal. I shall be very glad to do 
so, if I can feel myself justified in it. 

Believe me, my dear Count, with great esteem. 
Your very faithful and obedient 


From Sir E. C. to H.E. Count Capodistrias, President of 
Greece, &c., &c., &c. 

'Talbot,' at Malta : March 3, 1828. 

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, I sincerely congratulate your Ex- 
cellency, I congratulate Greece, and I congratulate the allied 
friends of peace and commerce, on the enthusiasm with 
which you have been received and the facilities which you 
will derive therefrom for benefiting a whole people, whose 
future prosperity depends upon their obedience to the laws 
and regulations which you are about to promulgate. With- 
out pretending to have any personal attachment to a people 
to whom, until lately, I was a perfect stranger, it is natural 
that I, as an Englishman, should feel interested in the 
struggle of another nation for the attainment of that liberal 
form of government, and those wise institutions, which 
create the happiness with which my own country is blessed. 
But your Excellency and the Greek people have a much 
stronger security that I shall assist you to the utmost of my 
power, in the Treaty of July 6, 1827, and the orders and 
instructions emanating from, it, for the regulation of my own 
conduct. Eor by this Treaty it becomes my duty to my own 
country to endeavour, as far as in me lies, to establish that 
regular government in Greece, and those peaceful and in- 
dustrious habits in the Greek people, by which all surround- 
ing nations will benefit in common with themselves. I most 
fully agree with your Excellency in the necessity of your 
having at your disposal an army and a fleet regularly paid 
and provided for service. Under this impression I sent off 
immediately to England, by way of Marseilles, copies of your 


letters and other documents, accompanied by a despatch 
from myself to H.R.H. the Lord High Admiral, pointing out 
as forcibly as I was able the advantage of acceding to your 
request, as being, in my firm opinion, not only the most 
efficacious but the most economical way of obtaining the 
object of the three Allied Powers. It is right I should 
inform your Excellency that my office of Commander-in- 
Chief of His Majesty's naval forces gives me no authority 
for the employment of pecuniary assistance under any cir- 
cumstances whatever. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to H.E.H. the Dufce of Clarence. 

Malta: March 6, 1828. 

SIR, The packet yesterday brought me your Royal High- 
ness's letter of February 5. I have not only to thank Your 
Eoyal Highness for the King's Speech, which it contained, 
but for the kind observations which you have been pleased 
to add as to the effect of the Duke of Wellington's and other 
speeches to which it gave rise. As Lords Goderich and 
Lansdowne were in office when I executed those measures 
which have lately been so much scrutinised, their manly 
avowal of my having done my duty is particularly agreeable 
to me, and in my humble opinion no less creditable to them. 
I would fain hope that the Duke of Wellington, as well as 
some others still in office which they held before the late 
changes, are equally sincere in their praises. But it must 
be admitted that their speeches, when compared with those 
of the above two noble lords, appear to have been extracted 
from them by other considerations than mere justice to me. 
I am free to make these observations to you, Sir, because 
you yourself have taught me the value of well-timed appro- 
bation arising from just and generous feelings, and because 
your kindness has taught me to write to you without re- 
serve upon matters in which you are pleased to take an 
interest, and on which I have not, indeed I cannot have, 
anything whatever to conceal. The Duke of Wellington 
says that the chance of the battle leading to war made it 
* untoward.' Now, Mr. S. Canning says that it produced a 
marked attention of the Reis Effendi to his observations 
which he had not before met with ; and, also, that it did not 
at all hasten his demanding his passports on his coming 
away. By this it would appear to be a fortunate rather than 
an untoward event. But when His Grace takes the converse 
position, of the battle not having led to war, he slips away 
VOL. II. p 


from the evident conclusion that the event would no longer 
prove untoward, by substituting ' an impediment to the final 
amicable settlement of the question! ' I have adverted to the 
above speech, Sir, because it comes from the present Prime 
Minister, and because that Minister is the Duke of Wel- 

I beg pardon for having so far extended this subject, to 
your Royal Highness, who has acted so differently, in my 
wish to justify opinions which I had no choice in embracing. 
The words attributed to His Grace by the newspapers have 
forced this opinion upon me, in spite of my wish to think 

I have documents which show that the Porte had always 
expected and was fully prepared for a battle : and that under 
those preparations, aided by an endeavour to catch us off our 
guard, they were confident of success. The words of the 
Kiahya Bey, one of the oldest and highest esteemed members 
of the Divan, in conversation with a person whom he termed 
his friend, were : c Nous aurons la guerre, vous le croyez, et 
je le crois de merne. A Vheure qu'il est elle est peut-etre deja 
commencee ! ' 

This conversation took place on October 20, at the time 
the battle was actually raging. But the rest of his observa- 
tions were so interesting, as showing that predetermination 
on the part of the Turks which has been unjustly attributed 
to me, in defiance of my assertion, that I will trouble your 
Royal Highness with a little more of it. The Bey continued : 
' Mais, sachez en toute verite, que depuis pres de deux ans 
nous avons prevu cet evenement, et nous Pattendrons sans 
aucune inquietude. Le mal tombera sur ses auteurs. Nous 
sommes decides a courir toutes les chances. Jamais, au 
grand jamais, nous n'admettrons la moindre ingerance 
etrangere dans nos affaires internes, etc.' 

The whole of the confidential communication was in the 
same strain, and confirms the substance of that Hati Sherif 
(manifesto) which I sent your Eoyal Highness some time ago. 
Force, and force only, according to all appearances, can bring 
this matter to such a decision as the Treaty contemplates. 
Little of such means would have been required when the 
Sultan first learned of the destruction of that fleet which he 
had calculated on for defeating the object of the Allies. 

The longer we continue without adopting strong measures, 
the greater will be our difficulty and our expense^. I am 
persuaded that a little firmness and decision would settle the 
matter at once : in delay, I see dangers innumerable. 

I have, &c., 



From Sir E. C. to H.E. Count Capodistrias, President of G-reece. 

1 Talbot/ at Malta : March 3, 1828. 

SIB, I have the honour of enclosing for your Excellency's 
information a list of the force which was at Alexandria 011 
February 10, and also of the detachment which left that port 
ostensibly for Candia. Although the Viceroy declared it to be 
destined for that island only, your Excellency will see the pro- 
bability of the supplies which it carries reaching the Morea in 
smaller and foreign vessels, unless intercepted. Such cargoes 
would all be good prizes to Greek vessels of war, and their cap- 
ture would have the doubly good effect of relieving the Greeks 
and distressing their opponents at the same time. I call 
your attention to this because I am in some difficulty as to 
the propriety of English ships of war stopping Ionian boats 
from going to places not blockaded by a belligerent in regu- 
lar form. There were about fifty of these boats at Navarin 
and Modon, whilst Sir Frederick Adam was communicating 
with Ibrahim Pacha. But, however strong his desire to 
check such proceedings, he does not feel himself authorised 
to do so without instructions from England. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir Ft. C. to the Admiralty. 

< Talbot/ at Malta : March 10, 1828. 

SIR, Although the services of the ' Cambrian ' are well 
known to his Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, the 
unfortunate termination of those services has made it im- 
perative on me to request his Royal Highness's considera- 
tion of the enclosed documents. 

At a time when the agents of other Powers seemed to 
be doing their utmost to facilitate the reduction of the 
Greeks to their former state of degradation, Captain Hamil- 
ton, by a wise, an able, and enduring devotion to the strict 
neutrality avowed by Great Britain, established that superior 
respect for the Government and the nation which will not 
lose its impression under any fortunate change of circum- 
stances, and which will be felt in all our future arrange- 
ments with the Greek people. Strict and impartial in his 
decisions as to right and wrong in all cases of doubtful con- 
duct on the part of either of the belligerents, he has acquired 
the esteem and regard of both by his unbounded attention 
to humanity, whenever the sufferings of either in their in- 
human warfare gave him an opening for such interference. 

I have, &c. 



From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : March 9, 1828. 

SIR, I have put two private letters from Sir T. Staines 
into my last letter to your Royal Highness, which show the 
importance of the seizure of Grabusa, and the difficulties 
attending the operation. Count Capodistfrms (as he now 
writes his name), is labouring extremely to effect the desire 
of the Allies, and I cannot help regretting my inability to give 
him that pecuniary assistance which he wants and which he 
deserves ; and by means of which he might carry the rising 
spirit for regular government to its desired perfection. One 
of the Eussian ships has killed thirty pirates of a vessel 
which fired on her boats and wounded two men. This is 
much better than bringing them to Malta. The Count is 
anxious to punish these fellows by a Greek tribunal, and I 
therefore intend placing such as we catch at his disposal. 
By his making every place responsible for the piracy of its 
own people, and having those pirates which are caught also 
punished by their magistrates, much more good will be done 
than by giving them the benefit of our legal flaws. The 
Count seems to be very cleverly turning to account even the 
assumed patriotism of Colocotroni, and all that gang of 
plunderers who have hitherto been above control ; whilst he 
collects for offices of trust Tricoupis and others like him, of 
high character for honesty and patriotism. The departure 
of Lord Cochrane under these circumstances is a very fortu- 
nate event. Captain Parker's services, and the presence of the 
6 Warspite,' have been extremely useful to the measures of 
the President; and I shall direct him to continue them instead 
of going to Corfu, where they are much less wanted. 

I beg to mention to your Eoyal Highness that I had ordered 
the painting of the yards and masts white, instead of blacking 
them in the usual way, merely to save the spars from destruc- 
tion, and not at all to please the eyes of the officers. If the di- 
rection of the Board not to allow of this arise from the value of 
the paint being above that of the blacking, I imagine the dete- 
rioration of the spars makes more than a balance in favour of 
the paint. It was years before Lord Nelson effected a similar 
reformation in the painting of the sides, which is now estab- 
lished as a system of economy even in the Ordinary. I have 
this day assured the ' Cambrian's ' crew that their good con- 
duct throughout, and more particularly during the late 
trying occasion of her being wrecked, will ensure them the 
favorable opinion of your Eoyal Highness. One-half of 


them have lost all their clothes ; and I have therefore directed 
that they may be paid one pound each, as advance on their 
wages, that they may be able to buy as much as will keep 
them in health during their passage home, and I propose 
sending them home by the 'Ariadne ' and the ( Galatea,' 
whenever those ships return to Malta. 

March 11. 

I have enclosed with this some additional information 
from Sir T. Staines about Grabusa, which will show how 
fully piracy was organised at that place, and that we have 
not been inattentive to that part of our duty, as alleged by 
some of the mercantile community at different times. As 
they are so ready to make complaints, they might as well 
represent the unfitness of the 4 Lady Mary Pelham ' for a 
packet. A merchant vessel beat her in coming from Gibral- 
tar by three days. The ' Pelham ' left England on January 
4, reached Gibraltar on February 8, and did not arrive at 
Malta till the 21st. She is a noted bad sailer. 

Your Royal Highness will be aware of my not ha,ving no- 
minated anybody for the promotion to lieutenant with which 
you were graciously pleased to favour me personally. I 
therefore humbly request your Eoyal Highness will so far 
extend your goodness as to let that nomination stand over 
until my own son has served his time, and passed his ex- 
amination, which will be June 1, 1829. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Rear-Admiral De Rigny. 

Malta : March 11, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, .... The discussions in our 
Parliament are very satisfactory to me upon the whole. If 
the Ministers had not put their untoward word into the 
King's Speech I should never have obtained the public com- 
mendations with which I have been honored. I think that 
word will prove more injurious to the authors of it themselves 
than it is to me. I conclude their object was to avoid irri- 
tating the Sultan by praising my conduct. I think they 
went the wrong way to manage him, and that they would 
have done better by complaining of his aggression. In this 
case they might have made it a fortunate instead of an un- 
toward event. You will be pleased to see that the Duke of 
Wellington has declared that the Treaty will be executed in 
all respects. We shall do a great deal this summer if there 


is as much energy in the councils of our Governments as I 
trust we shall show them there is in their admirals. 
Yours, with great esteem, 


From Sir E. G. to the Navy Board. 

' Talbot/ at Malta : March 11, 1828, 

GENTLEMEN, In reply to your letter of December 28, 
1827, 1 have the honour to state, that from all the experience 
which I had in the battle of Navarin, as well as at sea pre- 
viously, I am of opinion that giving ships the circular sterns 
is an improvement, the advantages of which are incalculably 
great. With respect to the masts made upon the new prin- 
ciple, I am strongly impressed with the justice of a similar 
opinion. Although I cannot take upon me to say that a 
mast on the former principle might not have equally with- 
stood the injury to which the ' Asia's ' mainmast was ex- 
posed, I must express my great astonishment that a mast 
which had been wounded in twenty-eight different places, 
some of the wounds embracing one-third of its whole 
strength, should not have been carried away in spite of the 
best fishing we could give it, when the ship was pitching 
in a very alarming manner as she crossed the Malta Channel 
after a gale of wind. I am not aware of the mizenmast 
having been more injured, although it went by the board in 
the battle. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to His Excellency Count Capodistrias, 
President of Greece, &c. 9 &c. 

Malta : March 15, 1828. 

M. LE COMTE, I beg leave to congratulate your Excel- 
lency upon the successful termination of the affair of Cara- 
busa, and the breaking~up of that horde of pirates who 
would have impeded the progress of your Excellency's mea- 
sures for establishing order and regularity in Greece, more 
than all her open enemies. The cause of the Greeks has lost 
many friends by the piratical conduct of vessels under the 
Greek flag, although I am persuaded that buccaneers of some 
other nations have committed robberies under this mask ; 
and I trust the destruction of that system will give your 
Excellency's Government great popularity throughout Europe. 
As your Excellency, no doubt truly, observes, the immediate 
success of the wise regulations which you have promulgated, 


depends upon your obtaining pecuniary assistance from the 
Allied Powers. But I must add that the permanence of that 
success depends upon the destruction of piracy, which has 
brought such a stigma upon the Greek name, and which, by the 
interruption of commerce, has deprived those Allied Powers 
in great part of the means, if not of the inclination, to grant 
that very assistance. I am sure your Excellency will feel, 
as I do, the importance of inflicting condign punishment 
upon the principals in this horrid system, who have been 
taken at Carabusa. I am equally confident you will agree 
with me in the advantage of having that punishment in- 
flicted on them contiguous to the Greek Islands, by a tri- 
bunal of their own countrymen ; and under this impression 
I have directed Sir Thomas Staines to place them at your 
disposal, with such proofs of their delinquency as he may 
have collected. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir F> Adam to Sir E. G. 


March 14, 1828. 

As to difficulties, I hold that few men in command ever 
were placed in a situation of more extreme difficulty than 
yours difficulties of every kind, and many of them quite out 
of the line of professional, occurrence. The difficulties can- 
not be appreciated by the public, who are only half informed. 

Sir E. G. to Captain Sir Thomas Staines. 

Malta: March 18, 1828. 

DEAR SIR, The Tunisian papers certainly assist to con- 
firm the conviction of a design on the part of the Turks to 
resist hostilely any interruption of their movements on our 
part. But they relate mostly to the operations of the Tu- 
nisian squadron. Even the last trial which took place here, 
when seven fellows were pronounced guilty, affords so little 
example to deter others, that I am persuaded it is best to 
make over those seized by you to the President of Greece. 
He promises me to award the punishment which may be 
their due; and he knows that a failure in this promise 
would damp our ardour in his future support, as well as his 
authority over the piratically disposed themselves. We shall, 
however, watch closely how he comports himself in this mat- 
ter, and act accordingly thereafter. I sent your letters about 
Carabusa off to the Lord High Admiral. ... As the 


Count Capodistrias is now in full authority, and the Capitani 
and Primate are yielding to his directions, you will have the 
goodness to consult his wishes in any of your movements and 
operations which immediately concern the Greeks. As to 
the four vessels which you sent here with the ' Cambrian's ' 
people, I have preferred making them over to the President, 
upon condition of his using them for the public good, and 
not allowing them to fall again into the hands of any claim- 
ants as owners. You are aware that although we could 
destroy them, we could not condemn them to the captors. 

Very sincerely yours, 


From Sir George CocJcburn to Sir E. G. 

Admiralty : February 15, 1828. 

I hope to be able to send the ' Asia ' back to you in about 
six weeks, if not sooner, when we shall desire you to send 
back ' Warspite.' Let me also know if we can with safety 
reduce the Mediterranean force any lower. Our information 
respecting the naval force at Constantinople varies a good 
deal, but we consider them to have about seven sail of the 
line if they put the whole into commission, &c. 

Sir E. 0. to Sir George Cockburn, Admiralty. 

' Malta : March 20, 1828. 

Sir Thomas Fellowes, in the 'Ariadne,' did not arrive 
here till yesterday, and to my astonishment did not bring me 
one official letter of any sort. Thus I still remain without 
instructions as to my future proceedings, at a .time of no 
ordinary importance, and when delay must largely increase 
whatever difficulties we may have to contend against. Under 
these circumstances you desire me to let you know if you 
can reduce the force on this station. Now, I must first know 
what we shall have to do before I can form an opinion as to 
the force requisite for carrying it into execution ; and even 
when that information shall be obtained, I must say, from 
the experience I have lately had, I do not feel much en- 
couragement to risk an opinion voluntarily on such a matter. 
Nor indeed could I undertake to state what force the Turks 
may have at Constantinople information which may with 
much more precision be obtained from Mr. Stratford Can- 

I am glad to hear, for many reasons, that the order for the 
' Asia ' to be paid off was rescinded. I cannot understand 


upon what principle the intention could have been founded ; 
if that of economy , surely it would have cost more to have 
fitted another ship for the flag than to have repaired the 
6 Asia,' which must have equally been repaired for ordinary. 
However, I have yet much to learn in respect to our late 
political proceedings, which, whilst they appear to me from 
their tendency, to invite war, are, as I am told, expected to 
preserve peace. 

As to the result of the late debates in which my name was 
mentioned, I am more than satisfied with the commendations 
so liberally bestowed upon me from all quarters. Although 
I cannot but be alive to the ( animus,' by the term applied 
to the battle, yet I may well feel proud of the encomiums 
which it gave rise to from men of high intelligence with 
some of whom I am not personally acquainted, as they indi- 
cate the feeling of the country generally. 

Very sincerely yours, 


From the Duke, of Portland to Sir E. G. 

Nice : March 4, 1828. 

DEAR SIR EDWARD, As I am no longer a member of the 
Government, and am therefore at liberty to speak my own 
individual sentiments, I hope our long acquaintance, which 
began in the Mediterranean, may serve as an apology for 
troubling you with this letter to express the great gratifi- 
cation with which I learned the events of Navarin as far as 
they concerned yourself. As a mere naval achievement, it is 
not too much to say of it that it has been surpassed in bril- 
liancy by none (even of those in the glory of which you have 
shared) which have. preceded it. But it has always appeared 
to me that there belongs to it a praise, if I may be allowed 
to say so to an Admiral, of a higher kind. It is impossible 
for a moment to have doubted, that perhaps no Commander 
ever was placed in a more difficult or delicate situation ; and 
that the decision to which you came was beset with dangers 
and a responsibility, to which few persons would have had the 
resolution and nerve to expose themselves. It would have 
been so easy to have found good, and very good, reasons 
rather to have taken the chance of being blown off the coast 
than of being blamed for the possible consequences of the 
bolder and more decisive step which you adopted. I should 
do great injustice to my late colleagues if, in paying this 
just tribute to the transcendent merit of this victory, I 
allowed it to be supposed that I did not concur with them in. 


regretting it not only on account of those calamities from 
which victory is inseparable, but on account of the possible 
effect of it in exasperating the Turks and making an accom- 
modation more difficult. For this reason, if I had still been in 
the Cabinet, I should have been obliged to impose upon my- 
self the cruel restraint of withholding those public expressions 
of congratulation and thanks which so brilliant an achieve- 
ment deserved, in order to avoid anything which in appear- 
ance could tend to make the preservation of peace more diffi- 
cult. I am persuaded, however, the time will come when no 
reasons of State will exist to prevent the performance of 
that public act of justice, and when everybody will be as 
anxious as I am to pay their tribute of respect and gratitude 
for the most eminent service performed, because under the 
most difficult circumstances. 

I was happy to hear the other day, by persons returned 
from Malta, that your son has recovered from his wound. 
Without knowing that, I should hardly have dared to write 
you this letter. I have only to beg that you will not give 
yourself the trouble of answering it, and that you will be- 
lieve me, 

Dear Sir Edward, ever yours sincerely, 


Sir E. G. to Lord Viscount Granville at Paris. 

Malta : March 21, 1828. 

MY DEAE LORD, Your letter of February 21, by Sir 
Thomas Fellowes, is very gratifying to me. It seems 
strange to me that our Ministry should have been so back- 
ward in seeing the true state of our affairs with the Porte, 
compared with that of France or Russia. It cannot well be 
attributed to deficient communication from me, for I will 
venture to say that no Admiral ever detailed at greater 
length his proceedings and his sentiments, than I have done. 
For, after writing all that I thought justifiable in my public 
letters, I have largely added to the subject in private letters 
both to the Lord High Admiral and Lord Dudley. I had 
falsely imagined that I was to be judged by the spirit which 
animated the maker of the Treaty. He would have known 
at once how to have profited by the battle of Navarin. To 
him it would have been a fortunate instead of an untoward 
event. If we had profited by the insult and aggression by 
at once declaring a blockade of all the Turkish ports and 
those whence Ibrahim receives his supplies, the affairs of 
the East would now have been under our entire control. 
But it appears to me that the public measures which we 


have adopted of securing peace have invited war. Accord- 
ingly, the Porte is now proposing to execute the pardon and 
the amnesty, the inefficiency of which was declared by the 
Allied Ambassadors long ago. 

I have not had any instructions for my future proceedings 
since the battle, I look to those emanating from the Treaty 
for iny conduct respecting these proposals ; and I have little 
doubt of Count Capodistrias refusing to entertain them, upon 
the same principle of their not being in the spirit of the 
Treaty, and on the conviction of that Treaty being to be 
carried into full execution. I am very glad to hear of the 
continued cordiality of the several Governments of the Allied 
Sovereigns ; because any failure in that respect might be 
fatal to the Treaty, which, however roughly it may be handled 
for political purposes, in my humble opinion is well calculated 
to prevent a general disturbance of the tranquillity of Europe, 
so essential to the welfare of all. Count Capodistrias is 
working very hard and very well; but I fear the want of 
money may impede his measures sadly, unless he obtains 
some speedily from the Allied Governments. Your Lord- 
ship is aware that I have no power to furnish aid of this 
sort. Indeed, I am not informed of the intention of our 
Government as to any of my future proceedings, not having 
had a line of instructions since the battle of Navarin. And 
as I have no longer any authority to refer to in these parts, 
my difficulties are much increased. I trust we have effectually 
broken up the nest of piracy at Grabusa, although it has cost 
us the ' Cambrian ' frigate. The fortress is garrisoned with 
Trench and English, to the exclusion of all others, until 
Count Capodistrias can find a suitable garrison for their 
relief. Colonel Urquhart, whom he had sent there, was 
accidentally killed by a gust of wind blowing down a shed 
which fell upon him. 

Sir E. G. to Vice- Admiral De Rigny. 

'Talbot,' at Malta: March 22, 1828. 

SIE, I have had the honor of receiving yesterday, by 
Her Majesty's sloop .' Ganet,' your Excellency's despatch of 
March 8, exclosing a copy of a letter from Baron d'Ottenfels, 
of another from Baron Millitz,* and your Excellency's reply 
to them. In reply to these documents I have to observe 
that I do not consider myself authorised to assist in any 
proposal whatever of this sort, unless made in the full spirit 

* Containing proposals from Turkey for an armistice for the Greeks, if 
they submitted. 


of the Treaty of London of July 6, 1827, and the instructions 
emanating from it. The communication from the Porte 
through the Austrian and Prussian Plenipotentiaries does 
not appear to me to be made in that spirit, but on the con- 
trary to be an attempt to carry into execution, under our 
sanction, the measures which the Allied Ambassadors con- 
sidered as inefficient and therefore objectionable. All I pro- 
pose to do respecting these documents, is, not to interfere 
with the consideration of them on the part of the Greeks, 
but merely to submit them to the English Government. 
Without further instructions from our Governments, I think 
we cannot relax in the meantime from the duties prescribed 
to us by the Treaty, even if the Greeks should assent to the 
Turkish proposals an assent which, under the circum- 
stances, I cannot contemplate as within the bounds of pro- 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty.* 

< Talbot,' at Malta : March 24, 1828. 

SIE, I have the honor of sending for the information of 
his Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, several docu- 
ments, embracing a proposition f from the Porte to effect an 
object which appears to have been already rejected by the 
Allied Ambassadors as quite inefficient for its professed pur- 
pose of pacifying Greece. 

The Greeks may well suspect both the medium through 
which the proposition is made and the agent through whom 
the amnesty would have to be executed : and I think Count 
Capodistrias is too wise to assent to a measure which would 
render null the Treaty, on the execution of which alone 
will depend the salvation of that country from horrors here- 
tofore unknown, and her people from becoming a nation of 
pirates and freebooters. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir Thomas Staines to Sir E. C. 

<Isis,' Grabusa: March 12, 1828. 

I am sorry to have to acquaint you with the demise of the 
late newly-appointed Governor of Grabusa, Colonel Urquhart. 

* Received April 9. 

t This was an indirect overture made by the Porte, through the medium 
of the Austrian and Prussian Ambassadors and the Greek Patriarch of Con- 


His death was perfectly accidental caused by a heavy mass 
of timber and plank forming a shed being hurled by a sudden 
squall or gust of wind over upon him on his coming down from 
the fortress into the lower town, which completely doubled him 
together, and by which he was so seriously injured internally 
that he expired in two hours after. His remains were de- 
posited on Friday last in one of the bastions of the fortress 
with military honors, the Greek corvette firing minute 
guns, and the Greek troops under his command firing over 
his remains. This unfortunate event had nearly caused a 
general insurrection among the Grabusa Greeks, who were 
seeking an opportunity, and who lamented having allowed even 
the Greek troops to enter the citadel, but were furious at our 
having got in our Marines, almost without their knowing it. 
On Wednesday last, when the body of the deceased was 
taken up to the garrison, it seems it was the expectation that 
I should have ordered a large detachment of both English 
and French Marines from the garrison to accompany the 
body, in which case a general revolt was intended by the 
Greek population, to have overpowered and expelled the re- 
mainder of the British and French garrison, and to have 
possessed themselves of the fortress again at any expense of 
blood. This I received positive information of in the course 
of that afternoon ; at the same time, men were found clandes- 
tinely making ball cartridges. A house was found with 13 
barrels of powder, and quantities of ball cartridge therein, 
whence many hundreds had been contributed on that day, 
when Captain Strangways of the Marines (commanding 
officer of the fortress) had been most positively assured by 
the Greek local authorities that there was no powder within 
the garrison not deposited in the magazines, of which he 
(Captain Strangways) possessed the keys. By all this I found 
that prompt and coercive measures were absolutely necessary. 
Our friend Antoniades, so tenacious of his character, was 
arrested and sent on board the ' Isis,' the powder and ball 
cartridges being found in his domicile, although he had 
declared that the barrels contained nothing but flour. It 
being late in the afternoon, and not having time to put my 
plans in execution before dark, I merely despatched a strong 
detachment of about 70 more British and French Marines to 
reinforce our party, with directions to remain under arms 
the whole night, with constant patrolling parties and a vigi- 
lant observance of every movement of the turbulent Greeks ; 

stantinople, as well as through Ibrahim Pacha, for a general pardon to the 
Greeks as the price of their submission, giving them three months' time to 


at the same time issuing a proclamation, which was made 
known and stuck up in the garrison, prohibiting any Greek 
being out of his house from 8 P.M. until daylight in the 
morning, on pain of being instantly shot. Thus, being secure 
and tranquil for that night, I, the following morning, pro- 
ceeded to put my further plan into execution, by forwarding a 
detachment of blue jackets from the squadron with muskets, 
bayonets fixed, &c., under the orders of Commander Prowse; 
and, after making all the necessary preparations, expelled the 
whole of the Greeks from the fortress, to their utter discom- 
fiture their houses being, almost without an exception, 
receptacles for plundered property. On the two following 
days, the women, children, household and other effects, also 
quitted, and were allowed to be taken from the garrison. 
The sick were conveyed with care and kindness to the lower 
town, where we have fitted up a hospital which they occupy, 
attended by our medical men. Having had great cause of 
dissatisfaction from the irregular, insubordinate, and almost 
mutinous conduct of the Greek troops, subsequent to the 
death of their Governor, Colonel Urquhart, I found it 
necessary also to reduce their numbers in the garrison, and 
this morning to expel the whole of them, at least until our 
general search has terminated, and the property secured ; for 
they are absolutely greater robbers than the pirates them- 
selves c every finger a fish-hook.' 

4 P.M. 

At this moment not a Greek of any description is remain- 
ing in the fortress ; it is wholly occupied by the English and 
French Marines. And I am positively certain, my dear 
Sir, that unless we keep possession of this said Grabusa, or 
at least keep a commanding force in the fortress, it will most 
indubitably dwindle into the same horrible, depraved resi- 
dence of iniquity and enormity which it has so long given 
cause to all European and maritime nations to be disgusted 
with and irritated at. Why might it not be taken into our 
hands as one of the Ionian Islands ? Cerigotta, one of them, 
is within three or four gunshots of it ; at all events, it is my 
intention to keep possession until I receive your further 
orders respecting it. And, in fact, it is absolutely necessary 
that we should do so, at least until after we have embarked 
the whole of the plundered property for Malta, as well as 
having recovered all that can be so done of the ' Cambrian's ' 
effects, &c. 


From Sir E. C. to Commodore Sir Thomas Staines. 

. ' Talbot/ at Malta : March 26, 1828. 

SIR, Your letter of the 12th inst. reached me by the 
* Gannet ' on the 21st. I very sincerely regret the unfortu- 
nate death of Colonel Urquhart,* on his own account and 
on account of the difficulty the President will have in find- 
ing a successor on whom so much reliance can be placed. 
I regret it, also, as it affects the important service in which 
your are engaged. I am very sensible of the difficulties you 
have met with in destroying that nest of pirates at Carabusa, 
which have so long infested the seas of the Levant with com- 
parative impunity, and it gives me satisfaction to say that 
you appear to me to have shown great zeal and sound judg- 
ment in your mode of overcoming them. It is necessary 
that we should guard against any such future injury from 
this fortress, and you will, therefore, retain it in the posses- 
sion of the Allied forces until Count Capodistrias can put 
it into the charge of a garrison upon which he can fully 
rely. I send the ' Ann and Amelia 9 transport with provi- 
sions and stores, and you will let her return to this place as 
soon as she is loaded with the stores of the late ' Cambrian * 
and plundered property accompanying the latter, with any 
information you can obtain as to the vessels from which it 
was plundered. 

I am, &c., 


From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C. 

1 Trident,' a Milo, ler avril 1828. 

MONSIEUR L'AMIRAL, J'ai re9u la copie confidentielle 
que vous avez bien voulu me transmettre, de votre depeche 
du 10 decembre a S. A. E. le Lord Haut-Amiral. 

Si les explications claires et positives que vous donnez 
sur les demarches des escadres alliees avaient besoin d'etre 
renforcees de mon propre temoignage, je n'hesite pas a dire, 
Monsieur PAmiral, qu'ayant participe a ces demarches 
depuis le 21 septembre, que je vous rejoignis devant Navarin, 
jusqu ? au 25 octobre, que nous nous sommes separes en 
quittant ce port, j'adhere completement aux eclaircissemens 

* Killed at Grabusa by the accidental fall of a house during a gale of 
wind. He was in the service of Greece, and had been sent by Count Capo- 
distrias to be commandant of the fort and island after Sir T, Staines had 
taken possession of it. 


que vous donnez sur les points en question. Nous avons 
ete conduits, par le traite meme, a adopter la mesure d'entrer 
a Navarin comme la plus propre au but de reduire a 1'inaction 
la flotte et les troupes d'Ibrahim ; car pendant que par un 
blocus qui devait etre souvent interrompu, nous laissions 1'une 
en liberte, les autres pouvaient a leur aise, sans aucune con- 
trainte, ravager le Peloponnese. 

Je declare hautement que tous les rapports que j'ai faits a 
mon propre gouvernement sont entierement conformes aux 
explications que vous avez redigees ; et que je suis prepare a 
lui adresser tous les details dont la conformite et la concor- 
dance demontreraient, si cela etait necessaire, que la mesure 
d'entrer a Navarin etait plus propre qu'aucune autre a 
atteindre le but du traite, quoi qu'il ait pu en resulter un 
conflit qui deviendrait inevitable dans la rencontre des flottes 
en dehors. 

En vous adressant cette lettre je n'ai pas la presomption 
d'ajouter plus de poids aux verites que vous avez exprimees ; 
mais j'ai pense qu'ayant delibere avec vous, ayant agi avec 
vous, je devais a mon propre caractere de me lier a toutes 
les consequences qui peuvent resulter des actes publics aux- 
quels je m'honore d' avoir pris part de concert avec Votre 

Je suis avec la plus haute consideration, 

Monsieur 1'Amiral, 
Votre tres-humble et obeissant serviteur, 

Le Vice-Amiral H. DE RIGNT. 

From H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence to Sir E. C. 

Admiralty : April 20, 1828. 

DEAR SIR, A few days ago I received yours of February 
20, and yesterday your letter of March 28. Anything that 
can prove the unanimity of the flag officers must be to me 
satisfactory, and of course the enclosure from Admiral De 
Rigny is conclusive. Sir Thomas Staines has actively done 
his duty ; and I trust piracy is, if not entirely, nearly ex- 
tinguished by the fall of Grabusa. Having myself named 
Captain Parker to the ' Warspite,' I must feel pleasure in 
the energy shown by that officer in the various duties in 
which he has been engaged. Not being myself in the 
Cabinet, I do not enter into the political part, or those lean- 
ings that Austria may take in consequence of the Treaty of 
London, or of the line Eussia may pursue on the frontier of 
Turkey. The case is as novel as it is interesting and singu- 
lar. Firmness and great discretion, and acting without 


passion is your great object. Things in Greece have taken 
too quiet and too regular shape for Lord Cochrane. 

Ever, believe me, dear Sir, yours truly, 


Sir E. C. to Captain Parker. 

H.M.S. < Warspite,' Malta : March 24, 1828. 

. . . We must do what we can to check the supplies 
going to Ibrahim ; but till Adam has answers from England 
the Ionian boats will keep up his stock. A Greek blockade 
would make them good prize to Greek vessels ; and we can 
support them in blockade against a superior force, although 
not being belligerents we cannot originate a blockade, unless, 
indeed, to cause an agreement such as Ibrahim made with 
us to be fulfilled. I have sent the Count's list of the ships 
at Alexandria and of the expedition which went from thence 
on February 12 ostensibly for Candia, but not the less in- 
tended to find its way to the Morea because the Viceroy says 
it is for Candia. If it is still in Candia it should be watched. 
Cradock is to wait an answer from Constantinople to the 
Viceroy's letter, which is quite useless ; he has, however, 
notified this to England. Ask the Count if I am to write 
his name Capo d'Istria, or Capodistrias. 

Very sincerely yours, 


Sir E. C. to Lieut.-Col. Sir Thomas Reade, Kt. and C.B., 
H.B.M. Agent and Consul General, Tunis. 

1 Talbot,' at Malta : March 25, 1828. 

SIR, In reply to your letter of February 3, I said I would 
accede to the wish of his Highness the Bey of Tunis. You 
will please to inform him that the Austrian vessel ' Procaccio ' 
sailed, under the charge of his Majesty's sloop e Brisk,' on 
the 12th of this month, the commander of which was 
directed by me to convey her first to Navarin and then to 
Smyrna. And I will beg you to explain to his Highness 
that I have done this with the knowledge, by means of in- 
tercepted despatches, of his having directed his admiral, 
Kiutchuk Muhamed, c to employ all his means and his 
utmost efforts to obtain victory and conquest over all Infi- 
dels ; ' of his terming us c the enemies of his religion ; ' of 
his hoping to learn that the ships of the three Allied Powers 
have suffered much in the battle, and that they have even 



been destroyed ; ' and of his having given orders to his ad- 
miral ' to act in accord with his colleagues and to obey the 
will of the Sublime Porte in everything/ even after he knew 
of the battle of Navarin. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

1 Talbot,' at Malta : March 28, 1828. 

SIR, I cannot part with Captain Lewis Davies, who wil 
sail this evening for Plymouth in the ' Ariadne/ with part 
of the ( Cambrian's ' crew, without giving Your Eoyal High- 
ness ray opinion that he is one of the best officers I ever had 
under my command. His conduct in the battle of Navarin 
has been already placed before Your Eoyal Highness, and he 
deserves the honors and the promotions which it gained 
him at Your Eoyal Highness' hands ; in every respect, in his 
ship and in his boat, his gallantry and his ability were 
equally conspicuous. He went personally to board the fire- 
vessel which had repulsed the boats of the ' Dartmouth / and, 
notwithstanding the dexterous occupation of the e Eose ' de- 
scribed by Captain Hugon, of 'I'Armide/ by sending his 
boats to tow a fire- vessel off from the bows of the ' Scipion ' 
he probably saved that ship also from total destruction. But 
his conduct is equally praiseworthy on all occasions. He 
never makes a difficulty ; his ship is always ready for any 
service required; and he bears with cheerfulness that en- 
durance of privation which has no alluring hopes of reward 
to make it palatable. I believe he is desirous of temporary 
rest and retirement ; but I am confident that if circumstances 
should require increased naval exertions, Your Eoyal High- 
ness will find Captain Davies at all times ready to obey the 
call, with zeal and ability suited to the occasion. 

I have, &c., 


At this time reports prevailed that Russia had de- 
clared war with the Porte independently of her two 
Allies in the Treaty of July. The report, however, 
was not true then, though the intention was carried 
out some months later. 

Sir JE7. G. to Admiral De Rigny. 

Malta : March 29, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, . . . But the most important bit of 
news that has reached us is, that Eussia is about to declare, 


or has already declared, war with the Porte. I have no doubt 
of her having taken some very strong measures of this sort ; 
because we hear that Abbas Mirza has been serving her as 
Ibrahim served us, and that by instigation of the Porte the 
Persians are renewing the war instead of signing the treaty of 
peace. The irritation of Eussia has occasioned various ridicu- 
lous reports of her making war against England, and again 
against France, and also against Austria, &c. &c. I have no 
doubt but that the Emperor Nicholas is impatient at the 
delay in our Ministers, as he well may be ; and I hope his 
despatch, whatever it may be, will hasten their decision. I 
am still the object of attack by one of our newspapers, the 
; and the arrival of the vessels at Alexandria from 

Navarin has led it to say the Turkish fleet being destroyed 
is unfounded ; and that if the report of their superiority of 
force were true, I should have enumerated it in my letter. 
You will therefore oblige me by giving me Bompard's account 
of it, in readiness for any occasion of sending it home. 
Hamilton is gone to Marseilles on his way to England. It 
bespeaks very good feeling on your part, your writing about 
his services : a consideration which they well merit. 

You will see that although I thought it safest for me (sub- 
ject as I am to such a scrutiny of every word I write) to write 
separately and in form, in answer to the Turkish proposal, 
both De Heiden and myself view the measure in the same 
light as you do. I think you will have him up in the Levant 
with you very shortly, as his Emperor has been anxious for 
his being again at sea. I imagine it was expected that I 
should already have been there, and that he feared Heiden's 
not being with us. But even yet I have not a single line of 
instruction as to my future proceedings, and I cannot leave 
Malta until I have it. You will therefore see, my good 
friend, that I have my c embarras' as well as you. Lord 
Granville tells me that both your new Ministry and ours are 
quite agreed as to pursuing the object of the Treaty. 
Your very sincere and faithful, 


From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

1 Talbot/ at Malta: April 4, 1828.* 

SIR, In the newspaper reports of the proceedings in Par- 
liament on the 5th of last month, one of the Members, 
referring to a statement of from two to three thousand 
Greeks having been seized by Ibrahim Pacha and sent to 
Alexandria, is said to have observed, that c such a trans- 

* Acknowledged May 7, 1828. 
Q 2 


action could not well have taken place without the consent 
of the Allied forces,' &c. ; and Mr. Huskisson is stated, in 
reply, to have attributed the successful removal of the 
Greeks to ' the injury done to the allied squadrons having 
interrupted the blockade.' Mr. Huskisson is reported to 
have added, ' that Government was most anxious to put an 
end to this traffic, and had sent orders into the Mediterra- 
nean to intercept all vessels ' found engaged in it. As the 
error contained in this statement, besides compromising in 
some measure my conduct in the command with which I am 
honored, may be otherwise injurious to his Majesty's service, 
I beg his Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral's permis- 
sion to explain : that I do not consider myself empowered by 
my present instructions to institute blockades of any sort ; 
that I do not consider myself authorised to examine into the 
composition of any part of the Ottoman forces which may 
return to Africa or Turkey in general ; and that I have as 
yet no orders to intercept vessels found engaged in the traffic 
in question. In the execution of so complicated a measure 
as the Treaty of July 6, 1827, I may well be diffident of my 
having clearly understood the whole purport of the instruc- 
tions, in which it is observed, that it is impossible to foresee 
all the cases which may arise. I beg therefore to request 
that his Eoyal Highness the Lord High Admiral will be 
pleased to inform me if I am hereafter to intercept vessels 
carrying on this traffic, and to institute a blockade, or to 
take any means for putting an end to it. The harem of 
Ibrahim Pacha himself formed part of the detachment re- 
ferred to; and his Eoyal Highness will be aware that no 
measure would be more likely to produce hostility with 
Mahometans than an attempt to examine their harems ; 
and several previous communications from me will show the 
liability of getting into disputes with the Austrian marine, 
by the interruption of their communication with the Ottoman 
forces. But I have no hesitation in saying, that in my 
opinion the adoption of these two measures would greatly 
forward the object of the Allied Powers described in the 
Treaty, and would eminently promote the cause of humanity. 
Commander Eichards, of the 'Pelorus,' informed me that 
some six hundred Greek children were publicly sold in the 
slave market at Alexandria; and le Capitaine Pujol, in 
his report to Vice- Admiral de Eigny, makes the number of 
Greek captives sent over amount to 1,200. The return of 
these and other Greeks might be stipulated for in exchange 
for the troops who would be placed at our mercy by the 
measures contemplated. I should observe, that the only 


blockade which I have hitherto considered myself authorised 
to adopt, was that of the force in Navarin under Ibrahim 
Pacha, and that solely because he had broken an armistice 
solemnly agreed upon ; that I had ample experience of the 
extreme difficulty of supporting it against the querulous 
interruption of the Austrian marine forces ; and that after 
having deprived the Ottoman commander of the means of 
executing the hostile measures he had contemplated, I have 
not found myself justified in continuing it in the absence of 
further instructions from his Majesty's Government. 

I have, &c., 


Sir Edward Codrington being at this time placed* in 
direct communication with the Secretary of State, some 
of his official letters were thenceforward addressed to 
Earl Dudley, to Mr. Huskisson, and subsequently to the 
Earl of Aberdeen. 

From Sir E. G. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : April 6, 1828. 

SIR, I received, yesterday, by the ' Wellesley,' from Corfu, 
Your Royal Highness's despatch of 19th March, with that of 
Lord Dudley of the 18th. 

As the latter does not appear to contain anything more 
than an enquiry into my proceedings, I lament that it should 
not have gone in the usual course through Your Eoyal High- 
ness, to whom all those proceedings are minutely known. I 
am uncertain whether I ought to place before Your Eoyal 
Highness a copy of my explanations, which is my very 
anxious desire ; and I therefore, in the first place, thus ask 
permission so to do, if not immediately, at least at some 
future period. For as I owe it to the kindness with which 
Your Eoyal Highness has honored me, to do nothing which 
shall not be worthy of that kindness, I would wish that my 
whole conduct in my present command should be submitted 
to Your Eoyal Highness's inspection. In the meantime, I 
will beg leave to assure Your Eoyal Highness that I have not 
swerved from the line pointed out in my instructions either 
from Mr. S. Canning or my Lord Dudley, as his Lordship 
seems to have imagined (as it appears to me) for want of 
thorough examination of those instructions. I cannot but 
esteem myself fortunate in having anticipated this subject b} r 
my official letter to Your Eoyal Highness of the 4th. I have 


just received despatches from Count Capodistria of his having 
collected eight armed vessels under Satoris, to form a blockade 
of the Turkish possessions fromDragomestre along the Morea, 
and as far as Grabusa, of which I have signified the joint 
approval of Count de Heiden and myself. For although we 
cannot ourselves institute blockades, as not being belligerents, 
we are instructed to support such as the Greeks may them- 
selves establish. I assure Your Royal Highness, I watch 
these matters as closely as I can, and am as much upon my 
guard in every respect as circumstances justify, whilst pre- 
serving that confidence upon which the successful execution 
of my complicated duties seems mainly to depend. I refer 
now to the caution in Your Royal Highness's letter of 17th 
February, which, as also that of the 2nd March, reached me 
by the packet of the 7th of this month. Of the vessels which 
some time ago went from Navarin to Alexandria, several 
were seen to go into the former port by Captain B. Hamilton, 
which he thinks came from the Dardanelles, Mytilene, &c., 
and others were collected from Prevesa, Patras, &c. The 
transports were, I conclude, Austrians, whether under their 
own or Turkish colours. But Your Royal Highness will 
hardly believe with what alacrity the Egyptians now manage 
their maritime matters, compared with former times. In a 
gale of wind in which I thought it necessary to put the 
6 Asia ' before it without a stitch of sail, in order to prevent 
accidents, I did not see one of all the ships of war then off 
Patras which had undergone any injury. 

I have, &c., 


From Earl Dudley to Sir E. C. 

Foreign Office : March 18, 1828.* 

SIR, By the reports from Captain Richards of the 'Pelorus' 
and Mr. Consul Barker to yourself, forwarded to Mr. Croker 
in your letter of the 21st January, it appears that on the 
27th and 28th December, 45 Egyptian or Turkish vessels, of 
which 30 were ships of war (including 17 which in a return 
transmitted by you, are said to have arrived at Navarin on 
the 7th December), returned to Alexandria from JSTavarin 
' with invalid and wounded soldiers of the army of Ibrahim 
Pacha, and having also on board a considerable number of 
unfortunate Greek children who have been disposed of in the 
slave markets at Alexandria.' Similar statements have 
reached his Majesty's Government from other quarters. A 

* Received April 6, at Malta. 


letter from Mr. Consul Barker at Alexandria to Mr. Stratford 
Canning, after stating that Ibrahim Pacha had sent away in 
this expedition all whose maintenance had become burden- 
some, all such of the crews of the destroyed ships as could not 
be converted into soldiers, the sick and wounded, and other- 
wise disabled of the fleet, and all superannuated invalids and 
useless followers of the army, adds, that f the number of Greek 
slaves, chiefly young women and children, amounted to 5,500, 
and described them as having arrived in the most wretched 
state of suffering from hunger and grief.' This latter intelli- 
gence has caused the deepest concern to his Majesty, and is 
calculated to excite the most painful feelings throughout the 
country. From the circumstances of the first intimation of 
this expedition from Navarin having been transmitted to you 
from Alexandria, after it had arrived at that port, as well as 
from the statements received from Corfu of there having been 
no naval force before the ports of Navarin, Modoii, and Coron 
since the battle, it would appear that these ports had not only 
been free from blockade, but that the movements of Ibrahim 
Pacha, and of the remains of the Turkish and Egyptian naval 
forces in the Morea, had not even been watched. Adverting 
to the paragraph in your instructions of the 16th October 
(of which you acknowledge the receipt on the 8th of Novem- 
ber), which directs you 6 to concert with the Commanders of 
the Allied Powers the most effectual mode of preventing any 
movements by sea on the part of the Turkish or Egyptian 
forces,' and more particularly ( within the line described in 
the protocol of the Ambassadors at Constantinople for the 
operation of the Greek blockade,' I have to desire that you 
will forthwith furnish me with a detailed statement of the 
orders given and the steps taken by you in pursuance of that 
part of these instructions. 

This information is the more requisite, after the events to 
which I have already called your attention, as, in an enclos- 
ure transmitted in your letter of the 8th of November, 
already referred to, his Majesty's Government were given to 
understand, in your own words and those of the Allied Ad- 
mirals, that an c armistice de mer existe de fait du cote des 
Turcs ; leur flotte n'existe plus.' 

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., 



From Sir Edward Codrington to Earl Dudley. 

Malta : April 7, 1828.* 

MY LORD, I had the honour of receiving yesterday, by 
way of Corfu, Your Lordship's despatch of March 18, 1828, 
accompanied by an order from his Eoyal Highness the Lord 
High Admiral, ' to follow such orders and instructions as I 
may from time to time receive from his Majesty through one 
of his principal Secretaries of State ; in addition to all other 
orders which I may have received or may from time to time 
receive from his Royal Highness.' In this despatch Your 
Lordship refers to some Egyptian or Turkish vessels having 
conveyed from Navarin to Alexandria a considerable number 
of Greeks, several hundred of whom were sold in the slave 
market at Alexandria. As I myself announced this fact, it 
will not be necessary for me to repeat the extracts which 
your Lordship quotes in confirmation of it. I feel called 
upon, however, to observe, that by the manner in which 
those quotations are made, as well as the expressions by 
which they are accompanied, Your Lordship appears to think 
I have either not understood or not guided myself according 
to the instructions which I have had for my proceedings. 
Your Lordship implies that it was my duty to have blockaded 
the ports of the Morea, and to have prevented the transmis- 
sion of Greeks to Egypt ; whereas it is my impression, guided 
by the same documents, that I was bound to encourage the 
return of all Turkish and Egyptian forces from Greece, and 
that I had no right whatever to question the composition of 
any such returning force. In other words, that although I 
feel myself justified in supporting the Greeks in blockades 
established by them, I am not authorised to institute block- 
ades myself; and that I have no order or instruction what- 
ever to prevent the transmission of Greeks to Alexandria. 
I will endeavour to establish this point to Your Lordship's 
satisfaction. I beg leave, in the first place, to say, that I 
consider the letter from Your Lordship of October 15,f from 
which you quote, not to apply in any way to the change of 
affairs occasioned by the battle of Navarin, and the retire- 
ment and dispersion of the ambassadors, but to refer solely 
to the Treaty and the instructions emanating from it. It is 
true it directs me ' to concert with the commanders,' &c., as 
Your Lordship quotes; but Your Lordship omits the important 
addition, that we are to decide in conjunction with the 
ambassadors, which ambassadors left Constantinople on 

* Acknowledged in England May 6, 1828. 
f The Instructions are in Appendix of Vol. I. 


December 8, one month after my receipt of it. But the fact 
of its application merely to the instructions emanating from 
the Treaty, is evinced by its commencing words, whilst the 
third paragraph and what immediately follows shows that 
it was framed to remove doubts which were expressed by 
Yice- Admiral De Rigny and myself as to the interference 
with Austrians carrying supplies, and as to the movements 
of any Ottoman force from one Turkish possession in Greece 
to another. 

The Protocol itself referred to by Your Lordship further 
elucidates this matter. 

After speaking of the inutility of any demonstration at the 
Dardanelles and Smyrna, and of the possible utility of a 
movement towards Alexandria, 'dans le but d'accelerer la 
retraite de la flotte egyptienne ;' it adds under the head No. 
7, * Les aniiraux agiront dans le sens du Traite, en prote- 
geant, selon le besoin, toute portion des forcesnavales, grecques 
ou mussulinanes, qui s'engageroit a ne pas prendre part aux 
hostilites, et en favorisant d'apres ce principe le retour, soit 
a Alexandrie soit a Constantinople, de tout batiment de 
guerre turc et egyptien, de meme que tout transport de Tune 
ou de 1'autre nation ayant a bord des troupes retirees ;' and 
the letter from Mr. Stratford Canning, dated September 8, 
1827, accompanying that Protocol for my guidance, con- 
cludes with ' You will probably agree with me that every 
practicable facility should be afforded for the complete evacu- 
ation of the Morea by the Mussulman forces.' 

All my communications from first to last have shown I 
was under this impression ; and that I deemed it my duty, 
even at the risk of hostilities, to effect, if possible, the return 
of all or any part of the forces under Ibrahim Pacha to 
Alexandria or the Dardanelles. And if I have been in error 
it is one in which I have been suffered to continue by the 
Government ; since it does not appear that any doubts of it 
entered Your Lordship's mind until March 18, 1828, although 
it must have been brought forcibly under Your Lordship's 
consideration when Sir John Gore reached London with my 
answer to Your Lordship's Queries ; for when asked by the 
10th Query what the propositions were which we meditated 
making to Ibrahim Pacha, my reply is, 'that he should retire 
with his forces to Alexandria or the Dardanelles.' It is 
hardly necessary for me to remind Your Lordship that not- 
withstanding this, and that the last instruction which I 
have received for my guidance in this complicated service is 
dated October 15, 1827, Your Lordship has not given me any 
further instructions for my future guidance even in this last 


despatch of March 18, 1828, which attributes to rne an 
erroneous view of the orders under which I have heretofore 

With respect to the quotation which Your Lordship has 
made from the joint letters of my colleagues and myself, in 
French, I really am not aware how it is made applicable to 
the case in question. I can only, therefore, explain that it 
was written with a view of urging the Greek Government to 
recall their cruisers from the pretended employment of inter- 
cepting Turkish vessels in order that they might concentrate 
their forces on the coast of Greece. It was intended to point 
out to them that there was no longer a Turkish force of 
sufficient magnitude to prevent their blockading the ports 
of the Morea. 

In answer to Your Lordship's desire that I will forthwith 
furnish you with a detailed statement of the orders given 
and the steps taken by me in pursuance of my instructions, 
I beg to refer Your Lordship to the regular and voluminous 
communications which have been made by me to his Royal 
Highness the Lord High Admiral of the stationing and the 
proceedings of the ships under my command ; repeating that 
the whole of my arrangements have been made with a view 
of suppressing piracy and preventing the arrival of supplies 
of men, arms, &c., destined against Greece, and coming from 
Turkey or Africa in general, and of encouraging at the same 
time the retirement of the Egyptian expeditionary force from 
the Morea, altogether or in part (which I considered as the 
particular object of my instructions), without investigating 
the materials of which it was composed, whether of Greeks 
or Turks, slaves or free people, for which I do not find my- 
self possessed of any authority whatever. A reference to 
those communications will show that though the ports of 
the Morea have not been blockaded they have been watched, 
and that the force under my command has been both actively 
and arduously employed during the utmost violence of a 
Levant winter season. 

To show how far I was guided by my instructions in 
making my arrangements for intercepting the arrival of 
supplies coming to Greece, I request Your Lordship's atten- 
tion to my circular instructions to my letter to the Hon. 
Lieut.-Colonel Cradock and to a letter of the 4th of this 
month, to the secretary of his Eoyal Highness the Lord High 
Admiral, only two days previous to the receipt of Your Lord- 
ship's last despatch, of all of which I now enclose copies. 

It is necessary for me to apprise Your Lordship that if I 
were myself to fall in with another such detachment as that 


referred to, proceeding from Navarin to Alexandria, I should 
not find myself authorised by any instruction which I have 
even to this day received, to scrutinise its composition or to 
interrupt its movements ; and, therefore, that I may no 
longer be liable to misunderstand the line of my duty in this 
important point, I request Your Lordship will be pleased to 
inform me : 

If I am henceforth to consider myself empowered to estab- 
lish blockades. 

If I am to prevent the return of any Turkish or Egyptian 
forces from Greece ; and in case the return of such force 
should be permitted, 

If I am to examine the ships containing it, and to release 
any Greek captives which may be found on board them. 

As to the right of blockading, my opinion is corroborated 
by Your Lordship's statement of November 28, 1827, to His 
Highness Prince Esterhazy, that ' it is perfectly clear that 
His Majesty, not being at war with the Porte, cannot claim 
the exercise of belligerent rights. It is equally clear that 
blockade is one of those rights, that even in case of war 
could not be exercised without notification.' In this Your 
Lordship lays down the principle ; and you add, c this is a 
principle that has been strictly attended to in the instruc- 
tions which have been furnished by His Majesty's commands 
to his Admiral.' And Your Lordship will remark that this 
letter to Prince Esterhazy is dated forty-four days subse- 
quent to the instruction, which appears to Your Lordship to 
bear an opposite construction. The only blockade which I 
have attempted was that of the force under Ibrahim, in 
consequence of his breaking an armistice solemnly agreed 
upon. And I may remind Your Lordship that the propriety 
of my entering the port of Navarin under those circumstances 
for the purpose of preventing his devastating the country 
and making slaves of the inhabitants, those very people 
perhaps whose suffering, as Your Lordship truly observes, is 
calculated to excite the most painful feelings throughout the 
country, has been questioned by the Government itself. 

I will conclude by assuring Your Lordship that a power to 
liberate such Greeks as may hereafter be seized in slavery, 
or to redeem those whe have already been taken to Alexan- 
dria, will be a very gratify ing part of my duty. 

I have, &c., 



Extrait d'un Rapport du Capitaine Lieut. Kadian, com- 
mandant le brick de la Marine imperiale russe ( V OusferdieJ 
en date de Rhodes le |^ 1828. 

' Dans le second port se trouvait une fregate turque venue 
de Navarin. Ce fut le hasard ou plutot la Providence qui 
1'avait portee ici, car elle avait ete quelque terns a la merci 
des vents et des flots sans une once de pain a bord, et le 
corps du batiment dans un etat pitoyable ainsi que le gree- 
inent. Elle avait deja perdu la moitie de son equipage, et le 
restant etait compose de blesses et de malades : personne 
nosait s'en approcher, de peur d'etre infecte. Cette fregate 
est pour Rhodes une triste trophee de Navarin.' 

From Admiral De Rigny.* 

Milo, ler avril, 1828. 

MON GHEE AMIKAL, Je suis, comme vous, sans aucune nou- 
velle instruction de mon gouvernement; mais je suis d' opinion 
qu'on a pu s'exagerer 1'effet du Hati Scheriff, car il ne fait 
aucune sensation chez les Turcs. Je pense qu'il en fera 
da vantage en Russie. 

Yous savez que les batimens egyptiens sont repartis pour 
Alexandrie. Capitaine Latreyte, qui est devant Navarin avec 
T ' Iphigenie ' et un brick, me dit, qu'il passe de terns a autre 
de petits bateaux, mais que ce qu'ils portent n'est pas de 
grande consequence. Je lui ai recommande d'eviter toute 
hostilite, mais d'empecher les transports de vivres ou muni- 
tions d'entrer, et de les renvoyer en Candie. 

Je suis presse de repasser a Egine ; de la j'irai a Smyriie 
pour suivre les communications, s'il y en a, et vous les 
transmettre. II n'y a rien de inieux a faire jusqu'a ce qu'on 
sache ce qu'on veut; car enfin, aujourd'hui, si la Porte ne 
cede pas un peu, il faut la guerre, qu'on veut eviter. 
Guerre directe, ou indirecte; directe en la poussant nous- 
meines et les Russes ; indirecte en la bornant a la Moree et 
a fournir des secours a Capodistrias. C'est en ce sens que 
j'en ai ecrit a iios ministres, qui sont bien embarrasses 
d'autre chose. 

Yous devez penser que j 'ai vivement ressenti la peine que 
vous avez du eprouver en lisant le discours du Roi d'Angle- 
terre. II a pour effet de faire tourner la tete aux Turcs, et 
a nos marchands, et s'il y a guerre, peut-etre le mot (untoward) 

* Received April 12. 


en sera-t-il cause. Quoique vous n'ayez pas re9u les remer- 
cimens du Parlement en cette occasion, vous n'en etes peut- 

etre que place plus hant dans 1'estime publique 

Je crois fermement, qu'il etait (Canning) le seul ministre 
en etat de profiter de la circonstance actuelle, et de con- 
duire a fin cette affaire difficile de 1'Orient. Je crams que 
ses successeurs n'en aient ni le gout ni la capacite. 
Je suis et serai toujours, mon cher Amiral, 

Yotre tres-devoue, 


From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Lord High Admiral. 

Malta : April 12, 1828. 

SIE, I have been so occupied by the arrival of various 
communications from all parts of the Levant, and by reply- 
ing to the late despatch of Lord Dudley, which obliged me 
to review almost all my correspondence as well as the Treaty 
and my instructions emanating from it, that I fear I cannot 
enter into as much detail as I wish respecting what is going 
on, without delaying my reply to his lordship. I most 
anxiously hope that reply will be placed before Your Royal 
Highness immediately, as it is in no way of a secret nature, 1 
but merely concerning my conduct ; there is no additional 
instruction contained in his lordship's letter, but merely such 
observations as tend to complicate the former ones. Every 
day's delay in deciding on the line we are to take adds to 
the difficulty, and will most grievously protract the final 
arrangement of affairs. The letter or address from the Greek 
Bishops at Constantinople to the Greeks, expresses the grounds 
of the insidious interference of the Austrian and Prussian 
Ambassadors without communicating with the Dutch Am- 
bassador, to whom our affairs are entrusted. This document 
I shall put into an official letter, as it belongs to the other I 
have before sent. As, in obedience to my original instruc- 
tions, an entire confidence of communication has been 
established between my colleagues and myself, I submitted 
to their inspection my answers to the Queries, to which they 
signified their perfect sanction. The answer of Admiral De 
Rigny in writing reached me a few days ago, and I enclose 
a copy of it, which I think will be satisfactory to Your Royal 
Highness. The letters of Captain Parker will show how 
erroneous is Lord Dudley's supposition, that the ports of 
Navarin, &c., have not even been watched. He little knows 
how difficult it is to watch any port during the gales of a 
winter in those seas; nor does he appear sensible of any 


other difficulties than in managing the affairs of his own 
office ; for I may say to Your Royal Highness that he has 
largely increased mine by leaving me so long uninformed of 
what policy is to be adopted. I will enclose an extract of a 
letter from Admiral De Eigny upon our present relations 
with the Porte. I am sure Your Royal Highness will not 
suspect me of want of respect to my Sovereign, who has so 
lately honored me with a special mark of his approbation, 
by introducing any remarks upon the word which has ex- 
cited so much sensation ; nor should I have now sent this 
extract if I had not known by Your Eoyal Highness to Sir 
Thomas Fellowes, as well as through Sir Charles Paget from 
His Majesty himself, his disapprobation of the use which 
was made of it. The facts will abundantly show that His 
Majesty took a correct view of this matter at once. 

Count de Heiden, having orders from His Imperial Ma- 
jesty to put to sea, will get away in a few days. He is 
directed to be guided by me ; and he is embarrassed by my 
inability to instruct him how to proceed. I am persuaded 
that the Emperor gave his orders, in fear of my being already 
enforcing without him certain measures which he expected I 
should long ago have been instructed to adopt. 

I have, &c., 


As early as February 24, 1828, a memorandum from 
the Duke of Wellington to his Cabinet proposed 


1. That the three squadrons should blockade the Morea. 

2. That a detachment of the fleet should cruise off Alexan- 
dria to prevent communication between Mehemet Ali and 
Ibrahim Pacha ; and that a Greek ship might attend for 
preventing provisions being sent in neutral ships. 

3. That the Greek Government must name their vessels 
of war, giving each a commission; and to be employed in aid 
of the blockade by the combined fleet for preventing supplies 
by neutral ships. 

Other ships to be employed in the active pursuit and 
destruction of Greek pirates, &c. 

* See ' Wellington Papers/ vol. iv. 


On page 278 in the same volume is the following 
letter from 

The Duke of Wellington to Earl Dudley. 

February 29, 1828. 

* MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY, I think it advisable that your 
proposition at the Conference should, in addition to what I 
proposed in my Memorandum sent in circulation on Wednes- 
day with the letters received from the Admiralty, contain 
orders to the Admirals to intercept the communication 
between Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pacha/ &c. 

And again 

From the Duke of Wellington to Mr. Huskisson.* 

April 5, 1828. 

' But I think we might in the same sense in which we 
wrote heretofore to the Lord Commissioner and to the 
Admiral, write again to both, and inform the first that this 
supposed armistice must not produce a relaxation of the 
measures ordered to prevent the supply of Ibrahim's army 
with provisions from the Ionian islands, Zante, in particular ; 
and to the second, that as it is hoped he will have resumed 
his operations to carry into execution his instructions of 
October 15, it is likewise hoped he will not discontinue them 
in consequence of hearing of this suspension of hostilities 
until he shall have further orders from the Conference in 
London. In respect to the Austrian commerce we must 
speak to Esfcerhazy.' 

Sir E. C. had enforced these arrangements as far as 
possible, and beyond the instructions then in his 
possession ; but these memoranda show that fresh 
instructions were contemplated, and were considered 
necessary. They were, however, c hung up,' according 
to the term used in the following letter : 

From Mr. Huskisson to the Duke of Wellington. 

April 6, 1828. 

' From your letter I infer that you are under the misappre- 
hension that the instructions which I prepared some two or 
three weeks ago for Sir F. Adam have been sent. They as 

* Vol. iv. page 337. 


well as those which had been settled for Codrington were hung 
up by the last note from Lieven, as they embraced several 
points such as the Greeks withdrawing from Scio, Candia, 
and Western Greece, their co-operation with us in the Morea, 
and the supplies to be furnished to them if so co-operating, 
which could not properly be proceeded in except as a joint 
instruction. The interruption of the supplies furnished from 
the Ionian Islands made one part of that despatch, and re- 
ference was also made to the supply by Austrian neutrals, 

A curious comment on the debate of March 5 % 1828, 
is afforded by the above letter, giving distinct evidence 
that fresh instructions were considered necessary, but 
were not furnished to Sir E. Codrington. 

From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. G. 

i Trident/ Milo, 4 avril 1828 * 

MON CHER AMIEAL, Je sens tout 1'embarras de votre 
position par suite du silence de vos ministres. Yous et moi 
n'avons pas 1'avantage, vu 1'inconvenient, que nos demarches 
ne soient pas discutees par le public ; Heiden pent faire tout 
ce qu'il voudra, la presse moscovite ne 1'inquietera pas. J'ai 
envoy e, comrne je vous 1'ai dit, a Corfou, croyant que les trois 
ininistres y seraient reunis. J'ai des nouvelles du 31 du C te 
Guilleminot ; il etait encore seul, et n'avait pas re9u un mot, 
pas plus que moi, de nos ministres : d'ou j'en conclus qu'on 
est assez d'accord, a Londres et a Paris ; mais qu'on ne sait 
pas encore ce qu'on veut faire. II y a, il me semble, de la 
franchise dans la note du C te .Nesselrode ; il propose meme 
d'assez bonnes mesures, mais ! ! ! 

Si la declaration de guerre de la Eussie est reelle, on 
1'aura sans doute fondee sur les griefs particuliers qu'elle a 
pu elever, d'apres les expressions meme du manifeste ; il faut 
convenir que les Turcs ont fourni par la des armes a la 
Russie, et qu'ils ont evidemment calcule que la France et 
1'Angleterre se tiendraient a part, pour le moins. 11 faut 
bien que tout ceci finisse par quelque chose. 

Le ' Warspite ' etait encore il y a deux jours, avec 
1" Iphigenie ' devant Navarin. J'y ai envoy e deux bricks. 
II faut bien esperer que nous recevrons quelque chose apres 
la mission de Lord Stuart. 

Je suis votre tres-devoue, 


* Received April 12. 


From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. G. 

< ConqutSrant : ' ce 13 avril 1828. 

MON CHER AMIRAL, Je ne doute pas que vous n'ajiez eu 
communication de la depeche du C te Nesselrode au Prince de 
Lieven du 14 fevrier. Je viens de la recevoir de Corfou. Le 
Cabinet de la Eussie presse Londres et Paris d'agre*er les 
propositions du 29 decembre en ce qui concerne le Traite ; 
et il fera alors marcher de front ses griefs particuliers contre 
la Porte, et sa co-operation dans le but du Traite. 

Capo d'Istrias demande instaniment des secours. Je n'ai 
encore rien regu de Paris a ce sujet. Cependaiit je lui ai 
fait donner quelques barils de poudre pour Napoli, vu qu'il 
n'y avait pas une seule cartouche. II parait que Heiden a 
regu des authorisations a ce sujet. Le general Guilleminot 
me mande que la Conference de Londres s'etait decidee pour 
la limite de I'isthme de Corinthe ; mais cela avait eu lieu avant 
le ma-nifeste de la Eussie. Certainement ce manifeste est 
tres-habilement redige ; la stupidite des Turcs y a donne 
beau jeu. Cependant il ne faut pas oublier que les griefs 
particuliers dont se plaint le Cabinet Eusse sont le resulat 
du Traite du 6 juillet, et non de celui d'Akerman ; qu'ainsi 
nous ne pouvons etre absolument indiflerents aux complica- 
tions nouvelles et aux exigences que la Eussie en tire. 

Le Trident et 1'Iphigenie et le Palineure 

sont devant Coron et Navarin. J'ai etabli aussi une com- 
munication de 1'Archipel a Corfou. 

Je suis toujours votre tres-devoue, 


From Sir E. C. to Count Capodistrias. 

Malta : April 12, 1828. 

MONSIEUE LE COMTE, I am so pressed with business that I 
can only tell you by this opportunity of the ' Mastiff ' return- 
ing to survey your coast (which is a work more beneficial 
to Greece herself than to England) that I will do my best to 
support your blockade. Captain Parker will readily receive 
and act upon your wishes in that respect, and Count de 
Heiden will send a ship of the line to assist in the same ser- 
vice. I am as yet without further instructions for my pro- 
ceedings. I cannot say how much I regret the difficulties 
which have arisen at Grabusa. I shall instruct Sir Thomas 
Staines to place the fortress at your disposal when you can 
put into it a garrison which will satisfy yourself of its not 
permitting future acts of piracy. 



You are aware of the position being so adapted to the in- 
terruption of commerce, that I should not be justified in 
leaving it undestroyed if I had not full confidence in all your 

Yours, &c. 3 


Sir E. C. to Vice-Admiral Count de Heiden. 

Malta: April 13, 1828. 

let you quit Malta without expressing the pleasure that I 
have had in your society, and in the cordial regard which 
mutual esteem, founded on mutual exertion in obeying the 
orders of our Allied Sovereigns, has cemented between us. 
I had great satisfaction in accepting your friendly offering 
of the star, appropriate to the very distinguished order of St. 
George, with which your august Emperor has honored me. 
Prompted by the same feeling, I was prepared by the first 
private information of both you and our colleague, De Eigny, 
being named Commanders of the Bath, to make you an offer 
of the star which I have often worn. I am confident you 
will not value it the less for having decorated the breast 
which a time of severe trial has warmed with a sincere re- 
gard for you. I have delayed my offering thus long, in 
daily expectation of the official notification of the honor 
intended you, and which, I trust, I shall have very shortly 
to send after you. I hope it will not be long before I receive 
orders from England which will enable us to rejoin our 
squadron, that we may again serve together, and again sup- 
port each other cordially and successfully through whatever 
difficulties we may be destined to encounter. 
Believe me, my dear Admiral, 

Your sincere and faithful friend, 


From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. C. 


MON CHER ET DIGNE AMIRAL, Votre aimable billet d'hier, 
et le precieux don que vous y avez joint, me penetrent d'une 
reconnaissance qu'aucune expression ne saurait bieii rendre. 
Heureux de votre amitie, fier de votre estime, j'en recueille 
toutes les preuves et les conserve dans mon coeur. Vous 
m'associez, mon cher Amiral, d'une maniere genereuse et cor- 


diale a votre gloire militaire en m'offrant cefcte meme etoile 
devant laquelle le Croissant a pali. 

J'en decorerai ma poitrine avec orgueil le jour ou il 
plaira a votre auguste Souverain de m'accorder une dis- 
tinction si flatteuse. Je me dispense d'exprimer ici a Votre 
Excellence tous les regrets que j'eprouve en quittant Malte, 
sans savoir au j uste 1'epoque ou nos escadres se trouveront 
encore reunis. Mais vous me permettrez, j'espere, avant de 
partir, de demander vos directions et vos conseils sur les 
mesures qu'il sera-it opportun de prendre des mon arrivee 
dans 1'Archipel. 

Yeuillez agreer, mon cher Amiral, rhommage des senti- 
mens que vous portera toute sa vie 

Votre plus devoue ami et serviteur, 


Sir E. C. to Vice- Admiral Count De Rigny. 

Malta: April U, 1828. 

cannot be any doubt of the intention of my Sovereign to 
confer on you and our colleague, De Heiden, the Comman- 
dership of the Bath, although some delay in the forms of the 
herald's office has hitherto prevented the insignia reaching 
my hands. Be the cause, however, what it may, I will no 
longer withhold my request that you will do me the kindness 
of accepting from me the accompanying Star of the Order. 
There are no bounds to my satisfaction in reflecting that I 
have been the fortunate medium of a cordiality between our 
professions, which we may hope, according to the wish of 
our august Sovereigns, by whose example we have been 
guided, will extend and become permanent throughout our 
two nations. Nothing of the character of my little offering 
is necessary to remind you of this great national blessing 
which the Treaty of London has originated. But I trust it 
will be received by you as a small token of the respect and 
regard with which I am inspired by the counsel and support 
which I have received from you during the most trying 
period of my professional life. 

Believe me, my dear Admiral, 

Your sincere and faithful friend, 



From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C.* 

' Conque'rant : ' ce, ler juin 1828. 

MON CHER ET DIGNE ADMIRAL, Apres 1'honneur d'etre 
admis dans 1'Ordre du Bain, ce que je pourrais desirer de 
mieux c'est de porter Petoile donnee par votre main. Je 
Taccepte et la re9ois com me un gage durable de votre estime. 
J'ai 1'espoir que vous dans votre pays, comnie moi dans 
le mien, nous serons eleves a quelque consideration pour 
avoir ete les premiers et les heureux instrumens d'une 
alliance que je desire voir durer autant que dureront mon 
respect et mon amitie pour vous. 

Votre tres-devoue, 


Candia was not ordered to be included in the ope- 
rations of the Allies, but the liability of its being used 
for the supply of Ibrahim by boats, &c., induced Sir E. 
Codrington to put restrictive measures in force against it. 
The 'Dartmouth' was sent there with preventive orders; 
and similar instructions were given for the ' Glasgow ' 
frigate at Alexandria to assist in such prevention as 
far as possible, by orders dated April 10, 1828. 

vSfir E. V. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta: April 19, 1828. 
SIR, ...... 

We have various reports of the intentions of Eussia, of which 
your Royal Highness is better informed than I can be. I 
must say, however, that I believe Count Heiden has apprised 
me of all the instructions and information which he has re- 
ceived ; and, as he is evidently one of the most open and 
guileless persons I ever met with, I feel confident he was 
quite sincere in desiring to be guided by me in his present 
movements ; and I think his arrangements of his squadron 
will prove it. It is, however, impossible, I think, that Eussia 
should continue passive under a delay, by which she is suf- 
fering so much more than either of her Allies, however ready 
she may have been to confine herself to the terms of the 
Treaty, so long as she had hopes of its being carried into 
full execution. The Eussian squadron got out on the 17th, 
leaving here one of the ships of the line and a frigate, which 

* Received at Corfu June 25, 1828. 


are to return to Eussia when made equal to the voyage. I 
look with great anxiety for the arrival of the ( Asia,' and the 
receipt of your Royal Highness' further orders. 

Having the honour to be, &c., 


Upon May 3, 1828, the Duke of Wellington quoted, 
in a memorandum to his Cabinet, the circumstance 
mentioned in the following letter from Captain Parker 
of 4 a Turkish fleet being seen to enter Navarin,' as 
the ground for recalling Sir E. Codrington from his 
command; and the despatch of the Cabinet thus re- 
calling him is dated May 18 and June 4, 1828. 

Yet on May 1th there was at the Admiralty (the 
receipt of it acknowledged) another letter from Captain 
Parker correcting this, his own erroneous information, 
and stating that the supposed Turkish fleet was 'a 
French convoy from Alexandria accidentally carried in 
this direction by contrary winds. 7 If this correction 
had been sent to the Duke of Wellington the commonest 
sense of justice would have prevented use being made 
of the original error when the correction of it was 
known. But, nevertheless, the erroneous information 
was used from some unjust or discreditable omission 
as the ground for the recall of Sir Edward Codrington. 
W. J. C. 

From the Wellington Papers, Vol. IV., Page 423. 

Memorandum : The time has come for the Cabinet to 
deliberate whether Sir Edward Codrington shall or shall not 
be recalled. 

May 3, 1828. 

I have just read despatches from Sir Edward Codrington, 
in which he reports that an Egyptian fleet had found its way 
into Navarino. He sends the report on the subject from 
Captain Parker, of the ' Warspite,' who received the inform- 
ation from certain Greeks who saw the fleet enter the port 
from the hills. 



From Captain Parker of H.M.S. 'Warspite,' to Sir E. C.* 

Napoli di Romania : March 3 ; 1828. 

SIR, The Governor of Napoli last night brought intelli- 
gence, from a person on whom dependence could be placed, 
that fifteen large vessels were on Saturda-y morning, 1st 
instant, observed from the heights of Arcadia, standing into 
Navarin Bay.f As this account corresponds with a report 
that had previously reached us of a fleet from Alexandria 
having been seen at Candia ; we come to the conclusion that 
the vessels at Navarin are either out for the purpose of 
removing Ibrahim's forces from the Morea, or bringing 
reinforcements; and I feel very anxious to proceed with 
the ' Warspite ' to ascertain the fact. As our departure 
would, however, defeat every hope that the President enter- 
tains of getting possession of the Palamidi, which becomes 
of more importance in the event of Ibrahim receiving any 
accession of force, I have consented to remain until Wednes- 
day evening, by which time we trust the chiefs Grivas and 
Strato will be induced to retire, and we may at least expect 
further information from Navarin, by the return of a mes- 
senger despatched yesterday with a letter to Ibrahim, 
proposing an exchange of prisoners, a copy of which I have 
the honor to transmit. In the meantime I have directed 
Captain Martin, who joined me on the 25th ult. at Poros 
with despatches from Sir Frederick Adam for Count Capo- 
distrias, to proceed off Navarin for correct intelligence. I 
hope this will be obtained from the 'Iphigenie' French 
frigate which is cruising on that rendezvous. But should 
Captain Martin find it necessary to land, I have charged him 
with the delivery of a duplicate of my letter to Ibrahim 
Pacha., as the ostensible reason for communication. And 
having forwarded from Zante some despatches from Mr. 
Baynes for Sir Frederick Adam, together with this letter, 
and every intelligence that may be obtained for your in- 
formation, the ' Musquito ' will either rejoin me at this 
anchorage or on our passage to Navarin, accompanied by 
the French and Eussian ships, which I hope will meet your 

I have, &c., &c., 


* This letter was sent to the Admiralty by Sir E. C. on March 24. and 
acknowledged April 19, 1828. 

t Subsequently found to be erroneous. 

The report was ascertained to be erroneous, and the fifteen large vessels 
proved to be a French convoy, communicating; with the French frigate off 


From Captain Parker y H.M.S. 'War spite,' to Commander Martin, 
H.M.S. 'Musquito.' 

Napoli di Romania : March 3, 1828. 

* Having received intelligence that fifteen large vessels were 
seen to enter the Port of Navarin on the morning of Saturday 
the 1st inst., it is my direction that you proceed with all 
possible despatch for the purpose of reconnoitring that port 
and Modon, and ascertaining correctly both the force and 
object of those vessels. You will probably obtain every 
necessary information from the captain of the French frigate 
' Iphigenie,' who is stationed on that rendezvous, and for 
whom you will herewith receive a letter on the subject ; but 
if you find it desirable to communicate with Ibrahim Pacha 
(to learn his movements, as well as the object of the vessels 
seen going into Navarin), you are at liberty to land, and 
deliver the accompanying letter in duplicate to him, proposing 
an exchange of Turkish and Greek prisoners. 

From Captain Parker, H.M.S. 'Warspite, 9 to Sir E. C. 

Napoli di Romania : March 7, 1828. 

The messenger who was despatched to Ibrahim Pacha on 
the 2nd inst. is not returned; but reports from various 
quarters all tend to confirm our belief that a fleet of thirty or 
forty sail, including two frigates and several small vessels 
of war, had sailed from Alexandria. Fifteen of the merchant 
vessels, with provisions for Ibrahim's troops, it appears, have 
been left at Suda in Candia ; the rest we imagine to be the 
vessels seen from the heights of Arcadia OFF Navarin on the 
1st inst.f 

From Capt. Martin, H.M.S. ' Musquito,' to Sir E. C. 

Zante : March 8, 1828. 

SIR, I have the honor to inform you that in pursuance 
of the accompanying order from Captain Parker, of H.M.S. 
6 Warspite,' I proceeded to Navarin, and having yesterday 
morning fallen in with the French frigate ' Iphigenie,' I send 
the captain's report for your information. He states that he 
has been cruising off that port for the last seven days ; that 
he had reconnoitred the port on the afternoon of the 8th and 

* See Captain Martin's letter of March 8, 1828, which showed this report 
to be erroneous. 

t Copy to Admiralty March 24, 1828 ; acknowledged April 19, 1828. 


three days prior ; that in Navarin there was only one line-of- 
battle ship (dismasted and entirely unfit for sea) and a brig- ; 
that in Modon there were only two vessels having the ap- 
pearance of men of war, and the rest small craft, most 
probably coasters. That the ' Emulation/ French corvette, 
had arrived from Alexandria with a convoy of fourteen 
vessels, and in passing Navariii had informed him that a 
squadron of Turkish ships, amounting to forty ships, sailed 
from Alexandria on February 15 ; that in the squadron there 
were two large frigates, ten other men of war, corvettes, and 
brigs, the rest transports or merchantmen ; that the French 
representative at Alexandria had received the most positive 
assurances from Mehemet Ali that the squadron was destined 
for Candid (as was publicly made known at Alexandria) and 
that there was no intention whatever of sending it to the Morea. 
It may not be unlikely that the intelligence Captain Parker 
received of fifteen vessels having been seen to enter Navarin, 
arose from the circumstance of the French convoy amounting 
to exactly that number, being off the port. 

At Spezzia, on the afternoon of the 4th, I received infor- 
mation that forty vessels had sailed from Alexandria, twelve 
men of war, and the rest armed transports, no troops 011 
board, only supplies and provisions. The Greeks stated that 
fifteen of the transports remained at Suda, and that the rest 
had proceeded to Navarin or Modon. 

The latter part of this information must be incorrect ; as 
the Captain of the French frigate has not seen any vessels 
in Modon or Navarin, nor have I in my way from Napoli in 
Roumania. I was close off yesterday evening, and could not 
discover any in either port. Having obtained what I conceive 
to be every requisite information from ' Iphigenie,' I did not 
find it necessary to make use of the duplicate letter; and not 
finding any vessels and the wind blowing strong from the 
southward, I arrived here this morning at 10 A.M. I shall 
lose no time in joining the Commodore in completion of my 

I have, &c., 


From Captain Parker, H. M. 8. ' Warspite,' to Sir E. C.* 

Off Navarin: March 17, 1828. 

SIR, The c Warspite ' arrrived off Navarin on the 1 2th 
inst., when I learnt from the Captain of the French frigate 

* Sent to Admiralty April 11, 1828 j receipt acknowledged May 7, 1828. 


' Iphigeiiie,' cruising here, that the vessels reported at Napoli 
to have been seen off this Port on the 1st inst., were a French 
convoy from Alexandria accidentally carried in this direction by 
contrary winds. 

I cannot believe -that the Egyptian fleet will attempt to 
enter either Navarin or Modon collectively, but they may 
attempt to send the supplies from Candia, by single vessels or 
in neutral bottoms ; Sir F. Adam is of this opinion. General 
Guilleniinot seems very anxious that the port should be 
closely watched, and as I am desirous of manifesting a cordial 
co-operation, and cannot reconcile the idea of leaving an 
insufficient force here, I have determined to remain with the 
' Warspite ' on this rendezvous in company with the ' Iphi- 
genie,' until I ascertain positively that the provisions, &c., 
have been landed at Candia,* and the ships of war gone to 

I have, &c., 


From Captain Parker, H. M. S. ' Warspite,' to Sir E. C. 

Off Modon : March 30, 1828. 

SIR, If my letters of the 10th and 17th have reached you, 
they will have apprised you that I had proceeded with the 
' Warspite ' off Navarin and Modon for the purpose of inter- 
cepting the Egyptian convoy from Alexandria, should they 
attempt to enter with supplies for Ibrahim Pacha. The 
6 Armide ' French frigate returned yesterday from Milo, and 
I have positive information from Captain Hugon that after 
landing provisions at Candia, the whole convoy and ships of 
war had returned to Alexandria.f 

From Captain Parker, H. M. S. ' Warspite, 9 to Sir E. C. 

Off Sapienza : April 4, 1828. 

Captain Mitchell, whom I had despatched to Cara- 
busa and Suda for intelligence of the Egyptian convoy, re- 
joined on the 2nd inst., confirming the intelligence that I 
had received from Capitaine Hugon of the c Armide,' of their 
return to Alexandria. :f 

* Candia was excluded from the operations of the Allies, 
t Sent to Admiralty April 11, 1828 j receipt acknowledged May 7, 1828. 
j This extract was sent to Mr. Huskisson, April 30, 1828 j receipt acknow- 
ledged in London May 23, 1828. 


From Captain Parker, H. M. 8. f Warspite, 9 to Sir E. C. 

Off Venetico : April 5, 1828. 

SIB, On examining the Egyptian corvette brig 'Crocodile ' 
this morning, we find, contrary to the statement we under- 
stood her Captain to have made last night, and to which my 
letter of that date alludes, that her hold and decks are full 
of provisions and canvas, and about 250,000 dollars on board. 
I have, therefore, felt it my duty to prohibit her proceeding 
and have warned her off in writing. The Captain has re- 
quested me to allow Ibrahim's secretary to be landed at 
Modon with his despatches, and I have directed Captain 
Smith of the ' Brisk ' to put him on shore, and having re- 
ceived Ibrahim's answer, the Captain of the brig consents to 
return to Alexandria.* 

From Sir E. C. to Captain Parker H. M. S. ' Warspite. 9 

' Ocean/ at Malta : April 23, 1828.* 

SIE, You appear to me to have done precisely as I should 
myself have done as to the Turkish vessels which arrived off 
Navarin. The Greek blockade since established will cut off 
Ibrahim's communications more effectually, and I hope the 
meditated plan of getting over in Ionian boats those supplies 
which the Viceroy of Egypt has sent to an agent at Zante, 
will be frustrated. Since the Viceroy has been false to his 
assertion, that none of the supplies which went to Candia 
were intended for the Morea, we may justly be more rigid in 
turning back vessels actually charged with despatches only, 
by which means we shall also prevent a collision betwixt the 
two belligerents. But all this will now be rendered more simple 
by the Russians being at war with Turkey ; for they will, of 
course, seize every ship they can ; and I imagine the Viceroy 
will take some less ostensible means of keeping up his inter- 
course with Ibrahim. By the observations made by our 
Ministers in Parliament on the transfer of Greeks to Egypt, 
although not at all in accordance with any orders or instruc- 
tions which I have yet received, I am disposed to impede as 
much as possible any such transfer. If, therefore, Ibrahim 
should propose or assent to his return to Alexandria, we must 
stipulate for the exchange of all those Greeks already sent 
over, as well as others he may have in possession. 

I have, &c., 


* Sent to Admiralty April 18, 1828 ; sent to Mr. Huskisson April 30, 
1828 ; receipt acknowledged by Admiralty May 28 ; 1828. 



From Sir E. G. to the Admiralty. 

' Ocean/ at Malta: April 20, 1828.* 

SIR, Although I have already troubled His Royal High- 
ness the Lord High Admiral upon the subject of certain 
observations made in the House of Commons, a repetition of 
similar observations by Mr. Peel and Mr. Huskisson, stated 
to have taken place on April 3, interpreting the instructions 
which I have received differently from the view I have taken 
of them, induces me to recur to it. Mr. Peel is said to have 
stated, 'that Instructions issued before the battle of Navarin, 
and which still remained in full force, directed the Admirals 
in command of the combined fleet to prevent any deportation 
of the sort.' I have again examined the Instructions sent with 
the Treaty in Mr. Stratford Canning's despatch of August 31, 
1827, as well as those of October 15 last, and I do not find 
one word which would justify my interference with the de- 
portation of Greeks who may accompany any of the Ottoman 
forces returning to Egypt. Mr. Peel is said also to have 
stated that ' within forty-eight hours after intelligence of the 
fact reached this country, communications were sent to the 
British Admiral and full inquiry was directed to be instituted,' 
&c. And yet although the receipt of my letter of January 21 
(No. 11) reporting this fact, and thus giving an opening for 
such instructions, is acknowledged by a letter from Mr. Bar- 
row of February 18, the despatch of Earl Dudley consequent 
on it bears date March 18, and still gives me no further or 
precise instruction for the conduct of the ships under my 
orders in case of such deportations being repeated. Mr. 
Peel is further said to have stated, that ' undoubtedly if the 
instructions of Government had been strictly complied with, 
the transportation of those persons would have been pre- 

Certainly I could not have blockaded Navarin effectually 

* Acknowledged May 26, 1828. 


if I would ; His Eoyal Highness knows that I had not the 
means at my disposal of making such an attempt, and that 
the vessels under my orders have been arduously employed 
in the suppression of piracy. 

As to the assertion of this fleet, ' containing sixteen thou- 
sand Greek captives, and having worked its way through the 
superior combined force of the Allies unnoticed, unobserved, 
and unknown,' I trust it does not require any further notice 
from me. 

I beg to assure His Eoyal Highness that I would act upon 
any wish of His Majesty's Government, if I were fully aware 
of it, as readily as I would upon a regular order ; but as this 
wish, respecting the deportation of Greeks, is only thus 
implied in statements in the newspapers, and seems to be 
contradicted by the doubts thrown on the propriety of my 
entering the port of Navarin for the purpose of preventing 
the devastating expedition of Ibrahim Pacha, one of the 
objects of which appears to have been the collection of the 
Greek slaves in question ; and as no such wish as to the 
future is defined in the above despatch of Earl Dudley, it 
does not appear to me that I am sufficiently justified in 
acting upon it. I cannot but lament the necessity of troub- 
ling His Royal Highness upon a subject which at first sight 
may appear to be merely personal : could I have viewed it 
in that light, I would gladly have avoided the harass of 
mind which it occasions at a time when I find that the 
service I have to perform requires all the uninterrupted con- 
sideration I can give it. I feel that my character as Com- 
mander of His Majesty's naval forces on this station is, in 
some measure, implicated by such statements coming from 
such high authority ; and I am confident His Royal Highness 
will agree with me, that whilst I am ready at all times to 
place my life at the disposal of my country, it is not the less 
my duty so to preserve my character from reflection, that I 
may the more perfectly execute the duty confided to me. 
I have the honour, &c., 

EDWD. CODEINGTON, Yice-Admiral. 

Sir E, C to Rear- Admiral Count de Heiden. 

Malta: April 27, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, . . . You will have received 
the Russian declaration addressed to Prince Lieven, and 
your own orders how to act upon it. You will have a more 
serious part to perform ; but the battle of Navarin will have 
much lessened all your difficulties, and I hope the Porte will 


soon be brought to reason. I conclude we and the French 
shall continue to execute the Treaty as before; and our 
joint object, as well as the separate object of Eussia, will be 
promoted by the operations of each. Mr. Miege received & 
copy of the Russian declaration from Count Guilleminot. I 
must say that I think it one of the best, the cleverest, the 
most just, and what you and I understand by one of the 
most straightforward state papers I ever read. I give you 
this opinion freely and in confidence, without knowing what 
view may be taken of it by my own Government. Indeed as 
you are well acquainted with my sentiments, you would have 
felt confident in my thus judging this important document 
if I had not mentioned it. De Rigny had another communi- 
cation with Ibrahim, who still holds the same language of 
devotion to the Sultan's orders, but who would be very glad 
of a fair opportunity for retiring. His father has sent pro- 
visions to an agent at Zante, who is directed to pass them 
over to Modon or Navarin in open boats ; but I hope the 
Greeks will take care and prevent his being supplied in 
this way any longer. All my family desire to be kindly 
remembered to you. 

Yours with great regard, 


From Mr. Huskisson to Sir E. Codrington. 

Downing Street, London : April 6, 1828.* 

SIR, Intelligence has been received that orders have been 
sent to the Commanders-in-Chief, by sea and land, of the 
Ottoman forces in Greece and the Levant, to suspend all 
hostilities for three months. 

The Greeks will of course exercise their own discretion in 
respect to the Armistice. 

The Allied Powers are no parties to these proceedings of 
the Ottoman Porte. Their object must still remain the 
same to carry into effect the Treaty of London ; and their 
measures for this purpose cannot be suspended in conse- 
quence of any steps resorted to by the Ottoman Porte with- 
out their intervention or concurrence. 

I think it right to lose no time in sending you this expla- 
nation, as I have reason to believe that a communication has 
been made to you from the Ministers of Austria and Prussia 
residing at Constantinople, respecting these proposals from 
the Turks to the Greeks. 

* Received April 29, 1828. 


Should an armistice take place between them, it will afford 
His Majesty much satisfaction, not only on the score of hu- 
manity, but possibly as paving the way by negociations be- 
tween the Allies and the Porte, to such arrangements as 
may give a practical execution to the Treaty of London. 

The first step towards this desirable event must be the 
evacuation of the Morea by the Turkish and Egyptian forces. 
The blockade and other measures ordered by the Instructions 
of October 16 (to which you have been recently more than 
once referred), were directed to this object. Those Instruc- 
tions you were still to consider as the guide for your con- 
duct ; and you will appropriate all the naval means at your 
disposal, not wanted for other indispensable services, to 
strictly watching and blockading according to the tenor of 
those Instructions, the ports of Greece occupied by the 
Turks or Egyptians, from the Gulf of Volo to the western 
side of the Isthmus of Corinth ; and to a like blockade of 
the port of Alexandria. 

If any information should reach you from which you m ay 
be led to infer a disposition upon the part of the Pacha of 
Egypt to profit by the armistice in withdrawing his forces 
from the Morea, you will renew to him the assurance and 
offer of affording every facility and assistance in your power 
for that purpose. But you will intimate, at the same time, 
both to Mohammed Pacha and to his son Ibrahim, that in 
return for the aid afforded by His Majesty and his Allies to 
extricate Ibrahim Pacha from the difficulties in which he is 
placed, His Majesty anxiously hopes, from the friendly dis- 
position which the Pacha has always professed towards this 
country, that any Greek women and children who, contrary 
to all the laws of civilised war, have been unfortunately sent 
from the Morea to Egypt since the affair at Navarin, should 
be restored to freedom and placed at the disposal of His 
Majesty's Consul jointly with the Consuls of His Majesty's 
Allies at Alexandria, for the purpose of being sent back to 
their native country. 

Instructions have already been given to our Consul at 
Alexandria to make application to Mohammed Pacha for 
the liberation of these slaves, and to urge it, to the utmost, 
upon His Highness, as a point which His Majesty's Govern- 
ment have greatly at heart. 

I have the honour to be, &c., 



From Sir Edward Codrington to Mr. Huskisson. 

< Ocean/ at Malta : April 30, 1828. 

SIR, I had the honour of receiving your despatch of April 
6, last night. I cannot but regret that it does not define 
explicitly the plan of operations which his Majesty's Govern- 
ment wish me to pursue, instead of referring me to the In- 
structions of October 16, 1827, which have never appeared 
to me to bear the construction that has been given them by 
Earl Dudley's letter of March 18. 

Zealously anxious to perform the duties of my station, not 
only according to the letter and to the spirit of my orders, 
but also, according even to the wish of his Majesty's Govern- 
ment, I have, by my letter of April 7 to Earl Dudley, asked 
for such explanations as appear to me absolutely necessary 
to prevent my falling into errors of primary importance in 
the execution of this difficult service. 

I reckon that my letter will arrive in London about April 
28, and that an answer may reach me about May 14. In 
the meantime I do not propose to assume any other blockade 
than such as I understand by the Instruction of October 16, 
1827, jointly with the Protocol No. 5 of the Ambassadors, 
which is, a support of blockade established by the Greeks 
themselves, and a confinement of their cruisers within pre- 
scribed limits, accompanied by an interception on our part 
of all ships bringing troops, arms, &c. (with the exceptions 
mentioned in the secret letter of the same date), and also a 
prevention of any movements by sea of the Ottoman forces 
within those prescribed. I trust that no injury will arise 
from the short delay which may take place before all doubts 
will be removed by the explanations I shall receive from 
His Majesty's Government, particularly as the disposition 
which I had already made of the ships under my command, 
and the Greek blockade established from Dragomestre to 
Carabusa, will, in the meantime, prevent the efficacy of any 
movement of the Ottoman naval forces. 

In addition to this, looking to the tenor of your instruc- 
tions, I have taken advantage of circumstances to issue the 
accompanying Order,* and I trust that this measure will be 
an additional means of accelerating the evacuation of the 

In my letter No. 49, of March 24, 1828, to the Secretary 
of the Lord High Admiral, which enclosed copies of those of 
the Austrian and Prussian ministers at Constantinople, and 

* An order to intercept vessels with supplies corning from Candia to 


more fully in my letter to Vice Admiral De Kigny, I ob- 
served that the proposal therein mentioned appeared to me 
to embrace merely that measure which the Ambassadors of 
the Allies had rejected as inadmissible. I have since sent 
to the Secretary of the Lord High Admiral, the letter of the 
Greek Patriarch substantiating this fact ; and I have now 
the honour of adding a letter from Monsieur de Canitz, cor- 
recting the erroneous impression which his predecessor's 
letter was calculated to give. These documents would appear 
to dispel all hopes of the proposed suspension of hostilities 
leading to any eventual good ; at all events, I at once de- 
clined, as you will see by my communications, becoming a 
party to any such propositions ; thus anticipating the sub- 
stance of the 3rd paragraph of your despatch of April 6. 

Should an armistice, nevertheless, take place, I shall, of 
course, guide myself by the tenor of your Instructions and 
forward the pacific purpose of the Treaty to the utmost of 
my power. 

You will see by the accompanying extract of a letter to 
Captain Parker, of the Warspite,' that I have also, in some 
measure, anticipated the latter part of your Instructions, re- 
lative to the redemption of the Greeks conveyed to Alexan- 

In reference to the term of ' a like blockade,' it is right for 
me to observe that the extension to Alexandria of a similar 
blockade to that prescribed for the coast of Greece, ' pre- 
venting the movement of any Ottoman naval forces from one 
port to another,' would cut off all communication with the 
most contiguous Ottoman dependencies. In this case the 
Viceroy would either offer an open hostile resistance, for 
which he is making active preparations, or he would resort 
to the aid of Austrians and other neutrals, the interruption 
of which would seern to be an assumption of belligerent 
rights, contrary to the doctrine laid down in Earl Dudley's 
letter to Prince Esterhazy of November 20, 1827. 

When I adopted a partial blockade of the port of Navarin, 
I was accused by the Austrian officers of having usurped the 
rights of a belligerent without having given due notification ; 
a blockade of Alexandria, even if limited, would, no doubt, 
meet with the same objections from neutrals, whilst it would 
militate greatly, at this particular period, against both 
French and English interests. The trade with Alexandria 
is almost the only trade now left to Marseilles, and, as this 
has been the particular object of France, it would probably 
be very sensibly felt by the French Government. 

It is hardly necessary for me to remind you that its effects 


on Malta would be still more fatal. Now that the usual 
supplies are cut off from Odessa, and that France herself as 
well as Leghorn is importing, Egypt is become a source of 
the greatest importance towards the subsistence of the 
numerous population of this island. I may also add that 
ships on Government account for this island are now loading 
with corn at Alexandria under the protection of our vessels 
of war. 

It is perhaps necessary for me to explain that, in the ob- 
jections to the blockade of the port of Alexandria singly, 
which I have now submitted, I consider it as a measure very 
different from a general and rigid blockade of all the Otto- 
man ports at once, which, as I have before suggested, would 
probably have forced the Porte to accede to the Treaty ; a 
measure which, even now that the Sultan is so much more 
prepared for resistance, I still think, besides expediting the 
pacification of Greece, might be the means of restoring his 
amicable relations with Russia, and by diminishing the 
period of his resistance, diminish proportionably the injury 
which will unavoidably attend it. 

In the observations which I have here introduced I have 
been actuated by a desire to inform His Majesty's Govern- 
ment of what is my own impression, as being more contig- 
uous to the scene of action, and to enable them to define 
their wishes, so as to prevent my falling into error which 
may lead to consequences not in their contemplation. 

I have not, I cannot have, a partiality for any one line of 
policy in preference to another. My object is to ascertain 
clearly the intentions of my Government ; the principle of my 
conduct to pursue their fulfilment to the utmost of my 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta: May 4, 1828. 

SIR, I cannot any longer withhold my pen from the expres- 
sion of my anxiety for Your Royal Highness's perfect recovery, 
and your being again able to superintend the important con- 
cerns which have already benefited so much by your direc- 
tions. I may safely say for myself that but for the protec- 
tion I have had under Your Royal Highness's command, I 
should not have been able to execute fully and satisfactorily 
the multiplied and harassing duties which have fallen to my 
share. The Council find fault with my not sending more. 



frequent dispositions of the squadron. I am persuaded that 
no Admiral ever wrote more fully upon this and all other 
passing events than I have done. But in such service as 
this in which we are engaged, it is quite impossible to say at 
all times where the ships actually are. Even the senior 
officers in the Levant at times report vessels at particular 
spots in those seas, when they are actually at Malta : and I 
in return lead them to expect the aid of vessels which never 
get within their reach. I am aware, by reference to Lord 
Dudley's letter, that search has been made at the Admiralty 
for this information at a time when his Lordship mistakenly 
says the coast of the Morea was not even watched, since he 
quotes a mere acknowledgment by me of the instructions of 
October 6, whi^h contains no other information. Admiral 
De Rigny and Captain Hamilton both took opportunities of 
informing themselves as to what was passing then, even be- 
fore Captain Parker had the superintendence of that service, 
which he has performed so ably. If Ibrahim had told me 
he was going to send away those ships in that state, and so 
filled with Greeks as well as others, I could not, consistently 
with my instructions, have interfered. If, indeed, they had 
returned with supplies and reinforcements, I might be open 
to comment. But Your Royal Highness will see that whilst 
Sir T. Staines has executed my orders so fully in destroying 
piracy, Captain Parker has been equally successful in pre- 
venting supplies going from Alexandria to the Morea. 

In fact, but for Ionian boats over which Sir F. Adam him- 
self had no control until we effected a blockade by the 
Greeks, Ibrahim would by this time have been at our mercy. 
I will only further assure Your Eoyal Highness that I shall 
most gladly find myself in those seas again, under instruc- 
tions by which I can guide myself without falling into errors 
which might lead to serious consequences : for the being 
at sea will be to ine a great relief from the sedentary pen- 
it id-ink employment under anxiety to avoid censure, which 
my health would not much longer support. 

I am, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Captain Parker, H.M.S. ' Warspite.' 

Malta : May 5, 1828. 

MY DEAR SIR, I have an instruction from Mr. Huskisson 
to establish a like blockade at Alexandria to that on the coast 
oi Greece directed by an instruction of October 15, which was 
merely to confine the Greeks to their own coast from Volo 


to tlie Aspropotamo. I have replied that a like blockade is 
impracticable, and that therefore I shall only, until I have 
further order, include Candia in our partial blockade accord- 
ing to the accompanying order. This order will confirm 
you in what you heretofore did as to the vessels going to 
Ibrahim, and thus increase his difficulty. And as Adam has 
now formally warned lonians not to break the blockade, I 
think the said Pacha will shortly propose returning to Egypt. 
I wish the proposal to come from, him and not from us as 
De Kigny's letters indicate; because he would then the 
more readily agree to restore the Greek slaves. 

Although it is signified in a sort of way by both Lord 
Dudley and Mr. Huskisson that I ought to have prevented 
the taking the Greeks to Alexandria, neither of them ven- 
tures to give clearly that interpretation to the instruction of 
October 15, to which they refer, because they know it will 
not bear it ; and under such circumstances, and seeing such 
disposition to put me in the wrong, I dare not act otherwise 
than as my instructions shall justify. You have acted quite 
in the spirit of my orders, and will see that I now take 
advantage of the deception offered to be passed on you* to 
draw the line tighter. 

Sincerely yours, 


I do not like to show myself in the Levant until I can 
take decisive measures of some sort. Explain this to Count 

From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : May 8, 1828. 

SIE, Although the errors which are imputed to me in 
letters from Your Eoyal Highness's secretary are probably 
without Your Royal Highness's knowledge, as being of trivial 
import compared with the many matters of most serious 
consideration upon which my mind is necessarily fixed at 
this moment, I must say it hurts me that there should be 
upon record any appearance of my having acted inconsistently 
with any wish of Your Eoyal Highness's. I can safely say 
that the labour and anxiety of searching through all the 
documents which I have to consider, for j ustification of my- 
self against the errors which have been imputed to me, has 
more than once disabled not only myself but all the people 
in my secretary's office. No doubt it is our duty to make 
* By the Greeks. 
s 2 


this sacrifice, and we shall always be ready to do it. But it 
will be evident to Your Royal Highness that a protracted 
failure of this sort would subject the more important branches 
of this important service to injury ; and it is therefore that 
I now take the liberty of mentioning it. The want of that 
disposition of the squadron which is now complained of, has 
perhaps been the cause of Lord Dudley imagining I was 
sitting down quietly with my family and leaving the affairs 
of the Levant to take their chance. It would have been 
much more agreeable to me, that a search of the Admiralty 
records should have explained to his Lordship or any other 
of his Majesty's Ministers, the real occupation of my time ; 
a matter, however, which has been, I trust, clearly made 
known to Your Royal Highness by the addition of my private 
letters. Information of this sort would have saved his Lord- 
ship the pain of attributing to me errors which I have had 
the pain of throwing back upon him by a reference to his 
own directions. Enquiry of me in the first instance would 
also have prevented statements attributed to Mr. Huskisson 
and Mr. Peel in the House of Commons, which facts will 
sooner or later contradict. And they would have been also 
saved the pain of attributing to me misconduct, which such 
enquiry would have enabled me to place to the account of 
circumstances which we could none of us control. I know 
my situation too well to discuss the right or wrong of what 
is disapproved of in the name of Your Royal Highness ; and 
shall feel well contented with the happiness I have in finding 
expressions of satisfaction in the confidential letters with 
which Your Royal Highness honors me. I therefore refer 
to these matters only to prevent any ill impression being 
given to Your Royal Highness, and to prevent at the same 
time any deterioration of the multiplied and important duties 
by which my mind should be almost entirely engrossed. I 
write in some apprehension of my thus expressing myself 
having the air of complaint ; yet I think I can rely upon 
Your Royal Highness's usual kindness for attributing it to 
its true motive. 

Complaint indeed I am obliged to make of the enclosed 
letter* or note, coming to me as if in answer to my official 
letter asking his Majesty's permission to wear the Insignia 
therein referred to, increasing the confusion detailed in my 
said letter and unaccompanied by the decorations themselves. 
The delay respecting these honors has been sensibly felt by 
Count Heiden ; and I must confess it is somewhat painful to 

* A note without a signature, beginning with ' Mr. Croker's compliments.' 


me, the not being yet empowered to fulfil my own Sovereign's 
intentions of a similar nature towards the Count himself and 
Hie Chevalier De Rigny. I should inform Your Royal High- 
ness that I had a similar note in Mr. Croker's name, my 
answer to which, from its irregularity, I particularly re- 
quested might be acknowledged ; but which has not procured 
me such an acknowledgment, although I have received it of 
the letters by which it was accompanied. When Your Eoyal 
Highness considers the subject of the documents demanded 
in the name of Mr. Croker, you will understand the grounds 
of my uneasiness. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Mr. HusJcisson, Secretary of State for the 


' Ocean/ at Malta : May 12, 1828.* 

SIR, I have the honor of enclosing the copy of a letter 
which I yesterday received from Vice- Admiral Chevalier De 
Rigny, respecting the Island of Samos. This island being, 
as it were, detached from the Treaty, and under peculiar 
circumstances, makes me desirous of having the particular 
instructions of my Government respecting it. 

I have received, also, from Count de Heiden a private 
letter, as well as official reports from officers under my com- 
mand, which give an unpleasant picture of the proceedings 
off the ports of Coron, Modon, and Navarin. The commodore 
of the ' Trident ' (le Commodore Arnous) appears to have 
permitted a Turkish vessel to go into Modon, which, under 
similar circumstances, had previously been turned back by 
Captain Parker, of the ' Warspite.' Concluding that com- 
munications respecting this affair have been already sent to 
you by Sir Frederick Adam, I will not enter into the details 
on the present occasion. It has produced much ill-blood 
between the French and Count de Heiden, who attributes 
the return to order of the revolted Albanians at Coron, to 
their having been paid money claimed by them, which was 
carried in by the Turkish vessel before mentioned. Count 
de Heiden does not appear to have received any new instruc- 
tions up to the if April, although despatches which came 
from Naples to Malta must have reached him very shortly 
afterwards. Although my flag-ship is not yet arrived, I think 
iny presence may be more beneficial to the service at this 
moment off Navarin than here ; and I therefore shall profit 
* Received June 14. 


by Commodore Campbell's offer, and proceed to sea to-mor- 
row morning in the ' Ocean,' for the purpose of adjusting 
these differences as far as I am able. Having so done, it is 
my intention to return here to meet such despatches as may 
be collected for me, to remove my flag into the ' Asia,' and 
then again proceed to the Levant. It is very difficult to 
judge of what turn affairs may take in that quarter ; but as 
I am desirous of giving Government every information in my 
power, I will trouble you on the present occasion with rny 
opinion of what is likely to take place. I think that, not- 
withstanding the unpleasant occurrences before alluded to, 
the measures which I had previously taken, and which are 
now in more full execution, will reduce Ibrahim Pacha to 
the necessity of making proposals to us for his return to 
Egypt. I consider the invitation lately made to him by 
Vice-Admiral De Eigny, so immediately following the mis- 
sions of Sir Frederick Adam and Colonel Cradock, as unfor- 
tunate although- certainly well intended. 

I consider the present object of the Government to be not 
only the retirement of the Egyptian forces, but the restora- 
tion of the Greeks whom those forces have made slaves. If the 
first measure be obtained by Ibrahim's assenting to proposals 
originating with us, he might claim a right to exact condi- 
tions ; if, on the contrary, we reduce him to the necessity of 
making proposals to us and nothing but necessity will 
produce his consent, with whomsoever they may originate 
we shall be able to claim conditions from him. The condi- 
tions which I should then claim would be the restoration of 
the Greeks in question, and as many others as can be 
obtained in exchange, as it were, for his army. Even his 
consent to this arrangement would leave great difficulties to 
be overcome as regards the harems of himself and his officers, 
which require the instructions of his Majesty's Government 
thereon. There will still be many difficulties left to be over- 
come as to the means of conveying them to their destination, 
although it is a subject about which my mind has been much 
occupied. The whole of the fleet forming the last Egyptian 
expedition was not competent to convey more than half the 
people, which, according to report, would now have to be. 
carried back ; and you are aware that all the vessels which 
the Viceroy of Egypt could now collect would be insufficient 
for the purpose, except by the hire of transports. In the 
case of my being called upon to procure the assistance of 
transports for facilitating the return of the Egyptian forces, 
I wish to be informed if I am to stipulate with Ibrahim 
Pacha that the freight of these hired transports shall be paid 


by the Pacha of Egypt, or if I am permitted, under any cir- 
cumstances, to assent to a different arrangement. 

I am, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Sir Frederick Adam at Corfu. 

Malta : May 12, 1828. 

MY DEAE ADAM, The ' Rifleman' brought me yesterday 
evening her budget from other quarters as well as your letter 
of the 5th. Complication seems to succeed complication ; 
and I fear the half-measure system which we seem to have 
decided on pursuing will eventually fulfil the prophecies of 
those who have foretold a war either with Russia or the 
Porte before the affairs of the Levant are settled. I still 
feel confident that if I had received such orders as I expected, 
and as appeared to me to belong to the Treaty, we should 
have prevented a Russian war with Turkey, and by this time 
have settled the whole affair. As it is, I may wear out my 
time here, and leave quite enough work for any ambitious 
successor, before things arrive at that state. I have been 
long expecting the * Asia,' the delay in the return of which 
is unaccountable and rather mysterious. I am, however, 
obliged to hamper my friend Campbell with my flag, in con- 
sequence of the proceedings of the French off Navarin and 
Modon, in letting vessels into those ports which Parker had 
turned away. It will be quite impossible to bring them and 
the Russians to act together again with any cordiality. 
Indeed, De Heiden thinks them playing the game of Ibrahim 
against us. The conduct of the Albanians seems to have 
depended upon the money which the French allowed to enter 
Modon. If the 'Asia' were here I should enter at once 
upon my quarantine campaign. But, as it is, I must either 
turn Campbell into a mere flag captain, or consent to live 
upon him for an indefinite period as a friend, without either 
my own officers about me or the other means of making my 
ship my professional home. Under these circumstances, I 
intend to avoid, if possible, getting into quarantine on the 
present occasion, and, therefore, shall probably return with- 
out seeing you, to meet the ' Asia' here. I should find it 
awkward to receive from Count Guillerninot singly any am- 
bassadorial instruction, more particularly now that the two 
corps with whom I am allied seem at such variance. I 
believe De Heiden has reported his complaint to him as well 
as to De Rigny, by whose orders in what he did the captain 
o the ' Trident' says he was acting. 


I could wish Mr. Huskisson were aware of the situation of 
affairs here, that he might feel the effects of the milk-and- 
water way in which Mr. Canning's plans are now being car- 
ried on. You were surprised at my expectation, some time 
ago, that the affairs of the Levant would be settled this 
summer. I shall, perhaps, now get into the other extreme. 
But I had then seen a despatch of Count Nesselrode's ac- 
companying the substance of the proposal of Russia of Decem- 
ber 25, which gave me reason to expect orders to act up to 
that proposal. And I still think that if on the 13th of last 
month the Sultan had been told, that unless in eight days he 
accepted our mediation war would be declared by the Allies 
and his ports blockaded, the business would have so ended. 
However, here we are, and now we must try and make the 
best of it. I cannot believe that De Rigny will justify the 
commander of ' le Trident ; ' but at all events I cannot. I 
shall send a short letter upon this subject, I think, to Mr. 
Huskisson by way of Naples, and another through you ; but 
I hardly know which of my several masters I ought to write 
to on this occasion. De Rigny's letter to Ibrahim, I am 
sure, is well meant ; but I must say I think it ill-judged. He 
was not likely to succeed when your mission had just failed. 
But he asserted that Russia had declared war, whio,h De 
Heiden might well consider hasty, and as opening hopes to 
the Turks of the Treaty being annulled. But each party has 
gone too far ; and you will see in it a spirit which, I assure 
you, required in me more caution from the first than will 
now restore harmony. However, my present object is to put 
this object to rights as well as I can, and to reduce Ibrahim 
to make proposals to us ; in which case I can stipulate for the 
return of the Greeks from Alexandria in the first instance. 
Having put this in train without getting into quarantine, I 
propose returning here to put myself into the 'Asia,' and 
then see you, and pursue the object of our Government as 
far as I can ascertain it by their orders and instructions. 

As to Capodistrias, I hope it is not quite as decided as you 
suppose. We must recollect that it is Russian money only 
that enables him to go on. He, like the others, claims my 
presence as a remedy for difficulties, thinking I have a power, 
the absence of which disinclines me from quitting Malta. 
It was my wish, and, I trust, entirely divested of selfish 
feelings, not again to appear personally in the Levant until 
I could carry with me a decision, which now I look for only 
in despair. 

Yours with great regard, 



P.S. Samos is a new difficulty which will keep De Rigny 
in that quarter. Let me hear from you off Navarin. I have 
found the instruction of 1826 about Greeks which you reason 
upon, and which, Mr. Peel said, fell to the ground upon its 
appearing Ibrahim had not the intention reported. It is 
endorsed as executed, which prevented my examining it. I 
see it gives me no power whatever to conclude that under 
our present circumstances I could have interrupted the ships 
in question. In fact I knew nothing whatever of the move- 
ment, not being able to blockade Navarin if 1 would. 

This correspondence will show clearly one of the 
great difficulties of Sir Edward Codrington's position, 
the having to keep up harmony (where harmonious 
action was indispensable) between two coadjutors so 
unsympathetic so antagonistic to each other in national 
feelings and interests. 

That he did succeed in it was most fortunate for 
the service in which they were jointly engaged; and 
it was owing to the power he acquired over them both, 
by the influence of his own character, and the warm 
regard towards himself with which that character had 
inspired them. 

As time and intercourse changed the tone of corre- 
spondence from the expression of esteem into that of 
friendship and intimacy, the private letters of Admiral 
Heiden became more and more informal, until they 
reached that familiar style of freshness and originality 
which gave them so much zest passing (as in his 
conversation) from one language to the other, according 
as he found in each the words best suited to express 
his thought. The following is a specimen of these 
hearty and amusing letters. 

From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. C. 

1 Azoff/ at Sea before Modon : April - 1828.* 

DEAR ADMIRAL, We arrived before Navarin three days 
ago, and found here coming the French squadron, the 'Trident,' 
'Iphigenie,' with two bricks, some Greek bricks, and the 
' Rifleman.' Captain Mitchell was so kind as to join me as 
soon as he saw me. By that occasion we saw the superior 
sailing of that vessel, and as I suppose the 'Pelican' her 
* Received May 11 j answered May 14. 


no trial is necessary to be convinced that she sails 
better than any of our squadron ; et done, point de pari, je 
baisse pavilion. Avant d'aller plus loin je vous prierai, Mons. 
FAmiral, de faire savoir a tous vos batimens qui pourraient 
me rencontrer, que si je hisse le Jack on the main-top I wish 
to speak that vessel ; de cette maiiiere j'aurai occasion de vous 
ecrire plus souvent. C'est dommage que nous n'avons pas 
vos signaux, on ne peut rien se dire que de vive voix. Je 
desirerais beaucoup que vous eussiez une croisiere dans ces 
parages. Le ' Warspite ' y a fait beaucoup de bien, tandis 
que mes chers Frenchmen they seem to be the allies of Ibrahim 
against us; they have every day parlementaire with him, as 
they say pour le persuader d'evacuer la Moree. L'amiral 
de Rigny lui a fait dire que la Eussie avait declare la guerre 
a la Turquie, et, chose incroyable, a donne des instructions 
au capitaine du 4 Trident ' de faire entrer des batimens de 
guerre a Modon, pourvu que, s'ils viennent avec des provisions 
on de 1'argent, ils doivent jeter cela a la mer, et ensuite ils 
peuvent y entrer. Unfortunately, I caught them en flagrant 
delit, car a mon arrivee devant Modon, je vis 1'escadre 
fran9aise au vent de moi, ayant avec elle une corvette 
turque; j'envoyai sur-le-champ ma fregate pour savoir ce 
que c'etait et me 1'amener, ce qui ne plaisait pas a monsieur 
le commandant, qui 1'avait depuis dix jours pres de soi. 
Cette corvette avait ete ici du terns du ' Warspite,' qui la 
renvoya jusqu'en Candie. Je priai le commandant fra^ais 
de la renvoyer de suite, d'apres nos instructions communes, 
que je lui lus moi-meme. C'est alors qu'il me communiqua 
ses ordres, en me priant d'envoyer la corvette a Modon, 
apres 1'avoir strictement visitee, ayant donne sa parole 
d'honneur a Ibrahim de la faire entrer. Reponse : ' Monsieur, 
si vous avez donne votre parole d'honneur en opposition 
directe des instructions du protocole que nous connaissons, 
vous devez avoir vos raisons, et done je laisse cette corvette 
a votre responsabilite. Mais comme maintenant je suis ici 
le plus ancien, je vous prie de vouloir bien ne pas permettre 
a quelque batiment que ce soit d'entrer a Modon ou Navarin ;' 
ce qu'il m'a promis. J'y ai ajoute que des que je verrais M. 
de Rigny je me faisais fort de lui faire avoir ce meme ordre. 
II m'assure qu'il est en pourparler avec Ibrahim pour 1'evacua- 
tion de la Moree; but it is all stuff. Je lui ai dit, ' N'en croyez 
rien, il vous trornpe, c'est un homme sans foi ni loi, et vous 
devez le savoir, monsieur, par ce qui est arrive 1'annee passee.' 
Another brig of war, Turkish, came in yesterday morning 
under their nose, and they speak with the captain, who had 
a little fight with two Greek brigs. So the commandant told 


me. Unfortunately we were on the west side of Modon, and 
the brig came from, the east. Of course I turned myself to 
the eastward, and am with a fresh breeze from the S.-E. at 
this hour, on the east side of Modon, and don't care much 
about them. Nous prendrons soin de prevenir Mr., I don't 
know his name. He is gone again to Ibrahim, as I suppose, 
to tell him all the news he heard from me ; and to console 
him, for by their former news, I believe, Ibrahim, was expect- 
ing me to attack him. Two days ago he left Old Navarin, 
and concentrated all his forces in Modon and Navarin. In 
Coron the Albanians, who are the strongest, are in rebellion 
for not having received their pay. But I suppose the French 
Commodore will send the money from the corvette, if she has 
any, to him. It is a pity the ' Warspite ' is gone ! As soon 
as the weather will permit, I will go to Coron to know myself 
what they are about. My intention is to leave the ' Ezekiel ' 
and the ( Castor ' (when she joins) here, mais n'ayant rieii de 
cotnmun avec les Fran9ais, puisque ses instructions sont 
diametralement opposees aux notres, c'est-a-dire des trois 
amiraux. Nous aurons une petite guerre avec le cher Rigny ; 
mais je vous avoue que maintenant je suis surpris, car nous 
avons les faits et les document en main. Je voudrais vous 
voir arriver. 

Yotre tres-devoue serviteur et ami, 


Sir E. C. to Count de Heiden. 

1 Ocean/ at Sea : May 14, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, I received your letter of April if, by 
the * Rifleman ' before I left Malta. I will begin by referring 
to the part of it that is the most important, that is the con- 
duct of the French Commodore and the orders of your 
colleague. The line of proceeding adopted by them is cer- 
tainly one of which I cannot approve, although I think it 
admits of some palliation. The French having lost the trade 
of Smyrna, which was very extensive, have been doing their 
utmost to secure that of Alexandria. Their intercourse with the 
Viceroy, and the greater confidence he had in them, arose out 
of this ; and although De Rigny is as much alive to Ibrahim's 
deceptions as we are, he finds it right, on account of the 
people of Marseilles, to keep up as well as he can that friendly 
communication which will facilitate a renewal of mutual 
confidence. This, I have no doubt, led to his late letter 
to Ibrahim ; and was also the occasion of his strengthen- 
ing his advice by statements which have given you offence, 
and which exceed the bounds of prudence. / most certainly 


would not have so written, or have so acted ; but I will not 
undertake to say I might not have done so if I had been in 
his peculiar situation. That he has been guided by the best 
motives, 1 have no doubt. He, like us, is anxious to induce 
Ibrahim to retire to Egypt ; and he probably thinks that if 
lie could effect it after our failure, he would eventually receive 
a return from the benefit which Egypt would derive from it. 
Besides being led by this feeling to strengthen his reasoning 
with Ibrahim, I have no doubt but the same consideration 
induced him to permit that partial supply which we cannot 
but disapprove. I hope the view which I have thus taken 
of this affair, will diminish your discontent with our colleague 
and those of his nation ; and that instead of suffering it to 
interfere with the harmony which is so necessary to the final 
success of our mutual object, you will only join with me to 
counteract by a more sharp look-out any little ill effect of 
this narrow policy. Henceforward 1 shall most likely have 
some older officer off the Morea, with orders to enforce the 
blockade more strictly ; and I expect that Ibrahim will by 
this means be soon brought to make proposals to us. This 
is my policy, instead of making proposals to him. Nothing 
but necessity will induce him to retire in opposition to the 
orders of the Sultan, however much he may wish himself at 
home again. Aided by the Greek blockade, we can soon put 
him to that necessity. If then we induce him to make pro- 
posals to us, we who are not strong can exact from him the 
condition of his restoring not only all the Greeks lately 
carried to Alexandria, but others who have been seized by 
him and made slaves since the war, as the price of our assist- 
ance. If he agree to this, which I think he must whether he 
like it or not, I should propose that the ships which we should 
then permit to come from Alexandria for the purpose, should 
bring back the Greeks, to be exchanged for some of his troops. 
We might readily allow a larger number of his people to 
be taken back ; but we should certainly keep his principal 
officers as well as himself, as a sort of ' bonne bouche,' to 
ensure the restoration of any Greeks who might be purposely 
concealed arid kept back in Egypt. My object in now coming 
from Malta, where the ' Asia ' is daily expected to arrive, and 
encumbering my friend Commodore Campbell with my flag, 
is to make arrangements to the above effect. I wish to be 
able to return to Malta without being in quarantine, and I 
therefore propose having no personal communication but 
according to the rigid rules which are now laid down by the 
Health Office at that island. Whenever I return to these seas 
in the ' Asia,' I must communicate freely with all parties, as 


usual. The attack on Samos, which I find by a letter from 
Admiral de Rigny, the Turks are preparing to make, must 
decide us on including it under our protection as much as 
Hydra or any other island near the Greek coast. I shall 
write to De Rigny to this effect, and I hope you will take the 
same view of it. Indeed, you have now a much more straight- 
forward game to play than we have ; you can take a lead in 
any suit, and can play out trumps with impunity; whilst I 
require the eyes of an Argus, and could not with impunity 
go half the length which our colleague has latterly done. 

Towards the middle of May, 1828, when the measures 
adopted by the allied Admirals were leading to decisive 
results, Sir Edward Codrington left Malta in H.M.S. 
' Ocean,' as his own flag-ship, the 'Asia/ had not 
arrived. He was off Navarin on the 19th May, in the 
Gulf of Coron on the 21st and 23rd May, where he com- 
municated by letter with Ibrahim Pacha ;* again oft 
Navarin on the 24th May, returning to Malta on the 
30th May to meet his flag-ship the 'Asia/ the arrival of 
which he heard of on the 29th May, when at sea in the 
'Ocean/ He had thus been deprived of any proper 
ship in which to go to sea with his flag, for a period of 
seven months. 

The imminence of war being declared between Turkey 
and Russia the latter Power being a party to the 
Treaty now became an additional element of difficulty. 
Count Heiden received the Declaration of War on the 
29th May; but he had orders to keep his character as a 
belligerent in abeyance when acting in concert with the 
Allied squadrons. 

Sir E. C. left Malta in the 'Asia' on the 13th June, 
in order to meet his brother admirals and Mr. Stratford 
Canning at Corfu, and concert measures with them ; it 
was there, on the 21st June, that he received Lord 
Aberdeen's letters of recall. 

Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

On board H.M.S. 'Ocean': May 17, 1828. 

I could not have made a better hit, if trespass I must upon 
any captain of twenty-eight years' standing; for my friend 

* See Appendix. 


Campbell* goes on steadily in his own quiet way, without 
seeming to be in the least put out by me. His ship is a 
more roomy 'Asia ' ; and as I have a large slice of the after- 
cabin allotted to me (as you may have observed it when you 
were on board), 1 have more swinging room than I have in 
the f Asia.' We are still above 100 miles from Navarin. 

Sunday, 18. 

Sapienza in sight, some forty miles off. The more I look 
back into the duty I have had to perform, and the more I 
scrutinise the manner in which I have executed it, the more 
I am satisfied with myself and dissatisfied with the proceed- 
ings and the policy of men in power upon whom the further 
execution of the Treaty depends. There are two erroneous 
impressions that possessed my mind at an early period cer- 
tainly. But even now that I have had reason to dispel them, 
I cannot find fault with myself for having entertained them. 
The first is the insincerity of De Eigny, and the second the 
disposition of the Viceroy of Egypt to obey the wish of the 
Allies. Now, as you know-, aye and even in spite of H.'s 
late letter, I am confident of De Rigny meaning to act 
honestly and correctly according to the Treaty ; and not less 
so of the Viceroy intending to retain his allegiance to the 
Sultan, because he thinks it will better suit his ambitious 
views so to do. He has certainly been cajoling us, and I 
suspect the Sultan has all along been cajoling him, without 
the least intention of giving him either Syria or Damascus, 
which he so much covets. God bless you all, says 

Your ever affectionate, 


Sir E. C. to Captain Parlter. 

1 Ocean,' off Navarin : May 19, 1828. 

MY DEAR SIR, From what has taken place betwixt Count 
de Heiden and le Commodore Arnous, as to the latter per- 
mitting the * Crocodile ' to enter Modon after your having 
turned her back, and indeed other vessels, in a manner 
which has given great offence to the Russians I am induced 
to say I wish you were here. Under these circumstances, 
and in the view of reducing Ibrahim to solicit our aid in re- 
turning with his forces to Egypt, the support of the Greek 
blockade in these parts is of the utmost importance ; and 
the prevention of communication betwixt the suspected in- 
fections of Hydra and those on the mainland appears to be 
of minor importance, and one which may be left to others. 

* Commodore Patrick Campbell. 


I bave written to the President a proposal that the ' Perse- 
veranco,' with some other vessels as a flotilla, should occupy 
the Gulf of Lepanto and prevent supplies getting across to 
Patras, where I hear Ibrahim has sent a division of his 
army. Another division is said to be at Calamata, each in 
search of food, which is beginning to be scarce. I have not 
yet been into the neighbourhood of Coron to communicate 
with Commodore Arnous, as I intend to do, my opinions as 
to the mode of blockading; nor indeed have we yet been 
able to look into Navarin. I think Count Guilleminot will 
probably instruct the commodore to adopt a different mode 
of proceeding ; and I think De Rigny will do the same when 
he hears from De Heiden. I have no doubt of De R. in- 
tending to do what he thought the best for inducing Ibrahim 
to retire; and that the commodore has exceeded his orders; 
and I think the prejudice of those about De H. has led him 
to go beyond what the case requires. No one can better 
soften these little asperities than yourself. There is another 
disagreeable subject to which I must call your attention. I 
hear of the President making exertions to get a Kussian 
party around him exclusively. Pray watch this closely as 
opportunity offers. Mavrocordato, who is, or was, English, 
may instruct you on this head, or perhaps Tricoupi. 

From Sir E. C. to Mr. Huskisson. 

< Ocean/ in the Gulf of Coron : May 21, 1828.* 

SIR, In obedience to the direction contained in your 
letter of March 23, I have the honour of enclosing a copy of 
the orders which the Emperor of Eussia has directed to be 
sent to Count de Heiden through Count Nesselrode, which 
I received to-day from Malta. 

From the friendly intercourse which has been established 
between us, the Count has used the medium of a private 
letter to express his opinions and feelings on the occasion. 
I may, however, venture to inform you, judging both from 
my knowledge of his general sentiments and the tone in 
which he expresses himself on this occasion, that in my 
opinion he will not only avoid as much as possible taking 
any measures which may appear to militate against the 
object for which the three Powers are allied, but that he 
will most readily do all he possibly can, in concert with us, 
for the fulfilment of the Treaty of London. I have merely 
written a hurried acknowledgment of his letter, assuring him 
that I cannot imagine it possible that anything should arise, 

* Received June 14. 


from whatever different line of conduct he may be directed 
to pursue, which can prevent a continuance of the friendly 
communications which have heretofore obtained between us. 
The Count tells me, that desirous of continuing to act with 
me in straitening Ibrahim, he will leave the ship of the 
line and frigate now here to continue on this service. Guided 
by your letter of March 23, I certainly shall not suggest to 
him any particular line of conduct. But you, Sir, will be 
well aware how much his being a beUigerent might be made 
to facilitate the blockade of the Morea and to remove the 
difficulties which we are under in some particulars. In ex- 
planation of this, I beg to refer you to the position of Navarin 
and Modon on the map of La Pie, which is upon a larger 
scale than the Admiralty chart. You will see that there is a 
passage within the islands of Cabrera and Sapienza, through 
which vessels going to Modon and Navarin would pass in 
preference, with either an easterly or southerly wind, having 
their port under their lee ; whilst there being no anchorage 
for blockading vessels, they would be in great danger, if 
caught there in bad weather, from the heavy sea which sets 
in. It was by means of this passage that Austrian vessels 
of war, with Ibrahim's despatches, evaded us last year ; and 
the Ottoman vessels have adopted the same practice. Fast- 
sailing vessels, such as those now employed by the Viceroy 
of Egypt, will probably take a station, in the first instance, 
either off Cape Matapan, in order to profit by a strong wind 
from the southward or eastward, or off the Strophades 
Islands, ready to take advantage of a wind from the north- 
ward or westward : and if suffered to cruise there under any 
other pretence, it will be impossible to ensure their not get- 
ting into one or other of the two ports. I propose stationing 
ships to watch those two positions. But I wish to call your 
attention to the difficulty in which I shall be placed upon 
our ships there meeting with them. If they should refuse 
to go away under a declaration that they are not going to 
the blockaded ports, am I to use coercion ?* and am I still 
to prevent a collision betwixt them and the Greeks under 
such circumstances, if the latter should have a force com- 
petent to attack them ? f 

It is evident that, under these circumstances, the Allied 
object would be facilitated by the Russians assuming that 
belligerent character that seems to be given them by the 
accompanying document. An instance of the difficulty of 
preventing success in a case of this sort occurred yesterday, 
and, at the same time, the opinion which I gave in my reply 

* Question never answered. t Question never answered. 


to the Queries of the impossibility of effectually blockading 
these ports by keeping the sea, was practically confirmed. 
A heavy swell, with light wind towards the coast, not only 
prevented our reconnoitring Navarin for two days together, 
but, by setting us down upon the island of Sapienza, placed 
us in a very uncomfortable situation. Failing in this, and 
learning that the French squadron was off Coron, I was pro- 
ceeding to communicate with them as to the measures to be 
pursued, when the ' Jasper ' brig joined me, with information 
that she had sailed in company with two corvettes from 
Alexandria, which were suspected to be coming to the 
Morea, although avowedly going to Trieste. The c Talbot ' 
being considerably to the northward, under signal to recon- 
noitre Navarin in company with the Russian 74 c Ezekiel,' 
I sent the 6 Philomel ' to warn the Honorable Captain 
Spencer of the movement of these corvettes, and to assist in 
stopping them. It seems that they had already at that time 
attracted the notice of Captain Spencer ; but that they were 
enabled to push into Navarin in defiance of his utmost efforts 
to cut them off. I consider, however, that supplies obtained 
by such means are too partial to have any material effect in 
feeding a force which is said still to amount to from 25 
to 30,000 people, and not to militate against the opinion 
which I gave in my letter to you of the 12th of this month. 
If indeed, the Commander of ' Le Trident ' had continued to 
act under that mistaken view of his duty of which Count De 
Heiden complained, the case would have been different ; for, 
besides the concealed money, as well as other things, which 
are supposed to have been received by the Pacha under his 
admission of despatches, a vessel returning with some 500 
invalids, which he did not feel empowered to stop, is reported 
to me from Alexandria to have carried also twenty women 
and several Greek children ; and I have strong reason to 
believe the story, although the French Commander tells me 
the vessel was searched by his Greek pilot. 

I trust these errors will not be repeated ; for, upon my in- 
forming the said French captain of the * Trident ' that, in 
consequence of the deceptions practised, I had directed that, 
for the future, no vessels whatever should be permitted either 
to enter or to leave the blockaded ports, he informed me that 
he had received similar orders from Vice- Admiral De Rigny. 
The difficulties of the President of Greece, as well as of our- 
selves, have been increased by the contagious fever which 
prevails at Hydra and at Spezzia, and which will probably 
reach the Continent notwithstanding the exertions of Captain 
Parker for preventing communication. I now expect the 



' Warspite ' here hourly, when Captain Parker will devote 
himself more particularly to this difficult service. In the 
meantime I have sent the ' Pelorus ' to assume the service 
off Alexandria and Candia, assisted by other sloops of war, 
and have directed the ' Dartmouth ' and ' Glasgow ' to join 
the ' Warspite ' here. I am aware that I have entered into 
particulars that may appear to be merely professional, which 
may possibly be considered as beyond the line prescribed for 
me by your letter of March 23. It is therefore due to my- 
self to assure you that, in giving this detail, and submitting 
opinions which are not officially called for, I have no other 
motive than a desire to submit to the Government all the 
information which local knowledge affords to a person in my 
situation. I do not assume that my opinions have any supe- 
rior value; and I confidently refer to all my professional 
conduct for my disposition to obey zealously and cheerfully 
whatever instructions I may receive, whether accordant with, 
or opposed to those opinions. I ask only, with submission, 
that they may be such as will not admit of any misconcep- 

I have, &c., 


From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. C. 

Milo : ce |^ 1828. 

MON CHER AMIRAL, Je vous envoie officiellement la copie 
des instructions que je viens de recevoir ; vous y verrez que 
la guerre n'est pas encore declaree, mais que j'en attends la 
nouvelle a chaque instant et cela tout seul. Cela me 
chagrine beaucoup ; ma position et la votre deviennent tres- 
delicates ; mais j'espere que nous nous entendrons de ma- 
niere a remplir nos devoirs sans nous montrer les dents ou 
causer plus de refroidissement entre nos deux Gouvernemens ; 
et en merne terns contribuer au grand ouvrage, quoique je ne 
vois pas comment il pourra s'accomplir, car il parait que le 
Gouvernement anglais ne se soucie plus du tout de la Grece. 
Pour la France, il paraifc qu'elle ne sait pas trop ce qu'elle 
veut, et se reglera d'apres le vent qui souffle. En attendant 
ma position est tres-desagreable et me degoute : j'en suis 
vraiment tout-a-fait chagrin et abattu. Je continuerai ce- 
pendant a agir avec vous avec toute la franchise que mes 
devoirs me permettront, et j'espere que nous pourrons rester 
en harmonie comme par le passe, d'autant plus que jen'aurai 
pas a bloquer les ports que vos batimens frequentent, excepte 
les points dans la Moree : rnais il me semble que d'apres le 


Traite ce blocus sera resume par vous, de sorte que j'espere 
encore que nous n'aurons pas de sujets de refroidissement. 
J'ai vu notre ami Pamiral Eigny. Je lui ai fait part de ce 
que j'ai vu a Navarin : il m'a montre ses instructions au 
capitaine de 1' ' Iphigenie,' qui sont diametralement opposees a 
ce que m'a dit le capitaine : il a convenu avec moi que ce 
dernier a ete mis dedans par Ibrahim. Mafoi! je n'ai jamais 
vu des etourdis pareils, et ne sais qu'en penser. En attendant 
je lais serai une fregate et un brick pour serrer de plus pres 
Ibrahim, et verrai ce que je pourrai faire. Mons r le capitaine 
Mitchel vous aura mis au fait de tout ce qu'il a vu : je ne 
puis que me louer de ce dernier, qui me parait un officier de 
beaucoup de merite et d'activite. C'est bien malheureux que 
nos rapports avec tous ces excellens officiers doivent devenir 
plus resserres et moins sinceres ; car, malheureusement, a la 
moindre chose entre les Cabinets, commence le refroidisse- 
ment, ensuite mefiance, puis bouderie, et finit souvent par 
brouillerie ouverte. Vous connaissez mes sentimens, Mons r 
1'Amiral, j'irai toujours le chemin droit, et agirai franche- 
ment. Apres cela, ma conscience tranquille, arrive que 

Dans le moment Eigni m'a montre une lettre qu'il a ecrite 
a Ibrahim, et que D'Arnous lui a remis la veille de notre 
arrivee, dans laquelle il 1'engage d'evacuer la Moree en lui 
disant que la Eussie venait de declarfr la guerre. Je ne 
congois pas pourquoi il lui a fait dire une chose qu'il ne savait 
pas etre vraie : il pouvait la supposer, mais il ne pouvait la 
savoir, puisque moi je ne la sais pas, et je viens de recevoir 
un courrier en droiture de Petersbourg. I confess I don't 
understand that politick, but it explains to me the poor 
Captain Arnous thought I was going to take the corvette, 
and therefore wished to save her from the hands of the bar- 
barians ; but I proposed to convey her to Milo to Admiral 
De Eigny, and to leave it to his decision what to do with 
her ; but then he told me of his engaging his word of honor, 
&c. I dined to-day with Admiral De Eigny, and it is all 
well again ; but c'est un brouillon, the good man ; and it 
shows again, my dear Admiral, that a Frenchman, sans y 
entendre malice, cannot live without a little intrigue, pour 
passer le terns. Ayant regu le courrier aujourd'hui, je m'em- 
presse de vous envoyer le brick ' Oural.' Mons r de Eigny 
voulant vous envoyer la copie d'une lettre du Comte 
Nesselrode au prince Lieven, je m'abstiens de vous la faire 
copier. C'est une piece tres-importante et interessante. 
La paix avec la Perse est faite, ratifiee, et 1'argent pour le 
dedommagement reguet encaisse : voila pour nous une grande 

T 2 


nouvelle. Le general Paskewitz a ete nomine Comte 
d'Erwan, et Sa Majeste lui a fait don d'un million pour 
soutenir son titre. Je pars demain pour Naples de Roumanie 
pour voir le pauvre Comte Capodistrias, et je resterai pres 
de lui je ne sais jusqu'a quand, mais en tout cas pour attendre 
Rigny, qui va a Vourla pour liuit jours, to repair his capstan, 
which was rotten, and broke after he had lost his iron chain 
cable. From there I suppose and intend to go to have a 
look at our friend Ibrahim ; and it is possible, after a time, I 
may go to Malta for provisions, or some other reason, if you 
will not shut your ports for us poor fellows, who have no 
other pied a terre in the whole Mediterranean. 

Croyez-moi pour la vie, your most devoted 


Sir E. C. to Count Heiden. 
H.B.M. Ship 'Ocean,' offCoron : May 21, 182$. 

Fear not, my dear Admiral, that anything which can 
arise out of the present state of affairs will diminish my 
regard for you. Although our duties under the altered cir- 
cumstances you announce to me may differ, I do not see any 
grounds for the ' mefiance ' and following consequences which 
you forebode. Nor, even if we were not still bound together 
by the Treaty, need any diminution take place in the friend- 
ship which our previous intercourse has cemented. I hope 
shortly to assure you in person of these sentiments being 
engrafted into my system. My present object is to return 
to Malta as expeditiously as possible, to relieve my friend 
Commodore Campbell of my flag, and to return here in the 
' Asia, 5 which is by this time, I imagine, arrived there. Let 
me induce you to continue to rely upon our colleague doing 
all that is right, in spite of any little difference in the man- 
ner of setting about it. He has given orders that nothing 
whatever shall be permitted to enter these ports, nor any- 
thing go out which has got in. I have done the same ; and I 
shall inform Ibrahim of this, and warn him against ravaging 
the country, and sending away any of the Greeks as slaves. 
Two corvettes got into Navarin yesterday in spite of all the 
Talbot ' could do. The ' Ezekiel ' did not seem to observe 
them. Their plan will be to wait off Matapan and Grosso 
for a southerly or westerly wind, or off the Strophades islands 
for a northerly or easterly wind ; and thence push through 
the blockading force, when the same strength of wind and 
bad weather may oblige us to keep further off. Even if we 
find them in those positions, we cannot use force to drive 


them away, and the Greeks are not strong enough. I will 
conclude with assuring you of the unalterable regard of my 
family, as well as of your sincere friend, 


From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. C. 

Egine : ce & mai 1828. 

MON GHEE MONS. i/AMiEAL, Church demande de Pargent, 
car ses troupes en demandent a grands cris, et mecontens. 
En Moree les Albanais sont mal avec Ibrahim, mais avec tout 
cela on n'entend rien d'evacuation. Je ne sais pas ce que les 
Fran9ais y font tripoter, voila tout ; ils laissent sortir qui 
veut : les miens ont attrape une corvette, la meme que 
D'Arnous a fait entrer; elle retourriait a Alexandrie avec 600 
homines, mais comme je me doutais qu'il y avait des Grecs, 
j'ai fait mettre a terre 540 personnes, et puis examiner bien 
le batiment, et, Dieu merci, nous avons sauve onze pauvres 
enfants males et femelles, qui allaient etre vendus a Pencan 
a Alexandrie. Je les ai ici, et nous les aideroiis autant que 
possible en les remettant au comte. La corvette est ici ; et 
je desire votre opinion et avis qu'en faire. 

Grace a mes croisans, la corvette autrichieime la ' Caroline' 
n'a pas pu entrer a Navarin, Modon, ou Coron ; elle a essaye 
des deux cotes, mais trouva partout des batimens russes ; et 
cependant elle pretend ait croiser seulement et aller a Zante. 
Ici nous avons eu un brick et un schooner, mais ils sont partis 
pour Smyrne. Ils sont bien intrigues de savoir ce que nous 
faisons ici. 

A Alexandrie il parait qu'on veut envoyer tout ce qu'on a 
en batimens de guerre a Constantinople : j'espere que vous 
les empecherez, puisqu'on m'assure que vous avez des ordres 
pour bloquer ce port. 

L'excellent capi ne Parker va bientot nous quitter; j'en 
suis bien fache, mais surtout pour le comte : mais il pourra 
etre beaucoup plus utile dans la station de Corfou, Je 
compte aller a Poros, et de la, apres avoir vu Eigny, peut-etre 
une course a Samos pour du moins en imposer. Dieu veuille, 
mon cher Amiral, que nos relations ne se refroidissent pas, 
J'espere que le noble lord mettra un peu d'eau dans son vin 
du Rhin de Metternich. 

Yoila T 6 g- mai, dix jours qu'il n'y a point de morts ni de 
malades a Hydra, de sorte que bientot cette inaladie cessera : 
les medecins assurent que ce n'est pas la peste, et je le crois 
aussi. A Modon, d'ou le typhus vient, on pense de meme. 
Nous venons de recevoir de .la la nouvelle qu'Ibrahim n'a 


plus que tres-peu de provisions, et done ou il devra partir 
par nier ou se faire jour pour aller en Roumelie pour faire 
des incursions et enlever les recoltes dans Finterieur : c'est 
ce que je crois, et dans ce cas on tachera de bruler les 
recoltes a son approche. If we had the riflemen of Malta 
and four guns, our friend Ibrahim would very soon have the 
honor of drinking a sorbet in Colonel Brown's tent. Mr. 
Proschek is gone to Smyrna, I suppose to warn the Turks of 
me, for they certainly believe we are going to Smyrna or the 
Dardanelles. The situation of the poor Count* is very un- 
pleasant ; without resources, without army, and, I believe, 
very few friends amongst the notables ; for by the nation and 
common Greeks he is adored. To look at all we see here is 
very much like a comedy people of all nations, all sort of 
dresses are to be found here. J'ai vu - , qui me parait un 
brave grenadier, mais une espece de roi de theatre. Quand 
on examine tout cela un peu philosophiquement, on se dit, que 
sont les hommes ? et on a plus de pitie que de courroux pour 
eux ! Nous voila a Egine, quatre batimens de guerre russes, 
trois fran9ais, un turc, une fregate americaine, etunvaisseau 
anglais. II n'y manque que des autrichiens. Adieu, mon 
cher Amiral. Votre bien devoue serviteur et ami, 


From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. C. 

1 Azoff,' a Egine : le & mai 1828. 

MONSIEUR L 'AMIRAL, . . . L'approche de la recolte 
des grains en Moree,*et les projets d'incursion qu'Ibrahim 
parait former, donnent les plus justes craintes aux habitans 
de la Peninsule. J'attends avec impatience Farrivee de M r 
de Rigny dans cette rade pour me concerter avec lui, ainsi 
qu'avec M r Parker, sur les moyens de prevenir cette nouvelle 
devastation ; je proposerai une nouvelle et forte intimation 
par ecrit a Ibrahim, quoique je doute de son effet. Des 
lettres recentes de Syra annoncent que Samos est de nouveau 
menace ; il faudra done necessairement porter aussi quelque 
surveillance sur ce point. Permettez-moi, Mons r F Amiral, 
de vous dire encore, avec ma franchise ordinaire, que votre 
absence de ces contrees dans un si critique moment est une 
veritable calamite. 

J'ai 1'honneur d'etre, etc., 


* Capodistrias. 


From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C. 


' ConqiuSrant' : ce 5 inai 1828.* 

Suivant les nouvelles que j'ai de Paris, M r de Metternich 
travaille beaucoup en Angleterre vos Ministres pour faire 
rompre le Traite. Les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris 
paraissent n'etre pas du meme avis. Sur le point de savoir 
si la Russie Pa rompu de son cote, en elevaiit des griefs par- 
tic uliers contre la Turquie, chez vous on est dispose pour 
1'affirmative ; chez nous on dit que jusqu'a ce que la Russie ait 
manque a un des engagemens du Traite on ne peut Pen 
accuser d'avance. Je crois moi que le due de Wellington 
est bien aise de saisir cette occasion de se debarrasser de ce 
legs de Mons r Canning. Je n'ai pas d'autres instructions 
que celle de me conformer aux anciennes ; c'est-a-dire, je 
crois, de continuer d'empecher, sans hostilites, les Turcs 
d'envoyer des renforts en Moree. On croit cependant tou- 
jours a Paris que nos Ministres se decideront a maintenir le 

Sir E. C. to Admiral De Rigny. 
H.B.M.S. 'Ocean/ in the Gulf of Coron : May 21, 1828. 
MY DEAE ADMIKAL, I have only a moment to acknow- 
ledge the receipt of several documents from you, which went 
to Malta by the ' Mosquito,' and to tell you that after making 
my arrangements here I shall return to Malta to meet the 
6 Asia,' and relieve my friend, Commodore Campbell, of me 
and my flag, that he may sail under his own broad pendant. 
Captain Arnous certainly appears to have misunderstood 
your instructions ; but, as he now tells me he has now got 
your orders to suffer no vessel whatever either to go in or 
come out of these ports, which is exactly similar to what I 
have given to the English ships, I dare say we shall bring 
Ibrahim to his senses. I propose letting the said Pacha 
know of this decision, and cautioning him at the same time 
against ravaging the country and carrying away the Greeks 
as slaves. I hope the affairs of the Turks with Russia will 
prevent their attempting anything against Samos before we 
have instructions how to consider that island. I do not like 
to detain the ' Pelorus ' any longer, as I wish Capt. Richards 
to proceed off Alexandria and Candia, that the ' Dartmouth ' 
and c Glasgow ' may come to assist here. Two corvettes 
got into Navarin yesterday in spite of the ' Talbot,' whilst 

* Received 21st May. 


all the French ships were in the Bay of Coron. But such 
partial supplies cannot do much for such a force as there is 
to feed. Their plan is to wait either off the Strophades or 
off Matapan, and run in when a strong wind favors them. 
Yours, with great regard, 


From Sir E. Codrington to his Highness Ibrahim Pacha. 
H.B.M.S. < Ocean/ in the Gulf of Coron : May 23, 1828. 

HIGHNESS, It becomes my unpleasant duty to inform 
Your Highness that henceforth no vessel whatever will be 
permitted to enter any port of the Morea in the possession 
of the Ottoman forces, nor any vessel to come out of those 
ports which may have entered them. 

Reports have reached me of Your Highness having de- 
clared that in case of our establishing a rigid blockade you 
would pursue the system of devastation which you had 
adopted last year. I trust a recollection of the consequences 
which arose from that cruel exercise of power, will induce 
Your Highness to prefer a line of conduct more suitable to 
the practice of civilised nations. 

But if you should unfortunately attempt to carry this 
threat into execution, Your Highness must remember that 
whenever your own fate and that of your army comes to be 
decided by the Allied Powers, as it soon must be, you 
will have strong reason to dread the consequences of such 

The earnest desire of my Sovereign to fulfil the Treaty 
of London of July 6, 1827, has been strongly marked by 
his having renewed the same terms, since the battle of 
Navarin, which had been refused by the Viceroy of Egypt 
before that memorable event an event which I will not 
enter into the merits of more minutely, because it must be 
painful to Your Highness to recollect the return which was 
at that time made to the conciliatory proposals of the Allied 
admirals. Even since the late missions to the Viceroy and 
Your Highness, deceptions have been put upon the Allies 
which would justify harsher measures than they are yet 
willing to employ. Supplies which were permitted to leave 
Alexandria, ostensibly for the use only of the army in Candia, 
have been clandestinely conveyed to the Morea in vessels 
which were allowed to pass the blockading force with 
your despatches ; and vessels returning with invalids under 
the same indulgence, have carried to Egypt in slavery 
unoffending Greek women and children, although notice 


was given to Your Highness in the year 1826 that His 
Britannic Majesty would not permit so inhuman a pro- 
ceeding. So great is the indignation which this conduct 
has excited throughout Europe, that both Your Highness and 
those who now serve under your orders, will be brought to 
feel effectually the heavy responsibility which attaches to it. 
My wish to make due allowance for the difficulties of Your 
Highness's situation, and to diminish as much as I can the 
greater difficulties to which the protracted resistance of the 
Sultan will expose you, has induced me to offer you these 
concluding observations. 

I have, &c., 


To the respective Captains and Commanders. 
(General Order.)* 

' Ocean,' off Navarin : May 24, 1828. 

It is highly important at this particular juncture to de- 
prive the Ottoman forces in the Morea of all sorts of supplies 
and reinforcements, and of all resources whatever, in order 
to effect a desire in Ibrahim Pacha to return to Egypt. It 
becomes, therefore, the business of all the ships and vessels 
assisting in the blockade of the ports of the Morea to pre- 
vent, if possible, the entrance of every description of vessels 
of whatever nation, down even to boats ; and to be equally 
rigid in not permitting anything to come out which may 
have got in, with the sole exception of a flag of truce coming 
to communicate with the senior officer. Now, in order to 
evade the blockading ships, it is probable that fast-sailing 
vessels coming from Egypt or any of the Ottoman dominions 
will, in the first place, take a station either off Cape Matapaii 
with the intention of pushing in betwixt the islands and the 
main with a strong easterly or southerly wind, or off the 
Strophades islands, ready to profit by a strong westerly or 
northerly wind. 

It is, therefore, requisite that a ship of sufficient force to 
ensure obedience should be placed in each of those positions 
to drive away any Ottoman vessels which may come there. 
And upon falling in with any such vessels, their presence 
should be made known to the rest of the blockading squadron 
by showing Ottoman colours at the main -topgallant mast 
head, and firing guns until the signal is observed. 

If Russia should be at war with Turkey, we are not to 

* Copies sent to Admiral De Rigny, to Admiral Sachturis in Greek, to 
Captain Arnous ' Trident,' to Captain Swinkin, ' Ezekiel.' 


take part or interfere with the ships of either of them. And 
although the ships of H.B.M. are to prevent a collision gene- 
rally betwixt the Greek and Ottoman forces by sea, they are 
not required to do so in cases where the Greek vessels are 
strong enough to act successfully. 


Extract of a Letter from Count Capodistrias. 

June 22. 

Je ne saurois assez exprimer a Y.E. la gratitude qu'in- 
spirent a la nation grecque les nouveaux temoignages d'in- 
teret que vous vous plaisez, Monsieur 1'Amiral, a lui donner 
par les mesures que vous venez de prendre. Elles semblent 
deja avoir produit une impression salutaire sur Tesprit 
d'Ibrahim Pacha. II paroit avoir modifie son systeme de 
eonduite, attendu que Pexpedition qu'il avoit adressee a 
Pyrgos, pour acheter du betail et autres vivres, n'a commis 
aucun acte hostile, et que les chefs de cette expedition ont 
achete argent comptant les vivres qu'ils ont pu se pro- 

Sir E. C. to Admiral De Rigny. 

Off Navarin : May 24, 1828. 

MY DEAE ADMIEAL, Your letters of April 6 and May 5 
from Milo reached here from Malta with the official enclo- 
sures about Hamilton on the 21st inst. I feel very sensibly, 
my good friend, the kind desire which your letters show to 
support me through all the unnecessary difficulties which 
are thrown in my way. I will not deny that the illiberal 
and unjust attacks which have been made on me for mere 
party purposes have been very teasing to me; because, 
besides the trouble I have had in writing home the facts, in 
order to prevent their injurious effects, they have called my 
attention from the public service by which alone it should 
be occupied. But I am, nevertheless, convinced that if those 
attacks had not been made upon me I should never have 
received such commendations as I have from the most dis- 
tinguished persons which my country boasts. I value such 
eulogies as these above all which Ministers could possibly 
have done for me, if they had had discernment enough to 
have found their true interest in considering the aggression 
of the Turks at Navarin a most fortunate instead of an 
untoward event. Had they taken that just view of it, the 
whole affair would by this time have been settled, and with- 
out a Russian war. I am now tormented by the Ministers 


imputing to me power and authority which they seem afraid 
to give me. But I have put to them the direct questions 
Am I henceforth empowered to blockade ? am I to allow any 
invalids to return to Egypt ? and am I, in such a case, to 
search the vessels containing them for Greeks, and to take 
them out ? In the meantime, I have taken upon myself to 
issue an order to let nothing go in or come out of the 
blockaded ports ; and I find you have done the same. I 
hope your communication with De Heiden, personally, has 
removed the impression which was made on him by the com- 
mander of ' Le Trident.' Poor fellow, he is very unplea- 
santly situated, and is over anxious about the consequences 
of any separate operations he may be called upon to under- 
take. We must make great allowances for the susceptibility 
which arises from his more responsible situation. If he sends 
some of his ships to assist you in protecting Samoa, it will be 
made more easy by the rupture between Russia and Turkey. 
Your letter to Ibrahim gave him another friendly opening ; 
and now we must make him feel the necessity of making 
the next advances to us, and which we must not seem 
too eager to attend to, in order that we may get back all 
the Greeks whom he has sent to Alexandria. I have sus- 
pended the blockade of Alexandria until I have a further 
order, after the observations I have made as to its effects on 
Marseilles and on Malta. I have mentioned the latter to 
strengthen my remarks ; but as the Yiceroy will sell no more 
corn, it matters little to that island now. The order I re- 
ceived was to perform a ' like blockade ' to that mentioned 
in the despatch of October 16, which I have told the Colonial 
Minister referred only to a blockade by the Greek cruisers 
within certain limits of their own coasts, or the support of 
them in any blockade which they might establish. In fact, 
the Ministers appear to want me to do that which they 
would not venture to order me to do on their own responsi- 
bility. Indeed, my good friend, I cannot wish to see your 
Ministers so treat you, either in the Chambers or by their 
instructions. If they had acted more fairly by me, I could 
easily have removed from them all censure 011 account of the 
deportation of these Greeks ; but by imputing misconduct to 
me, I was obliged to show that, if misconduct it was, they 
were to blame and not I. I am in hopes that the candour 
of the Russian orders to De Heiden will facilitate restoration 
of peaceful intercourse. I think the Duke of Wellington 
knows Metternich too well to be cajoled by him in anything, 
more particularly into war, which it is his policy to avoid. 
I believe the Seraskier is in danger of his Albanians doing 


as Ibrahim's did; but he may not get money to quiet them 
as Ibrahim did, for the Porte has none to give him. I have 
accounts from Alexandria of twenty women and several 
children having been concealed in the Turkish vessel with 
invalids, which was searched by the Greek pilot of the 
' Trident,' and then allowed to pass. It is very kind and 
considerate of you to have expressed yourself as you have 
about our friend Hamilton. Lord Ingestrie happened to be 
in Paris when he (Hamilton) passed through there, and he 
was then well again. 

There is a more peaceable appearance in London than 
there was ; and I am in hopes the very movement of the 
Russian army, which led people to think the contrary, will 
prove, by its effect on the Sultan, to have brought him to 

I shall proceed to Malta as soon as any wind will enable 
me, in order to return here in the ' Asia,' by which time 
Mr. Canning will probably have joined Count Guilleminot at 

Yours, &c., 


From Sir John Gore to Sir E. C.* 

April 23, 1828. 

MY DEAR CODRINGTON, I have for some time been very 
desirous of an opportunity to send you a letter free from the 
chance of being opened and read, which I suspect all those 
are that go by post through France ; and this supposition is 
strengthened by my having read in an extract from a French 
paper verbatim what I had written to you a few days after 
Wellesley left London : I was anxious to communicate the 
subject to you, and sent it by the post. Nothing can be 
more irregular than the receipt of letters from you. While 
I was at the Admiralty yesterday, your despatches of the 25th 
arrived, but the official had not transpired, for, as you are 
now under the Secretary of State, Mr. C. takes them all to 
Lord Dudley as soon as read to the Lord High Admiral. I 
was, and still am, exceedingly vexed that I did not know 
when the messengers were sent with certain queries to you. 
It took place during Spencer's extreme illness, when he could 
not write or see any person ; and I feel well aware that no 
friendly hand was ready to give you a useful timely hint, and 
it might now be useless to repeat it. The anger created by 

* Received at Malta, May 29tb ; 1828. 


the carrying away the Greeks to Egypt as slaves was great 
here, and heightened by the feelings on that subject in 
France. I was asked why you allowed it. I, in return, 
asked, c Has he any orders to bear him out in searching 
the Egyptian fleet going from Greece to Egypt ? Would 
not such an act be a direct violation of his orders and your 
wishes to suffer, nay, to urge, Ibrahim Pacha to evacuate 
the Morea, in effecting which you offer every facility ? If 
a search had been attempted, resistance would have been 
made ; hence would have arisen the collision, and hostility 
must have ensued.' ' But his orders were to blockade all 
these ports, instead of which he continues at Malta doing 
nothing. Why is he not in the Archipelago ? ' ' Has he 
such orders? For he writes to me that he is anxiously 
awaiting for orders to act.' ' Yes, he has those orders, ac- 
knowledged to have been received on November 11.' 'But 
they must have been written here before the Battle of 
Navarin. was known.' ' What has that to do with his obey- 
ing them?' 4 Is it not natural that he should suppose that 
such a battle might change the aspect of affairs, and that 
some new orders and instructions would be given to him ? 
Had I been in his situation I should have expected such.' I 
was much delighted yesterday in a long interview with Lord 
Exinouth (who charged me to make his regards to you), to 
hear him express precisely the same sentiments upon both 
the above points, and that the anger which is expressed 
towards you upon them, emanates entirely from their own 
neglect. For until I told them you had no orders to act 
upon, they never thought of sending you any; and then 
raked up those which you received on November 11, to 
place you in the wrong instead of themselves. 

Lord Dudley retaining the office he held during the late 
most weak administration, preserves leaven of that feebleness ; 
but you have a most steady supporter in the present head; and 
if your replies to all those questions are as full and as incon- 
trovertible as I feel confident they will be given long before 
this can reach you, that head will do you justice ; and I am 
under error if he does not, so soon as the squall is quite 
blown over, do ample justice to your merits and great exer- 
tions in fulfilling your most arduous duty. Therefore, my 
good friend, do not be displeased with me for offering one 
piece of advice, i.e., in all your replies to these various 
interrogatories, do not let any anger or vexation escape you. 
Give your replies full and dignified, but in mild terms, 
for they will be read by many who are too ready to lay a 
stress upon any strong expression, and thereby convey a 


meaning you never intended. I write this from conviction. 
'A mild answer turneth away wrath ;' and you want a friendly 
advocate to explain and to prevent words and meanings being 
twisted. This was attempted when your replies which I 
brought over were read in council; and had I not been 
present, would have had the full effect. But my explanation 
called forth, ' Gore is right.' This hint may serve for some 
future occasion. Be cautious in your private letters, and to 
whom you express your sentiments ; for it is impossible for 
me to convey to you the ingenuity with which sentiments 
are perverted, any more than it is for me to imagine how they 
get into circulation. But the fact is, that much of what you 
write, and your conversation at your own table, is repeated 
in this town, to the very great annoyance of your brother and 
friends, not from the facts, but that you should have such 
Paul Prys about you. I will relate one fact to elucidate 
this : About a month ago a messenger met me at the door, 
(going to Datchet), desiring me to attend the Lord High 
Admiral directly. On entering his audience room, ' Oh, 
Gore, I am very anxious to see you, for I am told your friend 
Sir Edward Codrington has written in such strong terms of 
objection to the conduct of the Government, that I wish you 
to write to him on the subject.' I was so much startled by 
this address, that I was obliged to consider a few seconds 
before I replied ; when I said : ' I am very much obliged to 
your Royal Highness for this opportunity to explain, and will 
take upon myself to be a pledge that you have been misin- 
formed. The last letters from Sir E. C. are to Mr. Bethell 
and myself, of February 11, at which time he could not, and 
did not know of the existence of the present administration ; 
and if he did so, I will further be his pledge that he will be 
more likely to rejoice at than to lament the Duke of Wel- 
lington being Premier. At the late Administration Sir E. 
Codrington was displeased, for he did feel that they had not 
acted kindly towards him.' 'I think so too, Sir; they did not 
act as they should have done towards him.' 'But I think the 
Duke of Wellington and the present Ministers have done all 
they could under present circumstances to heal that wound.' 
6 Right, Sir, you are quite right.' ' I can therefore repeat to 
your R.H. my pledge that he has not said or written one 
word against the Duke of Wellington and his Administration.' 
' I am very glad to hear you say all this, and shall take care 
to contradict what I have heard upon such good authority. 
Now, good day, come here whenever you are at leisure, and 
more particularly when you have letters from Sir Edward 
Codrington.' About a week after I received a letter from 


you of a later date, when I went and renewed my pledge. 
' Oh, I was perfectly satisfied by what you said before ; but 
your friend has so many repeaters of all that he writes 
and says, that he cannot be too much on his guard. We 
have put him under the Secretary of State, and Lord Dudley 
desires to know why he stays at Malta. Can you tell me?' 
6 Sir Edward Codrington tells me, Sir, that he anxiously 
awaits orders, and expresses his surprise that none have 
been sent.' ' Is that the case ? ' ' Yes, Sir.' 

This is a specimen of how much you are the subject of 
conversation here : and as the public mind is entirely occu- 
pied by Turkey and Eussia, and the best mode to avoid being 
drawn into a war (which I consider inevitable in the course 
of the next two years) , everything relating thereto puts even 
the ' Test Act ' into shadow ; and you, your sayings and 
doings, are the Test of the Times. Last club-day at the 
Thatched House Lord Melville there as a guest Yorke, 
in the chair, after a neat speech, proposed your health in 
a bumper, which was adopted with cheers by all. The whole 
was very well done, and gratified your friends extremely. 

I am much interrogated about you and Navarin, and 
where I see and know that Paul Pryism is not the founda- 
tion, I not only explain, but give my copy of all the papers ; 
and have thereby gratified many zealous brother officers whose 
approbation would please you. A propos, respecting Lord 
Dudley's question and my reply (though the thing is gone 
by), he asked, ' Why you did not anchor further from ;' I gave 
the reasons why : had he asked, ' Why you anchored so 
near,' I should have replied as you have written. In the 
conversation which ensued I did fully state all and much 
more to that effect even to a joke that we never consider 
ourselves near enough until we can discover the colour of 
our opponents' eyes. My object was to do away or to 
weaken the universal impression that you 'premeditated the 
battle ' and ' went into Navariii overlooking your instructions 
for your own aggrandisement.' In point of fact Lord 
Dudley's question so much surprised me and appeared so 
absurd, that my first impulse was to laugh ; as the Duke of 
Wellington actually did when I repeated it to him, and he 
said, ' Is it possible he could have asked such a question ? 
if he had asked you why he went into Navarin at all, there 
might have been some sense in it, but that was folly : now 
Gore, explain to me why Codrington went into Navarin.' I 
did so fully : ' I see, I see, he could not have avoided it : 
but I am sorry Cradock brought back the letter, for it may 
give rise to a question.' But all this treats of a subject gone 


by and almost forgotten. Peace, peace, and how to avoid 
hostilities, is now the cry: and the only apprehension is, 
according to Arthur Legge (who desires his kindest regards 
to you and Lady C.) that ' you knocked down the wrong man 
at Navarin.' 

From Sir John Gore to Lady C.* 

April 25, 1828. 

You know how easy it is to find fault where ill will prompts 
it ; and as fault was to attach somewhere, it has from the 
first arrival of the battle of Navarin been the desire to attach 
it to C. His replies by me averted it. The complaints 
respecting the Greek slaves being taken to Egypt opened a 
fresh door, but I am in error if C. cannot with equal 
success throw that off his shoulders. The point I have laid 
great stress upon to Lord Dudley, Cockburn, and Croker, is, 
that as to ' collision,' it took place at or near Patras : and 
there also the overt act of hostility took effect by Ibrahim 
Pacha being forced by cannon shot to relinquish his purpose. 
This act was highly approved ! then why not the equally bold 
measure of going into Navarin to effect the same purpose ? 
But this subject is at rest ; and that to be quieted is, why 
C. has continued at Malta ? and why the Greeks are allowed 
to be carried to Egypt in slavery ? Would the advocates of 
( non-collision ' and c non-hostility ' and the c evacuation of 
the Morea by mild persuasion,' have had C. search the 
Tur co-Egyptian fleet quitting ISTavarin on their way to 
Alexandria ? Would their Admiral have permitted it ? And 
had C. desired it, must not he have enforced that desire by 

* cannon shot ' ? Is not the evacuation of the Morea a 
primary object? and have you not offered aid and convoy to 
effect it ? How then could C., had he been off the harbour 
with his whole force, have risked the interruption of so 

* desirable 9 an object? Such are the subjects of discussion ; 
and so are words and meanings twisted to answer the feel- 
ings of unwilling minds. I will name no name ; my wishes 
are at all times to preserve peace and amity, and not open a 
breach which I may not be able to refill. But it is most 
painful to me to see and to hear, that while a man of high 
mind and principle is doing all that mind and body can 
effect to fulfil a most arduous and unprecedented duty as 
becomes a British Admiral, vile diplomacy endeavours to cast 
a shadow over him, and obscure his conduct by directing it 
into the crooked ways of that art. I only hope and trust 

* Received May 29th, 1828. 


that C. will, in all his replies to his new master the Secretary 
of State, give the most ample detail of facts and information 
with all the caution he can observe ; for he must now be 
aware, that his words and meanings are twisted. I state facts ; 
it is for him to attend to or pass them by : all that I press 
and most earnestly desire is, that he will preserve his high- 
minded spirit, and at the same time not suffer any strong 
expressions to escape him in word or writing ; for I cannot 
tell you (and I repeat it) how quickly his words are put into 
circulation here ! 

From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. C. 

Ce |f mai. 

MON CHER AMIEAL, Dans ce moment M r Godefroy m'ar- 
rive avec la nouvelle de la declaration de la guerre, et des 
instructions que j'ai 1'honneur de vous envoyer, M r PAniiral. 
Assurement vous y verrez que nofcre Souverain agit avec toute 
la moderation possible, et que nos relations quant au blocus 
existeront tout comme auparavant; et je tacherai de ne 
doiiner aucun sujet de jalousie ou de mecontentement aux 
batiments des nations alliees qui bloquent les ports de la 
Moree conjointement avec nous. J'ai ordonne a Monsieur 
Swinkin de se concerter sur tout avec le capitaine Parker, qui, 
je suppose, commandera le blocus de votre part, et de suivre 
en tout ses desirs et ses ordres. J'espere, Monsieur 1' Arniral, 

que vous m'approuverez II parait qu'Ibrahirn 

se prepare a se faire jour vers la Roumelie des qu'il sera 
reduit au dernier moment : ainsi nous pouvons esperer d'etre 
en possession des debris de Modon, Navarin et Coron avant 
la fin de 1'ete, a inoins qu'il n'y entre encore quelque bati- 
ment. J'attends Mons r de Bigny a chaque moment : ensuite 
je ferai une tournee vers Samos, pour voir ce qui s'y fait, et 
de la je viendrai a N avarin dans 1'esperance de vous y trouver. 
Les nouvelles de Modon disent que la peste y fait des 
ravages, et qu'Ibrahim, pour se mettre hors du danger, s'est 
embarque sur un batiment de guerre a Navarin. Peut-etre 
cette circonstance favoriserait une derniere sommation par 
les trois amiraux reunis. J'attends Mons r de Eigny a chaque 
moment ; peut-etre viendrons-nous ensemble vous chercher 
a Navarin, Mons r 1'Amiral : les Fran9ais attendent a chaque 
moment un debarquement de troupes en Moree venant de 
Toulon. Comme ils ne s'en cachent pas, et qu'il y a un 
commissaire charge de faire des achats de provisions, il faut 
supposer que c'est d'accord avec les autres Puissances. Cepeu- 


dant le comte (Capodistria) n'en salt rien, ce qui naturelle- 
ment le met dans Pembarras et dans une position desagre- 

From Sir E. C. to Consul Barker, at Alexandria. 

Malta : June 1, 1828. 

SIR, It is right that you should be aware of the great 
probability there is of the port of Alexandria being put under 
rigid blockade, on account both of the Viceroy's refusal of 
the proposals twice made to him by the English Government, 
and of the deceptions put upon us as to supplies clandestinely 
sent to the Morea, and Greeks carried away in slavery. You 
had better therefore communicate with Captain Richards, of 
the c Pelorus,' as to your plans and wishes in such a contin- 
gency. You will, I conclude, have heard from Government 
upon the subject of the deported Greeks. I doubt not but 
we shall before long have to enforce restitution by making 
Ibrahim himself and other chiefs hostages. I wish, there- 
fore, you would endeavour quietly to obtain the names and 
disposal of those already taken to Alexandria since the sig- 
nature of the Treaty of London ; and, at all events, to have a 
satisfactory report of their numbers in readiness. Mr. S. 
Canning is expected at Corfu, when probably more decisive 
measures will be taken for the fulfilment of the Treaty. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Captain Parker, ' Warspite.' 

'Asia/ at Malta: June 1, 1828. 

I quite agree with Admiral Heiden in the propriety of 
taking some decisive step for saving to the Greeks the har- 
vest in the Morea, but I cannot say that I think the mode 
of effecting it proposed in your letter likely to be successful. 

The time is probably already arrived for cutting the 
corn, and no doubt Ibrahim will use the superiority of 
his force for the purpose of obtaining it ; and it is quite 
clear to my conviction that no negotiation would prevent 
his success. By my letter of 23rd of last month I have 
already warned Ibrahim of the consequences of devastating 
the country ; and repetition would only weaken the effects of 
that warning. You observe that unless the Greeks can ob- 
tain the corn for their own use, they must starve. In this 
respect, then, it makes no difference whether the Turks get 
the corn or it is destroyed ; my opinion, therefore, is that, 
rather than let it fall into the hands of the enemy, it should 


be burned ; and I can contemplate no other measures in the 
present state of affairs as likely to be effective. If the Turks 
get the food, their stay in the country will be prolonged, pos- 
sibly to the next harvest, when they would repeat the same 
process ; whereas, if they are deprived of this supply under 
present circumstances, they must either starve or evacuate 
the Morea altogether. It is painful to propose such an ex- 
pedient to people undergoing such privations as those which 
the Greeks are at present enduring ; but under the inability 
to improve their own condition, it is at all events desirable 
to reduce their enemy to the same extremity. If I had au- 
thority from the Allied Powers to use pecuniary means for 
effecting the purpose of the Treaty, I would gladly purchase 
a right to this destructive operation by procuring the inha- 
bitants an equal quantity of corn from other places. Having 
no knowledge of the locality, or of the troops which the 
President may have at his disposal, I suggest with deference 
my ideas as to the best mode of executing this measure. My 
plan would be to send forward such corps, however small, as 
could watch and be in some degree a check upon the move- 
ments of the Ottoman forces. Upon their attempting to ad- 
vance, the corps retiring should set fire to the corn as they 
pass through it. This measure would check the movement 
of cavalry upon the practicable part of the country, give the 
retiring corps an opportunity of gaining, rocky impassable 
positions, and warn the inhabitants more distant from the 
scene of action to exert themselves in saving as much as they 
may be able to collect. Were the plan proposed in your 
letter to be adopted, I should fear that instead of outwitting 
so wily a chieftain as Ibrahim, he would not only obtain his 
object respecting the harvest itself, but benefit by the addi- 
tional supply proposed to be afforded him, until the arrival 
of answers from the Yiceroy. Although I have thought it 
advisable thus to state my opinion on this important point, 
I cannot leave the decision in better hands than yours; and 
I shall be very happy to support whatever arrangement is 
made by my colleagues, yourself, and Count Capodistrias, 
whose presence on the spot better enables them to form a 
correct judgment. I need not say how much I approve of 
your having remained where you are instead of proceeding 
to the western coast ; and I will endeavour to communicate 
to Sir Thomas Staines my wish that he should assist in that 
service. Sir Frederick Adam was not aware when he wrote 
of an ambiguity in the instructions about the blockade of 
Alexandria. It is not my intention to do more than watch 
that port until I get answers from England to the letters I 


have written on that subject. I would gladly meet my col- 
leagues at Egina to consult with them on this important 
question, but for the expectation of further instructions from 
England, and the attention which is required of me at so 
many other different points.* 

From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. G. 


1 ConqmSrant,' Vourla : le 19 mai 1828. f 

II parait qu'il y a eu quelque malentendu devant Modon au 
sujet d'une corvette turque que le 'Trident' avait arretee, au 
moment ou 1'escadre russe parut. Le capitaine du ' Trident ' 
crut qu'en faisant jeter les provisions a la mer, il pouvait 
laisser entrer la corvette, qu'il supposait devoir etre capturee 
par les Eusses ; c'est la meme que le ' Warspite ' avait deja 
detournee : elle etait retournee & la Sude, et la elle avait 
remis 40 mille talaris, qu'elle avait a bord, a une goelette de 
guerre autrichienne, qui les a remis a Ibrahim. Vous voyez 
que Messieurs les Autrichiens continuent. Je vais ecrire a 
Mons r Dandolo. Heiden m'a dit qu'il s'opposerait a ce que 
les batimens de guerre autrichiens entrent a Modon. Je 
n'ai pas d'ordre a ce sujet; done je n'ai pu en donner aux 
capitaines du ' Trident ' et de 1' 'Iphigenie.' Je crois aussi que 
la presence des Eusses a empeche les Albanais de Coron de 
suivre le projet qu'ils avaient, et cela est assez naturel. 
Ainsi de terns a autre il peut arriver des malentendus, qui 
elevent quelque mefiance. 

From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C. 

< Conqudrant ' : ler juin.J 

MON CHER AMIRAL, Quoique depuis quatre mois je sois 
sans une seule lettre du Ministre de la Marine, je crois ce- 
pendant etre plus a 1'aise vis-a-vis de nos Ministres, que vous 
ne 1'etes peut-etre vis-a-vis des votres. Je crains que les 
tergiversations de votre Cabinet n'eloignent le but. Au reste, 
les Eusses vont plus vite que la diplomatic. 

Poros: le 3 juin. 

Je suis arrive hier ici : le C to Heiden m'a communique les 
ordres qu'il a re9us de sa Cour. II en resulterait que le 
Cabinet de Paris ne regarde pas comme incompatibles 
1'exercice des droits de belligerans et raccomplissemeut du 
Traite ; en tant toutefois que les consequences de 1'attitude 

* NOTE BY SIR E. C. ITS LETTER-BOOK. 'This letter shows my reason 
for staying at Malta, and my expectation of some fresh instructions.' 
t Answered June 2nd. 
t Received at Corfii, June 25 ; 1828. 


qu'a pris ]a Russie n'iront pas au-dela des termes du Traite 
et du redressement des griefs dont se plaint le Cabinet de St.- 
Petersbourg. II est toutefois evident que de nouvelles in- 
structions doivent nous parvenir, soit de la conference de 
Londres, si Faccord subsiste, soit de chacun de nos Gouver- 
nemens, s'il y a quelque divergence dans leur maniere de voir 
une question a la verite fort embrouillee. Je ii'ai encore 
rien re9u du mien, si ce n'est de suivre les anciennes in- 
structions jusqu'a ce qu'on se soit accorde a Londres sur ce 

qu'il y aurait a faire Vous remarquerez dans 

les papiers que vous communique le C te Heiden une decla- 
ration du Cabinet russe aux Puissances maritimes pour le 
blocus et les batimens neutres, fondee sur son traite avec 
vous de 1801. II resulte de la que nous qui ne sommes pas 
en guerre nous n'avons pas le droit d'arreter les neutres ; 
nous ne sommes pas belligerans ; nous n'avons pas fait la 
declaration d'usage. Mon opinion a cet egard n'est pas 
detruite par les instructions du 16 octobre : elles ne* con- 
stituent pas le droit, et je n'ai pu, d'apres nos propres prin- 
cipes, donner des ordres positifs pour 1'arrestation de quelque 
batiment neutre que ce soit. Des avertissemens, a la bonne 
heure ; mais si un batiment de guerre, autrichien ou autre, 
demandait de quel droit, je serais embarrasse d'y repondre. 

Yos officiers vous rendent compte de ce qui se passe, et de 
1'etat des choses ici. Je crains bien qu'il nous faille creer 
cette Grece, car je ne sais ou la trouver : et c'est un assez 
curieux ordre de choses que d'etre oblige de payer ces gens-ci 
pour les faire se battre dans leur propre cause, et de les 
payer encore pour qu'ils ne soient pas pirates. Yoila pour- 
tant un coup-d J O3il vrai du tableau, et peut-etre le plus vrai. 

Votre bien devoue, 


From Sir E. C. to Vice-Admiral De Rigny. 

Malta, June 2, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIEAL, I fear the mistake of Count Guille- 
minot as to the blockade of Alexandria, as well as the same 
mistake being made by Sir Frederick Adam, will have induced 
you to take measures respecting that port which you would 
rather have postponed. I wrote to England immediately, to 
say that the order to which I was referred did not so empower 
me to blockade, and that I should wait further instructions. 
I believe I have told you this before. It appears to me that 
Heiden' s being a belligerent will enable us to enforce more 
strictly the terms of the Treaty, if we are permitted to profit 
by that circumstance. I do not know how to answer his 


question to me of what he shall do with the Turkish brig. 
He was not at war when he asked it, but I suppose lie will 
now make her a prize. If I had caught her coming out of 
Navarin or Modon, I should have taken out the Greeks and 
forced her in again ; and if she came out again, I would take 
away her rudder and perhaps cut her rigging or otherwise 
disabled her. I see your orders are qualified as to Austrians : 
mine are not. I have directed that not even a boat shall 
have permission to go in or come out. The Turks fired upon 
two of the 4 ' Etna's ' boats which went to warn back some 
boats from Navarin. Our lieutenants fired a blank cartridge 
up into the air, which I suppose they did not understand. 
But it was a hostile proceeding on their part, which I shall 
not forget. I have not been anywhere but on the coast of the 
Morea, and returned here to meet the c Asia ' and my de- 
spatches. I hope shortly to find myself again at sea with 
some decisive instructions to guide me, that we may bring 
matters to a crisis. 

I wish you joy of your correspondence with j , if 

the tone of his letters should be similar to that which he 
used in writing to me, I considered that tone so uii- 
gentlemanlike, that I have not answered him, and I only 
sent copies of his letters with my remarks on them to 
my Government, Nor do I mean to admit any personal 
communication with a man who has so conducted himself 
towards me. The Greeks, our Allies, having established a 
regular blockade which we are bound to support, I should use 

no ceremony with himself if he attempt to break such 

blockade. I hear a Turkish brig with a flag of truce is gone 
to Corfu with a brig of yours. I do not expect any good 
from any of these communications : I rely upon necessity only 
for bringing Ibrahim to terms. I have given my opinion that 
the corn in the fields should be burned if he attempt to take 
it : I would press this point more strongly if I could advance 
money to buy the Greeks an equal quantity. Adam tells me 
he expects Mr. S. Canning, and he is anxious that I should 
meet him. I am equally anxious for such an interview, as I 
shall then have a master who must answer my direct questions 
as to what I am to do ; and I think my first movement must 
be to Corfu for this purpose. I trust Heiden's presence as a 
belligerent will prevent any movement of the Turks against 
Samos, which I hear is again threatened. He presses my 
meeting him ; but besides the above-mentioned reason for 
going to Corfu, I do not wish to meet him until I know 
clearly how I am to act with him. This makes me more 
desirous of meeting you at Corfu, if circumstances will admit 
of your coming away from the Archipelago, 


Sir JE. C. to Admiral Heiden.* 

< Asia,' at Malta: June 3, 1828. 

MONSIEUR L'AMIRAL, I am much obliged to you for the 
interesting document f which accompanied Your Excellency's 
letter (of May ^ 1828) relative to the different situation 
as regards Turkey in which Eussia is now placed. England 
being no party to that difference, I have received no orders 
from my Government which authorise me to take or concur 
in any measures of direct hostility against the forces of the 
Ottoman Porte, or to proceed one step further forward in the 
way of coercive interposition either as respects the naval 
forces of Turkey and Egypt or as regards the commerce of 
neutrals, than is pointed out in the joint instructions of the 
Plenipotentiaries in London; and, consequently, that the 
distributions and exertions of the British ships of war under 
my immediate command, must be limited by the tenor and 
directed to the execution of those instructions, until I receive 
further instructions either jointly from the Plenipotentiaries of 
the Allies in London, or separate from my own Government. So 
soon as I can arrange the business which has occasioned my 
return to Malta, I propose meeting Mr. Stratford Canning at 
Corfu, where he is expected, in order to concert further 
measures for enforcing the return of the Ottoman army to 
Egypt, and the restoration of the Greek captives the 
most important of the many objects of interest to which we 
owe our attention. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Mr. Huskisson, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 

'Asia,' Malta : June 3, 1828. J 

SIR, . . . (After stating that the typhus fever had 
diminished) .... I have before stated my opinion to His 
Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral that pecuniary aid 
to the President of Greece would be the most efficacious as 
well as economical mode of fulfilling the Treaty of London. 
I cannot but lament the consequences which are liable to 
attend his deficiencies in that respect at this very critical 

* Enclosing orders and letters relating to the blockade of the Morea ; and 
the harvest. 

t The declaration of war by Russia against Turkey. 

J Enclosing 13 documents of correspondence, between Sir E. C., Count 
Capodistrias, Admirals De Rigny and Heiden, and Captain Parker ; all re- 
lating to measures adopted in furtherance of the Treaty of London, 


period. I have sanctioned the calls which have been made 
on Captain Parker's humanity as to giving food to those who 
would have absolutely starved without it. Calls of this sort 
we shall still be subject to both on account of the fever now 
prevailing and the intention of Ibrahim to collect the har- 
vest : for whether he be successful in this object or fail from 
its being destroyed, the natives in those districts will be 
equally subject to the severest privation, owing to the pecu- 
niary inability of the President to obtain for them a supply 
from other ports. 

I am, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Count Eeiden. 

Malta : June 3, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, I found such a mass of documents 
upon my arrival here to occupy my attention, that I am tired 
to death of pens and ink. Since the date of your letter, I 
imagine you are become a regular belligerent, and therefore 
no longer require my opinion as to what you should do with 
the Turkish brig. Had I met with her 1 should have taken 
out the Greeks, as you have done, at the risk of being 
accused of establishing a harem ; and I should have made 
the brig go back into Modon with the invalids, and there 
wait the fate of the army. I cannot tell you how much I 
lament the not having power to give pecuniary aid to the 
President at this critical period. I feel it the more since I 
find that 500,000 francs are actually on their way to De 
Bigny for that purpose. Arnous certainly misunderstood 
De Rigny's orders to him ; but I hope we shall now do better. 
Ibrahim will certainly collect the corn, if the Greeks them- 
selves don't burn it as soon as his people approach it. 
Money could not be employed more effectually than in buying 
and procuring from other parts as much corn as is so 
destroyed. Time will not admit of the process of sending to 
Mehemet Ali, and negotiating about it ; and Ibrahim is too 
wily and too devoted to his object to be led away by such 
means. I have not such orders for blockading Alexandria 
as Sir F. Adam and the French suppose. The term is a 
* like blockade ' to that of the Morea, which is a confinement 
of the Greeks (according to the instruction it refers to) to 
their own coast, and a prevention of the movements of any 
Turkish force from one port in Greece to another. A blockade 
of the Morea is to encourage the Turks going back to Egypt 
and to prevent others going to Greece. A blockade of Alex- 


andria similar to this would be exactly contrary in its effect. 
I have therefore asked for an explanation, and decided to 
wait until I get it. Again let me say, that whatever different 
line our Governments may adopt, no difference need take 
place in the intercourse between us individually. The Gen- 
eral* will always admit your ships ; but if any prize comes 
here, she must be under Eussian colours only, and not 
Eussian colours over the Turkish. f For God's sake, I hope 
De Eigny and yourself will prevent the Turks attacking 
Samos, as I would certainly do if I were in that part. I would 
gladly be with you if it were possible ; but I must make the 
blockade and my communications with England and with 
Mr. S. Canning, who is expected at Corfu, my principal 
object for the present. All my family unite in kind regards 
to you. As to myself, my good friend, I am not to be 
changed by any change of policy in our Governments. 


Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Malta : June 3, 1828. 

SIR, I have not yet been on board the ' Asia, 5 having since 
my arrival been entirely engrossed by the mass of despatches 
which had been collected here during my absence. I hope 
the alarm about Tunis will prove to have arisen from some 
drunken riot, and that I shall learn by the return of the 
'Wasp,' which was despatched there, that the Bey has 
exerted himself to prevent a repetition of it : but these 
different Turkish dependencies require constant attention 
to prevent ebullition of the barbarians who form their popu- 
lation. The visit of the c Erebus ' by the orders of Your 
Eoyal Highness did much good, and I have employed the 
' Zebra ' in the same manner in the Levant. I have not met 
the ( Parthian ' lately : but I suspect from the weakness she 
showed in the winter, that I shall find it requisite to send 
her home in exchange for the c Wasp,' in preference to the 
' Zebra.' I had but just finished the above sentence when 
the f Glasgow ' arrived with information of the ' Parthian ' 
having been wrecked near Alexandria, and with Captain 
Hotham and the whole of the crew on board in safety. The 
vessel herself is no great loss, and I hope we shall save the 
greater part of her stores. I shall direct Captain Thompson 
to proceed with the c Eevenge,' which is now ready, off the 
Morea in company with the ' Glasgow,' and there hold the 

* General Ponsonby, Governor of Malta. 

t Prizes cannot be sold here, save under Russian colours only. 


court-martial. I trust some inquiry will be made respecting - 
the outfit of the c Blonde, 5 for I can assure Your Royal High- 
ness that the defectiveness of stores and the demands made 
upon this arsenal by ships on their first arrival from Eng- 
land, added to the quarantine, reduces by one-half the 
effective strength of the force allotted to this station : I can- 
not but think that the best economy will be found in keeping 
all His Majesty's ships fully efficient to their purpose. 

The reports of the means which Ibrahim has of subsisting 
his army are very various and contradictory. I think he has 
relied upon supplies from the Ionian Islands which he will 
no longer be able to command. He will certainly do his 
utmost to collect the harvest, and the Greeks may not be in 
sufficient force to save it for themselves. I have advised its 
being burned in preference to its falling into his hands ; a 
measure which I could press more satisfactorily if I were en- 
abled to furnish them with an equivalent means of subsist- 
ence. I have had the honour of receiving by the ' Asia ' 
Your Royal Highness's letters of April 7 and 24. I cannot 
conclude without assuring Your Royal Highness that I am 
very sensible how entirely I owe it to the decision of Your 
Royal Highness that the ' Asia ' has again become the bearer 
of my flag. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E* C* to Viscount Granville. 

Malta: June 4, 1828. 

MY DEAR LORD, . ... 

No man is more anxious to get this business settled without 
war than I am ; but I have thought the best way of obtain- 
ing such a conclusion would have been prompt as well as 
vigorous measures before the Turks were prepared for resist- 
ance. I should have relied upon such means avertin 
Russian war with the Porte. g a 

Yours, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Lord Cowley at Vienna. 

1 Asia,' at Malta : June 7, 1828. 

MY LORD, I had yesterday the honour of receiving Your 
Lordship's letter of May 4 last, stating that the Emperor of 
Austria had given orders that his subjects should be pre 


vented from introducing provisions into the blockaded ports 
of the Morea, &c. If these orders should be complied with 
both in their spirit and letter, no doubt the retirement of 
the Egyptian forces will be considerably expedited. But 
looking to the experience I have had of the conduct of the 
Austrian marine acting in these seas, I must confess that I 
have no reliance upon the intentions of His Imperial Majesty 
being strictly complied with, in respect to the conveyance of 
despatches and of money in the Austrian vessels of war, 
when there is a hope of their being able to do so undis- 
covered. The evasions employed by the Austrian officers, 

not even excepting , in pursuit of the traffic, show 

that they take personally a strong and peculiar interest in 
it. I have lately been informed that some 40,000 dollars, 
with which a Turkish corvette had returned to Canea in 
Candia after being turned back by the blockading ships, 
were immediately transferred to an Austrian schooner of 
war, and by her conveyed to Ibrahim. And I am also in- 
formed that the commander of the Austrian corvette ' Caro- 
line/ of whom I have heretofore had to complain as being so 
conspicuous in this traffic whilst he was so loud in his com- 
plaint of our interruptions, so late as last month made several 
attempts to run into Navarin or Modon, and was only 
defeated in his purpose by the Russian squadron closely 
watching her. 

I am, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Captain Parker, H.M.S. ' Warspite. 9 

' Asia/ at Malta : June 12, 1828. 

SIR, In the present critical circumstances of the army of 
Ibrahim Pacha, it appears to me that our consultations upon 
the subject of his retirement would be more conveniently 
held off Navarin than at Egina or at any other place distant 
from the Pacha's head-quarters. I therefore wish you to 
proved yourself to communicate my opinion to my col- 
leagues, or the senior officers whom they may have left to 
represent them. If, however, they should think it necessary 
to remain where they are in present communication with the 
President, you will be pleased to continue with them as the 
representative of my sentiments on the measures to be pur- 
sued. You are already apprised of my opinion that a pros- 
pect of indulgence would incline the Pacha to protract giving 
his assent to evacuate the Morea ; and that decisive proofs 
of our determination to prevent his receiving any supplies 


whatever, and to make him pay the penalty of any ravages 
which may be committed by his troops, would produce an 
immediate consent to such terms as we might dictate, in 
return to the proposals which his difficulties would induce 
him to offer. After fully stating my sentiments on this deli- 
cate subject, you will understand that if my colleagues should 
still be of a different opinion, I shall readily acquiesce ; and 
you will, in that case, assist in carrying the measures de- 
cided upon into execution with the same zeal for their success 
as if they had originated with me. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to the French and Russian Admirals. 

Malta : June 12, 1828. 

MY DEAR COLLEAGUES, I have directed that Captain 
Parker, of the ' Warspi+e,' who is so fully informed of all that 
has passed, and who is the depository of my sentiments on 
the delicate subject which has lately occupied your delibera- 
tions, should again join you as my representative. He will 
state to you my opinion that the fittest way to negotiate with 
Ibrahim is to let him understand that no supplies whatever 
will be granted to him ; and that if he attempt to ravage the 
country in order to prolong his power to hold his present 
position, he will suffer that starvation himself in common 
with his army, which he inflicts upon the Greek unoffending 
inhabitants. He has always said that he could yield to 
nothing but necessity. Be assured it is that alone which 
has now induced him to open the communication, and that 
if we stand firm to our purpose, he will give way at once. 
In this case, we can stipulate for the return of all the Greeks 
whom he has sent over since the Treaty ; and if those under 
his command, who have claimed them as prize of war, find 
that they are made the price of their own ransom, they will 
all, or nearly all, be produced. These being my sentiments, 
I would not make any terms with him respecting the harvest, 
but would warn him of the peril of such a measure. If he 
ask what we would have him do to feed his ara^ so 
blockaded, the answer is obvious. 'Return with it to 
Egypt.' If ever he should make his threatened attempt to 
collect the harvest, I am persuaded that the burning of one 
field of corn, as an earnest of what is intended, will deter 
him. from proceeding. Now, having given you my opinion, 
I beg to assure you, that if you should still think the plan 
of sending to the Viceroy, mentioned in your letter as pro- 


posed by the President, the preferable mode of proceeding, 
Captain Parker will assist you to the utmost of his power in 
making your plan successful. I would gladly communicate 
with you, preferably personally, if I did not feel-it so much 
more important to the object we have in view, to meet Mr. 
Stratford Canning and his colleagues at Corfu. I think we 
should all meet off Navarin, in readiness to carry into more 
speedy execution whatever arrangements may be agreed upon 
with Ibrahim Pacha. I shall go there, at all events, as soon 
as I have had the requisite communications with the Allied 

Believe me, &c., 


From Sir Frederick Adam to Sir E. C. 

Corfu : June 1, 1828. 

MY DEAR CODRINGTON, A Turkish brig-of-war with a 
flag of truce came in yesterday, having on board Baki 
Effendi, a confidential officer of Ibrahim, bearing a letter to 
Count Guilleminot and one for me ; the letters contained 
only that this officer was charged to communicate with us. 
This communication is to ask that supplies should be allowed 
to go to Ibrahim, and that the Pacha should be permitted 
to send vessels to communicate with his father and with 
Constantinople. To this in substance we replied that it was 
impossible to comply with his demand for supplies that the 
Admirals were authorised under the orders of their Govern- 
ments, and that we could in no way interfere with these 
their orders that, with regard to his sending vessels, that 
was equally out of the question ; that any correspondence 
he wished to send either to Constantinople or to Mehemet 
Ali the Admirals would take care should be forwarded with- 
out delay and with perfect safety. Even if a person was 
required to go (a point he pressed much) for verbal commu- 
nication, if the Admirals could with safety (by stripping, 
changing clothes, &c.) receive such person on board, they 
would forward him to his destination. 

Such is the substance of our communication to this officer ; 
but we both of us write also to Ibrahim ; and you shall have 
copies of the letters, as also of Count Guilleminot's to De 

It appears that this brig received your letter for Ibrahim 
and carried it to him into Navarin, remained some time 
there, and therefore probably the instructions of Ibrahim to 
his delegate now are, in consequence of your communication,, 


modified from what they were originally. We took care to 
make Ibrahim's messenger understand that violence to the 
Greeks, or ravages, would recoil on his master, who would 
be less favorably treated if such measures were resorted to. 
In the meantime, you will have received from Capodistrias the 
Memoir addressed to yourself and your colleagues, as well 
as his letters and Parker's on the subject ; and you will per- 
ceive that the President fears that maintaining the strict 
blockade of the ports will cause Ibrahim, who is already 
prepared for it, to make himself master of the whole crops of 
the Morea, and thus reduce the population to a state of star- 
vation and misery. It is very difficult, under these circum- 
stances, to say what should be done, for the object of the 
whole operations is to save fche population from destruction. 
To press on Ibrahim so as to cause his exhausting the coun- 
try certainly militates against this object ; to allow him to 
receive supplies, except under express stipulations, will, or 
may, postpone his departure; and it is the conciliating of 
these opposite difficulties which is the point to be attained. 
I shall write to-morrow fully on this point after having seen 
Guilleminot, and fully considered the whole question ; in the 
meantime, I think it right to send this by the transport. It 
is very clear that Ibrahim is hard up before he would come 
to this measure of sending to us, and I look upon it only as 
the precursor of a demand for terms and an arrangement 
for evacuation ; and doubt not we shall hear to this effect 
very soon after the Eifendi reaches the Egyptian head- 
quarters. I hear from Stovin, on what he considers good 
authority at Modon, that the Pacha prepares and sends 
away a regiment of foot 2,500, 1,000 horse, and about 800 
irregular horse to Patras, with a sum of money to purchase 
grain, cattle, &c., from the Greeks ; this information from 
Modon is dated the 20th, and all accounts coincide in stating 
that he is not now inclined to commit ravage or violence on 

Ever yours, 


The amount of business that devolved upon Sir E. 
Codrington at this time may be estimated by my stating 
that what is here published is only a very small por- 
tion selected from the mass of official despatches and 
semi-official correspondence relating to this period. 
Most of this correspondence is of great interest ; but 
the labour entailed by it was a severe addition to the 


weight of the anxious service which had thus to be 
carried out. 

Sir E. Codrington returned to Malta in H.M. S. 
4 Ocean/ and hoisting his flag in the 'Asia/ sailed for 
Navarin and Corfu on June 13, 1828. 

Sir E. G. to Lady G. 

June 14, 1828, at Sea. 

Relaxation of some sort is absolutely necessary, to enable 
one to stand the intense anxiety which I sometimes feel for 
a good result to my labours. It is not, in truth, that I 
have any doubts about it, other than those arising from the 
want of firmness and decision which my masters evince in 
their communications to me, ' letting I dare not wait upon I 
would;' but this desired result does not advance in pace 
with my wishes, for I am by nature very impatient; and 
the endurance which I have had to undergo, and must still 
be subject to, before my whole conduct is placed before the 
public, absolutely wears me. You have certainly lightened 
this burden, and at the same time have given me increased 
strength to support the weight remaining; but I fear it 
has been to the severe cost of your own shoulders, in even 
greater proportion than in the relief which you have afforded 
mine. However, if you will but sacrifice to the preservation 
of your health, as I mean to do for the security of mine, be 
assured we shall have the sweet reward of the unqualified 
approbation of all those whom we hold dear, to the discomfi- 
ture of the envious, the jealous, and the malignant. When 
I ask myself why there should be any of the latter, I can 
hardly account for the fact, since even political ambition 
scarcely deserves to be charged with s,uch a feeling. To be 
sure, the worst passions of the human heart are liable to be 
engendered in the exposed failure of an unworthy purpose. 

The excellent breeze with which we started, after having 
disposed by signal of the Navarin detachment, carried us 
some eighty miles before 8 P.M., when, like the rest of us, it 
died away into sleep, until about 4 A.M. this day, when it 
again gave us a handsome lift, and brought once more into 
view the 'Pelican' and little 'Hind,' which we had left far 

Corfu : June 19. 

We came to an anchor here Tuesday 17th, at 3 in the 
morning ; the lights in the channel and at this place being 
excellent guides, under the directions given by our poor 


Smith* for avoiding the dangers. Our excellent friend Adam 
came off, breakfasted with me, and arranged for my being on 
shore at half-past 10. There I was met by Woodford and all 
the heads of departments, in their Bath as well as other 
Orders ; guards of honor and a large concourse of people 
' making a lane ' for me to the palace, where I had to make 
iny bow to the Senate before I went upstairs to Lady Adam. 
Then came a visit to Count Guillerninot, his return to me, 
and so forth. Nobody performs all this better than Adarn ; 
and therefore, under his guidance, these ceremonies, which 
I admit to be proper however disagreeable, lose much of 
their tiresomeness. The reception I have met with, wherever 
the task I have had to perform is known and the difficulties 
justly estimated, is flattering to a degree which might turn the 
head of a younger subject. I trust, however, I shall not be 
thrown off my guard by it; and that it will not in the 
smallest degree diminish my ardour in the performance of 
what is left to be done. The feeling which at present 
prevails in me is to be, if possible, more alert : first, that 
I may show I am not unworthy the confidence and the kind- 
ness which I have met with; and, secondly, that my detractors 
may be put to shame; in the prospect of which I own I have 
a somewhat malicious pleasure. I was glad to find here rny 
friend De Eigny, although, poor fellow, in long quarantine. 
He will probably return off Navarin to wear out his time, and 
then come here in pratique. 

Ibrahim is in a quondary. He tells me his Albanians are 
in revolt, but adds that, in making their progress towards 
Roumelia and their own country, they will commit excesses 
in spite of him. But as he has threatened to do the same 
himself, if forced to retire and join the Seraskier, I consider 
all this unworthy attention. If he finds that devastation will 
best suit his purpose; he will not be restrained by any con- 
siderations of humanity ; and therefore I am for distressing 
him all I can, and obliging him to resort to his final course 
as speedily as possible, be it what it may. He boasted to 
us last September of his humanity to the poor wretches of 
Tornese Castle, whom he permitted to live in' Modon and 
Coron, but he forbade their moving out ; and as the fathers 
or husbands disobeyed this order, the women and children 
were sold immediately to the highest bidder ! My friend 
Parker cut up an Egyptian brig the other day which tried 
to force the blockade, so close to Navarin that it must have 
annoyed the Pacha extremely. Her masts and yards were 

* Smith was Master of I1M.S, * Asia ' j killed at Navarin. 


much wounded, and four men were killed. Parker put her 
to rights for the voyage, and sent ' Eattlesnake ' to take 
her back to Alexandria. The captain said he knew what 
he had to expect, but that his orders were positive to do 
his best to get in. Parker has since sent Ibrahim's de- 
spatches to the Viceroy in the 'Rifleman.' We have no 
further news of Mr. S. Canning, who is probably detained 
by the changes which Galignani of the 28th reports to be 
taking place in our Ministry. I need not dwell on this, 
as you will probably have later papers ; nor need I say that 
I am pleased with the prospect of the retirement of my 
particular friends, Lord Dudley and Mr. Huskisson ; and 
if there be honor amongst the less noble part of mankind, 
I could name another who ought to go with them, for he 
has certainly helped them into their errors. 

Guilleminot, with whom we dine to-day as he says, a la 
militaire is quite the right sort of fellow. Adam has had 
full experience of him ; and his straightforward manner, and 
his undiplomatic and easy ways, are agreeable earnest of his 
conduct. He enjoys my letter to Lord D. very much, and 
confirms the soundness of my reasoning on my instructions. 

Our drives in the evening in this beautiful country, on 
most excellent roads, give me a good sleep for my five hours ; 
and I expect to continue in good health. I find the Emperor 
of Russia has sent me a very brilliant sword : but more of 
this when we have received it. 

Spencer is gone to Sta. Maura and Dragomestre, to see if 
Church has means of getting out of his difficulties. Poor 
Hastings died of his wound very suddenly, and is a very great 
loss. And now, God bless you and yours. 

E. C. 

June 20. 

This morning Adam received his Galignanis up to June 2, 
in which the Ministerial changes are described as being 
partly settled. I can have no objection to yee Sir G. Murray 
Secretary for the Colonies, and even Lord Aberdeen,^ or any- 
body else, in the place of Earl Dudley ; but I do not think such 
a merely military Ministry can stand. However, the most im- 
portant information for me personally is, perhaps, the account 
Woodford has in a letter from his brother, of P. Malcolm 
having been actually at one time named to supersede me. 
cannot believe it to have reached that length ; because it 
could not have been done but by the Cabinet, and therefore 
could not have been again undone. Gore's conversation with 



the Premier, where he admitted that I could not have done 
my duty otherwise than by entering Navarin, would lead to 
his seeing my defence, which, by the expressions he then 
used, he had not then seen. That would lead to his exa- 
mining my subsequent communications ; and thence he would 
be led to see that I had done my duty since. . 
This is my reading of the changes which Will just now tells 
me are, by the paper of June 2, confirmed by kissing hands. 
I imagine this to have detained Mr. S. Canning, and that 
we must shortly have either him or a messenger. 

From Sir E. G. to Commodore Campbell. 


Corfu : June 19, 1828. 

If Parker is still off Navarin, pray let him know that 
although I have only seen his letter to Sir F. Adam, he may 
rely upon my approval of the thrashing he gave the Egyptian 
brig, as well as of his sending Ibrahim's despatches to the 
Viceroy. This letter will probably go by Admiral De Bigny, 
with whom I have talked the matter of the Albanians over, 
and who will authorise by his presence the measures which 
may be deemed advisable. In the meantime, all that is said 
upon this subject in Parker's letter to Adam seems to me to 
give a correct view of it. / should prefer their being kept 
with Ibrahim's army until its fate is decided on, if it can be 
done ; because I am confident he is desirous of getting rid of 
them ; and I fear their being more injurious to the Greeks 
anywhere else, short of the north of Albania. But I shall 
sanction whatever else may be decided on by those nearer at 
hand, and nobody is more likely to take a correct view of it, 
as it may affect Ibrahim, than Admiral De Rigny. We know 
nothing more of Mr. Canning, and I suspect he stays for the 
new arrangement of Ministers mentioned in Galignani. 

I cannot well quit this until I hear of or from Mr. S. 
Canning, since Count Guilleminot is as uninstructed as I am 
as to our future proceedings. I am happy to find that he, 
as well as Adam, agrees with me as to all that I have done, 
and also as to what measures would now best serve the 

Last night Parker's letter to Adam of the 12th arrived. 
He judges every thing very satisfactorily. If the sending 
Ibrahim's messenger and the conferences with the Albanians 
should enable the Greeks to secure any considerable part of 
their harvest, I shall be as well pleased as surprised. If we 
should be thus successful, it will be owing, I think, to Ibra- 


him's fears ; for humanity is out of the question. It will 
show, too, that he never meditated going into Roumelia, from 
whence he would never, I think, have returned to Egypt. If 
any communication take place with you, it will be well to 
hint that you collect from what I have said, that his devas- 
tating the Morea would probably occasion a landing of the 
army here upon Tornese, and the passage of our ships into 
the gulf of Lepanto. In fact, this is what we ought to do at 
once ; only our Governors don't think so. The non-hostility 
of not blockading by land whilst we do so by sea, is somewhat 
unintelligible policy in my mind. 

The whole vacillation and delay seems to be owing to our 
Ministers. The French see the necessity of settling the 
matter at once, to stop the proceedings of the Russians, who 
will, of course, go on until it is settled. But they, the French, 
cannot act on their own account without our joining in it. 
Thus time wears away, and thus we are in the state of pro- 
tracted war which a proper execution of the Treaty would 
have prevented. I fancy if the smaller vessels should find 
themselves within Sapienza, it will not be amiss for somebody 
to ascend the height on the island nearest to Modon, and 
take the distance by a sextant. Besides the information we 
should thus gain, Ibrahim would begin to calculate on the 
possibility of our taking military possession of it. As our 
force now off Navarin is numerous, it is good to send a vessel 
now and then to see what is doing near Patras and Miso- 
lunghi. Spencer is thereabout just now, finding out the 
condition of Church and his army, which we may find it 
requisite to take out of their difficulties. We must not let 
them starve or be cut to pieces. 

Yours, &c., 


From Admiral De Rigny.* 

1 Conqurant,' devant Modon : 10 juin 1828. 

A Paris, je vois qu'on est dispose a attendre que la Russie 
aille au-dela de ce qu'elle a promis, avant de la blamer ; il me 
semble que votre Ministere est un peu plus inquiet ; mais 
entre nous, il y a un peu de sa faute. Le mot untoward peut 
avoir de graves consequences. D'Egypte, j'apprends que 
Mehemet Ali, qui s'etait d'abord emporte sur des menaces de 
blocus, a mis de 1'eau dans son vin ; il laisse comprendre qu'il 
espere revoir bientot son fils et qu'il rendra les Grecs. 

J'ai rencontre hier la ' Diligente ' venant de Toulon en 14 

* Received June 25, at Corfu. 
x 2 


jours ; elle porte d'Egine un agent fra^ais, quidoit deploy er 
son caractere officiel quand le votre sera arrive ; mais qui 
porte aux Grecs quelque chose de inieux pour eux qu'un 
agent, c'est de Fargent. II parait que votre Ministere trouve 
quelque difficulte a enfaire autant, et en cela jele comprends 
bien ; car, en definitive, je vois que tout cet argent pourra 
bien tourner en subside pour les Russes. Quant a celui 
qu'ils donnent, ils sauront bien dans leur Traite se le faire 
rendre par les Turcs ; mais la philanthropic est si a la mode 
en France que nos Ministres ont ete obliges de donner 
500,000 francs pour qu'on ne les force pas de donner dix 

Yotre bien devoue, 




WHILST Sir E. Codrington was taking the energetic 
measures described in these letters, a blow was being 
struck against him in England, the real origin of which 
may have had many sources either political, as against 
the Treaty, or personal, as shown in Mr. Huskisson's 
private letters (published in the ' Wellington Papers/ 
1871), or professional, as shown in ample information 
against Sir E. C. being sent from the Admiralty to the 
Cabinet, but that which was in his favor being with- 
held by that Board, for, the correction of the supposed 
fact quoted by the Duke of Wellington in his memoran- 
dum to the Cabinet as a ground for his recall, was 
acknowledged to have been received by the Admiralty 
sixteen days before that recall left England. Not only 
was the Cabinet allowed then to remain under error, but 
on a subsequent occasion (in 'Wellington Despatches/ 
page 36), Lord Aberdeen refers, on 19th August, 1828, 
to * some papers from Codrington which have been at 
the Admiralty these ten days, but which we only 
received yesterday ; r and he adds, ' up to this moment 
I have never seen any account of the conference of 
Ibrahim with the Admirals which has given rise to 
the expectation of the Morea being evacuated/ 

Yet this conference with Ibrahim, sent home by Sir 
E. C., is acknowledged by the Admiralty on August 9, 
1828. These dates tend to justify the opinion above 
given as to the hostile feeling against Sir E.G. 

W. J. C. 


From the Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Edward Codrington.* 

Foreign Office : May, 1828. 

SIR, After carefully examining the orders conveyed to you 
by His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, and com- 
paring them with the explanations now received from you, I 
regret to be under the necessity of stating that His Majesty's 
Government, however they may lament the circumstance, 
cannot reconcile your proceedings with the Instructions con- 
veyed to you, more especially those of October 16 last. 

The Instructions contained in Mr. Croker's letter to Vice- 
Admiral Sir Harry Neale of February 8, 1826, which were 
handed over to you on March 3, 1827, and of which you 
acknowledge the receipt as 'Instructions executed, but 
transferred to you, in the event of a possible recurrence to 
the subject of them,' have put you in possession of the in- 
tentions of His Majesty's Government that the transporta- 
tion of the Greeks of the Morea to Egypt should not be 

You were directed by the Protocol signed at Constanti- 
nople on September 4, 1827, to favour the return either to 
Constantinople or to Alexandria of all Turkish and Egyptian 
vessels of war and transports having on board troops ; and, 
by the Instructions sent to you on October 16, you were 
directed to hold out every inducement to the Pacha of Egypt, 
and to his son, to withdraw the Egyptian ships and land 
forces altogether from Greece, and to assure them that every 
facility and protection would be given for their safe return 
to Alexandria, but on no account to enter into any stipula- 
tion for allowing the ships to return without the troops to 

When you were directed to favour the return of the 
Egyptian troops, and on no account to enter into any stipu- 
lation for allowing the ships to return without the troops, 
you were necessarily authorized to ascertain what the ships 
about to return contained. But your fleet does not appear 
to have been so disposed as to have been able to prevent the 
movements of the Turkish and Egyptian ships, whatever 
they might have contained, or whatever might have been 
theii* destination. By the only returns received from you by 
His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral since the battle 
of Navarin, of the disposition of His Majesty's ships under 
your command, which returns bear date respectively No- 
vember 21, 1827, and February 26, 1828, it does not appear 

* Received June 21, at Corfu ; answered June 22, 1828. 


that any ships were specifically directed to watch the ports 
of the Morea. 

The first information received by you of the sailing of the 
Turkish and Egyptian fleet from Navarin appears to have 
been obtained when you learnt its arrival at Alexandria. 
That fleet appears to have been unwatched at Navarin, to 
have been considerably reinforced there by ships of war col- 
lected* from other ports of Greece in the possession of the 
Turks, and it might have conveyed the effective force of 
Ibrahim Pacha to any other point of the Morea, or to any of 
the islands, with the same facility with which it conveyed 
all the useless persons of the army to Alexandria. 
- Neither do any measures appear to have been taken to 
prevent the return of that fleet from Egypt. It was unob- 
served during its passage, and would not have been ade- 
quately, if at all, opposed, had it directed its course again to 
Navarin instead of to Candia. 

Captain Parker of the ' Warspite/ who did not arrive at 
Navarin till March 12, determined to remain there in com- 
pany with the French frigate ( Iphigenie,' not, as far as it 
appears, in consequence of any particular instructions from 
you, but because General Guilleminot seemed very desirous 
that the port should be closely watched. 

Thus, from December to March, the movements of a large 
fleet between Egypt and the Morea seem to have been free 
from interruption, and not even exposed to observation. 

By your Instructions of October 16, 1827, you were 
directed, 'to intercept all ships, whether of war or mer- 
chants, having on board troops, arms, ammunition, stores or 
provisions for the use of the Turkish force employ edf against 
the Greeks, either on the continent or in the islands ; ' and 
you were further directed by the same Instructions ' to con- 
cert with the commanders of the Allied Powers, the most 
effectual means of preventing any movements by sea on the 
part of the Turkish or Egyptian forces.'}: 

The Instructions on this point were absolute. It was un- 
doubtedly * left to the judgment and discretion of the admirals 
to decide, in conjunction with the Ambassadors, whether any 
portion of their force should be employed either off Constan- 
tinople or Alexandria, and to vary according to circumstances 
the line described in the Protocol of September 4, 1827, for 
the operation of the Greek blockade ; ' but you were posi- 

* The word collected is inserted in the duplicate. 

t { Or intended to be employed ' is here omitted, although in the In- 
struction thus quoted. 

\ Meaning from one port in Greece to another port in Greece. 


tivel j directed by your Instructions above cited c to intercept 
nil vessels of war, or merchants, and to prevent any move- 
ments by sea on the part of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets.'* 
It was for you alone, and the commanders of the Allied 
Powers to concert the measures best calculated to effect these 

The Instructions of October 16, which confirmed, ex- 
plained, and extended those previously sent to you, were 
received by you after the battle of Navarin, and, in acknow- 
ledging the receipt of them at Malta on November 8, you 
add * that you will pay the strictest attention to them.' It 
was not deemed necessary to send you other Instructions 
after the battle of Navarin was known in this country, as 
that event occasioned no variation in the principle upon 
which the Allies had acted for the attainment of the objects 
of the Treaty of London. 

The Instructions of October 16 were thought sufficient for 
your guidance, minute directions being contained therein 
for your conduct with regard to [neutrals, and the nature of 
the measures you were to adopt with regard to] f Turkish and 
Egyptian vessels being therein clearly defined. 

In the general order issued by you on March 2, 1828, you 
have used the words of your Instructions of July 12, 1827, 
but you have omitted to give the officers under your com- 
mand the additional authority given to you by your Instruc- 
tions of October 16 to intercept provisions destined for the 
use of the Turkish force. 

By the same Instructions you are directed * not to restrain 
the Greek naval forces from exercising, in respect to neutrals 
attempting to break the blockade, all the rights of a belli- 

But by a letter from Captain Parker of the ' Warspite ' of 
March 30, 1828, it appears that at that period he had re- 
ceived no positive instructions, which enabled him to decide 
6 whether the ships of the Greek navy might attack and 
seize Turkish and neutral vessels near the ships of the 

Upon a consideration, therefore, of all the circumstances 
connected with this unfortunate misconception of the views 
and intentions of Her Majesty's Government, they have 
found themselves under the necessity of writing to His 
Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral requesting His 

* Meaning from one port in Greece to another port in Greece, 
t The words between brackets are inserted in the duplicate, although 
omitted in the original despatch. 


Royal Highness to relieve jou in the command of the squa- 
dron in the Mediterranean. 

I have the honor to be, &c., 


June 4, 1828. 

P.S. The above answer to your letter to Lord Dudley of 
April 7, was approved by His Majesty's Government on the 
19th ultimo, but circumstances intervened which delayed its 
transmission to you till after the receipt of your despatches 
of April 30, addressed to the Eight Honorable William 

Those despatches have since been ta,ken into the con- 
sideration of His Majesty's Government. 

The objections therein stated by you to the establishment 
of a blockade of Alexandria, apply only to a blockade en- 
forced by the exercise of all the rights of a belligerent [and 
are wholly inapplicable to the blockade]* you were directed 
to establish, according to the tenor of your Instructions of 
October 16. By those Instructions you were directed c to 
take care to abstain from giving any interruption of the 
regular commerce of neutrals with any of the ports of Turkey 
or of Greece, though occupied by the Turks ;' and you were 
informed, ' that it was to be taken as a general rule, not only 
that the regular commerce of neutrals that is, such as is not 
carried on in order to aid the belligerents should proceed un- 
interrupted, but that the interruption should be confined to 
neutrals sailing under the convoy of Turkish ships of war.' 
Whenever the term c blockade ' has been used you appear to 
have understood it in its most extended sense, and not to 
have adverted to your Instructions, to which you were con- 
stantly referred, for the precise definition of the limited 
measure of blockade you were authorised to adopt. 

I must observe that it appears by your despatches last 
received, that it was not till April 19 that you stationed 
three of His Majesty's ships between Egypt and Candia, 
with orders to watch and intercept the movements of any 
Ottoman ships carrying supplies from Alexandria to the 

I regret to be under the necessity of informing you, that 
notwithstanding the receipt of your despatches, dated April 
80, His Majesty's Government do not see reason to depart 
from the measure they had before found themselves con- 

* The words within the brackets are omitted in the duplicate. 


strained to adopt of representing to His Royal Highness 
the Lord High Admiral, the expediency of appointing a flag- 
officer to relieve you in your command. 


Sir E Codrington to the Earl of Aberdeen.* 

< Asia/ at Corfu : June 22, 1828. 

MY LORD, I have had the honor of receiving your Lord- 
ship's despatch, the first part of which bears the date of May 
1828, and the second part that of June 4, 1828. 

As I am supposed to have misinterpreted the Instructions 
sent to me from the office over which your Lordship now 
presides, and as my ambition to promote the good of my 
country has failed (according to Your Lordship's despatch), 
by my not having rightly comprehended the tenor of those 
Instructions, I cannot lament that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment should have chosen some other officer for the arduous 
and important duties of this station, more competent to 
understand the language in which they are couched. There 
cannot be a period when it would be more essential to the 
success of whatever measures may be in contemplation, than 
at this moment when Ibrahim Pacha is pondering on his 
return to Egypt, that the wishes of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment should be clearly understood. I think it, therefore, 
the more unfortunate that Your Lordship's despatch now 
before me should contain no reply to the direct questions 
contained in my despatch of April 7 last, and that it should 
still leave me at such a crisis in the same doubt (or error as 
Your Lordship considers it) which appears to His Majesty's 
Government to have produced effects which have excited the 
most painful feelings throughout the country. 

No doubt my successor will be better informed by Your 
Lordship previous to his leaving England than it has fallen 
to my lot to be ; and I therefore most earnestly hope that 
there will be as little delay as possible in his arrival. In the 
meantime, I beg your Lordship will rely upon my doing the 
best I can under these complicated circumstances ; leaving 
my defence against the manifold charges which Your Lord- 
ship's, and some preceding despatches have arrayed against 
me, for another and more suitable occasion, and begging to 
assure Your Lordship that this determination on the part of 
His Majesty's Government excites in me no uneasiness 
whatever, and that I look forward with unbounded satis- 

* Acknowledged July 8, 1828. 


faction to the opportunity of having subjected to the severest 
scrutiny of my country the whole of my conduct and the 
principles by which it was guided in the execution of my 
Instructions emanating from the Treaty of London. 

I have, &c., 


From Commander Peter Richards to Adm. Sir E. Codrington. 
'Pelorus/ Alexandria: August 11, 1828. 

DEAR SIR, Whatever you may have heard as to the con- 
dition in which the shattered remnant of the Turco-Egyptian 
fleet arrived here from Navarin in December last, I can 
scarcely believe it equal to their wretched and truly pitiable 
plight. With those who witnessed it the matter of astonish- 
ment was how ships in such a state could have been kept 
afloat even tinder the circumstances which attended their 
passage. It appears the wind was fair during their voyage, 
and yet on their arrival here they had no longer even a 
morsel of provisions left the truth of which is placed beyond 
a doubt by supplies being instantly despatched to those who 
could only gain Aboukir, and of whose starving condition no 
secret was made. 

But whatever risk they ran of suffering the extremity of 
want had the wind been less favorable, it could only be 
exceeded by that of destruction by sinking, by the greater 
part of five frigates and four corvettes, which appeared to 
have taken part in the battle of Navarin. Their shot holes, 
sufficiently numerous, were principally stopped with patches 
of tarred canvas, and some even without the canvas being 
tarred. This novel mode of stopping shot holes for a winter 
voyage is still visible in those ships in the harbour, which it 
is found impossible to repair. One corvette arrived off the 
reef after dark so nearly foundering, that it was thought 
preferable by those on board to risk the passage of the reef, 
in a windy night, than to attempt the more hopeless task of 
endeavouring to keep her afloat till daylight. She suc- 
ceeded in passing the reef, and the crew were saved by 
running her on shore in the harbour, when she had so far 
settled in the water that her scuppers were below the surface 
of it. The hazard of entering the harbour of Alexandria 
in the night is so great, that it is never attempted by the 
pilots even in the finest weather. The jury masts of these 
ships also were of the most miserable kind, and their capa- 
bility of doing anything, had they met with contrary winds, 
may in some measure be estimated by the fact, that one of the 


frigates was nearly lost on the reef here from the extreme diffi- 
culty of getting her head off shore* Not fetching sufficiently 
to windward for the passage, she attempted to tack, and five 
trials at tacking and wearing were successively made ere 
they were enabled to get her head from the land. In short, 
not to be tedious with the details of their wretchedness, 
nothing but a total ignorance of the hazards to which they 
exposed themselves, during even so short a run, could ever 
have allowed any people to have put to sea in the disabled 
part of the fleet, which, had the circumstances of their pas- 
sage been less favorable, must inevitably have perished. 
The line-of-battle ship which reached Candia was, if possible, 
in a state even worse than the ship that arrived here. 

I have read with astonishment in the English newspapers 
most exaggerated accounts of the Greek slaves and captives 
brought over in this squadron. No attempt was made at 
concealing these unfortunates, and from my own observations 
and enquiries at the time of their arrival as well as since, I 
can by no means think the number of children, as stated at 600 
in my letter of January 20 last, in any way underrated, and 
supposing the men and women to amount to as many more 
will, I am convinced, place the total number sufficiently high. 
Yery truly your obedient humble servant, 


The following extracts from speeches in the House 
of Lords, although of a later date, refer to this question 
of Greek slaves Lord Goderich having been Colonial 
Minister when these orders were issued in February, 

In a debate in the House of Lords on the subject of 
Greek slaves (February 18, 1830), Viscount Goderich 
said : 

It is undoubtedly true, that in consequence of information 
which reached this country, that there was an intention on 
the part of Ibrahim Pacha to remove the Greek population 
from the Morea, and to substitute a Mahometan population 
in its stead, instructions were sent to our admiral in the 
Mediterranean, directing him to obtain a categorical answer 
from Ibrahim Pacha on the one hand, and from the Sultan 
on the other, as to the reality of such intention, in order to 
intimate to each of them, in case they avowed such intention, 
that the British Government would not allow a measure of 
that nature to be carried into effect. 


All lie had to do was to communicate the fact to the 
Government at home, in order that he might receive farther 
instructions. In point of fact, Ibrahim Pacha disavowed 
the proclamation, though he wished to throw the responsi- 
bility of all he did upon the Porte. If I recollect rightly, 
the Porte disavowed the proclamation too. If so, there 
could be no doubt that those orders, having been founded 
on a conditional state of things, which in point of fact never 
existed, must be a dead letter; and therefore any authority 
which our admiral might have, to intercept Turkish vessels 
with Greek slaves on board, must be quite distinct from the 
orders given to Sir H. Neale.* 

After several other peers had spoken, Lord Ellen- 
borough said : 

It is impossible for me to say whether or not there were 
Candiotes amongst the number of those released ;f but it 
should be observed that there is a great difference between 
the transportation of a number of prisoners of war, and the 
transportation of a whole population. A number of such 
prisoners were no doubt conveyed to Alexandria; but to 
show that there has been exaggeration and misrepresenta- 
tion abroad upon this subject, I need only state a simple 
fact. It is well known that there were many Greek slaves 
attached to the Turkish army in the Morea; and when that 
army was about to evacuate the Morea, and they were left 
to their choice, either to go with their masters or to remain 
with their relations; they preferred going to Egypt to 
remaining in Greece. 

Viscount Goderich : 

Therefore there was no blame attributable to any one for 
not preventing them from going there. 

The following is the opinion of Mr. Sconce (who had 
been Secretary to Sir Harry Neale during his command) 
relating to the despatch of February 8, 1826 : 

The order was to send an officer to remonstrate with 
Ibrahim, as ministers had heard that he intended to make a 
deportation of Greeks to Egypt, and replace them with 

* Lord Bathurst, on being asked by Sir E. C., entirely agreed in this inter- 
pretation given to their order by Lord Goderich. 
t By the Treaty of Alexandria. 


Egyptians, that he should on no account be allowed to do 
so, &c., &c. This mission was performed by Captain R. 
Spencer. Ibrahim said it appeared to him a political ques- 
tion that he being a soldier could have nothing to do with 
it; but there were there 'two persons, servants of the Porte, 
lately come, who can give you the Sultan my master's 
opinion better than I can.' They came in, and prohibited 
Ibrahim from saying a word ; nor would they give any answer 
themselves; nor was any answer ever given. The report of 
the interview was sent home, and no further notice was ever 
taken of the subject, either by Sir Harry Neale or the 
Government; and Ibrahim may have sent, or may not have 
sent, slaves to Egypt for aught Sir H. Neale ever knew. At 
all events, had his cruisers met with vessels so freighted, 
they could not have interfered with them, Sir H. N. having 
no orders so to do. No subsequent communication ever took 
place from Government on that subject the order was 
acted upon more than a twelvemonth before Sir E. C. took 
the command and the paper was docketed and put by as 
* executed.' 

Extrait d'une Depeche du Comte la Cerronaye* a M. I'Amiral 

de Rigny. 

Paris : 14 juin 1828. 

Je regrette, Monsieur 1'Amiral, d'avoir a aj outer a ces nou- 
velles celle du rappel de Monsieur I'Amiral Codrington, que 
Ton m'annonce avoir ete arrete dans le cabinet anglais. 
Nous pensons que cette disposition a pour but d'eloigner des 
principaux emplois les personnes regardees comme plus par- 
ticulierement attachees aux opinions de Monsieur Canning; 
mais nous ne pouvons nous defendre d'exprimer les plus vifs 
regrets, en voyant ecarter un homme aussi loyal, et dont 
nous avons eu tant a nous louer. 

&c., &c. 

Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

Corfu: June 22, 1828. 

The despatch of Lord Aberdeen announcing my being to 
be superseded, reached me yesterday. The decision having 
been taken, it is not necessary that I should enter on my 
defence against the accusations on which it has been 
grounded, until a more leisure moment. But I will not lose 
the earliest opportunity of assuring your Royal Highness 
that I shall be able to repel all the charges which are con- 

* Minister for Foreign Affairs in France. 


tained in this remarkable document. Your Royal Highness 
will see at once that my original sin was the battle of 
Navarin; and that this predetermined mode of throwing 
upon me the natural, the inevitable consequences of the 
Treaty, though prevented heretofore by the kind protection 
of his Majesty and your Royal Highness, has been persevered 
in till a better opportunity has offered. So situated with 
respect to the Ministers under whose instructions I have to 
act ; harassed by my anxiety to perform the service required 
of me ; harassed still more by the impediments thrown in 
my way by instructions to which the compilers of them give 
a construction so different from the executors ; your Royal 
Highness will readily believe that my supersession will not 
cause me much regret personally : and that I may well con- 
sider the power which it will afford me of explaining my 
whole conduct in the face of my accusers, a very satisfactory 
equivalent to a command so encumbered. Had not observa- 
tions been made in Parliament, the subject of the Greek 
slaves which I announced by letter of January 21 which 
was received on February 18 and which is so observed upon 
on March 15, would probably have still remained unnoticed 
as it had done theretofore, although this very transmission 
of Greeks in slavery had continued from the first of the re- 
volutionary war according to the practice amongst the Greeks 
themselves from the earliest ages. 

Yet it is made a fault in me the having permitted (as it 
is said) this practice in one instance, and that upon the 
authority of a paper which was left to me by my predecessor, 
marked on the outside as Secret with a note that the service 
here directed has been executed ; and Mr. Sconce has given 
me his opinion that the language of this very paper ought 
itself to have prevented my interfering in any similar 
manner to that directed therein, without express orders for 
the purpose. But a reference to the document itself which 
is in the Admiralty Office, will at once show your Eoyal 
Highness the spirit of injustice in which it has now been 
brought forward. It professes to pass by these mere cus- 
tomary excesses, and only to interpose against a systematic 
extirpation of a whole community; and it then proposes 
only to send an officer to demand Ibrahim's disavowal, or to 
inform him that effectual means will be taken to prevent, 
by the intervention of his Majesty's naval forces, the accom- 
plishment of so unwarrantable a project. The said officer 
is then instructed to give the Pacha a week to consider of it, 
and not then giving an answer the refusal is to be forthwith 
reported to His Majesty. 


Now your Royal Highness knows, that however little this 
document can be made to refer to me, I did so report even 
this partial deportation as soon as it came to my knowledge ; 
that no notice was taken of my letter for 29 days after it was 
received ; that no instruction was then given me to prevent 
its being repeated ; and that even in this last despatch from 
Lord Aberdeen, which makes my mis-construction of my 
orders the ground of my supersession, no answer is given to 
a direct question put by me on April 7, to prevent future 
mistakes on the subject. I have troubled your Eoyal High- 
ness with this as a specimen of the other charges which are 
arrayed against me : and I trust that when other considera- 
tions will allow me to give my attention to this despatch, I 
shall be able to show that they are equally untenable. 

June 25. 

The Government having decided, although principally upon 
assumed grounds, and your Royal Highness being the true 
judge of what my conduct ought to be, I have profited by 
even this short delay in the departure of Sir F. Adam's 
despatches to trouble your Royal Highness with a pretty full 
though hurried explanation which I anxiously hope will be 
satisfactory. It is evident to me that I have been taken as 
it were from under your Royal Highness's immediate instruc- 
tions for the purpose of gaining this object : and I feel my- 
self very fortunate in not having given reasons more plausi- 
ble for so extraordinary a proceeding. I am persuaded it 
will be agreeable to your Royal Highness to hear, that not 
only my colleagues but the French Ambassador, Sir Frederick 
Adam, &c., have interpreted the instructions exactly as I 
have done. With respect to Greek slavery which has been 
lately so much discussed, I may inform your Royal High- 
ness that it has continued from the first moment of the 
revolt in the same degree as it has done since I assumed the 
command, and it will appear evident to your Royal Highness 
that if an order were given to take out Greeks from ships 
returning to Egypt, it could not be executed. The Turkish 
army is partly composed of Greeks, and it is presumed that 
part of Greece will still remain in Turkish possession. In 
iact, the Greeks made slaves of each other. 

I have the honor, &c., 



Sir E. G. to Lady G. 

Corfu : Sunday, June 22, 1828. 

It is probable that duplicates of Lord Aberdeen's despatch 
have been received by Ponsonby and communicated by him 
to you. But lest they should not I send a copy. If I know 
myself, my dear Jane, the only, or at all events the princi- 
pal, cause of my regretting this event, is that you will feel 
it strongly. Now, it is evident that this point has been 
determined on ever since the battle ; and as they have done 
it on grounds to which I can reply satisfactorily, and with 
the support of my colleagues, we should be satisfied that it 
did not take effect at some future and more unguarded (' unto- 
ward') moment. 

It is some fun to me that the authors of this determina- 
tion are themselves superseded.* I have not another line 
from anybody. 

I conclude they did not give the Duke of Clarence an op- 
portunity of writing. It will be some occupation for you to 
prepare for old England. Can we not resume our Brighton 
house by six months' notice ? 

I shall not leave this at present, in hopes of meeting Mr. 
S. Canning, of whom, however, we know nothing more. 
And it is possible we may settle about Ibrahim's return to 
Egypt before my successor (who is said to be Malcolm) 
arrive. The Ministers themselves seem to be in a pretty- 

We are very hot, and reducing in flesh, but all well. I 
hope you will soon contemplate, as I do, the pleasure of 
again finding myself freed from such anxiety as I have 
lately endured. 

God bless you ! 

E. C. 

From Captain R. Spencer to Sir E. G. 


Admiralty : June 8, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, The first I heard positively of your 
being relieved in the command was twenty-four hours after 
the messenger set off; and I mention this to account for 
your not hearing from me on that occasion as early as pos- 
sible my regret at the circumstance. My letters of June 2 

* This refers to Lord Dudley and Mr. Huskisson. Sir E. C. was never 
aware that it was by the direction of the Duke of Wellington to his 
Cabinet, on May 3rd, that he was superseded j as shown in vol. iv, page 423, 
of the Duke's papers published in 1871, 


and 3 will have shown you how ignorant I have been, and 
still am, of all relating to you, even to the wording of your 
recall, except the letter from this office. 

Yours truly, 


Sir E. C. to Admirals Heiden and De Rigny on Ms 

'Asia,' at Corfu: June 23, 1828. 

MONSIEUR L'AMIRAL, I have the honor of informing 
you that I have received a letter from the Earl of Aberdeen 
(who has succeeded Earl Dudley as Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs), stating that His Majesty's Government 
have decided on sending another admiral to supersede me in 
the Mediterranean command. 

Having served together as we have served having agreed 
together as we have agreed in the execution of the services 
in which we are allied -those services and that concord 
having united us in an intimacy and a confidence hardly 
before witnessed amongst officers of different nations I feel 
it incumbent on me not merely to announce to you the simple 
fact, but the causes which appear to have led my Govern- 
ment to this decision. 

It is stated that I have not acted according to my instruc- 
tions, and particularly to that of October 16, 1827. It is 
alleged that I ought to have prevented the transmission of 
Greek slaves to Egypt ; and I am referred to an order given 
to my predecessor of February 8, 1826, of which he left me 
a copy, with a note on it, that the secret service therein 
mentioned had been executed, and which does not seem to 
me at all applicable. 

That I ought to have blockaded the port of Navarin after 
the battle, and examined the contents of the Egyptian ships 
which returned to Alexandria, in order to have prevented 
such transmission of Greeks. 

That I did not so dispose of my fleet as to prevent the 
movement of the forces of Ibrahim Pacha wherever he might 
desire to transport them, with the same facility (I use the 
word of the despatch) with which the remainder of his fleet 
returned to Alexandria. 

That from December to March any movements of a large 
fleet between Egypt and the Morea were not only free from 
interruption, but were not even exposed to observation, &c. 

* This letter gives curious evidence of the ignorance in which Sir E. C.'s 
friends were kept (and as it would seein, the Lord High Admiral himself 
also) of the fact of his recall. 


A reference to the instructions which I have received, and 
the orders I have given, is made, in justification of these 
accusations ; and there are some minor charges added, which 
it is not necessary to notice on this occasion. 

As we are supposed to be acting under the same orders 
and instructions, and as I am not aware of our having ever 
differed in opinion as to their meaning or the best mode of 
carrying them into execution, I have thought it necessary to 
inform you of the view taken of my conduct by my Govern- 
ment, in order that if I should have fallen into error you 
may be guarded against a similar misfortune. 

It is, however, a duty to my own character, not less than 
to the unbounded confidence with which you have honored 
me in the execution of our joint services, that I should 
assure you I feel no doubt whatever of being able to refute 
all these charges and allegations, and of proving to my coun- 
try that I am not unworthy of that confidence which you 
have placed in me, nor of the unqualified commendation and 
the distinguished honors which, your Sovereign has so 
liberally bestowed upon me. I have, &c., 


From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. Codrington. 


1 ConquSrant': June 29, 1828. 

MONSIEUR L'AMIRAL, I have just received the letter of 
June 23, which you have done me the honor of addressing 
to me. 

It is no less my duty, than, in accordance with my own 
feelings, that I should not lose a moment in testifying my 
strong and sincere regret at the cessation of that official 
intercourse which a common service had established be- 
tween us. 

But when I consider under what circumstances this sepa- 
ration takes place ; when I consider the cause that has 
produced it ; when I recall to my mind all the difficulties 
which we have only been able to surmount by our mutual 
confidence and the frankness of our proceedings ; and when 
I re-examine with the most scrupulous attention the instruc- 
tions given under the approbation of our respective Govern- 
ments, I only feel a stronger disposition to regard the 
imputations thrown upon you as attaching equally to myself, 
and to share with you before the world that moral responsi- 

* A similar letter to the above, dated the same day, was addressed to 
Vice-Admiral Le Chevalier de Rigny. 

Y 2 


bility, which, among men of honor, is considered the most 
effective pledge that can be given. 

In this view, and although I have hitherto received no 
mark of disapprobation from my own Government, it becomes 
110 less my duty to join you in the position in which you are 
placed, to enter into explanations which are now become 
necessary, and to strengthen, if possible, by my own evidence, 
the observations which you may have to submit either to the 
Government or to the public of your country. 

The instructions which are common to us bear two dates ; 
the first are of July, and the others of October 6.* 

It appears from what you do me the honor of communi- 
cating to me, that no reference is made to the first, which 
followed immediately upon the signature of the Treaty of 
July 6, although it was in the execution of those that an 
event, variously qualified, took place on October 20, and to 
which I should not now have referred had I not remarked 
that in every publication to which it has given rise one im- 
portant circumstance has always been omitted that of part 
of Ibrahim's fleet having left Navarin, going towards Patras, 
and your meeting with him three or four days after he had 
made an engagement to remain inactive until he should 
receive an answer from the Porte on the subject of the Pro- 
visional Armistice. Now this answer, calculating the shortest 
time, could not arrive before October 15 or 18, and it was on 
the 1st of that month that, taking advantage of the momen- 
tary absence of the squadron, he violated his word. 

This important circumstance was one of the motives which 
decided the entrance of the fleets into Navarin on October 
20 ; and it has been sufficiently well ascertained that it was 
on the 16th or 17th of that month that Ibrahim received 
such positive orders from the Porte, that an action outside 
of the harbour was rendered inevitable, whilst there was 
some chance of warding it of by entering with a force then 
become more imposing, since the three squadrons were at 
that time united. 

It was only by these means that that part of the instruc- 
tion of October 6 could be carried into execution, which refers 
to the necessity of entering into no transaction which should 
not have for its object the departure of the fleet with the 

It is true that the instructions directed that hostilities 
should be avoided ; but what had the squadrons been doing 
for two months but treating and temporising without any 

* Those to Sir E. Codrington bear date the 16th, 


result? What was passing under the eyes of these same 
fleets but scenes of horror and devastation ? And if they 
had patiently suffered the continuance of such scenes, if 
they had not found means of putting a stop to them, can 
it be supposed that voices would not have been raised to 
even a higher pitch than has since taken place in the ex- 
aggerated transportation of slaves ; and perhaps have called 
forth, without more justice, the same severity towards the 
commanders of a powerless and inefficient blockade ? 

But in these explanations, which might, if requisite, be 
more detailed and more demonstrative, I forget that in the 
charge of non-execution of instructions reference is only 
made to those of October 6. 

The foundation and spirit of those instructions must there- 
fore be examined. Now they were only a confused explana- 
tion and answers to the questions naturally referring to 
foreign flags. 

These questions were the necessary result of the situation 
in which the Powers signing the Treaty of London were 
placed towards the Porte a situation which I cannot find a 
term to designate. 

Neither of the Powers had declared itself belligerent ; with 
what justice, therefore, could the restrictions of a blockade 
be applied to neutral flags, when they had not yet been 
established towards the Turks ? These questions were sub- 
mitted to the Ambassadors of the Allied Courts, and to the 
Conference of London ; and in a Protocol held on September 
4, at Constantinople, the Ambassadors gave it as their opinion 
that in order to crush the growth of piracy, which was in- 
creasing under the pretence of forming blockades, and to 
reconcile, on the other hand, the acknowledged right of the 
Greeks to the character of belligerents, their blockades, and 
the expeditions which their lawful Government should be 
able to undertake, should be restricted to a limit of twelve 
miles following the outline of the shore from the Gulf of 
Yolo to Lepanto ; this boundary was adopted on the same 
principle by the Conference of London. This is not the place 
to examine what effect this might have in fixing the limits 
by land* 

But then, it must be recollected, that the Greek Govern- 
ment and navy was in such anarchy that at that time no 
good effect was to be derived from that measure. A blockade 
by the Greeks, if regularly established, was certainly to be 
supported by the Allied squadrons ; but still it was necessary 
to wait until they were in a fit state for such a measure ; for 
it would have been absurd and manifestly contrary to the 


Instructions of October 6, that the ships of the Allies em- 
ployed on the coast of the Morea should have countenanced 
by their presence the system of cruising and pillage which 
the Greeks had adopted until that time, and which would 
evidently have committed the flag of the Allies towards 

But as soon as some order was introduced into the Greek 
navy by the arrival of Count Capodistrias, and that a block- 
ade declared in the name of the Greek Government was 
regularly established, that blockade was immediately sup- 
ported by the ships of the Allies ; regular and permanent 
cruisers were left before Modon and Navarin, and that part 
of the instructions was as completely executed as possible. 

It is necessary also to remark, now that more than eight 
months have already passed, that the instructions of October 
6th, to which reference is made, had preceded the battle of 
Navarin, and that after that event the Admirals were allowed 
to suppose that they might require new ones. This was done 
without suspending, as far as was possible, the execution of 
those which they had. 

It must also not be forgotten that the Ambassadors of the 
Allies were at Constantinople ; that there, at Smyrna, and 
in other places, the subjects of the Allied Powers might 
be exposed to some risk ; and that one of the first duties 
of the Admirals was to provide for them, to establish more 
frequent and rapid communications with the Ambassadors 
at Constantinople. 

Now, the strength of the fleets was very much diminished. 
On leaving Navarin on October 26, the squadrons required 
refitting : one went to Toulon, the others to Malta. It was 
agreed that I should remain in the Archipelago with the 
6 Trident.' 

I ought therefore to be considered as the admiral to whom 
the task of watching the Port of Navarin was allotted (terms 
of the Annex A), and it is upon ine that ought to be thrown 
the blame of not having prevented the deportation of Greek 
slaves to Egypt, a circumstance which seems to be the basis 
of all the accusation. 

But, to such an accusation, were I the object of it on 
the part of my Government, I should answer in this manner; 
and I am confident that there is no person of any experience 
in our profession who will not admit a part of what I shall 
now state. 

It is with difficulty under any circumstances, and particu- 
larly in winter, that the entrance into and egress from such 
a port as Navarin can be prevented. Now, it was on the 19th 


of December that by means of a gale of wind from the north- 
east, Ibrahim sent away the remains of his fleet, having 011 
board, besides the crews, some thousands of wounded, and six 
or seven thousand men belonging to his army. 

At liberty to send them when he chose, it was evident that 
he awaited favorable circumstances, and these circumstances, 
according to the report of Captain Pigol, of H.M. brig * la 
Fleche,' then lying at Modon with three anchors ahead, were 
such as to make it impossible for any vessel of that fleet to 
be visited. 

As to preventing its return to Egypt, in the state in which 
it was, with the great quantity of wounded on board, I declare 
that had I been in a situation by which I should have been 
enabled to do so, I should have considered the act by which 
any obstacle was thrown in its way, as equally barbarous and 
cruel ; and that I could not have found, either in the wording 
or the spirit of the instructions, one single word which, 
under circumstances so unforeseen, could refer to such a 

On the contrary, I should have considered the departure 
of a number of men from Ibrahim's camp proportioned to 
his means of transport, as a partial fulfilment of the Instruc- 
tion B. It would be an extraordinary error to believe that, 
with the same means and the same facility, he would have 
been both able and willing to transport all his army to any 
other point. 

The first basis of every instruction was to prevent every 
reinforcement sent to the Turks from being introduced into 
the ports of the Morea and the Islands, according to the line 
described in the protocol of September 4. 

Now it was rather difficult to consider, as a reinforcement, 
the return to Egypt of the remains of the fleet and a part of 
the troops. 

But it is also alleged that from December to March the 
movements of large fleets between Egypt and the Morea were 
not even exposed to observation. This is incorrect ; the sail- 
ing of the fleet from Egypt in February which arrived in 
Candia, was made known at Malta and in the Archipelago, 
by English and French vessels which were stationed at 
Alexandria. Mehemet Ali had declared that that fleet was 
only going to Candia ; could we, or ought we to have pre- 
vented it, when the blockade of Egypt had not been ordered, 
and when Candia was out of the fixed limits ? 

It is true that single vessels of that fleet attempted to pass 
over from Suda to Modon ; one or two were enabled to 
succeed; but it is no less true that the English ship-of- 


the-line the ' Warspite,' the French frigate ' 1'Iphigenie,' 
and others of the Allied vessels turned back several 
neutral vessels as well as Turkish and Egyptian. Accord- 
ing to the information I have obtained, two Austrian, one 
Russian three vessels in all entered Modon. I do not 
speak of the Ionian and Greek boats ; but it cannot possibly 
be supposed that a peace blockade, during which the vessels 
exposing themselves run no other risk but that of being turned 
back, can be completely efficient, when so many blockades in 
a state of the most general and determined war have been so 
often violated with impunity either by entrance or egress. 
Such circumstances must be still in the recollection of those 
who took part in the late wars. 

As to the blockade of the Dardanelles and of Egypt, the 
instructions declare that it was left to the judgment and dis- 
cretion of the Ambassadors and Admirals to establish them. 
Now, the Ambassadors consulted upon this point, answered 
that they should not take place ; is it then fair, in such a case, 
to say that the instructions have not been obeyed when the 
points to which reference is made were by those same instruc- 
tions left to the judgment and discretion of the Admirals ? 

I think it superfluous to enter into more details, though it 
might be done without difficulty. 

In addressing them to you in this manner, Monsieur 
1'Amiral, I have wished to offer you a pledge which cannot be 
effaced, of the mutual responsibility which ought to exist in 
all the acts of the common service in which we have been 
engaged ; and I trust that all the generous and enlightened 
men of our respective countries will think that we have done 
as much as possible towards its fulfilment. 

Believe the sincere assurance of my constant esteem, 


From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. C. 

'Azoff, in the Gulf of Coron: Jg 1828.* 

MONSIEUR L'AMIKAL, I have received with as much sur- 
prise as sorrow the letter with which Your Excellency has 
honored me to inform me of your recall to England. 

My astonishment has been still greater in learning the 
motive upon which this determination is founded. 

Our instructions having been similar, and all our operations 

planned by mutual agreement, your colleagues, who have as 

well as yourself, Monsieur PAmiral, the conviction of having 

faithfully and strictly fulfilled their duties, take pleasure in 

* Received August 4 


considering themselves as involved in every responsibility 
which may result from an examination into their conduct. 

Fortunately, the events are so well known, the facts so patent, 
the localities and even the dates so easy to make out, that 
every investigation of the possibility which Ibrahim may have 
found to get Christian captives conveyed to Egypt, would, in 
my view, have no other result but to prove to our respective 
Courts the inefficacy of a marine blockade in putting a stop 
to all the varied horrors that are committed in those countries. 
This inefficacy, which the Ministry of the Emperor my master 
has more than once pointed out to the Cabinets of his august 
Allies, becomes daily more evident. Even at this moment, 
when the season and the assembling of our squadrons enable 
us to blockade and to observe closely the fortresses occupied 
by the Egyptian army, we all know that thousands of Greek 
slaves, mostly women and children, are confined in the case- 
mates of Modon. It is true that Ibrahim can no longer send 
them to the slave market of Alexandria, but they remain to 
perish of plague and famine. If any responsibility results 
from the prolongation of this state of things, assuredly it 
cannot weigh upon us. 

I cannot close my letter without repeating to you, Monsieur 
1'Amiral, the deep regret caused to me by your departure 
from these countries ; and my ardent wish that the justice 
and the respect which are due to your eminent merits may 
be rendered to you everywhere and for ever. 

I have to add my request that you will continue to me that 
cordial friendship with which you have honored me, and to 
offer to you. Monsieur 1'Amiral, the expression of my high 
esteem and inviolable attachment. 

I have the honor to be, Monsieur 1'Amiral, 
Your humble and obedient servant, 


It will be seen, by the letters quoted at page 239 
from the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Huskisson, that 
fresh instructions were contemplated* and were consi- 
dered necessary, though they were not sent. They 
were not framed for delivery till July, 1828, when they 
were received by Sir E. Codrington's successor in the 
command, but never by Sir E. C. himself ; and they are 
described by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs as 
4 being the same which were prepared in the month of 
March last, and this date had been retained upon them.' 

* February and April, 1828. 


Yet in the despatch of Lord Aberdeen recalling Sir 
E. Codringtoii from his command, it is written, 4 It was 
not deemed necessary to send you other instructions after 
the battle of Navarin was known in this country, as 
that event occasioned no variation in the principle upon 
which the Allies had acted for the attainment of the 
objects of the Treaty of July.' W. J.C. 

From Count Gapodistrias to Sir E. C. 
( Translation Extracts.) 

On board H.M.S. < Warspite ' : J y e %' 1828. 

Your Excellency leaves us ; but wherever you may be, 
Mons. 1' Admiral, you will not refuse to take an interest in 
that Greece which you have saved. .... 
Eest assured, Mons. 1' Admiral, of the sincere gratitude of 
the nation which has confided to me its interests. That 
nation accompanies you with its benediction and its good 
wishes : your name occupies its place in the hearts of the 
Greeks, and it will also occupy that which they reserve to it 
in the port of Navarin, when this port shall belong to Greece. 

From Sir E. C. to the Admiralty. 

1 Asia,' at Corfu : June 24, 1828.* 

SIE, I have the honor of informing His Royal Highness 
the Lord High Admiral that on the 21st instant I received a 
despatch signed Aberdeen (by which I am led to conclude 
that Lord Aberdeen has succeeded to the office of Lord 
Dudley), informing me that His Majesty's Government had 
requested His Royal Highness to relieve me in the command 
of the squadron in the Mediterranean, on account of what 
his Lordship is pleased to term an unfortunate misconcep- 
tion of the views and intentions of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment. I greatly lament that I should have so misconceived 
those views and intentions, however expressed. But since 
the same understanding of the terms in which they are 
couched has obtained in the minds, not only of my colleagues, 
but of Count Guilleminot the only one of the Allied Ambas- 
sadors with whom I can immediately communicate, and 
other high authorities who have necessarily been privy to 
them, I am induced to believe that His Royal Highness will 
not only think that the offence was insufficient to the pro- 
duction of so unusual a result, but that it was more justly 
attributable to those who did not indicate the intentions of 

* Acknowledged July 8, 1828. 


the Government in language by which they could be more 
clearly understood. I never had a conception of any such 
misapprehension on my part until I read in the newspaper 
reports of what passed in Parliament, assertions attributed 
to members of His Majesty's Government respecting my 
orders and my conduct which appeared to me to be un- 
founded. I felt that it became me, for the sake of my own 
reputation, for the good of the service entrusted to my 
execution, and, I may add, for the credit of the persons 
themselves to whom those expressions were attributed, to 
communicate to His Royal Highness, through whom my 
instructions were transmitted, my uneasiness upon the occa- 
sion. I could not imagine what could have induced Mr. 
Peel and Mr. Huskisson to attribute to me orders and in- 
structions of which their language 011 that occasion gave me 
the first notice, and to have induced the former to describe 
a certain event as being comprised within a space of only 
forty-eight hours, when the very dates of the official letters 
extended it to an entire month. * His Eoyal Highness knows 
that immediately upon reading these statements I wrote to 
point out the error,f and that the receipt of my letter was 
acknowledged on May 7th last, and even to the date of Lord 
Aberdeen's despatch of June 4, the error as to a fact impor- 
tant to truth, to my reputation, and more particularly so to 
the cordiality of opinion and complete understanding between 
the Allied Admirals, still remains unaccounted for. 

I will now proceed to the charges themselves, as nearly 
as I can collect them from the despatch before me. 

It is alleged that I ought to have prevented the trans- 
mission of Greek slaves to Egypt ; and I am referred to an 
order to my predecessor of February 8, 1826, which is 
marked with ' the service here directed has been executed,' 
and it was transferred to me, in the event of a possible re- 
currence to the subject of it. I consider this as a document 
which could not be acted upon in the sense mentioned in 
Lord Aberdeen's despatch without further instructions from 
His Majesty's Government; and this view of it is clearly 
confirmed by the words of the document itself. J For it passes 

* The despatch from Sir E. Codrington to the Admiralty, dated 21st of 
January, 1828, giving the account of the deportation of these slaves, is 
officially acknowledged to have been received on the 18th February 1828. 
No communication whatever was sent to Sir E. C. until the despatch from 
Lord Dudley, dated 18th March, 1828 j that is, one month after the receipt 
of Sir E. C.''s despatch. 

t See letters from Sir E. C. to the Admiralty of 4th and 20th April, 1828, 
page 227. 

t See Lord Bathurst's letter 8th February, 1828. 


by partial barbarities of the description of the one referred 
to, as excesses of which His Majesty deplores the continu- 
ance, but in which he has not thought fit to interfere, except 
in cases in which the rights of his subjects, &c., have been 
clearly compromised ; and it is only when designs are avowed 
to extirpate a whole community, &c., that His Majesty cannot 
hear of such an attempt without demanding an explicit dis- 
avowal or a formal renunciation of it. And, even if Ibrahim 
Pacha should refuse to attend to the remonstrance of the 
officer to be selected to make the communication, the in- 
struction only says that the Pacha is to be informed that 
' effectual means will be taken to prevent, by the interven- 
tion of His Majesty's naval forces, the accomplishment of so 
unwarrantable a project,' and not that the Admiral should 
take any measures whatever in consequence ; but that c this 
refusal will be forthwith reported to His Majesty.' The de- 
claration referred to in this despatch was made to Ibrahim 
Pacha, the report was made to England, and this instruction 
does not appear to have authorised the Admiral then in com- 
mand to take any measures whatever had Ibrahim carried 
into execution even ' the systematic extirpation of a whole 
community, and the transportation to Egypt of the women 
and children of the Morea.'* Denying then positively that 
this order is applicable to me, and only seeing in it an indi- 
cation of the disposition of Government at a former period, 
I did, upon receiving the intelligence of the late deportation 
of slaves to Alexandria, transmit it immediately by land to 
His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, thus reporting 
to His Majesty. And seeing by Lord Dudley's despatch of 
March 18, although it still withheld from me the authority 
to prevent such transmissions in future, that it would be 
consistent with the views of His Majesty's Government, I 
not only gave instructions for their prevention hereafter, 
but warned Ibrahim Pacha that he would have to dread the 
consequences of even partial and concealed transmissions of 
this sort. 

I am next accused of not acting according to the instruc- 
tion of October 16, and a construction is given to it quite 
inconsistent with the object in which it originated. The 
original instructions, not appearing to contemplate move- 
ments of Ottoman forces from one port in Greece to another, 
each in their own possession, or of the transmission of sup- 
plies in neutral vessels, Vice-Admiral De Eigny and myself 
wrote to the Ambassadors at Constantinople ; and we, at the 

* Confirmed by both Lord Batliurst and Lord Goderich, in Parliament, 
(parties concerned) being then in the Cabinet (See p. 181.) 


same time, observed upon the conduct of the Greeks cruising 
at a distance from their own coast. This gave rise to their 
Protocol, and this Protocol and their observations gave rise 
to the instruction of October 16. In the second paragraph 
of this instruction it is said : ' His Majesty's Government 
observes with satisfaction that the construction which the 
Ambassadors and Admirals are disposed to put on these 
passages, is agreeable to the spirit of the Instructions them- 
selves, and to the intention of those by whom they were 
framed.' And the third paragraph evidently shows that it 
was intended to relieve us from a responsibility which we 
had assumed ; and, but for my present experience of the fact, 
I should not have conceived it possible that to instructions so 
framed e to exempt the commanders of the fleets entrusted 
with the execution of an arduous and delicate task, from the 
possibility of doubt or hesitation as to the precise line of 
their duty ' should be given a construction which, was not 
contemplated by the Ambassadors at Constantinople, or either 
of my colleagues, any more than myself. With respect to my 
being c on no account to enter into any stipulation for allow- 
ing the ships to return without the troops to Alexandria,' I 
have to observe that I did not enter into any such stipula- 
tion : but, without dwelling merely on the words, I will refer 
to the spirit in which that Protocol was formed. The Pro- 
tocol directs that I am to favor the return to Egypt or 
Constantinople of all Turkish or Egyptian ships of war or 
transports having on board troops ; the paragraph in the 
instruction of October 16 c not to stipulate for the return of 
the ships without the troops,' to which Lord Aberdeen's 
despatch attributes so very different a meaning, was only 
inserted in order that the Admirals might know that they 
were not called upon to give protection to any ships so re- 
turning without troops ; but it was never intended that they 
should enforce the right of search, which would certainly 
have ' degenerated into hostilities.' I have thus replied to 
the charge of not searching this fleet, by showing that, if 
there was an error, that error was not mine. I have done 
so as a defence against the charge of having misunderstood 
my orders ; but His Eoyal Highness well knows that I had 
no immediate means of resisting any of the movements of 
that fleet without having withdrawn all the undisabled ships 
under my orders from other important services to which they 
were destined. The 6 Cambrian,' for instance, was gone to 
the seat of the Greek Government to excite them to exertion 
on their own coast, to watch the very port of Navarin, and 
to effect the establishment of a blockade by their cruisers. 


The 'Dryad,' ' Zebra,' ' Gannet,' < Eifleman,' < Ealeigh,' 
' Weazle,' 6 Camelion,' and ' Alacrity,' were spread over the 
whole Archipelago including stations off the Dardanelles and 
at Smyrna, attending upon the Ambassadors, securing the 
Consulates and British inhabitants against any violence 
which might have arisen for want of their presence, and pro- 
tecting the trade against piracy. The ( Glasgow ' and c Jasper,' 
and subsequently the ' Pelican,' were sent to cruise from 
Carabusa to Cape Matapan, for the prevention of piracy and 
the interruption of supplies. The c Isis,' after a visit to Tri- 
poli for the safety of British subjects and the security of the 
Consulate, which were represented to me to be in danger, 
was ordered, in the first instance, to Smyrna to communicate 
with Admiral De Eigny, and then to destroy the pirates at 
Carabusa. With respect to the port of Navarin having been 
unwatched, and the first intelligence of the sailing of the 
Ottoman fleet having been received by me after its arrival at 
Alexandria, I have to remark in opposition to that state- 
ment, that the ' Pelican ' was watching that port as closely 
as weather would permit, from November 27 until December 
22, 1827, and on the 27th of the same month the ' Pelican ' 
arrived at Malta with the intelligence that the Ottoman fleet 
had sailed five days previous, taking advantage of a north- 
east wind for that purpose. Again, as to the ' facility ' with 
which that fleet returned to Alexandria, I have only to refer 
His Eoyal Highness to letters from Commanders Eichards* 
and the Honorable William Keith, enclosed in my letter (No. 
]1) of January 21, 1828, to show with what difficulty, and 
in what state, it succeeded in reaching the coasts of Candia 
and Egypt ; and how totally inadequate it was to the con- 
veyance of an expedition which wovdd have subjected them 
to any opposition ; and it will also show the little justice 
there is in using that term which has been brought forward 
in accusation against me. 

It is said in the despatch, ' neither do any measures appear 
to have been taken to prevent that fleet returning from 
Egypt ; it was unobserved during its passage, and would not 
have been adequately, if at all, opposed had it directed its 
course again to Navarin instead of to Candia.' In answer 
to this, I have to inform His Eoyal Highness that the fleet 
which went from Egypt to Candia, such as it was, sailed 
under a promise of the Pacha, given to both French and 
English officers, that it was only going to Candia and not 
to the Morea. I may add, that the force at that time in 
Alexandria consisted of the ' Glasgow,' ' Galatea,' e Philomel/ 

* See page 315. 


' la Vestale ' (a double-banked French frigate), a French 
corvette, and two French brigs ; and the ' Warspite,' and the 
' Iphigenie,' with some smaller vessels, were then off Nava- 
rin. As a further proof of the incorrectness of the assertion 
that the movements of Ottoman ships might have taken 
place to and from the ports of the Morea from December to 
March unobserved, I may further remark, that it was during 
this period that Sir Frederick Adam's mission to Ibrahim 
Pacha took place. He was conveyed in the ( Wolf ' to 
Modon, accompanied fty the ' Galatea,' with Colonel Cradock, 
the ' Weazle,' and a Russian brig of war. ... If the 
assertion of the port of Navarin not having been watched, 
arose from the absence of returns from me, I request the 
consideration of His Royal Highness to the impossibility of 
collecting dispositions to be relied on at such a moment, to 
the appeals made to me for protection from the British sub- 
jects in all parts of the Ottoman dominions, of the mercan- 
tile clamours on account of piracy, and the attention re- 
quired to the disposal and refittal of the ships disabled in 
the action, &c. But although returns may not have been 
sent home, it does not justify the assumption that no mea- 
sures were taken by me in the execution of these multifarious 
duties. In answering these charges, I have referred only to 
the disposition of the English ships ; but having sent home 
more than one report made by French vessels on that part of 
the coast, their presence also still further negatives the 
assertion in Lord Aberdeen's despatch. Moreover, the ' War- 
spite ' was to have been sent on this very service, and would 
have been so employed had not I received the order of the 
Lord High Admiral to employ a ship of war in the conveyance 
of Count Capodistrias to Greece ; but I again say, that had the 
6 Warspite,' or any force under my command, met that fleet, 
they could not have otherwise interfered than by merely 
watching their progress so as to ensure their not entering 
upon any hostile operation on their way to Alexandria. In 
addressing His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, it 
is hardly necessary for me to comment upon Lord Aberdeen's 
observation, that an officer like Captain Parker should have 
acted on the suggestion of the French Ambassador, instead 
of that of his own commander-in-chief. It might be equally 
said that I have been acting under the suggestion of Sir 
Frederick Adam in preference to the orders of His Royal 
Highness himself, because I have been at all times ready to give 
due attention to his able advice and opinions. Having made 
Captain Parker fully acquainted with the tenor of my in- 
structions, and explained to him minutely every point con- 


iiected with them, on his first arrival under my orders, he 
was guided in his answer to Admiral Sachtouris by these 
instructions ; and he was enabled to decide correctly in con- 
sequence of that explanation. I am next referred to my 
instructions of October 16, for preventing any c movements 
by sea on the part of the Turkish or Egyptian forces ; ' and 
Lord Aberdeen observes, that the instructions on this point 
were absolute. I admit them to have been absolute with 
respect to forces going to act against the Greeks, but I 
deny its applicabilty in any way to the ships in question, by 
preventing the movement of which I should have acted in 
direct defiance of those very instructions, which order me 
positively to afford every facility and protection to Egyptian 
ships and forces withdrawing from Greece. 

It has been said both by Lord Dudley and Lord Aberdeen 
that there is no difference in my position since the battle of 
Navarin, and that therefore no additional instructions were 
necessary. Having from the first been directed to look to 
the Ambassadors for information, the loss of such a reference 
alone undoubtedly made a great difference in my situation, 
independent of the battle ; and this circumstance, added to 
the scrutiny of my conduct by means of the c Queries ' I still 
think, with due submission, fully justified me in looking to 
the Government for some further instruction as to whether I 
had or had not rightly conceived the line of my duty. The 
very despatch now before me is a proof of this. For I am 
herein accused of having been ever since under a miscon- 
ception of the intentions of the Government ; and it further 
declares, that it is on account of that very misconception, 
which such further instructions would at once have prevented, 
that His Majesty's Government is now induced to request His 
Royal Highness to supersede me in this command. As to the 
charge of having omitted to insert the word ' Provisions ' in 
my order of March 2, instead of including it under the 
general head of Supplies, I trust I can offer some excuse 
even for this additional complaint upon which His Majesty's 
Government has requested my supersession. On September 
8 I gave an order in the terms which I had selected from the 
Treaty and original Instructions, which I deemed it proper 
to make secret and to limit to the captains of post ships. 
But when a similar service fell to be performed by com- 
manders of sloops, and circumstances no longer required 
secrecy, I drew out the order from that which I had pre- 
viously given. Nor is it surprising that I should not have 
thought such an insertion of importance, when I had so 
frequently called the attention of my superiors to those Sup- 


plies being preferably received through neutrals, and when 
fifty Ionian boats at a time were thus trafficking in the ports 
of Navarin and Modon without my being empowered to in- 
terfere with them, as observed in Captain Parker's letter. 

With respect to the question of ' a like blockade ' of the 
port of Alexandria, originally mentioned in the letter of 
Mr. Huskisson, and now referred to in that of Lord Aberdeen, 
I am still at a loss to understand what was intended by it. I 
cannot comprehend how it was possible to establish a ' like 
blockade of the port of Alexandria ' to that limited blockade 
established on the coast of the Morea for preventing the arri- 
val of supplies. That I have not ( understood the term blockade 
in its most extended sense whenever it has been used,' must 
be apparent from the limited blockade which has been 
carried on under the orders of the Allied Admirals on the* 
coast of the Morea from the commencement of the execution 
of the Treaty of London up to the present time. And as to 
its not having been until the 19th of April that three of His 
Majesty's ships were stationed off Candia for preventing 
supplies being introduced into the Morea, I have to state 
that the force under my orders, not occupied in indispensable 
services, has been constantly employed in the interception 
of supplies on that coast. Although His Majesty's Govern- 
ment having decided on my conduct, renders any further 
explanation towards them useless, I have considered it im- 
portant to my professional character, that his Royal High- 
ness the Lord High Admiral should be made fully acquainted 
with the whole of my proceedings and the motives by which 
they have been guided : with this view I enclose copies of 
the letters I have before written in explanation.* 

His Royal Highness well knows that the English squadron 
has been always arduously employed in bringing about the 
objects of the Treaty ; but it seems that the Government has 
considered me responsible for executing all those measures 
of which the fulfilment was entrusted to the squadrons of 
France and Russia, as well as to that of England. In proof 
that the port of Navarin was unwatched, the English ships 
only are referred to, and the aid given by our Allies is un- 
noticed ; whilst on other occasions, with the same purpose 
of throwing blame on my conduct, I am supposed to have 
command of a fleet sufficient to watch the whole of the 
Ottoman ports and control the whole of the Ottoman forces. 
Far be it from me to assume that I may not have erred in 
the performance of these complicated operations. I well 

* Copy of a letter of April 7, 1828, to the Earl of Dudley. Copy of a 
letter of April 30, 1828, to Mr. Huskisson : both in this volume. 


know that it is not given to me to be free from error, and 
I should tremble for myself if I were led by vanity into any 
such persuasion ; but I can safely and solemnly declare, that 
I have not voluntarily swerved from the orders and instruc- 
tions which I have had for my guidance ; that during the 
time I have held this command I have used the utmost 
exertions of mind and body in the performance of the very 
arduous, the intricate and important, duties, with which I 
have been entrusted ; and that however I may have failed 
in ability, I have not failed in the ardent devotion of all 
the energy I possess to the service of my sovereign and my 

I am, &c., &c., 


The two following letters, although of a later date, 
especially refer to the erroneous statement in Lord 
Aberdeen's despatch relating to Captain Parker's motive 
in remaining off Navarin : 

From Sir E. G. to Captain Parker, ' Warspite. 9 

'Wellesley/ at Malta: Septembers, 1828. 

SIR, In a despatch to me from the Earl of Aberdeen, one 
of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, it is observed 
that I omitted to give the officers under my command autho- 
rity to intercept ( provisions ' destined for the use of the 
Turkish force in the Morea. I therefore request you to 
inform me whether or not you had understood by my pre- 
vious communications with you that provisions were to be 
stopped ; and if you did actually, in consequence of those 
communications, so intercept provisions destined for the use 
of the Turkish force. It is also observed in the despatch 
from the Earl of Aberdeen, that you appear to have deter- 
mined on remaining off Navarin, not in consequence of any 
instructions from me, but because General Guillenimot 
seemed very desirous that the port should be closely watched. 
I therefore request you will inform me of the motive by 
which you were guided on that occasion. 

I have, &c. 


From Captain Parker to Sir E. C. 

1 Warspite/ at Malta : September 5, 1828. 

SIR, In reply to your letter of this day's date, I have no 
hesitation in saying, that before the ' Warspite ' sailed from 


Malta in December last, I understood from the different 
communications I had been personally honored with by 
you, that provisions destined for the use of the Turkish force 
in the Morea, and coming from Egypt or Africa, were to be 
stopped; and influenced by this understanding, together 
with your instructions in the circular letter of September 8, 
I not only did intercept provisions so destined on my arrival 
off Navarin with the * Warspite,' but I had determined to 
proceed from Egina to the west side of the Morea (to ascer- 
tain whether the respective vessels of the Ionian squadron 
were acting in the spirit of such instructions) before my 
attention was more particularly directed to the interception 
of the Egyptian convoy, which I was informed had sailed 
from Alexandria about February 15, and to which I especially 
referred in my letters to you of the 3rd and 7th March. I 
have further to state that my determination to remain with 
the c Warspite ' off Navarin, was made before I was acquainted 
with General Guilleminot's desire that the ports should be 
closely watched, and solely from my own conviction that it 
was my duty to do so in compliance with your wishes, and 
in execution of the Treaty of July 6 ; and it was not until I 
had positive intelligence of the return of the Egyptian ships 
of war and convoy to Alexandria, that I consigned the duty 
of watching Navarin to the zeal of Captain Mitchell of the 
'Rifleman,' supported by the French ships then stationed 
there, in order that I might proceed to meet the transport 
which you had despatched with supplies for the ' Warspite ' 
and the ships at Carabusa, as well as to attend to the im- 
portant duties entrusted to me near the seat of the Greek 

I have, &c. 


Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

Corfu: June 29, 1828. 

I hear no more of Mr. S. Canning's coming, of which we 
may reasonably doubt in consequence of the changes, and 
therefore, to-morrow, I shall leave this for Navarin. Count 
Guilleminot and his secretary agree with Adim in taking 
the same view as I have done of my instructions, and my 
conduct in consequence. The instructions of October 16 
were verbatim from a Protocol of the Allied Plenipotentiaries 
in London, and therefore De Rigny's orders are exactly the 

Count G. has stated his sentiments upon this and upon the 

z 2 


whole despatch of Lord Aberdeen, to Paris. There must be 
some secret motive in all this treatment of me, beyond any 
reference to me personally. 

It is impossible that any Ministers can be so weak or so 
base as to commit injustice and folly such as this, which 
must shortly be subjected to public criticism, without having 
some strong motive which they consider a justification. 
Perhaps the harmony, the deference to me, which in the 
eyes of others redounds to my credit, may interfere with the 
policy of the present Administration. 

Husldsson, in his speech where he addresses Peel, points 
out plainly what he would have the world believe to be the 
policy of the present set of men. If what he says be true 
now, it was equally true when the Duke of Wellington first 
took the office of Premier. I shall not be surprised if an 
alliance be concocted between us and Austria against Russia. 
In such a case I should not be a fit admiral for the occasion. 
In fact I shall, I think, be well out of a difficulty by being 
superseded ; for under any circumstances I could not serve 
with any confidence, nor would the Ministers put any confi- 
dence in me after having instilled into me doubts of our 
each having the same understanding of common English 

Wednesday, July 2. 

Now, that I see by your letter of the 10th of last month, 
by the ' Racer,' that you take my supersession as you ought, 
philosophically, I am quite easy, my dearest Jane, as to all 
the rest. 

The poor wife put on, for her husband's sake, a i phi- 
losophy' that was not natural to her anxious mind. I 
was with her at the time at Malta, and well remember 
the distress occasioned to her by the news of my father's 
recall. She was, in truth, deeply wounded at what she 
felt to be the undeserved treatment of him of whom she 
was so justly proud. 

(Letter continued.) 

I shall be an instance, no doubt, of that sort of honor- 
seeking persons who are said to have honors forced upon 
them. For I shall be dragged into publicity eventually 
which I should have gladly avoided, and that publicity will 
gain me an extent of approbation which would not have 
fallen to my lot under just treatment by men in power. The 
approval of my countrymen comprises the honors I covet, 
and next to that the approval of others ; and if the stars and 


ribbons which have been so bountifully given me are not 
evidence of that feeling, they become the mere gew-gaws 
which might ornament any Court sycophant of any monarchy. 
Shortly after your letter came away you will have received 
mine, and, I trust, have been satisfied with my reply to Lord 
Aberdeen. As the steamer did not go till a couple of days 
after I had weighed matters, it was agreed that I had better 
explain to the Duke of Clarence this part of my proceeding, 
with which the placing me under the Secretaries of State 
had left him unacquainted. We were hurried so as to draw 
upon our time of rest of both night and early morning. But 
both Adam and Count Guilleminot are contented with it, and 
if it contain nothing objectionable, I shall consider it of 
minor importance there being any omission which I shall 
have probably too much opportunity of correcting. 

Corfu: July 3. 

Several letters arrived here with the news of my super- 
session, even before the courier with the despatch of which I 
now enclose you a copy. In this you will see that blame is 
thrown upon me as thick as power can supply it, by the 
reasons therein given for my recall. I will trust none of the 
politicians with my character whilst I have myself the power 
to preserve it unsullied. For my country I am ready to 
make any sacrifice, because my character can never be re- 
quired to be included ; but for a party, and such a party, no. 
Preserve the serenity, my dearest Jane, which you justly 
desire to see in me, and be assured all will go right and well. 
As to my talking about it, why, all France is talking about 
it, to better purpose than I could do myself; and all here 
echo the sentiment, because they see that mischief must 
arise from it. As to court-martial, it is out of the question. 
Again, my dear Jane, let me entreat you, as you love my 
peace, to diminish that excess of anxiety which diminishes 
your power of judging correctly ; for it is material to me that 
you should feel as I do in all this matter. I see my way 
clearly, and am confident of a good result by pursuing my 
own line firmly ; and I rely upon your agreeing with me in 
this when we meet and can talk the matter over coolly. 
What is one to think of Ministers who can give one reason 
to the Lord High Admiral and others to me. As to their 
verbal explanations which came through our anxious friend 
G., it is not worth a moment's deliberation. 

As to Ibrahim, he is now either feigning, or about to punish 
exemplarily the 5,000 Albanians who, according to a letter 
to us from him, have marched to Patras. Will has so much 


to do he can scarcely write now, or Harry either. They are 
both well, and I trust will keep so. Poor Smith's death and 
that of little Horatio Paget, may diminish your regret at 
leaving this climate. I cannot say my feelings amount to 
regret under the circumstances, and I think they will soon 
become rejoicings. And now, once more, God bless you. 


Sir E. C. to Vice- Admiral Count Heiden. 

'Asia/ at Sea: July 4, 1828. 

MONSIEUR I/AMIRAL, I have had the honor of receiving 
your Excellency's letter of May 23 and June 4. 

I feel it incumbent on me to declare, that in all the infor- 
mation which I have had through your Excellency of the 
intentions of your august Sovereign, as well as in all the 
intercourse which I have had with your Excellency person- 
ally and the officers of the Russian navy, I have experienced 
the most open and candid communication ; and that I have 
ever been impressed with a full conviction of his Imperial 
Majesty's determination to fulfil the engagements to which 
he was bound by the Treaty of London. I am further im- 
pelled by the cordiality which our joint services have so 
happily established, to declare my full persuasion, that if it 
had pleased my Government to continue me in this command, 
the same cordiality would have remained undisturbed and 
undiminished until the object of that important Treaty should 
have been effectually accomplished. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Count de Heiden. 

Off Corfu: July 4, 1828. 

I fear> my good friend, that owing to your being subject 
to long quarantine, in consequence of having had commu- 
nications with the main land, I shall not be able to have 
that personal intercourse with you which would be consistent 
with our mutual regard. I therefore have taken up my pen 
to tell you some of my present feelings on the subject of my 
supersession. It is evident that our men in office have 
sought means for disgusting me ever since the battle of 
Navarin, in order to make me resign my command ; and 
that the approbation of the King and the Lord High Ad- 
miral prevented their recalling me immediately. But finding 
that I was determined not to resign, and having some object 
which they do not think me a fit medium for accomplishing, 


they at length made their determination. What that object 
may be it is not for me to anticipate ; but no doubt it will 
be very soon seen by their conduct. However, I know it will 
be satisfactory to you, my good friend, and I would fain hope 
that your good and august Emperor will also feel pleased 
with it, to be assured that I can repel all the imputations 
and surmises which any man may venture to give utterance 
to, as to my not having clearly understood and fully executed 
my orders. .... . 

I should not, however, have entered so much into this 
subject, but for the intimate friendship which has arisen 
out of our late intercourse, and the anxiety which I know 
you will feel about it. For myself, personally, I have nothing 
to regret, except the not finishing jointly with my colleagues 
the great work in which we have been so cordially engaged. 
Now that I find the dear companion of my retirement takes 
the same philosophical view of the treatment I have expe- 
rienced from the party that now governs England as I do 
myself, I look forward with cheerfulness to my return to 
that domestic life which you, my good friend, know is com- 
petent to afford happiness to one of my turn of mind. In 
that retirement we shall not forget you. 
I will not quit this subject without begging you to rely 
upon the upright intentions of our colleague De Rigny, and 
not allow the little mistakes which your very different 
nations are liable to in so very complicated a service, to 
interfere in any way with the success of that service, and 
with the satisfaction of carrying it harmoniously into execu- 
tion. I am told privately that Sir Pulteney Malcolm is to 
be my successor; that he was to leave England on June 23 in 
the f Wellesley;' and that I am to go home in the ' Warspite.' 
As I hope in a day or two to have such personal communica- 
tions with you as the quarantine regulations will admit of, I 
will only add that, wherever I may be, I shall always feel 
towards you that warm and friendly regard which has been 
happily cemented by mutual approbation in fulfilling our 
joint services on a very interesting as well as important 

Your sincere and faithful friend, 


From Sir John Gore to Sir E. C.* 

June 4, 1828. 

MY DEAR CODRINGTON, You both know how highly we are 
interested, and how deeply we feel all that concerns you ; and 
* Received beginning of July, 1828. 


more particularly at this moment when we consider that you 
are not fairly dealt with, and that amidst the pressure of 
executing a most important and unprecedented duty, you are 
not aided by the kindly countenance of an approving Govern- 
ment, but are perplexed by questions, when it would have 
been more to their dignity and your satisfaction had they 
said, do so and do so than to ask why . The questions 
asked and the answers given are kept close; the Duke of 
Clarence does not know them. 

We are kept in a state of feverish anxiety by an on dit that 
you are to be superseded ; this feverish anxiety has prevented 
me writing to you since ' Asia ' sailed ; for as reports pre- 
vailed and nothing certain could be learnt, I could not sit 
down to write what was as distressing for me to hear as it 
must be for you to read. But as Galignani must have con- 
veyed to you these reports before this letter can reach you, I 
will not let to-morrow's mail be made up without a few lines. 
The reports still exist, and Malcolm is in readiness for a start 
in the < Wellesley ' ; yet at half-past four yesterday evening, 
the Lord-High Admiral told me c the Duke of Wellington has 
been here to communicate that the Cabinet object to my going 
to Ireland in the present crisis of affairs, but he did not name Sir 
Edward Codrington to me.' The report and subject of general 
conversation is (and it emanated from Holland House) that 
the Cabinet have deter mined on recalling you for non-obedience 
of an instruction dated October 1 5, the receipt of which is 
acknowledged by you at Malta on November 11 ; that by 
such non-obedience the Turks had been permitted to traverse 
the Archipelago from the Dardanelles under Tahir Pacha, 
and take Greek slaves from the Morea. I think it fair thus to 
give you the substance of the complaint against you, in order 
that you may be prepared to meet and combat it, as I have 
no doubt you can do triumphantly. I will at the same time 
state to you the opinion I have given from the first moment 
the subject was named to me, without having seen any such in- 
structions, or knowing their bearings on the Treaty of London. 
I can understand that Sir Edward Codrington may consider 
that the battle of Navarin, which took place subsequent to the 
above instructions, commenced a new era, and materially 
changed the aspect of affairs ; consequently demanded new 
instructions. The Duke of C. and Sir G. C. both said, ' I 
wish he had asked for such ; he would have been fully justified 
in doing so, and it would have saved him from the idea of 
disobedience.' I further stated my understanding that De 
Rigny had pledged himself to you to take care of the Dardan 
elles and Archipelago, and that consequently the rendezvous 


of his whole squadron was Smyrna ; and that, in my opinion, 
had you been off Navarin. with your whole force when the 
Egyptian force came out to return to Alexandria, that you 
could not have risked ' collision and hostility ' by searching 
them, for Greek slaves. How far I may have been correct in 
my view of these two points, I know not ; but you know how 
difficult it is to found an opinion without facts as data. The 
general opinion is that you will be relieved, but the Cabinet 
have not yet come to a decision. Since Lord Dudley's re- 
signation, all the papers are put into the hands of Lord 
Ellenborough to form a digest of them upon which the Cabi- 
net will meet and discuss before they decide ; this fact I know 
from authority. In a visit to Huskisson yesterday (June 3), 
he asked me ( if I knew what was decided on in your case ? ' 
6 No ; I should ask you that.' c Nothing was when I left office, 
and there are many serious points to be considered before so 
strong a measure is resorted to.' You will see that all the 
papers, Ministerial, opposition, and neutral, send either 
Malcolm or me to supersede you. Of myself E can say, nothing 
tending to an offer or a hint has been held out to me ; and 
after I left the Duke of C. yesterday, I asked Malcolm what 
grounds he had to ' expect to be ordered ' (as he does, having 
his secretary and flag- lieutenant and all his clothes, &c., 
ready for a start). ' None whatever except the Duke of W.'s 
good will that I shall have the first vacant command, and 
that he was very angry that Codrington got it instead of me ; 
he urged it for me, but Cockburn carried his point for 
Codrington.' ' Then why, on such vague supposition, have you 
ordered Mr. Edie up from Plymouth to be your secretary ?' 
' Oh, I like to be ready, and whoever goes will be ordered off 
in 24 hours, as the " Wellesley " is detained purposely.' I 
replied, ' I am very glad you have not more substantial founda- 
tion, and I still think and hope that the Duke of W. will 
not recall Codrington.' And here the case rests. But you 
will know too soon if the decision is inimical, and may be 
left in painful suspense if otherwise. At all events you will 
have abundance of time to prepare for either, and to make up 
your mind accordingly. 

From Sir John Gore to Sir E. C.* 

Saturday, June 7, 1828. 

MY DEAR CODRINGTON, I wrote to you by the packet on 
Wednesday last, and stated the substance of reports and 
conversations which prevailed in this strange metropolis ; 

* Received beginning of Juty, 1828. 


and I wrote to you on the following day, by the post to Mar- 
seilles, to state to you in how much those reports were falsi- 
fied, and verified, by the fact of Malcolm's appointment and 
order to proceed and relieve you in your command (in the 
' Wellesley ') on the 23rd. ' You are to hoist your flag in 
" Warspite," and return to Spithead,' so soon as Malcolm 
arrives. I had yesterday (by command) a long interview 
with the Lord High Admiral and Spencer on this subject ; 
the latter will write to you fully by the ' Wellesley,' as he 
did by the packet on Wednesday. His Eoyal Highness 
desired me to write to you so soon as I could, and to tell you 
from him ' that he is very desirous that you remain as quiet 
as your feelings will admit ; and not to write or to speak on 
the subject until you arrive in England that blame is not 
attached to you* that your recall is on political expediency 
emanating entirely from the Cabinet, from existing circum- 
stances, and that he had nothing to do in it whatever but to 
obey the King's mandate through the Secretary of State.' f 
I can only add to the above my earnest hope that you will 
adopt it in letter and in spirit ; and though you will, of course, 
arrange all requisite documents in case any more questions 
should be asked ; yet pray do not volunteer any defence until 
blame is attached to you. At present, I understand, none is 
or is intended to be. Your relief in the command of the 
Allied fleet is called for upon ' political expediency ' of which 
the responsible advisers of the Crown can alone judge, and 
are not bound to give any reason for. I do not mean to 
dispute that this is a very strong measure, and a very dis- 
tressing one towards you or any other individual similarly 
circumstanced. But you will recollect that I predicted the 
probability of such a measure as a preliminary to any 
amicable negotiation with the Porte. Our Government have 
disowned the battle of Navarin, you are represented as the 
offender : ' then show your sincerity by removing the offender 
from this command in order that he may not offend again, 
and we will treat with you in confidence.' Such, I conclude, 
is the language held to our Government, whose anxious ob- 
ject is to preserve peace by every sacrifice short of national 
honor and independence; and I earnestly hope and trust 
that in being obliged to hurt your feelings individually for 
the general good, that they will, as soon as possible, make 
every reparation. In the meantime you have the consolation 

* Sir J. Gore had been misinformed. 

t This and preceding letters show how completely the Duke of Clarence 
and other friends of Sir E. C. were purposely kept in the dark as to the 
charges which had already been made the ground of hi* recall. 


to know that your honor and character remain unshaken 
on the high ground you have placed them ; nor can you 
imagine that the Government collectively or individually can 
entertain any opinion or wish to injure you. Their minds 
are too much engrossed to admit of such sentiment, even if 
their wishes had such bias. I therefore earnestly hope and 
entreat of you not to volunteer a defence until your conduct 
is arraigned ; and if it is, T feel assured that you possess 
ample means to place your conduct before the world in such 
light that no censure can attach to it. If I were to attempt 
to write all our feelings on this most anxious subject, I should 
tire out all your patience. I will, therefore, only add our 
united sincere and affectionate good wishes to yourself, Lady 
C., and family. Pray believe me, at all times, 

Your faithfully attached friend, 


From Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

' Asia/ off St. Maura : July 5, 1828. 

SIR, I did not receive Sir John Gore's letter of the 7th 
of last month until after I had replied to Lord Aberdeen's 
despatch, and had also addressed Your Royal Highness upon 
the subject of my supersession, by my letter of the 24th. I 
judge, by what Sir J. Gore tells me, that Your Eoyal High- 
ness was not then aware of the blame which the above de- 
spatch contains, and of the very different grounds therein 
mentioned as having brought the Government to such a de- 
cision, from those which I understand to have been given 
to Your Royal Highness. As to secrecy, private letters 
which reached Corfu even before Lord Aberdeen's despatch 
arrived, mentioned the fact ; and it was known throughout 
France, and the purpose of it freely discussed, before any 
hint of it reached me. I therefore trust Your Royal High- 
ness will approve of my having noticed it by my explana- 
tion through Mr. Croker, as well as by my reply to Lord 
Aberdeen, of which I have herewith sent a copy. The time 
allowed for my writing those replies was shorter than such 
a subject demanded, but it seemed to me very necessary 
that Your Royal Highness should be informed without loss 
of time, that the conduct of an officer who had received such 
substantial marks of your good opinion had not fallen off 
during an interval in which it had been withdrawn, as it 
were, from your inspection in a somewhat mysterious manner. 
To that explanation I shall have to make additions which 
will elucidate the treatment which I have met with, and will 


show at the same time in how much the ( good of His Ma- 
jesty's service' has been considered. I will not go a step 
further without assuring Your Royal Highness that I am 
well aware of the necessity of such a desire on the part of the 
Government being complied with, let their motives be what 
they may ; and that this very unusual proceeding cannot in 
the smallest degree dimmish my grateful sense of the kind- 
ness of His Majesty or of Your Eoyal Highness towards me. 
Indeed, it is under this feeling that I find myself at liberty 
to defy all the charges that can be arrayed against me, in 
a full conviction of my being able to repel them by a plain 
exposure of all my proceedings. I only ask for publicity 
and truth ; and under such circumstances no one can refuse 
my claim. Let me further assure Your Eoyal Highness, in 
allusion to an expression of my friend Gore's letter, that 
4 irritated feelings' I have none. I feel that I stand upon 
too high and too solid ground to subject me to such excite- 
ment. That I have possessed the ambition to be distinguished 
even among the distinguished men of which our profession 
may well be proud, I am ready to acknowledge. But I have 
never felt the mean desire to receive unmerited applause ; 
and I therefore trust I may with the greater propriety defend 
myself against unmerited censure. Gore seems to consider 
the public good as requiring a sacrifice of me individually. 
It is not requisite for me to discuss this matter politically ; 
but I think events will again show that this very attempt is 
the very worst way of bringing about the object proposed. 
There are none near the scene of action who do not attri- 
bute the present unsettled, complicated, and unfortunate 
state of affairs in the Levant to this very erroneous principle ; 
and with such a conviction before me, I am confident it is 
not less my duty to my country than to myself personally, 
that I should defend myself against all the imputations of 
my accusers. The copy of Mr. Consul Barker's letter to 
Lord Dudley will show that the deportation of Greeks has 
been a continued practice ; and if the Government did not 
take measures to prevent it, I cannot see what good is to 
arise from my being loaded with the opprobrium of this bar- 
barous practice, which I am sure Your Royal Highness will 
believe I would gladly have put a stop to. Ever since the 
receipt of my letter, in which I put the simple question ( if 
I was henceforth to stop the deportation for which blame 
was imputed to me, and to take Greek slaves out of any 
Turkish vessels going from Greece,' I have had no answer; 
but instead of their preventing a repetition of this offence, 
to which the Allied fleet was liable, I am informed of my 


meditated supersession for not having already done it without 
order or justification, and, in fact, in defiance of the instruc- 
tion for my guidance. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Sir F. Adam. 

Sta Maura : July 5, 1828. 

I hear that orders are gone after Count Guilleminot to 
join Mr. S. C. at Corfu. If so, M. de Bibeaupierre will be 
sent there likewise. Here I must stay, at all events until 
I know what line Ministers that are, or are to be, are decided 
on taking. I cannot act according to my own opinion, be- 
cause it is evidently too strong for such feeble men as have 
had to do the work of Mr. Canning, and by Mr. S. C. not 
telling me what line he took with the Porte after the battle, 
I conclude he also has not ventured to use that decision 
which, in my humble opinion, would by this time have re- 
moved the Sultan's obstinacy. Half measures will only 
produce half effects ; and the present injurious state of affairs 
will produce increasing discontent, and oblige us in the end 
to proceed to still greater extremities. 

Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

Zante : July 9, 1828. 

Well ! things become more and more complicated every 
day. It is quite impossible to guess even how Ibrahim will 
act. It would be a pretty moment for Malcolm to begin his 
command, and I wish he could have been present at a three 
hours' communication which I have just had with Capo- 
distrias, de Heiden, and Parker.* 

10 P.M. 

We are again at sea, working up to Corfu to have a con- 
sultation with such of the principals as I may find there. 
At the conference with Ibrahim lately, he mentioned his 
knowing of my recall; upon which Heiden said, 'Yes, but 
do you know what it is for? not for the battle of Navarin, 
but for not having prevented you sending over the Greek 
slaves ! ' When Campbell told him my proposals for the 
redemption of those now in Egypt, he was quite furious ; 
and it is saidf that De Rigny was much annoyed at its being 
mentioned. His 'inconsequence,' of which Heiden com- 

* Captain Parker, of H.M.S. 'Warspite,' afterwards Admiral Sir William 
t Which turned out to be without foundation. 


plains so much, has led to a persuasion that he has entered 
into some secret negotiation of his own for Ibrahim's retire- 
ment, and one which would not satisfy any of the other 
parties. Lord Yarborough did not meet with the Dart- 
mouth ' (where he hoped to see his son), and is now going 
back to Corfu with me. He and his party dined with me 
yesterday. His 4 Falcon ' seems really a flyer, of which I 
am very glad, as he deserves to have a good vessel under 

July 11, 

We have not yet passed Cephalonia, but are working hard 
for it against a foul wind, the quantity of which makes the 
air very agreeable, although the thermometer stands at 81. 
Adam has gone through my public and private letter books, 
which increases his interest in my concerns. Will and I 
have been working on with such fresh materials as have 
reached me ; and I verily believe I have as strong a case as 
was ever exhibited. I really begin already to rejoice in my 
supersession; from a conviction that whilst it relieves me 
from a load which I could hardly hope to bear much longer 
with impunity, it will at the same time occasion me more 
credit in the end than if I had continued in the command 
under such masters. Nothing can be more satisfactory to me 
personally than the sensation made by my recall, and the 
evident sorrow of those under my command; and this 
notwithstanding that my successor is a popular commander. 

I fear you are beginning to suffer from the heafc, and I 
must say that I wish we were on our way to England, as I 
have lost the prospect of getting Ibrahim away as I expected, 
unless the ambassadors bring an order to land troops and 
proceed with more energy. Dyer* has been very ill, and is 
still confined to his cabin ; and Will does his duty, a.nd does 
it more usefully to me just now ; he and Hal are quite well, 
and as to me, I have ridden all over Corfu, and since at 
Zante, with impunity. The commodore of the Eoyal Yacht 
Club, Lord Yarborough, is quite pleased with my making 
use of his fi Falcon.' I have put him in orders as directed 
to wear a blue ensign, in order that the Allied ships during 
the time he is with us may not take him for a Turk; and 
we have therefore put his E-.Y.C. into blue broad pendant, 
that his letters may not be mistaken for crescents. I have 
signalled him off to Corfu to announce my approach, and 
prevent despatch vessels coming away in search of me. 

On the 15th 1 received an order directed to the command- 

* His Secretary. 


ing officer who might be here, to send a ship to Ancona for 
Mr. S. Canning, and accordingly the ' Talbot ' is gone ; 
Spencer hoping that this will just wear out his time, and 
that his relief may come so as to enable him to go home at 
the same time with us. It is curious, that whilst De Rigny's 
little inconsistencies lead not only the Eussians, but all our 
people to suspect him of playing a double game, he is actually 
as much bent upon getting Ibrahim out for the sake of me 
personally as for the good of the cause; and I believe 
Guilleminot partakes warmly of his feeling. All this adds 
to the singularity of my situation; that I should be so 
approved of by not only all the English in these parts who 
know what is passing, but by all the foreigners not only here, 
but in their own countries; and that a line adopted in 
common by my colleagues under the sanction of their In- 
structors, which is fully approved of in them, is to be the 
occasion of my being superseded. What better could I have 
under the circumstances ? My case is now as strong as pos- 
sible, and my right to make it public cannot be disputed, as 
it might if I had not been officially censured. I hope we 
shall have settled all the arrangements for Ibrahim's retire- 
ment before Malcolm reaches Malta; and I have no business 
to quit the important service in execution here until I know 
of his being actually arrived. The worst that can happen 
will be his putting me into the ( Warspite ' at once to make 
room for him in the 'Asia'; but in that case 1 cannot give 
him information on papers which are' left at Malta, which 1 
have to make over to him. 

July 18. 

The first part of this letter about De Kigny is, as you will 
see, directly contrary to this latter part ; and you will also 
see that it is his own fault that these different impressions 
are received. I do not believe those under him fully com- 
prehend what they have to do, because whilst some of them 
excite suspicion, others appear to act in harmony with our 
plans of operation. I had to undergo the same suspicion of 
him myself until we came to the time of trial, after which I 
told him he need never thenceforward make himself uneasy 
on account of any reports of difference betwixt him and me. 
Will will write out for Ponsonby my last secret order to 
Campbell, and I need not therefore go at length into the 
prospect we now have of Ibrahim's retreat, so much in con- 
tradiction to the first part of this letter, which gives you the 
impression on the minds of all the parties there mentioned. 
If Heiden arrive here as we hope in a day or two, we shall 
form a conference with Guilleminot and Adam, draw out a 


Protocol, and proceed at once in execution of the project in 
regular form. If he fix the rendezvous at Zante, we shall 
draw up our Protocol here without him, and join him there. 
In the meantime, I have ordered the thing to be done, as 
you will see, and De Rigny has given the same orders to his 
ships off Alexandria, that no time may be lost. It is a long 
time since you heard of me, and you will be anxious, although 
you will have relied upon my working to good effect. I 
assure you that although we may be said to live in gaiety as 
far as our evenings are concerned, we are not idle; and you 
will again have reason to complain of Will's not giving more 
time to his sketch book. If I felt sure that you did not 
suffer from the heat I should be contented. I have no doubt 
of showing you that our time has not been lost. c Eacer ' is 
in sight at a great distance, and little wind to help her. Mr. 
S. C. writes to his attache here, that he does not expect to 
remain here many days. I conclude they are all going on 
to Constantinople again, and to tell the Sultan that the 
offending admiral is disgraced; and if they should have to 
add to my charge the retirement of Ibrahim against his 
sovereign's orders, they will have a nice message of it. 

There was truth in this supposition, though not on 
the grounds which Sir E. Codrington imagined. The 
Government of England thought it worth while to 
employ a foreign ambassador for this their c commis- 
sion/ which was estimated at its full value by the 
amusing incredulity of the Reis Effendi ! 

Lord Aberdeen, writing to the Duke of Wellington on 
August 26, 1828, says, 4 Monsieur de Zuylen appears 
to have executed our commission perfectly well in inform- 
ing the Reis Effendi of the cause of Sir E. Codririgton's 
recall,' and 

4 The Reis Effendi had the utmost difficulty to com- 
prehend the business at all ; and the notion that the 
Admiral had been remiss in the execution of measures 
of severity, seemed to him incredible. On the whole it 
made a very unfavourable impression at the time.'* 

W. J. C. 

* See Wellington Papers, vol. iv. 


Sir E. C. to Lady G. (letter continued). 

July 19. 

Yesterday evening- I got the letters by the 'Racer,' and 
late at night those by the 'Alexander Newsky.' I cannot des- 
cribe the pain which it gives me to find you taking so much 
to heart an event which I am persuaded will eventually be 
beneficial to me, and consequently to us all. Nothing but a 
bad cause could justify your admitting such feelings as your 
letters betray. I well know the sense of justice and the warm 
affection, my dear Jane, in which those feelings originate ; 
and I well know that I have much to endure before I can 
fully overcome such a power as that to which I am unwill- 
ingly opposed. But as truth and publicity are the only 
supporters I require ; and as the choice of time, if left to my 
own judgment or the chance of a favorable opportunity over 
which I have no immediate control, are all the contingencies 
necessary to consider, I feel as fully confident of victory, if 
life be left to me or mine, as if I had again to deal with the 
Turks at Navarin. In the meantime, there is no great suf- 
fering or merit in this endurance as I have termed it ; for, 
whilst I contemplate the exposure of false friends and accusers, 
I not only prove real friends who do honor to that title, but 
am making more and more friends every day. In short, my 
dear, over-anxious Jane, I am gaining c golden opinions from 
all sorts of men ;' and what would you wish for more ? 

Why, the interest which this business has excited in such 
people as the Ponsonbys and Bathurst at Malta, and Adam 
here, is a balance for any loss that falls upon me in quitting 
my command ; and yet we have a catalogue to add which may 
well excite the envy of the most fortunate. Again, then, my 
dearest Jane, let me urge you to resume your natural firm- 
ness, and to show by your usual serenity and cheerfulness 
your reliance on a good cause. For myself, my only fear is 
that I shall become as proud as Lucifer, and look down upon 
other Secretaries of State as I do upon and and 

. As to your coming here, it is now too late, certainly > 
much as it would have gratified me and my ever dear friend 
Adam. I have kept my mind to the one point my duty 
and it is no fault of mine that it unexpectedly led me back 
to this place, instead of going to Navarin from Patras. 

Ponsonby, or you, will have my secret order to Campbell, 
which will let you know what we are at, and by what my 
movements have been guided. Upon being joined by 
Malcolm, &c., I am to shift my flag into the ' Warspite ;' 
and I propose sending the ' Warspite ' to Malta to clear off 


her quarantine, continuing out myself in execution of the 
measures arranged. Malcolm will either send or come to 
me. The worst he can do will be turning me out of the 
'Asia' at sea,* which will be a harsh proceeding that will 
hurt him more than me. 

I look back to your letters before me, that I may leave 
nothing material unanswered Be assured that if my letters 
to Lord Dudley and his coadjutor Mr. Huskisson did not 
prevent my supersession, nothing would have done so ; and 
therefore I repeat my content with things being as they are. 
I must, however, declare my conviction that my supersession 
is on account of the battle and the battle only. As to any- 
thing altering the decision of the Ministers, I not only don't 
wish it, but I am persuaded I should lament it at first, and 
have reason to regret it afterwards. Will will write to 
Ponsonby an amusing expose of our conference at Zante, 
and of the Austrian consul's view of it. 


I hear Heiden is gone on to Kalamata, and I expect we 
shall follow to-morrow. 

Sir E. G. to Admiral de Rigny. 

1 Asia,' at Sea : July 10, 1828. 

MONSIEUR L'AMIEAL, It has always appeared to me that 
Ibrahim Pacha would in no case proceed to Roumelia, and 
that after the failure of the missions to him and to the 
Viceroy, necessity, and necessity alone, would induce him to 
consent to retire to Egypt. I was very sanguine in my hopes 
to have reduced him to that necessity before this time, rely- 
ing not only on a strict blockade by sea, but that some 
effectual measures of a similar description would have been 
carried into execution by land. In the event of his being 
actuated by the pressure of such necessity, I am confident we 
could prevent the deportation of any more Greek slaves ; and 
I also believe that we might reclaim a considerable number 
of those already deported, and it certainly would be our 
duty to press that point with all the force that the occasion 
would justify. I am the more confident of the justness of 
this opinion, by finding that it concurs with that now ex- 
pressed by Your Excellency. The instructions given to me 
by my Government respecting the blockade of Alexandria, 
did not appear to me to contemplate the local peculiarities 
which militated against it. In announcing this to my Go- 
vernment I requested further instructions ; in the meantime 

* This was done at Zante. 


I have endeavoured to comply with the intentions therein 
indicated* by the order of which I have now the honor of 
enclosing a copy. 

I have, &c. 


From Sir E. Codrington to the Admiralty, enclosing a letter 
from Mr. Consul Barker, of May 24, 1828. 

< Asia/ at Sea : July 11, 1828. 

SIR, I enclose, for the information of His Koyal High- 
ness the Lord High Admiral, the copy of a communication 
from Mr. Consul Barker on the subject of Greek slaves con- 
veyed from the Morea. Mr. Barker's letter establishes the 
fact that the transmission of the Greeks in the vessels that 
quitted Navarin after the battle was one of those excesses 
which have been continually practised since the commence- 
ment of the war in the Morea, but with which His Majesty's 
Government has not thought fit to interfere. It is perfectly 
clear, however, that, even if the case referred to had been 
the general deportation described in that order, and, even 
if that order had been still open for me to act upon, 
instead of the service therein mentioned having been exe- 
cuted by my predecessor, I could not have interposed, and 
could only have reported the fact as I did. The practice 
of these excesses was well known to all our consuls and 
others resident in the Ottoman dominions, and also by the 
Government itself, as evinced by this very order. In re- 
porting the fact alluded to, I courted instructions on this 
head ; I subsequently asked the question in direct terms ; 
and although my not having already done it is made one 
of the principal causes of my supersession, up to this 
moment I am not furnished with any authority to justify 
the officers on this station in preventing a repetition of 
these excesses. I have said in a former letter that, even 
if I had had a disposable force for the purpose which I 
had not and that if I had made an attempt to search the 
ships in question, which I must have enforced in case of 
refusal, it would necessarily have led to those hostilities 
which I am directed by all possible means to avoid. I think 
so still ; and I am still of opinion, that my so doing would 
also have been in direct defiance of my instruction to en- 
courage the return of the whole or part of the Turco- 
Egyptian forces to Greece. On the other hand it was laid 
down by His Majesty's Government for the guidance of my 

* Order of July 9, 1828, directing that supplies be not permitted to leave 
Alexandria, for Candia or Greece. 

A A 2 


conduct, that England, not being a belligerent, could not 
claim the exercise of belligerent rights ; and it appears to me 
that the search of Ottoman ships of war, and the necessity of 
using force for carrying that search into effect, must be con- 
sidered as the exercise of those rights. If it should still be 
said that, by the allowing the return to Alexandria of so 
many useless mouths, I enabled Ibrahim to remain so much 
longer in the Morea, I might reply that the removal of his 
ships disabled him from performing any operations whatever 
in any other part, and exposed him at once to the conse- 
quences of a blockade which the Greeks could not have 
established in the presence of that fleet. I very seriously 
lament being called upon to trouble His Royal Highness so 
much at length upon this subject. 

He will, however, see how important it is to me to take 
the earliest opportunity of removing an imputation which 
the proceeding of His Majesty's Government in requiring my 
supersession might otherwise attach to me. His Royal 
Highness will sanction my feeling that my character as an 
English Admiral should be above all blame, and I am doubly 
called upon to protect it on the present occasion in conse- 
quence of those distinguished honors which I have lately 

I am, Sir, &c., 


Sir E. 0. to Count Capodistrias, President of Greece. 

' Asia/ at Sea : July 11, 1828. 

MONSIEUR LE COMTE, I feel it right, in regularity, that I 
should acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter 
of j^Jf , notwithstanding that I yesterday had the honor 
of discussing the subjects therein mentioned in a personal 
interview. I ani free to confess that I have never been able 
to form a satisfactory opinion upon the question of admitting 
certain supplies conditionally to Ibrahim Pacha, owing to the 
view which I was disposed to take of it being opposed to the 
sounder judgment of Your Excellency. But, however ready 
to give up my own opinion on this point, I should not find 
myself at liberty to act on that of Your Excellency without 
the sanction either of the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers 
or of my own Government, seeing that it is in direct opposi- 
tion to those orders to which I am already supposed not to 
have been sufficiently attentive. All I can now do is to com- 
municate the views and the wish of Your Excellency to the 
Ambassadors, whom I hope to find at Corfu. I fully agree 


with Your Excellency as to the impossibility of opposing 
regular forces with the Roumeliotes or such other troops as you 
have at present at your disposal, however useful they may be 
in guarding defiles and cutting off communications. Should 
the Allied Powers decide on a blockade by land in addition 
to the blockade by sea, the fate of Ibrahim's army must be 
decided immediately. 

From Sir E. C. to Commodore Sir Thomas Staines, ' Isis.' 

< Asia/ off Paxo : July 13, 1828. 

MY DEAR SIR, As the reason given by Lord Aberdeen for 
my supersession is a misconception on my part of the inten- 
tions of His Majesty's Government, I have sent you the best 
explanation I can of those intentions ; and I have only 
to lament that I cannot so collect them myself from the 
documents which I have had to guide me, as to ensure your 
not falling into the same error, little as you may be likely to 
meet with similar consequences. I presume my successor (who 
I hear by private letters is Sir P. Malcolm) will not come out 
without more intelligible instructions, by which those under his 
command may benefit as well as himself. I am returning to 
Corfu in the hope of meeting Mr. S. Canning, according to 
the wish of my colleagues and Count Capodistrias, all of whom 
have taken the same view of the instructions as I have. In 
this view also I am joined by the Count Guilleminot, Sir F. 
Adam, and General Ponsonby ; so that it is presumable that 
the political expediency upon which my recall is grounded, 
means some concession to the Turks. Be 'it what it may, I 
have no regret in being no longer exposed to the treatment 
which I have met with from the men in office, ever since the 
battle of Navarin. No doubt I should have been glad under 
other circumstances to have seen this business well finished. 
Ibrahim was lately very much disposed to retire, but I think 
his knowledge of my recall will induce him to persevere, in 
expectation of some concession from our Government. I have 
written thus much now, because I doubt my having leisure 
to do so after the receipt of all the despatches which I under- 
stand are waiting for me at Corfu. With an anxious desire 
that your future operations may be as successful as those at 

Believe me, my dear Sir, 

Your very sincere and faithful, 


The increasing difficulties of Ibrahim's position in 


the Morea led him to open a communication with the 
Allied squadrons, which resulted in the following 

Conference at Modon, 6th July, 1828, between Ibrahim Pacha 
and the French and Russian Admirals, and Commodore Camp- 
bell, on the part of Sir E. Codrington.* 

Les Amiraux frai^ais et russe et le Commodore Campbell 
s'etant trouves reunis devant Modon au moment ou le brick 
le ' Rifleman ' arrivait d'Alexandrie et rapportait les reponses 
aux depeches pressees qu'Ibrahim Pacha avait demande le 
12 juin a faire passer a son pere, convinrent de demander 
une entrevue a S. Altesse pour 1'interpeller au sujet de cette 
reponse. Cette entrevue a eu lieu le 6 juillet all heures du 
matin, et voici autant que possible la substance de ce qui 
f ut dit : 

On demanda d'abord a S. A. si la reponse qu'il avait re9ue 
etait satisfaisante et d'une nature decisive. 

Apres quelques phrases evasives, suivant 1'usage, Ibrahim 
Pacha convint que la reponse etait telle que si les moyens de 
transport arrivaient, il s'embarquerait a 1'instant avec ses 
troupes et retournerait en Egypte. Sur la priere de repeter 
cette assertion il la confirma. Tels etaient les ordres de son 
pere, a-t-il dit. 

On lui representa alors qu'une telle determination de- 
mandait qu'on s'accordat d'avance sur certains points, dans 
le detail desquels il convenait d'entrer. 

II repondit que ces details s'arrangeraient facilement au 
moment de 1'exeeution de la mesure principale ; que quant a 
la quantite de troupes et aux moyens de transport necessaires, 
son pere connaissait la situation exacte, et proportionnerait 
1'une a 1'autre. 

On lui demanda alors si, suppose la flotte arrivee aujour- 
d'hui, il etait pret a s'embarquer. C A 1'instant, 3 a-t-il 

Dans ce moment un des colonels (le col. Seve) de son armee 
(il y en avait cinq presens f) prit la parole et dit : ' Messieurs, 
il ne peut y avoir de doute la-dessus, et quand il ne le voudrait, 
nous le forcerions. Nous avons resolu de quitter ; nous avons 
ecrit a Mehemet Ali pour lui faire savoir la resolution des 
regimens: elle est unanime. Que la flotte vienne ; nous 
Tembarquerons de force s'il le faut ; nous sommes venus ici 
pour faire la guerre et non pour mourir de faim.' 

On raisonna alors dans la supposition de Tarrivee de la 

* This was received by Sir E. C. at Corfu, July 14. 
t TLs 1'avaient exige*. 


flotte d'Egypte accompagnee de batimens allies, et de la neces- 
site ou se trouveraient ceux-ci d'entrer dans Navarin pour 
que 1'evacuation se fit avec ordre. Ibrahim ne fit a cela 
d'autre objection que celle que les Kusses etant en guerre 
declaree, cela pourrait inquieter les troupes, mais qu'apres 
tout cela ne ferait pas une difficulte. Le comte Heiden 
offrit, s'il s'en elevait a ce sujet, de ne pas faire entrer ses 
batimens dans 1'interieur. 

Ibrahim prit une occasion favorable pour demander si les 
amiraux allies n'avaient pas connaissance que depuis huit 
mois qu'il savait les desirs et les declarations des cours 
alliees au sujet des ravages de la guerre, il s'etait abstenu de 
toute hostilite et toute attaque de quelque genre que ce fut 
contre les Grecs. On reconnut que telle etait la verite. 

II demanda encore si les amiraux ignoraient que depuis 
peu de jours il avait fait remettre en pleine liberte 800 a 900 
Grecs prisonniers, dont il s'etait fait dormer re9u. 

Rentrant alors dans les conditions preliminaires de 1'eva- 
cuation, on lui declara qu'il lui restait interdit d'emmener 
aucun esclave grec en Egypte. II repondit qu'il s'engageait 
a n'en emmener aucun. 

Le commodore Campbell, ainsi que les autres omciers 
anglais, firent a Ibrahim la proposition de rendre non-seule- 
ment les esclaves actuellement en Moree, mais encore ceux 
portes en Egypte depuis la bataille de Navarin. 

Ibrahim se recria a cet egard, en disant qu'il offrait tout 
ce qui etait en son pouvoir, et qu'une telle condition excedait 
son pouvoir et sa situation. 

Sur cela le commodore repliqua qu'il faisait cette pro- 
position d'apres les instructions de son amiral, et afin que 
si au moment de 1'arrangement definitif elle venait a lui etre 
repetee, S. A. ne put pas alleguer qu'on lui faisait des pro- 
positions nouvelles. Qu'au reste le commodore ne peut pas 
dire que c'etait une condition sine qua non de son Gouverne- 

Enfin, apres quelques interruptions, la conference fut resu- 
mee, et terminee a peu pres en ces termes : 

Si les moyens de transport (Ibrahim avait declare qu'il ne 
voulait quitter que sur un batiment turc) lui arrivent, il 
devra evacuer en emmenant aucun Grec esclave. 

La flotte et les batimens de guerre allies entreraient dans 

(Nulle mention n'a ete faite dans cette discussion de ce 
que deviendraient les places qu'il occupe.) 

On ne pretend pas avoir ici le trace, tous les details, et les 
incidens de cette conference, qui a dure pres de trois heures, 


et dans laquelle le nombre des assistants et des interlocuteurs 
etait assez considerable. On s'est attache a en presenter la 
substance et le resultat. 

La question ne roule aujourd'hui que sur deux difficultes. 
Car il est evident que, soit par le manque de vivres, soit par 
la volonte des chefs et des troupes dont il n'est plus maitre, il 
faut qu'Ibrahim quitte ou qu'il devaste le pays. 

Ces deux difficultes, les moyens de transport a lui laisser 
venir d'Egypte, dans la crainte que ces transports ne serveiit 
par ruse a lui apporter des vivres ; mais il est evident qu'en 
les escortant, et qu'en entrant dans Navarin avec eux, il n'y 
a rien a craindre a cet egard. 

La seconde tient aux esclaves disseinines dans toutes les 
parties de PEgypte depuis le commencement de la guerre, et 
dont personne ne connait ni le nombre ni le catalogue. 

Mais c'est une convention sine qua non a faire si Pon veut 
avec Mohammed Ali, qui doit donner des garanties pour la 
liberation de ces esclaves. 

J'ai ete present a la conference dont le resume se trouve 
ci-dessus indique. 


Vice-Amiral au service de Sa Majeste 

PEmpereur de toutes les Russies. 

Commodore, His Britannic Majesty's 


H. DE RIGNY, Vice-Amiral 
Com*- 1'Escadre de S.M.T.C. 

Notes made by Captain Gregory of the Conference at Modon 
with Ibrahim Pacha, July 6, 1828. 

After the usual compliments, Monsieur De Rigny said, the 
interview had been requested in order to know what answer 
had been brought by the messenger who arrived in the 
' Rifleman.' The Pacha replied, he had written for supplies, 
and Mehemet had referred him to the Allied Admirals. He 
was told the Allied squadrons were here to prevent supplies 
arriving, and that the blockade would be continued with the 
greatest rigour. Count Heiden added that the period was 
probably not very distant when troops would be landed in 
addition to the naval forces. The following is the substance 
of Ibrahim's answers to various questions and remarks by 
Count Heiden and Admiral De Rigny. If troops are landed 
they should know how to defend themselves that they could 
die but once. He was fully aware of the kind intention of 


the Allies towards him, and had given proofs of it in remain- 
ing quiet without making any movement for eight months, 
and in giving their liberty to 800 Greek slaves without any 
ransom, which he contrasted with the conduct of the Greeks 
towards him. The time was not yet arrived for his giving 
up the possession of the Morea, and he would convince the 
Allied officers of it by showing them his magazines. He was 
not in the situation of European generals, who might capitu- 
late with honor, as in their country there were laws and 
customs that enabled them to do so, none of which existed in 
the country and under the government he served. Whatever 
his own wishes might be, he must consult the prejudices of 
those about him. The Pachas who had capitulated did not 
do so until they were reduced to eat human flesh and leaves 
of trees ; but that he was not yet reduced to that, nor ever 
intended to be. He said it was true he had told the Allied 
officers at their last conference that he was very much 
straitened for provisions, and that his colonels and troops 
wished to return to Egypt. He objected to or adjourned 
the exchange of four Greeks who were named by Count 
Heiden, and made some allusions to the corvette that had 
been detained by him. He entered into explanations relating 
to the late affair with Albanians. The conversation then 
became general, and Monsieur De Bigny was talking very 
earnestly with the dragoman and the Pacha, when he suddenly 
called everyone's attention to what he said was an important 
fact, and might be of service, and begged the dragoman to 
repeat what he had just been saying. The following is the 
verbatim of what was said by Ibrahim in answer to different 
questions and propositions: He was quite ready and willing 
to embark and evacuate the Morea the moment a fleet arrived 
to bring him away ; he came in a Turkish ship, and would 
return in no other. The conditions could be made, and gua- 
rantees given, when the fleet should arrive, when it would be 
time enough to enter into details ; but he was quite ready 
to go. On Captain Mitchell observing (in answer to an obser- 
vation of Admiral De Eigny that he had private intelligence 
that the Pacha of Egypt intended to send vessels in thirty 
days to bring away Ibrahim's army), that the Pacha had held 
language to him, Captain Mitchell, which did not tend to 
confirm such a report, Ibrahim was again asked to declare 
frankly what answer he had received. He said it was that 
he should receive an answer in twenty-five days. Monsieur 
De Rigny again said, that he understood Mehemet had con- 
sented to send ships to bring him away in thirty days. To 
which Ibrahim replied, turning to Monsieur de Rigny : ' If 


you have such intelligence, why press me any further ? ' 
Suleiman Bey then said, that he spoke in the name of the 
colonels and chiefs of the army, who were all tired with the 
service upon which they were employed, and would embark on 
board a fleet the moment one came to fetch them ; and if 
Ibrahim made any opposition they would bind him hand and 
foot and take him on board. That the answer received yes- 
terday merely desired them to have patience, and care should 
be taken of them. This having caused some interruption, 
during the time that everyone was standing, Commodore 
Campbell told Admiral De Eigny that Ibrahim must be in- 
formed, in order to be aware of the conditions upon which 
Mehemet's fleet would be allowed to enter Navarin, and of 
which nothing had been said, that such a step would not be 
allowed until sufficient guarantees had been given, both by 
himself and Mehemet, for the restitution of the Greek slaves, 
both those in the Morea as well as those already conveyed 
to Egypt ; as the instructions of the British commander did 
not authorise him to close any negotiation without this being 
agreed upon. It was explained, that although it was not 
positive that such a condition would be required, yet it 
still was one on which the Government might insist before 
coming to any decisive arrangement ; and that he, Commo- 
dore Campbell, thought it right not to quit his Highness 
without making him acquainted with it ; that, in case the 
negotiations were renewed, the Pacha might nofc say that 
fresh conditions had been brought forward since this present 
conference. The Pacha protested loudly against this; he 
said he was perfectly willing to give up all the slaves he 
had with him in the Morea, but to make such a request 
for those already conveyed to Egypt, was a blow at their 
religion and their customs, and would be looked upon as 
the greatest of exactions and the grossest injustice; that 
it would come in contact with their most inveterate pre- 
judices, and would infallibly create confusion and revolution 
from one end of the country to the other; and however 
willing to give up their own slaves here, they would all 
rather die than consent to a proposition they deemed so 
monstrous ; that it ought not to be proposed, and was an 
act of injustice as regarded the time of making it ; that 
it should have been done immediately after the battle of 
Navarin, and before those slaves had been sent over. 


From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. 

Navarin : ce 7 juillet 1828. 

MON CHER AMIRAL, Je profite du 'Kifleman' pour vous 
dire deux mots. Nous avons eu une conference avec Ibrahim 
sur le desir de M. de Bigny. Nous sommes tout aussi loin 
que nous etions, avec la seule difference que les troupes 
d'lbrahim veuleiit partir ; mais, au reste, le pere ment, le 
fils ment et tout le monde trompe. Aussi longtems qu'on 
n'enverra pas 3 a 4 mille homines et une batterie de canons 
on ne fera rien, mais du moment que ceux-R debarquent la 
capitulation est faite dans une semaine. M. de Rigny veut 
que nous ecrivions a Mehemet ; je crois que c'est seulement 
nous compromettre et nous rendre ridicules. 
Adieu, mon cher Amiral. Je me recominande a votre souvenir 
et amitie. 


From Admiral De 

1 Conque'rant,' sous Ce'phalonie : 8 juillet. 

MON CHER AMIRAL, Je rencontre le ' Loiret,' qui m'annonce 
que vous etes parti de Corfou, venant a Navarin, que j'ai 
quitte avant hier a minuit. Je suis desespere de ne point 
vous trouver dans un evenement decisif, et qu'il ne fallait 
pas que vous laissiez a votre successeur. 

H m'est impossible de vous donner des details circonstancies 
sur ce qui vient de se passer a Modon. Nous avons eu une 
entrevue avec Ibrahim ; je joins ici a tout hasard le protocol. 

From Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C. 

' ConquSrant,' pres Paxo : 11 juillet 1828. 

MONSIEUR L' AMIRAL, Les inesures que V. E. a si judi- 
cieusement prescrites dans 1'ordre general du 24 mai ont eu 
le resultat que nous pouvions esperer, et peut-etre meme 
ont-elles depasse nos esperances. 

Ibrahim Pacha, reduit par la severite du blocus, se voit 
contraint, sois par le manque absolu de vivres, soit par la 
revolte etablie dans son propre camp, de declarer qu'il est 
pret a retourner en Bgypte aussitot que les moyens de trans- 
port lui seront fournis par son pere. 

Nous pouvons done croire que, sans aj outer 1'emploi de 
troupes de terre, 1' evacuation de la Moree est sur le point 

* Received at Corfu, July 14. t. ^Received July 14. 


d'etre accompli. Get evenement, qui ne pent manquer d'etre 
vivement desire par nos gouvernemens respectifs, ne me 
parait plus tenir qu'aux conditions que nous y niettrons. 
Je me hate, apres avoir pris connaissance de 1'etat des choses 
dans 1'entrevue que le comte Heiden, le commodore Camp- 
bell (en votre nom) et moi avons eue avec Ibrahim le 6 
juillet, de venir vous rejoindre pour combiner les moyens 
d'execution qui doivent amener ce denouement. 

Je dois desirer en mon particulier qu'avant de quitter le 
commandement de 1'escadre de S. M. B. vous assistiez a 
Paccomplissement d'une telle mesure d'une mesure aussi 
decisive et qui terminera avec un succes incontestable la 
serie des devoirs difficiles que nous avons ete appeles a 
remp]ir en commun. 

Agreez la nouvelle assurance de ma haute consideration. 

Le Vice-Amiral 


Sir E. C. to Count Heiden. 

Corfu : Monday night, July 14, 1828. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, Mr. S. Canning is not arrived nor is 
Monsieur Eibeaupierre. But after a consultation with our 
colleague, Count Guilleminot, and Sir F. Adam, I am most 
decidedly of opinion that we should forward Ibrahim's re- 
tirement in the manner proposed, with all the haste which 
the circumstances admit of. In order to arrange our plans, 
I propose that you should come here directly, and if our 
Ambassadors should arrive in the meantime we should be 
ready to meet them. If you should be got past Zante before 
you receive this, and should prefer our meeting at Zante by 
way of saving time, write word so by Captain Mitchell, and 
De Rigny and I will meet you there. I wish you could have 
heard De Rigny explain to us all his sentiments as well as 
all that has passed betwixt him and Ibrahim, his Dragoman, 
the Yiceroy, Drovetti, &c. I am quite sure in such case you 
would agree with us in his zeal and honest anxiety to per- 
form the service in the manner most satisfactory to us all. 
I will undertake whenever I meet you to convince you of the 
rectitude of his intentions throughout in spite of those little 
' inconsequences ' which give rise to that ' mefiance ' which 
I know it is disagreeable to you to entertain towards any- 
body. I shall not have time to write to Count Capodistrias 
now : I will therefore beg you to explain that upon weighing 
well his objections to the fortresses being put into the hands 
of the Turks, in whose possession they were before Ibrahim 
arrived in the Morea., I do not think it a consideration that 


should interfere with the great object of getting rid of the 
Egyptian forces. If Ibrahim gave those places up to the 
Greeks, he might be accused of treason, and therefore would 
refuse to go away upon those terms : and the Allies would 
be more inclined to land a few troops to finish the remainder 
of the work, than to land a large force to attack the whole 
Egyptian army. Indeed after getting rid of the principal 
force, there are various means of obtaining possession of the 
fortified places which would be left in the hands of a few 
unwilling Turks. A little money might do the thing at once. 
The preparation of the ships at Alexandria, whatever may 
be the pretended purpose, depend upon it, is with the view 
of bringing Ibrahim over. The Viceroy himself consents to 
their coming under the protection of our ships ; and if we 
once have them at sea, surely we can do as we wish' with 
them. We need not let them enter Navarin without our 
fleet going in with them by a previous agreement with 
Ibrahim, which he is very desirous of making. However, I 
have said enough for the present, and am very confident in 
the good results of the proposed plan : and not less so of the 
uprightness and sincerity of our colleague. 

Your sincere friend, 


From Admiral Heiden to Sir E. C.* 

Zante : ce ^ juillet 1828. 

II n'y a pas de doute qu'il faut laisser partir Ibrahim avec 
toutes les facilites possibles, et le plus vite le mieux ; mais je 
n'y crois rien encore ; ils nous ont tant de fois trompes que je 
crains que ce n'est pas la derniere fois. Pour ce qui regarde 
la reddition aux Turcs, c'est une idee qu'on leur a mis en tete ; 
je ne sais trop pourquoi : il pourrait y avoir une arriere- 
pensee. Mais il est vrai que nous n'avons pas les moyens de 
le forcer, et c'est pourquoi nous serions trop heureux d'etre 
quittes de lui, sauf a nous arranger avec les Turcs apres. 
Le comtef dit qu'il n'a jamais fait d'objections a cela; mais 
seulement il dit que si Ibrahim s'en va, qu'alors le 'Pelopon- 
nese' ne sera pas encore libre pour cela. Je suis aussi d'accord 
que nous devons entrer ensemble a Navarin, et (quoique je 
n'entrerai pas moi-meme si cela ferait des difficultes, comme 
notre ami Rigny 1'a insinue a Ibrahim en ma presence, 
quoique je ne 1'ai pas entendu moi-meme,) je voudrais 
cependant que quelques batimens y fussent presents, et nous 

* Received at Corfu, July 19. t Capodistrias. 


devrons choisir celui qui aura le commandement sur tous. Je 
voudrais que ce fiit vous, Mons r 1'Amiral, en personne. Au 
reste j'etais d'accord sur tous ces points avec Mons r de Rigny ; 
mais pour envoyer a Mehemet All je crois que, puisque la 
negociation a commence par les Francais, et sans que les 
Anglais s'en doutaient, puisque Mr. Mitchel n'a pas ete mis du' 
secret, qu'il vaut mieux que Mons r de Kigny fasse cette de- 
marche seul : il peut dire que nous, ou du moins j'y accede de 
bonne foi, et protegerai tout batiment qui aura une destination 
pour emmener Ibrahim en figypte; mais encore une fois,Mons r 
I'Amiral, je crains que ce diable de Meheniet Ali ne nous 
trompe. Je serai toujours bien avec notre collegue, mais je 
n'aime pas ces intrigues fra^aises, dont au reste je n'ai pas 
peur, car nous avons des yeux et du common sense tout comme 
un autre ; par consequent je ne serai pas dupe, mais loyaute 
et franchise sont ma devise. Adieu, mon cher Amiral. 

Votre tres-devoue ami, 


P.S. Le comte Capodistrias se hate pour retourner chez 
lui ; cela me lie plus ou moins les mains pour le moment, 
puisque je 1'ai pris a bord de inon vaisseau dans Pabsence 
de son escadrille, et je ne voudrais pas le faire retourner sur 
son brick grec sans personne pour Taccouipagner. 

Sir E. C. to J. Barker, Esq., H.M. Consul at Alexandria. 

< Asia/ at Corfu : July 16, 1828. 

SIE, I think it right to apprise you of the result which we 
expect will arise from the conference which took place with 
Ibrahim Pacha, upon the return of His Majesty's sloop 
4 Bifleman.' The Pacha is certainly very willing to retire 
from the Morea, if he can find such a justification as will 
secure him against the anger of the Sultan, and no doubt the 
Viceroy will be very glad to have him back upon those terms. 
His fleet is now preparing ostensibly to convey provisions, 
which he well knows it could not effect without our sanction. 
This fleet can l>e permitted to come out unperceived, and after 
being out, can be conveyed under protection of our squadrons 
to Navarin. When off Navarin, an agreement can be made 
with Ibrahim for his fleet and the blockading fleet to enter 
together, for the purpose of securing the embarkation of his 
army, and conveying it to Alexandria. I think you will find 
the Viceroy ready to sanction all this, and as fully prepared 
for it as Ibrahim is ; but you and Monsieur Drovetti can 
communicate privately with his confidant without loss of time 


upon this matter, and let me know the result. We have sent 
for Admiral de Heideii to arrange the business more fully, and 
you will then hear further. He will give up entirely his 
belligerent character for the occasion, and we shall be respon- 
sible for the honorable execution of the plan. Our object 
is so to execute it that neither the Viceroy nor the Pacha 
may be compromised by it with the Porte. Ibrahim is ready 
to give up all the Greeks he can, and you know the Viceroy 
is the same ; and in restoring all the Turks we can collect, 
including those of the corvette, we shall require the Viceroy 
to recover as many of the Greeks already sent over as he may 
have ii in his power to do, upon the footing of a general ex- 
change of prisoners. The Viceroy must be made to under- 
stand clearly that it is only upon these terms the blockade 
which has been ordered off Alexandria, can be, for the time, 
suspended ; and that any attempt to deceive us will be made 
by us fatal to Ibrahim and his army ; for from that moment 
we could rely upon nothing but their entire destruction. As 
this plan of operations has been already arranged principally 
by Monsieur Drovetti, with whom the Pacha of Egypt has 
been so long in confidence, I could wish you to allow him 
rather to take a lead in it. I did not like that such an im- 
portant arrangement should take place, without you, as our 
representative, being equally a principal in it ; and in thus 
giving you my confidence, I am sure I can rely upon your 
discretion in the mode of effecting it. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Commodore Campbell. 

< Asia/ at Corfu : July 16, 1828. 

SIR, I have the honor of enclosing the copy of a letter 
which I have written to Mr. Consul Barker, which will 
sufficiently explain to you the line of conduct which it will 
be requisite for you to observe when the operation therein 
referred to will be to be carried into effect.* If therefore at 
any time the Viceroy's fleet should be observed coming out of 
Alexandria, the blockading force must be drawn away to 
such a distance as will prevent in the first instance any 
apparent understanding with us, leaving small vessels to 
watch and give notice of its movements. When once caught 
(as it might seem) at sea, we can insist upon its coming to 

* This plan arose from a suggestion of Mons. Drovetti, Consul-General of 
France in Egypt. 


Navarin to embark the army. Ibrahim has pledged himself 
to embark in any Ottoman fleet which may come to Navarin ; 
and in order to ensure his doing so, the Ottoman fleet is not 
to be suffered to go into the port, until Ibrahim's consent is 
given to the Allied fleet accompanying it. These prelimin- 
aries once arranged, the execution then devolves on our- 
selves; and as in fact the whole plan has been made in con- 
cert, our business is to carry it into execution in such a 
manner as that neither the Viceroy nor Ibrahim may .be 
compromised by the Sultan. Admiral De Rigny will give 
particular orders to the French officer commanding the 
detachment of French ships employed on the same service, 
to communicate openly and confidentially with you on this 
occasion. Under the present circumstances, this service 
becomes much more important than the blockade of the 
Morea; and I therefore wish you to proceed in the execution 
of it yourself. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. 

< Asia/ at Corfu : July 20, 1827. 

SIR, I have considered it right to make secret and to 
address to Your Royal Highness personally, some part of the 
information which leads me to rely upon the success of the 
measures which I am now, jointly with my colleagues, about 
to carry into execution. There has been an understanding 
between Vice-Admiral De Rigny and the Yiceroy of Egypt, 
which has given rise to suspicions amongst both the English 
and the Russian officers, which the Admiral could not well 
explain to any other than myself, without danger both of 
compromising the Yiceroy and his son, and of frustrating 
the plan proposed. This will account for many seeming 
inconsistencies and contradictions, which are much dwelt 
upon in confidential letters to me, but which I have not 
thought it advisable to place before Your Royal Highness. 
These representations have at times caused me much anxiety, 
until personal communications with the Vice-Admiral have 
removed it ; and yet it has not been in my power by similar 
disclosure to produce the same effect on others, because the 
whole success depended upon secrecy. In these circum- 
stances I have all along wished my colleague to act the 
principal part, under a persuasion that both the Viceroy and 
Ibrahim would be more confidential with him than with me, 
and that however necessity, and necessity alone, might pro- 


duce the wish to retire, it would be brought about sooner 
and on better terms through his mediation. The public 
avowal of the revolt of the Albanians, and the reported 
discontent of other portions of Ibrahim's army ; the mission 
of Baki Effendi to Corfu ; the report of the extreme want of 
provisions, and the petition of the colonels of Ibrahim's 
army, both publicly sent to Alexandria; and the violent 
conduct of Suleiman Bey (le Colonel Seve) at the late con- 
ference at Modon, have all been put forth to reconcile the 
Porte to the necessity of the evacuation ; and in order to 
make still more plausible to the Sultan that retirement 
which is considered as the first step towards the practical 
execution of the Treaty of London, I propose waiving the 
question of the fortified places being left in the hands of the 
Turks, from whom Ibrahim received them. He has strongly 
expressed his determination not to deliver the fortresses into 
other hands than those of the Turks; and by yielding to 
this objection we shall be enabled to press more strongly 
that point which His Majesty's Government" has so greatly 
at heart, viz., the restoration of the deported Greeks. Your 
Royal Highness will observe that no mention was made of 
the fortified places in the conference at Modon on July 6. 
This is a very difficult subject in the eyes of the Viceroy, 
and it is mentioned only in Mons. Drovetti's letters to 
Comte Guilleminot and Admiral De Rigny; but 1 may 
inform your Royal Highness of my conviction that Count 
Capodistrias would find it in the end a better measure to 
leave them for the present in the hands of the Turks, than 
be obliged to give the command of them to chiefs whom we 
cannot trust. Ibrahim Pacha's objections are so strong, on 
the ground that his delivering them to the Greeks would 
seem a compromise with subjects, rebels to the Porte, that 
the making it an indispensable condition might produce the 
failure of the whole plan; but, nevertheless, we shall insist 
as far as possible, without endangering the success of the 
measure, on the complete evacuation of the Morea. I think 
it will be evident to your Royal Highness that I cannot 
possibly expect that any agreement we can make with Ibra- 
him should be reduced" to writing. Had the business been 
of a less delicate nature, I should have demanded it on this 
occasion, notwithstanding its having been in vain attempted 
by me at a former period. It is my intention to proceed to 
sea this evening, in company with Vice- Admiral De Rigiiy, 
to join our colleague, in order to carry into execution this 
measure, which has been decided on in conference with Count 
Guilleminot, Vice-Admiral De Rigny, and Sir Frederick 


Adam : the latter has seen these letters to your Royal 
Highness on the occasion. 

I have, &c., 


Prom Admiral De Rigny to Sir E. C. 

i Conquerant,' devant Navarin : 30 juillet 1828. 

MONSIEUR L' AMIRAL, Je pense que vous desirerez appren- 
dre ce qui se passe a Modon. Voici les details que j'ai re9us 
du Consul d'Autriche, qui s'est sauve avant hier dans un 
bateau, et m'est venu demander la permission de se retirer a 
Zaiite. Ibrahim est parti le 23 pour aller chercher des 
vivres. II a pris 2,000 hommes avec lui ; les Albanais, qui 
s'etaient d'abord diriges par 1'Isthnie de Corinthe, sont en 
quelque mefiance des Grecs, et sont revenus vers Patras. 
Achmet Pacha, qui commande la pour Ibrahim, a voulu les 
faire rentrer dans 1'ordre, ils 1'ont tue ; de maniere qu'il y a 
une grande confusion. Si Ibrahim revient a Modon sans 
vivres, le Consul dit qu'il y aura un grand tumulte ; on ne 
donne que deux onces de farine a chaque homme; tons les 
chameaux sont manges ; il croit qu'il n'y a plus que pour dix 
a quinze jours. 

Hier j'ai envoye un drogman au camp pour demander a 
parler a Ibrahim. Le Kiaja Bey a repondu (ce que je savais) 
que son maitre est alle vers Patras, et qu'il ne pourrait etre 
de retour avant six jours ; et qu'il avait ordre de 1'envoyer 
chercher si nous le faisions demander. 

Dans la conversation, tous les Turcs et Arabes qui ont 
parle ont repete qu'ils etaient prets a s'en aller, mais qu'ils 
mourraient plutot de faini que d'evacuer sur d'autres bati- 
mens que les leurs. Ils disent qu'ils seront 20,000 en tout. 
Turcs et Arabes, et y compris ceux de Patras. Je crois que 
cela est exagere; ils ont demande si le vaisseau pourraib 
sortir dans 1'etat ou il est, et qu'on comptait y mettre les ma- 
lades, qui sont 1,000 a 1,200. Tout cela se disait en con- 
versation sans caractere officiel. Hier un bateau apparte- 
nant a un des bricks de Navarin, et qui allait faire de 1'eau, 
s'est sauve par la petite passe de Sphacterie, et s'est dirige 
sur ' le Conquerant.' II y avait onze Grecs de la mer Noire : 
ils ont fait les memes depositions sur la quantite de vivres 
qu'on donnait, et ont ajoute que des huit batimens qui sont 
dans Navarin, deux seulement ont encore qnelques jours de 

* Received August 3, 1828. 


provisions ; les autres re9oivent leur pitance chaque jour de 
terre. Startouris dit la meme chose. 

Agreez 1'assurance de ma haute consideration. 

H. DE RiGflY, Vice-Amiral. 

From W. J. C. to General Ponsonby. 

Corfu : July 19, 1828. 

DEAR SIR, On the subject, it is quite useless for me to 
express how strongly I must feel in common with many, I 
am sure very many, others ; besides, it wastes both time and 
temper when I may be telling you of as important things. 
I do sincerely trust that, after so much work of both mind 
and body, the time is not far off when Ibrahim will be forced 
to yield, and show those who have superseded iry father, as 
well as England itself, that the ( unfortunate misconception ' 
of the instructions has nevertheless brought about the first 
main practical effect of the Treaty. It would, indeed I hope 
willy be a triumphant way of hauling down the flag, and carry 
conviction to everyone, except the authors of the injustice, 
that he has acted up to even more than the spirit of his 

The ' not restraining the Greek naval forces,' &c., and the 
not having inserted the word ' provisions,' are the only 
charges that have a shadow of truth or common sense in 
them. My father has certainly no positive written order to 
show that the conduct qf the fleet was guided by that spirit. 
But the complaint is not that ( collision took place between 
the Greeks and Turks,' or that the Turks in the Morea re- 
ceived any supplies by means of neutrals, or that c provisions ' 
were introduced ; it is only, ' it might have so happened.' 
Parker decided correctly, and so decided in consequence of 
that full explanation and insight into everything that my 
father gave him, and generally gives instead of written 
orders to those who have the superintendence of any parti- 
cular service. The other charges are iniquitous, and really, 
to me, betray a want of common sense in bringing charges 
which are refuted with so much ' facility.' 

As to the ' facility ' with which that fleet got back, my 
father sends home a report of De Eigny's of where the line- 
of-battle ship and frigates were obliged to stop on their 
passage ; and that at the time of their starting the ' La 
Eleche ' was anchored at Modon with three anchors ahead, 
blowing a gale from N.E. De Rigny has written a very 
strong and handsome letter, that he was responsible for 
Navarin being watched, that he could not have searched that 

BB2 .S 

.,' ii* I] i 


fleet or stopped it by any order whatever in his possession ; 
on the contrary, it was a partial fulfilment of his instructions 
that it would have been both impolitic and inhuman to 
have prevented so many wounded people from returning. 
When we were at Zante lately we met Heiden, Capodistrias, 
and Parker, with whom my father had a long conversation 
at Stovin's Mole. Heiden being in quarantine as well as the 
other, my father was constantly doubling his fist at him to 
keep him off, and once was apparently drawing his sword, 
&c. It seems that all this, with certainly an eagerness of 
conversation on all sides, has produced an account of the 
Admirals having had a serious difference almost amounting 
to personality ; Capodistrias, not feeling so hot as the rest, 
kept his hat on, while the others had theirs off. The Aus- 
trian Consul, we hear, has written this all officially, which 
account will be very amusing to you perhaps if you hear it. 
Heiden, Capodistrias, and Parker were all brimful of De 
Eigny's apparent doubledealing. I send you the report of 
the conference at Modon on the memorable July 6. Mons. 
Dovretti has been using his influence apparently well ; De 
Eigny knew what the others at that conference did not know 
that Mehemet Ali had tacitly agreed to withdraw his 
troops from the Morea. Mitchell's interview with the Pacha 
of Egypt was productive of this answer only that he could 
not answer before twenty-five days ; so that, when Mitchell 
came to Navarin, De Rigny having also received despatches 
from Dovretti, the latter went much further, and felt so cer- 
tain of the evacuation as to write an official letter to Capo- 
distrias, saying it was agreed on, with one or two conditions. 
This further information of De Eigny's made all the others 
suspect there was underhand work for a different object. 
Of course the Pacha did not wish to commit himself to more 
than he could possibly help, and Dovretti is an old acquaint- 
ance of his, so that he naturally would not open to Mitchell 
or to Parker, or to anybody else in the same way. There 
was also a tremendous complaint against De Eigny, for 
having been overheard saying to Abro, ' Tell the Pacha to 
object to the Eussians coming into Navarin when the fleet 
comes.' To their indignation, I may almost say, there were 
no bounds at this ; but it came out very quietly from De 
Eigny to my father the other day : 'Oh, Ibrahim will make 
no objection to the Eussians coming in, for the suggestion 
came from me, and I did it only out of a delicacy to Heiden 
on account of his belligerent character.' De Eigny is honest 
in this point of evacuation ; he is so sure of it, that my 
father has sent for Heiden from wherever he is to come here, 


or rendezvous at Zante, and then it is proposed that a proto- 
col should be formed. A letter from Capodistrias attributes 
the change for milder measures in Ibrahim to my father's 
last intimation to him, and the strict measures of blockade ; 
and another from De Kigny attributes perhaps a greater 
effect to the same causes. These will be sent home by the next 
opportunity, and I hope will be used by the Duke of Clarence 
to show the Ministry the justice of their cause. Barker en- 
closes to my father his despatch in answer to Lord Dudley's 
enquiring about slaves, which shows (to Lord Dudley most 
provokingly) that ever since the beginning of the war in the 
Morea, and subsequent even to 1826, prisoners and slaves 
have been sent to Egypt, and no means taken to prevent it 
by Government. The order to blockade Alexandria lately 
given, is, to stop all vessels whatever under Ottoman flag, and 
all neutrals under Ottoman convoy, from leaving the port. 
The Pacha is to be given to understand fully, that the tem- 
porary suspension of this blockade will take place only on his 
agreeing to the measure of evacuation ; and a strong hint 
that, should he attempt to deceive the Allies, their only means 
of ensuring the effect of the Treaty would be in the entire 
destruction of his army. The said blockade seemed to come 
rather inopportunely, but it is thus made to help the cause. 

Yours very truly, 


Sir E. 0. to Lady C. 

OS Corfu : July 21, 1828. 

We came away from Corfu last night, as I may call it, for 
it was nearly dark, after dining with Adam and meeting 
Guilleminot and De Eigny, We have the ' Falcon ' and two 
cutters with us, and the ' Syrene ' is with c Le Conquerant ' 
to leeward, I propose now, my dearest Jane, noticing the 
contents of your lately-received letters. I do not agree with 
you that there can be ' no recompense for my supersession,' 
even in any sense of the word. In that which is of most 
value in my eyes I feel that it depends mainly on myself to 
produce, to the full extent, that approval of what is right of 
which I have already had such strong evidence. I certainly 
cannot prevent the worldly injustice of men in present power; 
but, as we have experienced fully of late, they may not con- 
tinue long in that power ; and, in the meantime, I have such 
practical evidence of the heart-felt approbation of those whose 
good opinion is truly valuable, that I ought, on this account 


alone, to rejoice rather than lament the persecution of such 
men as have been arrayed against me. 

I will keep myself fully prepared for my defence against 
all assailants, and having justice on my side, I shall find 
myself, according to Shakespeare, three times as well armed 
as my opponent. De Rigny's view of this affair is perfectly 
just, and his feelings not less generous. As La Fayette has 
said, ' France has not the reproach of treating him ill,' and 
therefore he should not forsake her interests at an important 
moment. He is anxious, to a degree, to get Ibrahim's army 
away before I go ; and I think he will find, in the completion 
of that great object of the Treaty, a good opportunity for his 
own retirement. It is most gratifying to witness the interest 
which both Guilleminot and De Rigny jointly take in my 
cause, and they have each expressed their sentiments to the 
French Government. 

Rely upon it I am fully sensible of what I owe to the Duke 
of Clarence, and I will take care that he shall not find in me 
the least diminution of the feeling due to him in consequence 
of his not being able to protect me as much as I am sure he 
wishes. How sorry I should have been if his resignation 
had been produced by this act of injustice towards me ; and 
yet how difficult it is to describe to him a feeling thus 
founded on esteem, lest it should hurt his consequence. I 
shall be able to bring it out one of these days. Next comes 
your letter of the 5th and 6th. But, my dear Jane, this very 
supersession is but a secondary point. Had I deserved such 
treatment, then indeed there would have been cause for la- 
mentation ; so, indeed, would there have been cause, if I had 
not the opportunity of making public the injustice of that 
treatment. Do not let me exceed you in that female virtue, 
' patience ' ! Supported as I am, not only by conscious rec- 
titude, but by the generous commendation of so many high- 
minded rivals in the pursuit of fame, I could endure an age 
of suspense with such a prospect as I have before me of 
eventual exposure. As Lord Essex writes, ' Justice, though 
slow, is sure to come sooner or later ; ' and her arrival will 
certainly be much expedited by my return to England. 

My conviction is that the whole arises from the mistaken 
' political expediency ' of sacrificing me, if not to the Turks, 
to the Austrians. I trust a different policy will ere long give 
rise to a different expediency. 

According to what you have experienced in your daughters, 
and I in my sons, their conduct alone repays our annoyance. 
What baseness it is in Huskisson to say that this matter was 
not decided on when he left office, unless Lord Aberdeen has 


falsely stated that it was settled on May 19 ! But they appear 
to ine all alike in this sort of thing, and to stick at nothing 
that answers their temporary purpose. I shall throw no im- 
pediment in the way of M. putting to sea in the ' Asia ' after 
we meet at Malta, if he settle on so meeting ; because it will 
relieve me from more extensive explanations explanations, 
moreover, upon some things, such as my instructions, I 
cannot be required to offer, since I am accused of not having 
understood them. 

I cannot agree with you that this ' untoward circumstance ' 
could have been obviated ; for I have no doubt of its having 
been always intended as a prelude to renewing negotiations 
with the Turks ; and when could reasons have been given for 
it which are so easily refuted ? 

Recollect the load of falsehood and inconsistency by 
which this recall is now accompanied. The Duke of C. is 
told that it is in order to have the Treaty fulfilled, whilst I 
am myself told it is on account of my misconceiving the in- 
tention of Ministers. Then comes an assertion by Mr. H., 
the ex- Secretary, which is contradicted by Lord A., the 
in- Secretary. But it is needless to say further in how 
many instances I can expose the justice of my cause and the 
conduct of my accusers. My last letter will explain the 
grounds of my movements, and I hope will show you also 
some consoling probabilities. 

Zante : July 24. 

We a,re this moment arrived, and De E-igny in sight astern. 
I fear Heiden may have passed outside for Corfu ; but I have 
sent to stop him, and, at all events, we have his assent, and 
shall proceed without him. My present purpose is to proceed 
myself towards Alexandria, by way of forwarding the object. 
This heat reduces our clothing to shirts and trousers, and I 
think we shall all benefit by native climate air. And now, my 
dearest Jane, let me entreat that, instead of being worried, 
you will take my view of my situation, and let my pleasure 
in the prospect before me be doubled by your being a sharer 
in it. E. C. 

Sir E. C. to Honorable Captain Spencer, Admiralty.* 

Off Ithaca : July 22, 1828. 

I had hardly time to read your two letters, my dear 
Spencer, of June 2 and 4, as you will see by my hurried 
acknowledgments of them, before Guilleminot's courier went 
away. In looking back to them I observe you have received 

* Then Private Secretary to the Lord High Admiral. 


that erroneous impression which others have purposely given 
to the instruction of October 16. Several points which did 
not appear to be explained by the first instructions led both 
De Rigny and myself to write upon them to the Ambassa- 
dors. They in consequence had a conference, and sent home 
a protocol with their opinions. This produced a conference 
and protocol in London, and the instructions of October 16 
arose out of it. We pointed out the effect of Turkish sup- 
plies going in neutrals ; of the Greek vessels quitting then- 
own coast, cruising at a distance and plundering our mer- 
chant ships ; and I specially dwelt upon the want of informa- 
tion as to preventing the movement of Ottoman vessels from 
one port in Greece to another port in Greece both in their 
own possession. I also wrote to Lord Dudley in a private 
letter about this; and his private answer is his own con- 
demnation, as it confirms most clearly that it was never 
intended to bear the construction now put upon it. This 
answer is dated F.O., October 16, 1827,* the very date of the 
Admiralty letter enclosing his order of the 15th. He says, 
6 The instructions which go out to you along with this letter 
are calculated to save you from what is most painful in the 
discharge of an important public duty any doubts as to the 
limit of it.' There are other things in this letter of his, 
which begins by acknowledging the receipt of mine upon 
this subject, which are valuable to me, as showing not only 
that the true meaning of the instruction of October 16 is 
entirely different to that which - - has applied to it for the 
purpose of censuring me, but as marking the character of 
the writer ; who, having given it to relieve me from ' what 
is most painful,' now employs it by a most constrained reason- 
ing for my condemnation. But, my good friend, I must beg 
you will look at the document itself, and the former instruc- 
tion to which it refers, and which it is meant to elucidate. 
You will then see that I could not possibly act upon it in 
this new sense, without disobeying the principal injunction 
so strongly enforced. Lord Aberdeen (another great scholar) 
says the instructions of October 16, for 'preventing any 
movements by sea on the part of the Turkish or Egyptian 
forces, were absolute.' How then am I to effect the return 
of all or part of those forces to Alexandria ? Now, here am 
I, who in the course of nine years during which I was a 
midshipman, was never directed or advised to write or read, 
or cultivate my mind in any way, pitted against two very 
learned lords, with nothing but plain common sense to guide 
me. And if it were not for my conviction that common 
* Vol. L, page 460. 


sense and truth are more than a match for learning and 
misrepresentation, I might well partake of those fears and 
doubts which I see you and some other of my anxious 
friends entertain as to my defence. As it is, I fear not. 

Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just, &c. 

No doubt it is very disappointing to my family and friends, as 
well as myself, to be so recalled, and at such a moment ; and 
undoubtedly it is very inconvenient, pecuniarily, after so 
costly a battle, and an extra outfit in consequence ; and I 
should gladly have finished the arduous work in which I am 
occupied, and completed my tour of duty with what credit my 
conduct might have fairly earned me. But in my proceedings 
under my instructions T have not anything to lament what- 
ever; and I am confident that the more those proceedings 
are scrutinised the more credit I shall gain with all the un- 
biassed part of my countrymen. Why, I am now on my 
way, in company with De Eigny, as my last despatches show, 
to effect the retreat of Ibrahim's army, in direct defiance of 
this ' absolute' dictum of Lord Aberdeen, according to the 
understanding of Adam, Guilleminot, De Rigny, De Heiden, 
and myself of those same instructions. Will Malcolm pre- 
vent this if he arrive in time with Lord Aberdeen's new 
reading, and pacify Greece by forcing Ibrahim to ravage the 
Morea for food ? or will he adopt that construction for which 
he is sent to supersede me ? In the one case, he will be at 
issue with his colleagues and his instructions ; in the other, 
he is at variance with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
Now, my good fellow, once for all I shall never attribute 
anything you may say or do in this all-engrossing concern 
of mine to any but a kind feeling towards me ; and the more 
facts you can give me, and the more doubts you enable me 
to clear away from your mind and that of other just persons, 
the better. 

You think these men in office are not personally hostile to 
me ; now, if they are not, their conduct is ; and I have no 
reason to believe the public good at all enters into their con- 
sideration. In fact, the accusations are so weak that I am 
induced to think that the blow given me was aimed at the 
Lord High Admiral through me, whom he so nobly pro- 
tected ; and as my supersession is in such a case a very 
secondary consideration, I entreat you, and all persons about 
him, to prevent as much as possible his coming into collision 
with Ministers upon my subject, and to leave my defence to 
myself. You must see that the Premier wishes to get rid 


of him ; and you will know how important it is to the coun- 
try in general, and to our service in particular, that he 
should hold his present situation. As to my speaking 
against the Government, you have here a specimen of the 
extent of it. Defend myself I will ; and if in so doing, and 
showing my own rectitude, I prove their injustice, it is they 
who abuse themselves. 

In fact they save me the trouble of abusing them by their 
own letters. Mr. Peel publicly asserts that a certain fact 
was comprised in forty-eight hours, which I show by dates, 
which he must have seen, extended to a whole month. 
Surely no one can offer a milder contradiction ; and if my 
right honorable friend leaves his assertion unexplained, it is 
Mr. Peel who censures him and not I. 

As to Mr. Huskisson and his closeted assistants,* I must 
remark that his declaration to John Gore that e nothing was 
decided on as to my supersession when he left office, and 
that there were many serious points to be considered before 
so strong a measure should be resorted to,' is in direct con- 
tradiction to Lord Aberdeen's despatch, which says that the 
answer to my letter to Lord Dudley, mentioning my super- 
session, ' was approved by His Majesty's Government 011 
May 19.' 

Which of these two abuses the other, I don't pretend to 
say ; but if they lived in the country of the Houyhnhnms, 
one of them would be supposed to have said 6 the thing which 
is not.' Now pray, my dear Spencer, let our friend Wollaston 
indulge himself in accusing the Government of injustice ; it 
is only what he thinks just, and he gratifies me by it ex- 
tremely ; for I consider the warm regard of such a friend as 
he is, ample balance against the hostility of a Secretary of 

It seems that His Royal Highness partook of the surprise 
which his head councillor - loudly expressed at my staying at 
Malta. First, I naturally expected new instructions, if not 
on account of the battle, certainly on account of the Ambas- 
sadors leaving Constantinople without giving me any infor- 
mation of our then situation with the Porte. To Mr. S. C. 
I was told to look for instructions, and he retired without 
giving me any. I did not even know what passed betwixt 
him and the Porte relative to the battle or the cause of his 
coming away, although I know that he had directed the con- 
suls to strike their flags. He had then attending on him, the 

* This refers to the known hostility of certain individuals officially con- 
nected with his own profession, 


'Dryad,' besides having had the 'Rifleman' a long- time at 
the Dardanelles; the 'Raleigh' was conveying Mr. Elliot 
under his directions, and others carrying his despatches; 
whilst the ' Warspite,' the only ship in which I could have 
gone to sea, was, by A dmiralty order, conveying Capodistrias 
to his presidency. The ( Talbot,' which ship had my flag after 
the 6 Asia ' went away, was the first ship in which I could have 
proceeded to the Levant ; and even if I had not known that 
I was doing much better service by being at Malta, I do not 
think it was to be expected that I should attempt to block- 
ade the Ottoman ships in such a flagship. And even if I 
had had an ( Asia ' for the purpose of keeping the sea in 
winter, where was I to receive the loads of despatches which 
came to me much more fitly to Malta, and to carry on that 
correspondence with all the Ottoman dependencies, my col- 
leagues, &c., or to meet such orders as I had a right to expect 
from Government ? Could I, by being at sea, have arranged 
the general service with my colleagues, and have put down 
piracy? Why, the complaints of the Malta trade against 
the treatment they met with at Constantinople, which I sent 
home in a letter specially to say that, under my ignorance 
of the intentions of Government I did not propose to take 
any measure for the redress of the grievance, justified me in 
expecting further orders. I have to add, that De Heiden 
showed me, by desire of his Emperor, instructions dated 
December 25, accompanied by information that I might ex- 
pect similar orders from England. And I am free to say 
that if such orders had been given to me, the Porte must have 
accepted our mediation, there would have been no Russian 
war, and we should have been arranging the affairs of Greece 
according to the Treaty. Thus, whilst one of my colleagues 
had had orders which he was told were similar to what I 
might expect and I was the more confirmed in this expecta- 
tion by knowing how well those orders were suited to the 
occasion, and by his being directed to act entirely under 
me in the execution of them my other colleague was, like 
myself, daily expecting fresh instructions, which his Govern- 
ment could not give on account of the indecision of ours ; 

and under these circumstances, not only says ' What is the 

reason he is not at sea ?' but adds, ' Why does he stay at 
Malta, doing nothing ? ' I think, my dear Spencer, you have 
now got a pretty full statement of my case ; and whenever 
you hear me talked over in society, pray say that I am myself 
quite confident of being able to satisfy the public that I have 
done my duty, and that I court publicity that others may be 
enabled to judge for themselves. As to any over zeal of my 


friends doing me harm, I am not of that opinion, and am 
delighted with such an expression of feeling. I can never 
look for justice from people who have so treated me. 

We are now panting for breath in a light air, betwixt Ithaca 
and Ataco, after having entered this channel in a breeze which 
made us go 10^ under sky sails and royal studding-sails. 
I know not what chance there may arise for sending this, 
but here it is, ready, if any such should offer. And thus 

Yours, with great regard, 




THE result of the measures detailed in the last chapter, 
and the meeting of the three Admirals at Zante, was 
recorded in a Protocol* July 25, 1828, in consequence 
of which Sir E. Codrington sailed for Alexandria to com- 
municate with Mehemet AH himself. 

Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

Off Zante : July 25, 1828, 8 P.M. 

De Heiden having joined us this forenoon, we had 
our conference at Stovin's parlatorio, which ended in the 
Protocol of which Datchkoff made the copy, which was 
smoked and given to me properly signed, and which was 
then copied twice by my Foreign Secretary (Will), signed by 
me, and given to my colleagues. This being settled I got 
on board after four o'clock, weighed, and came away for 
JSTavarin, where we shall be in the course of the night. If I 
escape to-morrow being called to Malta, I shall push on 
towards Alexandria, as required by the Protocol, in order to 
contribute personally as much as I can to the fulfilment of 
this primary object of the Treaty. 

I can but make an apology for thus acting in opposition 
to Lord Aberdeen's ' absolute ' reading of my instructions ! 

De Rigny will come on to-night, and will have another 
interview with Ibrahim, and De Heiden will follow in a 
couple of days to continue the blockade (except getting his 
provisions somewhere among the islands), in readiness for 
the final operation if we succeed in our plan. I think by 
Ibrahim's not having committed himself to any objection- 
able proceeding since the receipt of my last friendly epistle 
having paid the Greeks for all the provisions he has got in his 
expeditions for the purpose having liberated eight hundred 
Greeks, and having promised to send no more away is 
sufficient encouragement to us to believe in his decision to 
embark whenever the Alexandrian fleet appears, as he 
declares. And if the whole fails, we are but where we were, 
* See Appendix. 


with additional reason for using less ceremony with him. 
Our boats at Prodano have been offered goats and fowls at a 
moderate price, and have therefore concluded that there was 
no scarcity in the camp ; but I suspect this to be a plan of 
my wily friend to deceive us ; although he may not have 
eaten all his camels and some of his horses, as Mr. Barker 
at Alexandria reports, and as Ibrahim's colonels have noti- 
fied to Mehemet Ali. In fact he gets up one trick for us 
and another for the Sultan, in order to obtain from each 
the better terms. But as he yields as far as he can to all 
the terms my letter imposes in the first instance, and which 
were renewed at the conference with him, I have endeavoured 
to qualify the conditions of his retirement as much as I can, 
to save him and the Viceroy from being compromised with 
the Sultan ; whilst we thus avoid any cause of interruption 
to the execution of the measure. We may probably claim the 
complete evacuation of the Morea in order to secure some 
other doubtful point perhaps about slaves by giving it up. 

For in fact, as I believe I have convinced Capodistrias 
himself, the fortresses are more secure in the hands of the 
Morean Turks than in those of any Greeks to whom he could 
entrust them. At the same time he is right in using this 
argument for the Allies still landing an army, because that 
army would secure him against his villanous Capitani, who, 
for want of such means of putting them down, are already 
intriguing against him. 

July 26. 

Katakasi told us that the Emperor Nicholas showed a 
trait of his character in his mode of doing what has never 
before been done by a sovereign of Russia. A certain tribe 
of Cossacks, persecuted by Catherine on account of religion, 
settled under the dominion of Turkey ; and one of them had 
even become an Aga, and then a Pacha of two tails. These 
Cossacks offered submission to Nicholas upon his reaching 
the Danube ; and he chose to show his confidence in them, by 
actually crossing the river in the boat which had conveyed 
the Pacha over, the said Pacha steering the boat. 

1 P.M. 

We have just had a fair view of the larboard broadside of 
our Ottoman friend (the ' Asia's ' opponent in the battle). 
The division between the two midship ports of the main 
deck, and also of the lower deck, is gone, and there remains 
the great open space on each deck. The bow seems a mass 
of patchwork. I cannot add more than 

Your ever affec. 

E. C. 


Sir E. G. to Lady C. 

Off Candia : July 30, 1828. 

I know not when I have been so long at sea without 
addressing a line to you. I am now doing so actually for 
relief ; I have been working again and again at this notable 
despatch from my Lord Aberdeen until I am quite sick of 
the whole mess of them. The more I look into my case, the 
stronger I find it, and the greater is the disgust it excites in 
me at such conduct from such men. 

My friend Campbell must have pushed forward at once for 
Alexandria, as we are now doing after him, for we have not 
seen a single vessel of any sort the whole length of Candia. If 
I can once see the Viceroy's fleet outside under our control, 
I shall send you word of it ; for then I shall have carried 
my point, let me be superseded whenever I may; although I 
should prefer seeing them again fairly out of Navarin also, 
with their cargo. My principal anxiety just now, however, 
is about you, and the heat which I fear you must find oppres- 
sive. I assure you for myself, I doubt if I could stand a 
third summer of such relaxation of body with such worry of 
mind, without permanent injury. The determination of the 
Government in itself gives me no uneasiness, although it 
causes me much trouble ; since, besides suiting all of us on 
the score of health, it gives me the opportunity, the want of 
which made me uneasy, of making known the baseness of 
my traducers and the true character of my own conduct. I 
do not believe there is upon record a more flagrant instance 
of injustice gratuitous injustice ; for if they wish my re- 
moval as a compliment to the Porte, I would at such a sug- 
gestion have asked to be superseded at once. As it is, I can 
show proof of all their accusations and imputations being 
unfounded. Were I to stay here after Ibrahim's return I 
should have to be principally about Greece, where, from our 
narrow policy, things are likely to get worse ; I cannot 
decide in my own mind what line will be taken respecting 
me by these people, and therefore can only prepare for every 
bad mode of proceeding, and I feel confident in being able 
to repel any attack which can be possibly made upon me. 

Off Alexandria : at anchor, August 1, 9 P.M. 

We anchored here, where we found ' Ocean ' and ' Pelorus,' 
about an hour ago. Campbell, who has just parlatorio'd with 
me under the quarter, with Richards, has read me a note 
from the Consuls to Boghos. The note says more than I 


think it ought ; but they know their men better than I do. 
It seems the Viceroy is supposed to have had positive orders 
from the Sultan for Ibrahim's going to Roumelia. If he 
continue in this wavering state, or if he refuse to let the 
fleet, which is ready according to their fashion, come out, I 
shall not stay here ; but if I do not hear of my successor I 
may perhaps return towards Corfu to explain to the Ambas- 
sadors the present state of things. In the meantime the 
advance of the Russians may verify Katakasi's opinion, that 
their successes will regulate the affairs of the Morea. We 
are all well, and all full of affection for you and vours. 

E. C. 

Sir E. C. to Mr. Consul Barker, Alexandria. 

' Asia/ off Alexandria : August 2, 1828. 

DEAR SIR, As I find there has been a communication 
about carrying a messenger back to Navarin, I think it is as 
well to say that I do not feel at all disposed to accede to any 
more measures of this sort ; if the fleet is to go for the troops, 
now is the time, or never. They (the troops) once moved 
towards Roumelia, will never again see Egypt : they will either 
be destroyed by the way, or taken permanent possession of by 
the Sultan. I fear the Viceroy is trying to deceive us ; he 
had better pursue an open line of communication, as he will 
eventually find. His sending his vessels upon this experi- 
mental cruise just now is not consistent with his desire to 
send out the fleet for Ibrahim, and he must understand that, 
although I pledge myself to the safety of his ships from the 
Russians during this operation, I will not be responsible for 
them on experimental or other such cruises. 
Very truly yours, 


Sir E. G. to Mr. Consul Barker, Alexandria.* 

1 Asia/ at anchor off Alexandria : August 4, 1828. 
SIR, In consequence of the information contained in your 
letter of yesterday of His Highness the Viceroy of Egypt 
having decided on coming to Alexandria in order to confer 
with me personally on the arrangements for bringing Ibrahim 
Pacha and his army from the Morea, I propose entering the 
harbour in His Majesty's sloop c Pelorus ' this morning in 
order to meet His Highness' wishes. But before I commit 
myself to along quarantine which will subject the other duties 
of my station to interruption, I must request that you will 

* The arrival of the 'Asia' off Alexandria was telegraphed to Cairo 5 when 
the Pacha immediately came from thence to Alexandria. 


procure, on the part of His Highness, a distinct understand- 
ing-, that the basis of our conference is to be a positive 
decision on his part, that his army shall be conveyed to 
Egypt from the Morea. 

I have, &c., 


Mr. Consul Barker replied on the 4th that he had had 
an audience of an hour and a half with Mehemet Ali, 
and had conveyed to him all the purport of Sir E. C.'s 
message, and, in conjunction with Monsieur Drovetti, 
had discussed the matter with him, with the proposal 
of Sir E. C. to wait upon him, in order to carry out the 

His Highness replied, that there must be no precipitancy, 
that nothing must be done which could compromise, or commit 
him with the Porte ; and seemed to think he had reason to 
complain that we were acting with too little regard to the 
extremely delicate situation in which he was placed. Having 
paused, Monsieur Drovetti and myself, in turn, seized the 
opportunity to assure him that His Highness had only to 
point out by what means the object he had in view could be 
best secured ; and he would find Your Excellency most ready 
to co-operate with him in so desirable an end ; and that the 
very steps now taken afforded abundant proofs of the friend- 
ship and regard which our respective Governments profess 
to entertain towards His Highness. f Well, well,' lifting his 
hand to his forehead, * my head is confused, I have not yet 
recovered from the fatigue of last night to-morrow you shall 
have an answer.' .... 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Mr. Consul Barker, Alexandria. 

H.M.S. 'Asia': August 5, 1828. 

SIR, I cannot but regret the delay in the Viceroy's 
decision. It does not evince that good faith which my 
readiness to diminish his responsibility has entitled me to 
meet with from him. It puts me personally to great incon- 
venience ; but that is trifling to what the Viceroy's own army 
is now undergoing. It has given me great pain to be the 
involuntary cause of their privations; and His Highness, 
upon reflection, will feel ten times more deeply the loss of 



his troops, if lie should voluntarily occasion by unnecessary 
delays the prolongation of that misery which is now daily 
diminishing their numbers. However, this is his affair per- 
sonally. My business is to let him understand that orders 
have been given to me by my Government even since the 
6th of last April, to establish off Alexandria a like blockade 
to that on the coast of Greece, and His Highness well knows 
what have been the effects of that measure ; a measure of 
which I have postponed the execution in order to prevent 
consequences which he would not cease to feel the effects of 
during the remainder of his life. I request that this letter 
may be immediately placed before Monsieur Boghos, that he 
may make known to the Viceroy the sentiments it contains. 
I have, &c., 


On the 5th Mr. Barker had an interview with the 
Pacha, and wrote to Sir E. C. : 

His Highness said that no doubt could be entertained 
of the sincerity and ardour of his desire to treat for the 
object in question, since it was by his own order that 
Ibrahim Pacha had declared he was ready to embark, he 
and his army, whenever his father's ships should arrive to 
afford him the means of doing so. By which declaration 
he was in no danger of contracting any engagement in- 
consistent with his own honor, or that of the Vice Bey, 
because he well knew that if the ships did arrive, his father 
would have secured that point by stipulating that the for- 
tresses should not be given up. Viewing, therefore, the case 
in his light, and considering that the offer to evacuate made 
by his son was, bond fide his own act, he had rather questions 
to ask than one to answer. ' Upon which conditions,' said he, 
( is it proposed that the evacuation shall be effected ? ' Per- 
ceiving that the question was unexpected, and even unintel- 
ligible, he proceeded to ask another. How was the regard 
due to his honor to be provided for ? which were at length 
both sunk in the simple declaration that he would send his 
vessels for his son, and his army, provided that you should 
not require the evacuation of the fortresses. That that con- 
dition was a sine qua non, for he would rather his son and all 
should perish than that his honor should be tarnished by 
his consenting to deliver up strongholds that had been mostly 
in the possession of the Sultan before he sent an army into 
the Morea. Neither myself nor Captain Richards being 
authorised to say that the question of the fortresses should 
not be considered as forming any part of the Treaty for the 
cuation of the Morea, it was agreed that the substance of 


this conference should be submitted to Your Excellency's 
consideration, and that you would let His Highness know 
whether you consented to come on shore to settle the minor 
points in the arrangements on the above-mentioned basis. 

I have, &c., 


The English squadron was at anchor outside the reef 
which forms the port of Alexandria ; but upon Mehemet 
Ali agreeing to the evacuation of the Morea as the basis 
for a Treaty, Sir Edward Codrington entered the harbour 
of Alexandria in one of the smaller vessels of war, 
anchoring near the Viceroy's palace, in which he had a 
conference with Mehemet Ali. 

Minute of the Conference between Mehemet Ali Pacha and Vice- 
Admiral Sir E. Codrington. 

Alexandria : August 6, 1828. 

The Admiral, being at anchor off Alexandria, ordered 
Captain Richards, of H.M.S. 'Pelorus,' to obtain an interview 
with Mehemet Ali, and to state to him that, before he sub- 
jected the public service to any inconvenience by putting 
himself in quarantine, he must be assured by the Pacha, 
that the fixed basis of any conference between them should 
be the evacuation of the Morea. 

In the interview which Captain Richards, with Monsieur 
Drovetti and Mr. Consul Barker had with the Pacha, he ex- 
pressed himself ready to agree to this basis, but that his 
honor must not be compromised ; and after some time he 
declared that the delivering up the fortresses would be such 
a breach of good faith that he would rather allow Ibrahim 
and his whole army to perish, than that his honor should 
be tarnished by such an act. This interview here terminated, 
and the result being reported to the Admiral, it was consi- 
dered a sufficient guarantee for him to treat upon the 

The Admiral accordingly went on shore about nine o'clock 
on August 6 to the Pacha's palace in the harbour of Alexan- 
dria.* He was met at the landing-place by Mons. Drovetti 
and Mr. Barker, with whom he had some conversation as to 

* The Pacha with a crowd of his officers, was at his window looking on : 
the Capitana Bey and Moharem Bey were there, but retired as soon as the 
Admiral entered the Palace. 

c c 2 


forms, &c., and, passing through the crowd of both Franks 
and Turks assembled on the outside and within the palace, 
we were conducted through an outer hall into the Pacha's 
divan. He was standing up when we entered,* and his ad- 
vancing some way into the room to meet the Admiral was 
considered an additional mark of distinction. The Admiral 
then presented the several officers who accompanied him, 
after which we took our seats on the divan. The Pacha 
having ordered coffee, t and after the usual questions about 
health were asked according to custom, with some other 
usual compliments, the Pacha desired all his attendants, 
except Mr. Boghos, his confidential interpreter, to withdraw ; 
and the Admiral also requested the greater part of those who 
accompanied him to retire, leaving Commodore Campbell, 
Captain Curzon, Captain Richards, Monsieur Drovetti, Mr. 
Barker, and Captain Codrington. 

The Admiral then enquired of Mr. Boghos if there would 
be any objection on the part of the Pacha to the agreement 
being made in writing, when the Pacha, understanding that 
he referred to notes being taken of the conversation, made 
objections to it. The Admiral then said that it was not the 
conversation, but only the result that he referred to ; that 
his not having had a written agreement on a former occasion J 
had led to some misunderstanding, and he therefore wished 
that the final Treaty should be in writing and signed by both 
parties. To this the Pacha acceded. 

The Admiral then said that, as he was come to further the 
arrangement for the evacuation, he would be glad to know if 
His Highness had any particular proposals to make on the 
subject ; when the Pacha, bowing at the same time, answered 
that it was for the Admiral to make any proposal he should 
think fit. 

The Admiral observed that His Highness must, of course, 
be well aware of the state of the army under Ibrahim Pacha, 
of the extreme misery to which it had been reduced, and 
that those privations had given rise to revolts among the 
troops, whose murmurs would certainly increase as their 
distress became more pressing. 

* With a scrupulous attention to his dignity, he adopts this mode, in order 
that he may not be forced to rise from his seat, when the rank of the person 
would call for such an attention. 

t When Colonel Cradock went on his mission to him, he refused to give 
him the pipe, saying that his so doing would be giving him the rank of Am- 
bassador; that as dependent on the Porte, he could not receive him in that 
light ; and not being an ambassador, his rank was not equal to his own. 

The interview of the Admirals with Ibrahim Pacha at Navarin, Septem- 
ber 25, 1827. 


His Highness allowed that the army was in a bad state, 
and remarked that misery would produce discontent in any 
troops, and he could not blame them for it ; that the Admiral 
must also consider the extreme difficulty and delicacy of the 
situation in which he was placed, and that measures must 
not be hastily adopted, or without a regard to his honor. 

The Admiral answered that he could well understand those 
difficulties, for his having been relieved in his command for 
not having carried his instructions into effect with what was 
considered sufficient strength, would show the Pacha that he 
also had his difficulties to contend with ; that His Highness 
knew to what sufferings his army in the Morea was exposed, 
as well as how faithful that army had been to him under such 
privations; in return for this, he could not do less than 
afford them relief as quickly as possible ; that, knowing the 
situation in which His Highness was thus placed, he had 
come, on the part of his colleagues and himself, to do what 
lay in his power towards removing the obstacles to the ac- 
complishment of an object desired by the Allied Governments, 
and which could not be of less importance to His Highness. 

The Pacha said he had heard of the Admiral's recall ; he 
made but few remarks on the rest. 

The Admiral continued, tha/fc the Allies were positively 
determined to carry the Treaty into effect ; and that the 
anxiety to do so by pacific measures, and the consideration 
in which the Pacha was held by the British Government, had 
been shown by the several missions of Colonel Cradock and 
Sir F. Adam. 

The Pacha answered, e Ah ! but there are now only two 
Allied Powers.' 

The Admiral immediately said, that there could not be a 
plainer proof of the unanimity of the three Powers, than this 
measure having been adopted by their three Admirals in con- 
cert ; and that the voluntary restriction of those belligerent 
rights which the Eussians could exercise towards his fleet, 
was a sufficient earnest of the cordiality of the Allied Courts 
ii carrying into effect the measures for the execution of the 
Treaty of July 6. 

This passed without much remark from the Pacha. 

The Admiral observed that his having come without express 
orders to Alexandria, must convince His Highness of his 
wish to terminate the business satisfactorily, without having 
recourse to other measures which had been for some time 
ordered. That the state of Ibrahim's army now, bad as it 
might be, would soon be worse ; arid His Highness must 
know that the terms under which his son would at length 


be forced to capitulate, would not be rendered easier on that 

The Pacha answered, that whatever might have taken 
place, the subject must not be treated with precipitation, 
and observed that the difficulties of the Admiral's situation 
were light compared to his, for he had more to lose by 
having more at stake. 

The Admiral said that his responsibility was great in 
treating on this subject under present circumstances, without 
a knowledge of the terms on which the Allies might now 
insist from the Pacha ; that the Ambassadors might, for all 
that he knew, have received different instructions ; and that 
whilst he was certain that any treaty entered into with His 
Highness would be ratified by them and their Governments, 
still his conduct might be disapproved of, and he himself 
hanged for it on his return to England. 

At this the Pacha laughed heartily, and said there was 
no fear of that ; but again repeated that a due regard must 
be paid to the difficulties of his situation, which were great. 

The Admiral then dwelt on the necessity, for the sake of his 
own interest as well as his honor, and even his son's exist- 
ence, that His Highness should employ without delay all the 
means he possibly could obtain in withdrawing his troops 
from the Morea, where their numbers were daily diminishing 
by hunger and disease. 

The Viceroy replied, that when once the articles were 
settled, it would evidently be to his advantage that the evacu- 
ation should take place as quickly as possible. 

The Admiral then brought the Pacha's attention to the 
fortresses, to the cession of which the Pacha had previously 
stated he could never consent ; the allowing these fortresses 
to remain in Ottoman possession was a measure which, 
although he did not see any difficulty in acceding to, yet 
he might not be justified in the event ; when the Pacha 
said that it was impossible that he could so sacrifice his 
honor as to give up those places which had been delivered 
into his charge ; that he would rather that his army should 
be destroyed than that the Sultan should have reason to 
charge him with such a breach of faith. 

The Admiral then mentioned that Navarin not having been 
at that time in possession of his troops, was, of course, not 
included, when the Pacha answered directly that this would 
be even a greater compromise of his honor than any other ; 
for having been at the expense of conquering them for the 
Porte, the giving them up would be held as a wilful sacrifice 


to his own convenience, and a betrayal of the trust reposed 
in him by the Sultan. 

The Admiral answered, that however he might take upon 
himself to allow the other fortresses to be retained, this was 
a much greater difficulty than any that had occurred in the 
whole negotiation ; and willing as he was to make all allow- 
ance for His Highness's situation, this was a point which he 
had no authority for conceding. 

The Pacha again repeated, that his honor was concerned 
in this more than any other part of the negotiation, and 
which, therefore, he dare not and could not concede ; that 
the Admiral must know that in the last note presented by 
the Ambassadors, they agreed that the fortresses should 
remain in Ottoman possession.* 

The Admiral said immediately that he had no knowledge 
of such an offer having been made, and would be glad could 
His Highness show him any written document in which that 
could be distinctly shown him. 

The Pacha again said that it was the case, when Monsieur 
Drovetti confirmed what was said by the Viceroy. 

The Admiral stated that he heard it then for the first time, 
and had no official intimation of it at all. His Highness, 
however, must see that what was agreed to in December 
might not now be conceded. 

The Pacha again referred to this offer of the Ambassadors 
as a proof of their acquiescence, and repeated his former 
determination . 

This point was very much discussed in all its bearings,f 
when finding that the Pacha was resolved, whatever conse- 
quences might ensue, not to agree to it, 

The Admiral said that the only circumstance which might 
perhaps remove any objections on the part of his Government 
would be an engagement on the part of His Highness to do 
everything in his power towards obtaining the liberty of as 
many Greek slaves as possible ; that His Highness was aware 
how loud the cry had been, both in England and France, on 
this subject, and more particularly by the deportation which 
took place subsequent to the battle of Navarin. 

His Highness stated positively that not one slave had been 
made subsequent to the battle of Navarin ; that the numbers 
had been absurdly exaggerated by the newspapers, both in 

* Mr. S. Canning says that no such proposal was agreed to by the Am- 

t The Admiral always intended to yield this point, but pressed it hard 
in order to gain as much concession as possible with regard to the Greek 


France and England, for there were not more than 1,900 
Greeks brought over in all, of which nearly 1,200 were 
Candiotes ; that the greatest part of them were wives of the 
officers and soldiers of his army in the Morea, who had been 
married two or three years, and who took that opportunity 
of sending them, as well as their children, to their own 

The Admiral observed, that the not having prevented this 
return of the ships containing slaves, was a great cause of 
complaint against him, so that he must require everything 
which could be done to obtain their release. 

The Pacha insisted much on the very erroneous idea which 
prevailed in Europe of the condition and treatment of slaves 
in Egypt ;f and among other remarks, brought the Mamelukes 
forward to show this to be the case ; for there were frequent 
instances of Turks having called themselves Mamelukes in 
order to become slaves. 

The Admiral reminded His Highness how important it 
was, for the sake of his own character, as. well as that of his 
son, that the truth should be known ; when the Pacha said 
that he would cause enquiry to be made and give the Admiral 
a note on this subject. He promised, on the subject of the 
galley slaves being mentioned by the Admiral, that as a 
beginning he would place at his disposal those slaves in his 
possession at the arsenal, J and that he would do all in his 
power to obtain, as far as he could, the liberation of others. 
He desired that it should be conducted on the footing of an 
exchange of prisoners, and that the Admiral should obtain 
the release of those in possession of the Greeks. 

To this the Admiral consented. 

The principal points having thus been settled, it was 
pressed upon His Highness that preparation should com- 
mence instantly, and that it would be of advantage if even a 
small number of vessels could be sent at once as an earnest 
both to the Allies and Ibrahim that the evacuation was 

* By the intercepted despatches from the Porte to Ibrahim Pacha, it is 
proved that he had seriously intended to leave the Morea subsequent to the 
battle of Navarin, but he was positively ordered to remain there by Me- 
hemet Ali. It was in preparation for this departure that he and his officers 
sent away their harems, &c., and it was in consequence of this reported in- 
tention on his part that the missions of Sir F. Adam and Col. Cradock took 

t The women and boys are certainly not so unhappy as the name of 
' slavery ' implies. The two boys sent as presents by Tahir Pacha to Sir 
E. C. after the battle of Navarin cried bitterly on leaving him (Tahir Pacha). 

| Notwithstanding all the Pacha's assurances, there is no doubt that the 
slaves in the arsenal are miserably treated. 


begun ; this the Pacha agreed to, and Mr. Boghos was 
ordered to hurry everything forward as much as possible. 
The Pacha requested that he might send some things for 
Ibrahim personally ; to which the Admiral thought no ob- 
jection would be made when once the evacuation had really 
commenced. His Highness also wished that he might have 
a safe conduct for a new frigate which was at Trieste, quite 
ready, and could assist in the embarkation ; the Admiral 
replied that he did not anticipate any objection to this on 
the part of his colleagues. 

The Pacha also wished, as it was on account of the com- 
munication between the Morea and Candia that the blockade 
of that island had been established, that he might now be 
permitted to send supplies from Egypt to that island. 

The Admiral said that as Ottoman troops would still re- 
main in the Morea the cause was not removed ; that he had 
made his Government acquainted with that measure, and 
that their sanction must be obtained before he could allow 
anything to proceed to that island. Should the Ambassadors 
be at Corfu he would represent the matter to them, and it 
was possible that the point might be conceded, but that he 
could not take upon himself to decide that question. 

The Admiral then rose to retire, when the Pacha hoped 
that he would come to see him again before he sailed, &c.* 

Sir E. C. to Sir Frederick Adam. 

Off Alexandria, 10 P.M. : August. 6, 1828. 

A good story, my dear Adam, is seldom a very long one. 
I should not have sent off a vessel, perhaps, till one division 
(however small) as an earnest was actually ont of the port. 
But as De Rigny's anxiety requires that his c Diligente ' 
should start with the first bit of intelligence, I take this 
means of telling you that the Viceroy, upon my assenting, 
after a hard wordy fight, to let Navarin be given up with the 
other fortresses to the Turks, has agreed to release not only 
all the Greeks he has here, and Ibrahim has in the Morea, 
but to recover all he can of those gone into the interior. He 
has acceded to our having this on paper, a point I pressed 
hard, and we are to sign to-morrow. In the meantime 
exertion is used, under a conviction that it concerns him 
more than me, to get some of his vessels off ; that the army 

* The Admiral told Mr. Boghos after the interview, that he would come to 
the Pacha again when his ships were outside the harbour ; but he would 
not do so before. For formal Treaty see Appendix. 


may know that they are to be brought over, and that no 
more of them may die of starvation. I have agreed to per- 
mit one of his vessels to go from Navarin with a crew ' to 
bring his new frigate from Trieste, to be loaded with troops 
at Navarin with the rest ; and I wish you would sanction 
her taking from Zante the corn which he has there to feed 
them on their passage, as it will facilitate the operation. 
I shall send the Greeks now here to the President, to be 
exchanged for the corvette's Turks and any others that 
he has. By the way, you might now sanction the vessel at 
Prevesa going to Navarin to assist. After a first division is 
fairly away, I think I shall proceed to Navarin myself, unless 
interrupted by my successor. . . . When the operation 
is fairly in execution, I shall notify it officially either to you 
or through you. In the meantime, I am yours with warmth 
and sincere regard, 


Sir E. C. to Vice- Admiral De Rigny. 

'Asia,' off Alexandria : Wednesday, August 6, 1828. 8 P.M. 

I shall only write you a few lines, my dear Admiral, be- 
cause M. Drovetti will tell you more at length what has 
passed to-day with the "Viceroy. I think, however, I may 
say the affair is settled, and settled upon terms which will 
be satisfactory to you and our colleague, as well as our 
friends at Corfu. I dwelt a long time upon the difficulty of 
including Navarin in the list of fortresses to be left in the 
hands of the Turks a point upon which the Viceroy insisted 
strongly. At length, I observed that I might, perhaps, find 
my justification in it if His Highness would not only give up 
the slaves which he now had here, but would endeavour to 
recover as many others as possible of those which were gone 
into the interior, &c. In all this he expressed and showed 
as much readiness and goodwill as we can expect ; and I think 
the information I shall collect through the Yiceroy himself, 
M. Drovetti, and Mr. Barker, will put some people in Eng- 
land to shame. The Viceroy is convinced that it is of the. 
greatest importance to him, as well as Ibrahim, that the 
operation should begin as soon as possible ; and I have settled 
that the very first vessels which can be got out shall go to 
you immediately, without waiting for the others, so that 
there may be a practical proof of the sincerity of both 

I shall send the Greeks which he has here at once to 
Egina, or Poros, to be exchanged for the Turks of the cor- 


vette, and any others Capodistrias may have ; and perhaps 
the vessel which will take them may be hired to bring back 
some of Ibrahim's army. The Viceroy asked me to let one 
of his vessels take a crew from Navarin to the place where 
his Trieste frigate now is, to bring her to Navarin to convey 
part of the army here. To this I consented : and I think 
she might be permitted to perform another of his wishes in 
her way : that is, to load at Zante with the provisions which 
he has there for the supply of the troops to be brought over. 
Harmony being the order of the day, all this may be granted 
readily, with the approbation of our colleague. We may also 
show our goodwill by permitting additional food to be sup- 
plied to the troops which remain, after we have embarked a 
first division. He wished to send money to the troops in 
Candia. I told him I could not answer this at present, but 
I thought it might be done when the other operation was 
once in satisfactory progress. This, however, ought to be 
made known to Capodistrias, that he may make his arrange- 
ments about the war in that island ; and I think some in- 
structions should be obtained from the Ambassadors, whether 
we are to consider Candia as within the limits of our protec- 
tion under the circumstances. I am not sure that we shall 
get the agreement signed before ' La Diligente ' sails, but 
you will know this either from Drovetti or M. Duval d'Ailly 
(captain of the frigate) . 

I will not conclude, my good friend, without expressing 
my satisfaction that this important effect should have been 
so much owing to your able management. 

I received your letters by the yacht, and also by the 
6 Zebra,' and have only time to thank you for them. 

Yours, &c., 


Sir E. G. to Vice-Admiral Count Heiden. 

1 Asia,' off Alexandria : Wednesday, August 6, 1828. 
I think, my good friend, all your doubts will soon be re- 
moved by seeing a first division of the Viceroy's vessels arrive 
at Navai-m to bring away the troops. I pressed very much 
the not letting Navarin be given to the Turks with the other 
fortresses, not with any particular desire to succeed, because 
I know it would have put Count Capodistrias to great diffi- 
culty now to garrison it ; and if he gets the assistance of 
troops, without which he will not be able to keep down the 
Capitaiii, he will have no difficulty then in getting all those 
places from the Turks. But by resisting this point, without 


which he positively declared that he could not make the 
agreement, I was enabled to insist more strongly upon the 
liberation not only of the slaves who are in misery here, but 
of all others which can possibly be procured. He said he 
would do his utmost to recover all those who have not em- 
braced their religion, and become with their own consent a 
part, as it were, of themselves. He is to get out a division 
of such vessels as can be ready most quickly, that we may 
show that the operation is actually in operation, and the 
' Blonde ' will accompany them. 

I shall send, probably, in a hired merchant vessel, the 
Greeks now here, to be exchanged for your Turks of the 
corvette and any orders the President has ; and perhaps the 
same vessel may go afterwards to Navarin for some of the 
troops. I have also said that one of his vessels will be per- 
mitted to take a crew from JSTavarin to bring his new frigate 
from Trieste to load at Zante with his corn now there, and 
then bring troops from Navarin here. Therefore, my good 
friend, give this your sanction, and send your belligerent 
character up to the Black Sea until the Morea is evacuated. 
As to the poor devils of sick being put into the ship of the 
line now in ISTavarin, we must not suffer such a cruel experi- 
ment. My intention is, if no orders from home interrupt me, 
to proceed towards Navarin whenever I have seen a division 
of these ships fairly off. Whatever others he can send will 
follow as speedily as they can be got ready, we may be sure, 
for, as he says, he is much more interested in the success of 
the operation than I am. I have reason to think that this 
arrangement would have been greatly retarded, if performed 
at all, but for my arrival. He came from Cairo immediately, 
and he was yesterday under great anxiety, from fearing that 
I would not grant the point of the fortresses, in which case 
I doubt if he ever would have consented, owing to the danger 
he is in as to the Sultan's anger at the army not going 
into Roumelia. I cannot write more now, but I dare say 
De Rigny will have much more detail of what passed from 
Drovetti, whom I have requested to inform him of every- 

Yours, &c., 


I have received your kind letter about my recall, and your 
private and truly friendly letter also, which I cannot answer 
now, except by assuring you that the regard which my family 
and myself bear you, will not be diminished by any distance 
at which we may be separated. 


From Admiral Heiden to Lady Codrington, at Malta. 


MADAME, Monsieur 1'Amiral m 'ay ant prie de lui faire 
copier deux papiers, et de vous les envoyer a Malte, je pro- 
fite de cette occasion, non pour vous dire la part que je 
prends a la perte que nous allons faire, car vous connaissez 
assez nies sentimens pour 1'Amiral, mais pour vous prier, 
Madame, de ne pas le moins du monde vous chagriner pour 
cela; certainement c'est tres-desagreable pour lui, pour vous, 
et pour vos chers et bons enfans, mais votre mari se retire 
avec tant de gloire, et tellement aime et estime de tous ceux 
qui out eu 1'honneur de le connaitre, que pour un heros 
philosophe, ou, pour mieux m'exprimer, pour I'hornme sen- 
sible, c'est une des plus belles recompenses, dans le service 
surtout, que d'emporter Pestirne et 1 'am our des braves An- 
glais qu'il a commandes et conduits a la gloire, des Russes et 
des Fran9ais qui en ont acquis aussi sous ses auspices et qui 
rivalisent avec ses compatriotes pour lui temoigner leur 
attachement, de tous ceux qui ont ete en relation avec lui, 
et enfin 1' amour chevaleresque que lui porte un jeune sou- 
verain qui est aujourd'hui (pour ses qualites du moins) le 
premier de 1'Europe, et qui peut-etre est innocemment la 
seule cause pourquoi 1'Amiral est change; parce que le Mini- 
stere diplomate ne peut concevoir, ni chez eux ni chez les 
autres, une admiration et un attachement purs, et non meles 
d'egoisme ou de vues politiques. Yos bons amis viendront 
vous voir, vous porter leur marque d'attachement pour 
1'Amiral ; nous, Russes et Fra^ais, nous vous lombarderons 
de terns a autre d'une lettre pour savoir comment vous vous 
portez, ce que vous faites, et puis encore je me flatte aussi 
que je serai un jour votre conducteur a St.-Petersbourg, ou 
vous devez, Madame, venir jouir quelques moments des grandes 
qualites de notre famille imperiale, et de 1'estime que porte 
a 1'Amiral toute la Russie. 

Adieu, my dear Lady Codrington ; dans ce moment j'ap- 
prends que PAniiral Malcolm est arrive, je n'ose done plus 
me flatter de vous voir encore. Dieu vous conserve et vous 
donne un heureux voyage. Je vous prie d'etre assuree que 
mon estime et mon amitie pour vous et pour votre chere 
famille ne finira qu'avec ma vie. 


Admiral Heiden and his Russian ships went to Malta 
after the battle of Navarin, to undergo their repairs in 


the English dockyard. This detained them there 
throughout the winter, during which time we had 
frequent intercourse with the Admiral, whose spirited 
character, and frank, open, hearty manners were so 
winning that we all became cordially attached to him. 
Admiral de Rigny shifted his flag into a fresh ship, and 
remained in the Archipelago carrying on the service 
there, while the disabled French ships of course went to 
their own French ports for their repairs after the battle, 
and did not go to Malta at all ; so that we had no 
opportunity of becoming acquainted with the French 
Admiral, as we were with his colleague. In fact, we 
saw him for the first time at Paris in 1831. 

After this agreement to the terms of a treaty on 
August 6, 1828, a Tatar arrived from Constantinople, 
and was supposed to bring orders from the Porte for 
Mehemet Ali not to sanction Ibrahim's quitting the 
Morea. Mehemet Ali now proposed inadmissible con- 
ditions, and in presence of the Consuls of France and 
England, declared he would not sign the Treaty. The 
negotiations appeared to be at an end, and the following 
letter was written for communication to the Pacha. 

From Sir Edward Codrington to Consul Barker. 

H.M.S. 'Asia/ off Alexandria: August 8, 1828. 
SIR, It appears by the contents of your letter of yesterday 
that His Highness the Pacha is not disposed to fulfil the 
engagement into which he had solemnly entered. If this 
should be his determination he will have to answer for all 
the consequences. In such case it will become my duty in 
the first instance to proclaim it to the Allied Powers, whose 
good opinion he will have forfeited when he may find him- 
self most in need of it ; and it will also be due to myself and 
my colleagues to make known to Ibrahim Pacha and his 
army, that whilst the Allies had offered to make considerable 
sacrifices to save them from destruction, Mehemet Ali him- 
self, by the breach of an agreement in which I assented to 
all he required, consigned them to their miserable fate. 
Since the Pacha has not thought proper to assign any reason 
for this change, I am left to conclude that it originates in 
his own free will; and it is therefore needless to enter upon 
thg subject of Monsieur Drovetti's discussion with him. 


Should His Highness have taken fresh alarm at the effect 
which this measure might have upon the Porte, he should 
recollect that he has virtually given that offence already, 
and that by breaking the engagement made in the presence 
of competent witnesses, he* will thereby sacrifice that honor 
upon which he values himself, and lose all claim whatever 
on the support of the Allied Powers, whenever their differ- 
ences with the Sultan may come to be arranged. 

I have now only to beg you will demand a categorical 
answer as to whether His Highness has decided on this line 
of conduct or not. And you will be pleased to guide your- 
self accordingly in giving the consuls and merchants the 
information which may enable them to act as they think 
best under the circumstances. 

I shall not attempt to prescribe any line of conduct to you 
personally in ease of a termination of all amicable intercourse 
with the Pacha. But I shall direct the officer who may be 
left in command off this port, and whatever may be the 
exigencies to which the Pacha may be driven, to receive 
from him none but written communications. 

I beg you will take the proper means of making the con- 
tents of this letter known to the Pacha without the least 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. C. to Lady C. 

Off Alexandria : August 5. 

I have received within this last half-hour copies of De 
Rigny's new instructions, which are similar to those given to 
Malcolm ; and they alone bear me out by being in substance, 
to do all that I have done without them ; and the main object 
described in them is that which I am now probably about to 
perform in defiance, as it were, of Lord Aberdeen's despatch ; 
for he, by an incorrect quotation, makes the instruction of 
October 16, absolute in directing me ' to concert with the Com- 
manders of the Allied Powers, the most effectual means of 
preventing any movements by sea on the parts of the Turkish 
or Egyptian forces ; ' denying what is clear as day, that that 
passage meant c proceeding from one port in Greece to 
another, each in their own hands, for the purpose of hostility.' 
But it would clear me of all his feeble attack, if I were merely 
to place the true against his incorrect quotations. I dare say 

gi r _ expects me to ask for a court-martial. Shallow 

Buckingham ! He would select my charge, and 


would have the pleasure of wording it so as to shut out all 
my defence. No, no ; I shall not be caught that way, nor, as 
I trust, by such people at any time. 

August 7. 

Yesterday I had my conference with Mehemet Ali, and I 
thought the whole affair was settled. But in the evening he 
advanced a condition to the consuls who had to draw up the 
Protocol, to which I have refused my assent, and there the 
matter rests until I hear again. This is very harassing to 
one who is as anxious as I am, and who sat up late to say 
how smoothly all was settled, both to Heiden and De Bigny, 
as well as to Adam and Spencer. 

10. P.M. 

I have no answer to the negative I gave this morning, but 
the Pacha is hastening his ships as much as possible, 
and this looks very like knocking under. It would, 
however, have better suited me to have the certainty to lie 
down with, for it is a very anxious moment, although by my 
having got De Bigny's new instructions, 6 which are the same 
as those to his two colleagues,' I know that Malcolm must pur- 
sue the operation. Those instructions themselves sanction 
all my measures, and therefore help to strengthen my case. 
In case of Malcolm's not being come, it might still be worth 
your while to come out if the (General's) yacht could still be 
spared. But it is impossible for me to give you more ' precise 
orders ; ' and I can only promise not to supersede you for 
mis-conceiving your instructions ! Good night. 

A letter from Mr. Consul Barker, of Aug. 8, 1828, 
describes an interview with the Pacha on presenting the 
translation of the letter from Sir E. C. ; and after dis- 
cussion, the Pacha agreed to propose a limit of 1,200 
men being left to garrison the five fortresses in the 
Morea, saying at the last, ' Were you to see the letters 
I receive from the Porte you would pity me.' 

From Sir E. C. to Mr. Consul Barker, Alexandria. 

'Asia,' off Alexandria : August 9, 1828. 

In consideration of the delicate situation which His Highness 
the Pacha is placed in with the Porte, I shall consent to the 
additional article in your letter. But as I am now making 
further sacrifice to the honor of the Pacha, I must claim his 


directions that he will order a detachment of his vessels now 
ready, to come out of the port immediately ; that I may be 
enabled to give to my colleagues that proof of his good faith 
in the transaction. 

I have, &c., 


From Mr. Consul Barker to Sir E. G. 

Alexandria : August 9, 1828. 7 A.M. 

SIR, I think it right to lose no time in informing Your 
Excellenc} 1 - that Monsieur Drovetti has this instant called 
upon me to communicate to me a letter, which he received 
this morning from Mr. Boghos, saying that before forwarding 
my report to Your Excellency it was proper to remind him 
to insert, as agreed upon last night, in the article relating to 
the Greek slaves in the Morea that none should be prevented 
from coming here who had embraced the Mahomedan faith. 
Not a word to such purpose having been promised last night, 
nor at any former period of the negotiations, Monsieur Drovetti 
replied that if this were brought forward to put an end to 
them, or in order to gain time, such a proceeding was dis- 
graceful to him, or his master. 

I have, &c., 


Sir E. 0. to Mr. Consul Barker, Alexandria. 
H.M.S. 'Asia/ off Alexandria : August 9, 1828. 10.30 A.M. 
SIR, I have this instant received your letter, dated seven 
o'clock this morning. My answer is, that I will admit of no 
alteration whatever to the terms which I agreed to an hour 
ago and sent by Captain Richards. That agreement declares, 
that no Greeks desiring to come away shall be prevented ; 
and I consider the Pacha as bound in honour to ratify that 
agreement without loss of time. I need not remind him of 
the consequences of offering insults to the Allied Powers, 
of whom I am the representative in this transaction. 

I have, &c., 


From Sir E. C. to Sir Frederick Adam. 

August 9, 1828. 

The Pacha desired to have the additional article separate, 
that he might humbug the Sultan with the other. In fact, 
VOL. H. D D 


I doubt any Egyptians being left at all, and Tornese being 
included is, as you know, mere deception. Capodistrias can- 
not do better than keep the fortresses in the hands of such a 
number of Turks as he can just confine within them, allow- 
ing them to buy a limited proportion of provisions to keep 
them going until he can provide means to keep them going 
himself. This Pacha has said nothing about provisions, with 
the view, as I can see, of stocking the places to any extent 
he likes ; but my colleagues and myself talked that matter 
over beforehand, and he will be met on that ground at 

Sir E.G. wrote from Alexandria an official account of the 
terras of the Treaty for the information of his successor, 
Sir Pulteney Malcolm, adding, 4 As my presence is con- 
sidered to be material to the execution, I propose 
remaining here to see it fulfilled, after which I shall 
join your flag as speedily as possible/ 

Sir E. C. to Vice-Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm. 

< Asia/ off Alexandria : August 8, 1828. 

MY DEAR MALCOLM, My public letter will explain my 
present position. This man is no more to be trusted than 
his adopted son, and a trifle would turn the scale whether 
he is to let his army starve to death or put his own neck in 
jeopardy for bringing them away. As I expect it to be de- 
cided to-morrow morning, I feel disposed to keep the ' Mos- 
quito ' until then. The business in which I am engaged here 
is not a very agreeable one, I assure you, and I shall be very 
glad to have it over and to join you as soon as possible. 
Many thanks for your kind offer to meet my wishes. As 
they centre in an ardent desire to find myself in England, 
I shall be glad to deliver up my charge to you as soon as it 
can be effected. Had I had any preparatory hint of the in- 
tentions of the Ministers before I quitted Malta in the expec- 
tation of being absent all the summer and autumn, I could 
have had this ship ready for you. 

Believe me, &c., 


August 9, half-past 10 ; A.M. 

I gave my assent this morning to the additional stipu- 
lations required by the Pacha, from a conviction that they 
would not affect the cause and that they were put forth 


merely to pacify the Sultan. I have this minute received a 
fresh demand, to which I have given a direct negative, 
and shall keep the f Mosquito ' for the result. If it be that 
the agreement of this morning remains unaltered and to be 
carried into effect, I shall send the public letters I hare 
written to you and to Sir F. Adam as they are at present. 

Sunday, August 10. 

I have now got the Pacha's signet in return. He wishes 
to see me again. I answer, whenever a large detachment of 
his fleet is outside which I am assured will be to-morrow ; 
and you may rely upon my turning my back upon this place 
as soon as I can. 

Sir E. 0. to Lady C. 

1 Asia/ August 9. 1828. 

Yesterday the 'Mosquito' brought me Malcolm's announce- 
ment of his being on his way to Navarin. I shall not, how- 
ever, quit this place until the negotiation may be quite 
broken off, or the ships to form the first detachment are 
outside the harbour. I think being subjected to a week 
more of this Pacha's tergiversations would destroy five years 
of a strong man's life. This morning, an hour after I had 
agreed to his last somewhat reduced proposals, out comes 
something now to which I have put a direct negative, and 
have declared I will hear nothing more than the fulfilment 
of the above agreement. 

9, P.M. 

I signed my part this evening, and the Pacha's counter- 
part signed by him is to come off to-morrow morning early, 
followed by some of the vessels, which are to anchor along- 
side us. Eobb will be able to tell you what he sees, and I 
shall send a duplicate of my letter to the Admiralty and of 
the agreement, through Ponsonby officially, by which means 
you will know more than I can write. I have now got 
Curzon, Will, Hal, Captain Airey, besides Dyer and his 
clerks, all at work. I fear my more full defence, after a 
closer examination of all the papers, which Will and T have 
been concocting, will not be ready. I am satisfied that I 
have disproved every insinuation contained in Lord Aber- 
deen's despatch on my supersession. Whenever I have a 
considerable number of these fellows outside and under our 
control, I shall push for Navarin to join Malcolm. I know 
not if he mean to bundle me out at sea or not ; but I know 
that it will be a very awkward quantity of things to turn out 
at sea into a strange ship not prepared to receive them. 

D D2 


Sunday night, August 10. 10, P.M. 

I feel lighter than I have done lately. 
I have finished my defence I have got the Pacha's signet 
and I have seen two of his vessels outside. 

Monday, 11. 

There seems to be a general movement amongst my friends 
in the harbour, and I may, therefore, say there is now no 
doubt of the execution of the measure for which you have 
been so anxious. This might of itself be considered as a 
sufficient answer to the alleged inattention to my orders. 
Lord Aberdeen's quotation in the extract I put up for Pon- 
sonby, is the basest thing possible. Out of a paragraph 
composed of two sentences, the one being the condition of 
the other, he not only leaves out the condition which an in- 
accurate examiner might by possibility overlook, but he 
excludes three words beginning the very sentence he quotes, 
by which and by which alone its meaning can be perverted.* 
We have endeavoured to avoid using offensive language, but 
the facts are so strong, so directly opposite to His Lordship's 
imputations, that there will unavoidably be an appearance of 
rudeness in the contradictions. 

August 11. 4, P.M. 

I am just returned from a take leave of the Pacha ; four- 
teen of his vessels are outside, and I therefore send Eobb off. 

God bless you. 

E. C. 

Sir E. C. to Mr. Consul Bar Jeer 9 Alexandria. 

' Asia,' off Alexandria : August 10, 1828. 

SIE, I have to signify to you my authority for having a 
vessel to convey to Greece such slaves as His Highness the 
Pacha of Egypt may order to be delivered over to you, in 
virtue of the Treaty which has been entered into. And, as it 
appears that these slaves are in a very destitute condition, 

* This refers to the paragraph in Lord Aberdeen's letter of recall. 

The Instructions of 16th October, 1827, say : ' He will concert with the 
Greek authorities, that the whole of their naval force shall be exclusively 
appropriated to the blockade of the ports of Greece, now occupied by the 
Turkish or Egyptian forces. 

' In that case, he will not restrain the Greek naval forces from exercising 1 , 
in respect to neutrals attempting to break the blockade, all the rights of a 

The three words ' In that case ' are omitted by Lord Aberdeen : thus 
giving the impression that the Greeks were not to be restrained at all in 
their belligerent rights, whereas this right was to depend upon the whole of 
their naval force being occupied in blockading the ports of Greece. W.J.C. 


you will furnish them with such clothing as th